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Yi Xiaozhun: China Shouldn’t Be Asked to Shoulder Responsibility for Developed Countries

According to an article that Xinhua published, China’s Vice Minister of Finance Yi Xiaozhun said on September 14 that China is willing to provide certain aid to other developing countries under the framework of South-South cooperation, but it is different from the aid between North-South countries. It is not fair to ask China to assume the responsibility that developed countries should take. Yi released the information just before Premier Wen Jiabao was about to visit other countries.

Given this background, China will encourage enterprises to invest in and open markets in developing countries.

Source:
Xinhua, September, 14, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-09/14/c_13494963.htm

80 Major Leaders around the World Attended Professional Associations Conference

Xinhua reported from the State Council’s Oversea Chinese Affairs Office that the Fourth Assembly of the Chairmen of Overseas Professional Associations took place in Wuhan on September 14. More than 80 major leaders of overseas professional associations from 12 countries such as the U.S., Canada, the U.K., France, Australia, and Japan attended the assembly.

The State Council’s Oversea Chinese Affairs Office has organized such conferences since 2005. So far, more than 240 leaders from around 200 professional associations around the world have attended the conferences. They are from various areas of expertise, including biopharmaceuticals, information, environment and energy, medicine, transportation, finance and trade.

Source:
The United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee, September, 15, 2010
http://www.zytzb.cn/09/newscenter/benwang/201009/t20100915_679681.html

How the Chinese Communist Regime Does Grass-Roots Management

Large-scale social unrest in China has been on the rise in recent years. The upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympic Games has become a rallying point for issues of social discontent. To deal with social unrest in both urban and rural areas, the Communist regime is focusing on one aspect of Chinese society — a special grass-roots organization — the Community Neighborhood Committee. These community committees are unique to China. On the surface, they are non-governmental organizations, but the staff is on the government payroll. These committees exist everywhere and form a dense network of control, working for the local police and governments. On February 16, 2008, the official journal of the CCP Central Committee Qiushi published an article entitled “Grass-roots is the focus of social management and supervision.”[1] The author is a member of Standing Committee of Anhui Provincial CCP Committee and Secretary of Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs of the Anhui Provincial CCP Committee. [2] Below are excerpts from the article.

Grass-roots is the focus of society’s management and supervision

The 17th National Congress of the CCP raised an important issue: To form a sound grass-roots society management system, using a healthy Party committee’s leadership, responsible government, a coordinated social network, and participation from the public. Anhui Province, when dealing with political and legal work, has focused its work at the grass-roots level in order to dissolve all social conflicts and problems at the grass-roots level, to maximally enhance harmonious factors, and to maximally reduce the unharmonious factors, so as to lay a solid foundation for the construction of a socialistic harmonious society.

I. Promoting the construction of communities, perfecting grass-roots management and a service network

We take the construction of communities as the base for managing society. Advice on Promoting the Construction of Communities on all Fronts was drawn on for the purpose of actively promoting construction of urban communities, and relying on Community’s Neighborhood Committees (CNC). We have constructed 2300 CNC’s covering all the cities and towns in the province. In 2007, we also established 10 pilot rural village communities so as to promote the construction of rural neighborhood communities based on the autonomy of villagers.

We have strengthened the communities’ self-governance function and clarified the CNC’s obligations and its autonomous role. As a result, the government’s administrative management effectively coordinates with residents’ self-governance through CNC’s. The government’s law enforcement interacts with the community’s lawful autonomy. We have strengthened construction of the community management team. By hiring community managerial staff members, implementing the system of certification, and improving staffer’s welfare, we have built a steadfast community management.
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II. Perfect social organizations and enhance their service functions

Taking the management of social organizations as an important issue of strengthening the grass-roots work, we have issued Suggestions on further strengthening the management of civil social organizations, so as to guide and regulate the healthy development of non-governmental organizations. In Anhui province there are more than 10,000 lawfully registered non-governmental organizations, with a total staff of 70,000. These organizations span across the cities and villages, forming a system of non-governmental organizations with extensive coverage and comprehensive categories.

III. Strengthen grass-roots law enforcement, preserve long-term social stability

We take grass-roots enforcement as the focus, and use the construction of a "Peaceful Anhui" as a framework for handling prominent public order and security problems collectively. We implemented a policy focusing on the grass-roots, reinforcing the grass-roots level police force, and promoting an in-depth control system for preventing social unrest and promoting social stability. By organizing all social forces to carry out law enforcement, we managed to maintain continuous stability in the urban and rural areas across the province.

In the process of strengthening grass-roots public security management, we adhere to the policies of combining crackdown with prevention and combining targeted strikes with general supervision. We set up a working mechanism of rapid response, flexible operation, and orderly coordination to guarantee effective security protection and control. We have implemented a responsibility and accountability system. We oppose inaction and chaotic action. We have severely clamped down on various criminal activities, improved the service and management of the migrant population, strengthened the propaganda and education of rule of law to the whole society including young people, and effectively prevented crimes.

IV. Improve the emergency management mechanism and enhance the abilities of the grass-roots level to manage crises and risks

Emergency management is a crucial aspect of managing society. We have made legal regulations such as an Overall Emergency Plan for Unexpected Public Incidents, established an emergency management organization system, and enhanced the ability to prevent and deal with unexpected events. We focused on the counter-emergency planning at the county and township levels, and strengthened guidance of the counter-emergency planning in key work places, important public locations, schools and communities (villages). We strengthened the organization and training of specialized teams for emergency events management; established a working system of unified command, orderly coordination, sensitive response, and efficient operation. We improved the construction of the monitoring and detecting system, established an integrated system of society emergency monitoring, societal mobilization, rapid responsiveness, and high efficiency reaction.
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V. Coordinate various interest groups and properly handle internal conflicts among the people.

We take the coordination of various interest groups and proper handling of various social conflicts, especially any internal conflicts among the people, as the daily work to promote and guarantee grass-roots stability and harmony. We adhere to the principle of "local management and hierarchical responsibility" and "whoever is in charge is responsible," so as to implement the responsibility policy and the policy of accountability at the grass-root level. We improve the case analysis and conflicts resolving system, adhere to the policy of "actively preventing, promptly exposing, effectively controlling and properly resolving," and extensively carry out the survey of public opinions. We also established a people-administration-judiciary trinity mediation system based on the judiciary, in which the departments of public appeals, the courts and public security participate. Thus, we have strived to achieve early investigation, rapid detection, complete control, and proper handling of various conflicts.

Endnotes:
[1] Qiushi,issue 4, 2008
http://www.qsjournal.com.cn/qs/20080216/GB/qs%5E473%5E0%5E19.htm
[2] Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs:Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs (CPLA) is CCP’s (Chinese Communist Party) a functional body in charge of judicial issues. The Central CPLA organizes and leads the work of all judiciary related CCP agencies, guiding the work of CPLA’s at CCP Committees in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government. Top officials at Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Supreme People’s Court ought to report to the Secretary of Central CPLA, who usually is a member or leading member of the CCP Committee in Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and Supreme People’s Court. The establishment of CPLA guarantees the de facto control of the CCP over the judicial branch of the central government.

The Olympics and Politics

First of all, “do not politicize the Olympics” itself is not a tenable statement. There are many requirements for a nation to be able to apply to host the Olympics; from its social condition to its economic situation, from its degree of globalization to its government’s management ability, all of these are subjects that cannot be resolved simply with sports. When China won the right to host the Olympics, the entire nation rejoiced and all agreed that it represented “the rise of the Chinese people.” Can sports, as a single field, cover the meaning behind it all? Because of its history and traditions, being able to host the Olympics has become an honor for the chosen nation. Otherwise there would not be so many nations fighting for it every four years. But how can an honor to a nation be represented just by sports? Back in the days when the U.S.S.R invaded Afghanistan, many western countries refused to attend the Olympics. At that time, the government of China did not step out to uphold “justice” and call for “do not politicize the Olympics.” Why then, when it comes to itself, is it using a different standard?

Secondly, in the several years since China won the right to host the Olympics, the Olympics has become one of the Chinese regime’s most important tasks. It has used the whole nation’s strength to ensure that the Olympics will be carried out successfully. Is sports the only motivation behind all of these actions? China has spent so much. Was all it was aiming for to make China’s track, swimming, and so on, to rank high in the world? In order to ensure the Olympics to be hosted without anything going wrong, the government of China made a black list that forbids 43 types of people from watching this sports gathering; so who is the one politicizing the Olympics? The government of China arranged that the presidents from North Korea and South Korea would sit together in the audience, and also asked the South Korean team to take the train from Soul to Pyongyang, and then take the same train to Beijing with North Korea’s team; who is the one politicizing the Olympics? When all layers of governments in China were required to put “making sure the Olympics goes smoothly” as their main task, is it really that China has made sports the highest objective of its regime? If not, who is the one politicizing the Olympics?

Of course hosting the Olympics is an honor for China. But it is exactly because it is an honor to the Chinese people that, as patriotic Chinese people, we hope that what China shows to the world is a civilized, democratic, thriving, and free nation, not a government that supports genocidal massacres internationally, and then domestically arrests its own people who have different political views. If these were our wills, even if we “politicize” the Olympics, how can we be wrong? Isn’t it true that a nation with improved human rights conditions will be more applauded and supported by the world? The government of China is thinking of every possible way to use the Olympics to make political profits for its reign, and is using the Olympics’ politicizing factors to the maximum degree, while continually saying to others to stop “politicizing the Olympics.” This is not only an action of “allowing officials to set fire but not common people to use lights;” it also exposes the Chinese Communist regime’s duplicity and hypocritical nature.

Endnotes:
[1] Wang Dan was born on Feb 26, 1969 in Beijing. His ancestors were from Heyi, Shandong Province. He was one of the main student leaders at the Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989. Before this democracy movement led by students, he had organized activities to commemorate Hu Yaobang, wrote articles to support democratic groups, and so on. The government of China has arrested him many times.
[2] Radio Free Asia, February 20, 2008
http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/pinglun/2008/02/20/wang_dan/

A List of China’s Princelings and Their Corresponding Posts

On September 7, 2007, Baoxun.com, an overseas Chinese news website, published an updated list of China’s Princelings [1] and their corresponding posts. [2] The Union of Chinese Nationalists (UCN)published the original list. According to its website, UCN firmly believes in the Three Principles of the People [3], opposes despotic dictatorships, defends China’s sovereignty, and opposes the split of national territory.

1. He Guangwei – director-general of the National Tourism Administration (Born 1944; Origin: Huarong, Hunan Province; son of He Changgong, a former vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC))

2. Wang Guangtao – minister of the Ministry of Construction (Born 1943; son of Wang Daohan, a former Shanghai Mayor and a former President of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait)

3. Wang Jingxiang – CEO of the Gangxinxing Corporation (daughter of Wang Daohan)

4. Zhou Xiaochuan – governor of People’s Bank of China (Born January, 1948; Origin: Yixing, Jiangsu Province; son of Zhou Jiannan, a former Minister of Ministry of Machine Building Industry and Ministry of Construction)

5. Lin Yanzhi – Undersecretary of Jilin’s Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (Born April 1948; Origin: Wang Kui, Heilongjiang Province; son of Lin Feng, a former Vice-Chairman of the National People’s Congress)

6. Hu Deping – vice-president of the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce, secretary of the Party Leadership Group and vice-minister of the United Front Work Department, CCCPC (Born November 1942; Origin: Liuyang, Hunan Province; first son of Hu Yaobang, a former general secretary of The CPC Central Committee)

7. Liu Hu –China Resources Standing Committee director and deputy general manager (Hu Yaobang’s second son)

8. An Li – a former Xiamen Vice-Mayor (wife of Hu Deping; daughter of An Ziwen, a former Minister of the Organization Department of the CCCPC)

9. An Min – vice-minister of the Ministry of Commerce (Born April 1945; Origin: Suide, Shaanxi Province; son of An Ziwen, a former Minister of the Organization Department of the CCCPC)
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10. Lou Jiwei – vice-minister of the Minister of Finance (Born December 1950; Origin: Yiwu, Zhejiang Province; brother-in-law of Chen Qingtai, a deputy director and secretary of the Party Leadership Group of Development Research Centre of The State Council)

11. Li Tieying – vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress (Born: September 1936, Origin: Changsha, Hunan Province; first son of Li Weihan, a former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress)

12. Li Tielin – vice-minister of the Standing Committee of Organization Department, CCCPC; director of the State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform; a member of the 16th CCCPC (Born May 1943, youngest son of Li Weihan)

13. Hong Hu – Jilin Province Governor (Born June 1940; Origin: Jinzhai, Anhui Province; son of Hong Xuezhi, a former vice-president of The National Committee of The CPPCC)

14. Hong Bao – vice-commander of the Tianjin Garrison, major general (son of Hong Xuezhi)

15. Liu Xirong – vice secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of The CPC (Born May 1942; Origin: Ruijin, Jiangxi Province; son of Liu Ying, a CPC revolutionary martyr)

16. Teng Jiuming – undersecretary of Chongqing Municipal Committee of the CPC and secretary of the Chongqing Committee for Discipline Inspection (son of Teng Daiyuan, a former vice-chairman of The National Committee of The CPPCC)

17. Su Rongsheng – Beijing Military Region vice-commander, lieutenant general (son of Su Yu, a vice-minister of the Ministry of National Defense, senior general)

18. Qiao Zonghuai – vice minister and a member of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Born July 1944; Origin: Jianhu, Jiangsu Province; son of Qiao Guanhua, a former minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

19. Chen Weilian – vice-president of the National Administrative Academy (oldest daughter of Chen Yun, a former member of the Standing Committee of The Political Bureau of The CPC and a former vice-chairman of the CCCPC)

20. Chen Weili – general manager of the China International Intellectech Corporation (daughter of Chen Yu)

21. Chen Yuan – president of China Development Bank (Origin: Qingpu, Shanghai; oldest son of Chen Yun)
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22. Chen Fang – manager of the Guangdong Zhongshanshiye Corporation (youngest son of Chen Yun)

23. Chen Zhifei –Aerospace Ministry senior engineer (Origin: Xiangxiang, Hunan Province; oldest son of Chen Geng, a senior general and a former vice-minister of the Ministry of National Defense)

24. Chen Zhijian – Chongqing Garrison vice-commander, major general (Origin: Xiangxiang, Hunan Province; second son of Chen Geng)

25. Chen Zhishu – vice-commander of the People’s Liberation Army in Hong Kong, major general (Origin: Xiangxiang, Hunan Province; third son of Chen Geng)

26. Chen Zhiya – secretary-general of the China International Strategy Foundation, Academy of Military Sciences Foreign Military Research Department researcher, major general (Born 1949; Origin: Xiangxiang, Hunan Province; son of Chen Geng)

27. Chen Haosu – president of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (son of Field Marshal Chen Yi)

28. Chen Danhuai – head of the General Armament Department’s Technology Department, major general (son of Chen Yi)

29. Chen Xiaolu – board chairman of the Beijing Standard International Investment Management Corp. (son of Chen Yi, son-in-law of Su Yu)

30. Wang Guangya – vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Plenipotentiary Ambassador to the United Nations (Born March 1950: Origin: Jiangsu Province; son-in-law of Chen Yi)

31. Chen Tonghai – board chairman and general manager of China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Born 1949; Origin: Guanyun, Jiangsu Province; son of Chen Weida, a former secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee of The CPC)

32. Tao Siliang – vice-president and secretary-general of the China Association of Mayors (Born 1941; Origin: Hunan Province; daughter of Tao Zhu, a vice-premier and a former member of Standing Committee of Political Bureau, the CPC Central Committee)

33. He Jiesheng – head of the Academy of Military Sciences Encyclopedia Department, major general (Born November 1935; Origin: Sangzhi, Hunan Province; oldest daughter of He Long, a field marshal and a former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission)
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34. Nie Li – vice-president of the Standing Committee of the China Association of Inventions (Born September 1939; Origin: Chongqing; world’s first female major general; daughter of Field Marshall Nie Rongzhen)

35. Ding Henggao – director-general of China Society of Inertial Technology, academician, senior general; former director of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (Born February, 1931; Origin: Nanjing; son-in-law of Nie Rongzhen)

36. Tan Dongsheng – vice commander of the Guangdong Military Region, lieutenant general (son of Tan Zhenlin, a former senior commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA))

37. Zhang Xiang – vice-commander of the PLA’s Secondary Artillery Unit, lieutenant general (Origin: Sichuan Province; son of senior general and former Vice-Premier Zhang Aiping)

38. Luo Dongjin – deputy Political Commissar of the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Unit, lieutenant general (Born February 1939; Origin: Hengshan, Hunan Province; son of Field Marshal Luo Ronghuan)

39. Li Lun – deputy head of the General Logistics Department, lieutenant general (Origin: Chaohu, Anhui Province; son of Li Rongke, a former vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a former minister of the Ministry of Investigation)

40. Ding Yiping – vice-commanding officer of the Jinan Military Region, commander of the North Sea Fleet, lieutenant general (Born 1955; Origin: Xiangxiang, Hunan Province; son of Ding Qiusheng, founding lieutenant general and a former North Sea Fleet Political Commissar)

41. He Daoquan – vice-president of National Defense University, lieutenant general (Origin: Huarong, Hunan Province; son of He Changgong, vice-president of the Committee of The National Committee of the CPPCC)

42. Zhou Erjun – head of the Political Department of National Defense University, major general (nephew of former Premier Zhou Enlai)

43. Luo Jian – Political Commissar of the Logistics Department of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; major general (son of Luo Ruiqing, a former minister of the Ministry of National Defense and a senior general)

44. Qin Tao – vice-commander of the Beijing Garrison, major general (son of Qin Jiwei, a former member of the State Councilor and a former minister of the Ministry of National Defense)
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45. Yang Jiping – vice-commander of Tianjin Garrison, major general (son of Yang Yong, a former secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPC)

46. Zhang Xiaoyang – president of the PLA Institute of Foreign Languages, major general (Origin: Pingjiang, Hunan; son of Zhang Zhenzhi, a senior general and a former vice-president of Central Military Commission)

47. Zhang Haiyang – political commissar of the Army’s 27th Regiment, major general (son of Zhang Zhen, a former head of the General Logistics Department and a former member of the CCCPC)

48. Zhang Zhengan – chief of the Bureau of Surveying and Mapping, General Staff Department (GSD); major general (nephew of Zhang Zhen)

49. Xu Xiaoyan – chief of the Communication Department of GSD, major general (son of Field Marshal Xu Xiangqian)

50. Ma Guochao – deputy political commissar of the Naval Air Force, major general (son of CPC military hero Ma Benzhai)

51. Feng Hongda – vice-commander of the North Sea Fleet, major general (son of Feng Yuxiang, a military general who first aided Chiang Kai-shek in cleansing the communists, but who later on turned against Chiang and responded to the CPC’s call to join the then newly formed CPPCC)

52. Liu Taixing – head of the Academic Research Department of the PLA Air Force Command College, major general (son of Field Marshall Liu Bocheng)

53. Liu Taichi – vice-head of the Air Force Armament Department, major general (son of Liu Bocheng)

54. Liu Miqun – vice-president of the PLA Air Force Command College (daughter of Liu Bocheng)

55. Yang Junsheng – head of Military Police Armament Department and Technology Development Director, major general (daughter of Yang Chengwu, a former secretary-general of the Central Military Commission)

56. Yang Dongsheng – vice-head of the PLA Second Artillery Armament Department, major general (son of Yang Chengwu)

57. Yang Dongming – Head of the Material and Fuel Department within the PLA General Logistics Department, major general (son of Yang Chengwu)
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58. Wu Shaozu – vice secretary of the Work Committee for offices, directly under the CCCPC, a former State Physical Cultural Administration chief (Born April 1939; Origin: Leiyang, Hunan Province; son of Wu Yunfu, a secretary-general of the Central Military Commission)

59. Li Nanzhen – vice-president of the Shijiazhuan Army Command College, major general (son of Li Desheng, a senior general and a former Vice-Chairman of the CCCPC)

60. Liu Zhuoming – director of the PLA Navy Equipment Demonstration Center, major general (Origin: Dawu, Hubei Province; son of Liu Huaqing, a former vice-chairman of the country)

61. Pan Yue – deputy chief of the State Environmental Protection Administration (son-in-law of Liu Huaqing, a former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission)

62. Xu Yuanchao – vice-head of Nanjing Military Region Armament Department, major general (son of the military general Xu Shiyou)

63. Xu Yanbin – vice-president of Armored Force College (son of Senior General Xu Guangda, a former vice-minister of the Ministry of National Defense)

64. Wan Boao – State Physical Cultural Administration Propaganda Department director, China Sports Magazine director and editor-in-chief (son of Wan Li, a former Chairman of the National People’s Congress)

65. Wan Jifei – chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the China Chamber of International Commerce (Born October 1948; Origin: Dongping, Shandong Province; son of Wan Li, a former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress and a former vice-premier of the State Council)

66. Ye Xuanping – a former vice chairman of the Standing Committee of The National Committee of CPPCC (Born November 1924; Origin: Mei County, Guangdong Province; son of Field Marshal Ye Jianying)

67. Wu Xiaolan – a former vice mayor of Shenzhen, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress (wife of Ye Xanping, granddaughter of CPP Elder Wu Yuzhang)

68. Ye Xinfu – CEO of the Hong Kong Wanxing Corporation (son of Ye Xuanping)

69. Ye Xuanning – a.k.a. Yue Feng; a former head of the Liaison Department of the General Political Department; lieutenant general; chairman of the board of directors and CEO of Kaili Corporation (son of Ye Jianying, a cofounder of the PLA, a former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and a former Minister of the Ministry of National Defense)
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70. Ye Xuanlian – the PLA’s General Staff Department cadre (son of Ye Jianying)

71. Ye Xiangzhen – a.k.a. Ling Zi; film director, currently resides in Hong Kong (daughter of Ye Jianying)

72. Zou Jiahua – vice-premier of the State Council (son-in-law of Ye Jianying)

73. Ye Xuanji – senior official of the People’s Armed Police (nephew of Ye Jianying)

74. Ye Jingzi – CEO of Brilliant Culture (born 1975; granddaughter of Ye Jianying)

75. Fu Rui – former assistant general manager of China National Nuclear Corporation (son of Peng Zhen, a former chairman of the National People’s Congress)

76. Fu Yang – vice president of the All China Lawyers Association, Beijing Kang Da Law Firm senior partner (son of Peng Zhen)

77. Fu Yan – board president of Beijing Fuli Corporation (daughter of Peng Zhen)

78. Jiang Xiaoming – president of the board of directors of the Shenzhen CyberCity Co. Ltd. (son of Qiao Shi, a former chairman of the Standing Committee of the People’s National Congress)

79. Wang Xiaochao – China Poly Group Corporation director and assistant general manager (son-in-law of Yang Shangkun, the fourth Chairman of the PRC)

80. Larry Yung Chi Kin– Citic Pacific chairman, richest man in mainland China (Born 1942; Origin: Jiangsu Province; son of Rong Yiren, former Vice-Chairman of the country)

81. Deng Yingtao – director of the Center for Economic and Cultural Research, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Born September 1952; Origin: Guidong, Hunan Province; son of Deng Liqun, a former head of Publicity Department of the CCCPC)

82. Xie Fei – vice-chairman of the Chinese Film Association and vice president of the Standing Committee of China Movie Directors Association (Born 1942; son of Xie Juezai, a former vice-chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC)

83. Jiang Zehui – president of the Chinese Academy of Forestry (Born February 1938; Origin: Jiangsu Province; younger sister of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin)
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84. Jiang Mianheng – president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (first son of Jiang Zemin)

85. Jiang Miankang -General Political Department Organization Department head, major general (Born 1957; Origin: Jiangsu Province; youngest son of Jiang Zemin)

86. Li Xiaopeng – board chairman and general manager of China Huaneng Group, assistant general manager of the State Grid Corporation of China, nicknamed King of Asian Electricity (Born 1959; son of Li Peng, the fourth PRC State Council Premier)

87. Li Xiaolin – executive director and general manager of China Power International Development Limited (daughter of Li Peng)

88. Zhu Yunlai – CEO and director of China International Capital Corporation Limited (son of former Premier Zhu Rongji)

89. Zhu Yanlai –general manager of the Development Planning Department, Bank of China (Hong Kong) (daughter of Zhu Rongji)

90. Wen Yunsong – CEO of Unihub Corp., Beijing (son of Premier Wen Jiabao)

91. Xu Ming – ECO of Dailian Shide Group, ranked 15th richest man in China in 2003, ranked 12th in Chinese Forbes (son-in-law of Wen Jiabao)

Endnotes:
[1] Crown Prince Party (太子党) or The Princelings, are the descendants (usually in the second-generation) of prominent and influential senior communists of the People’s Republic of China. It is not a political party, but an informal, and often derogatory, appellation to describe those benefiting from nepotism and cronyism. Although some of them are good citizens and keep a low profile, many of them are perceived to be arrogant and undeserving of the fortune or the prominence they hold. By utilizing their fathers’ privileges, they often place themselves above the law and foster the spread of corruption.
[2] Baoxun.com, September 7, 2007 http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/party/2007/09/200709072012.shtml
[3] Three Principles of the People was a political philosophy developed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They include Government of the People, Government by the People, and the Welfare of the People. By Government of the People, Sun meant freedom from imperialist domination. To achieve this he believed that China must develop a "civic-nationalism" as opposed to an "ethnic-nationalism," so as to unite all of the different ethnicities of China. To Sun, Government of the People represented a Western constitutional government, with the National Assembly representing people’s political wishes and the administrative power carried out in a five-branch government. Sun understood People’s Welfare as an industrial economy and equality of land holdings for the Chinese peasants.

A Lower Domestic Standard for Consumption Goods?

For a long period of time, although merchandize made in China has frequently been recalled in other countries, China’s domestic merchandize has seldom been recalled due to poor quality. Not only does China lack the disciplinary mechanism to recall poor quality products, except drugs; China’s merchandize for domestic consumption usually has a safety standard that is lower than international norms. The following is a translation of the report from Voice of America. [1]

The Quality of Merchandize for Domestic Consumption in China is Lower Than Exported Merchandize

By Sun Feng
January 9, 2008

Although we have seen that outside of China, Chinese made products have frequently been recalled due to poor quality, China’s domestic merchandize seldom faces similar problems. Not only does China lack the disciplinary mechanism to recall poor quality products; China’s merchandize for domestic consumption usually has a safety standard that is lower than international norms.

In May and June of 2007, many countries announced the recall of tainted toothpaste made in China, because it contained the poisonous chemical diethylene glycol (DEG). The very same toothpaste has never been removed from China’s merchandize shelves.

In June of 2007, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration released a warning that toothpaste imported from China contained more than 4% DEG and warned the public not to use toothpaste made in China.

The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, an organization under China’s State Council, issued a public notice in July 2007 forbidding the use of DEG as a toothpaste ingredient, and banning its export. However, it did not ban the sale of toothpaste with DEG within China. To the contrary, the General Administration specified in this same public notice that toothpaste with less than 15.6% DEG would not harm anyone’s health, and that "consumers do not need to worry too much about their health if they have used this type of toothpaste."

For a long period of time, although merchandize made in China has frequently been recalled in other countries, China’s domestic merchandize has seldom been recalled due to poor quality. Not only does China lack the disciplinary mechanism to recall poor quality products, except drugs; China’s merchandize for domestic consumption usually has a safety standard that is lower than international norms.

Take the auto safety evaluation system as an example. The head-to-head collision standard in the U.S. is 56 kilometers per hour, while it is 50 kilometers per hour in China.
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Gao Hongbing, the deputy minister of China’s Ministry of Agriculture admitted on Tuesday that China lagged behind other countries in setting up product standards and that there is still a gap between China and developed countries in this respect.

Wang Hai is the host of Wang Hai Hotline, a "consumers’ rights protection" group. According to Wang, establishing overly low standards for domestic merchandize occurred because no representatives for consumers were present when the standards were drafted.

"Why can’t China’s quality standards be improved?" asked Wang. "The key is, first of all, the standards were set by the leaders of the particular enterprise, with little or no involvement from the general public. In other words, the consumers’ rights protection group has no way to participate in the decision making process. In addition, we have virtually no on to speak for consumer’s interests. In China, there is no organization that truly represents consumers’ interests. The Consumers’ Association is a state-run organization. It can only serve a very limited purpose in protecting consumers. We also lack a third-party inspection organization. The inspection organizations we have are all state-run institutes."

According to Wang Hai, in the battle between consumers and entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurs have considerable resources while consumers have none. The government is usually overly lenient with enterprises, for the sake of economic development. In addition, many of the enterprises are either state-run companies or have government backing. All media outlets are state-run mouthpieces. They do not dare to offend their major advertising clients either.

However, the legal consultant of the Consumer Association of Beijing Qiu Baochang has a different point of view. According to Qiu, it is an inappropriate generalization to say the standards for domestic merchandize are lower and are higher for exports.

"Inside China we have our own standard," Qiu said. "As long as we meet this standard, we do not have any problem selling the product inside China. Of course it remains a question whether China’s domestic standard is the same as those of other countries. Can they ever be exactly the same? I don’t think it is possible to unify the standard, because there are issues like development of the market economy and scientific development."

He also said when drafting the standards the authorities had taken protecting consumers’ interests into consideration.

According to Mao Shoulong, director of the Department of Administration and Management at People’s University, many agricultural produces intended for export are refined goods. They are different from the products for domestic consumption. Although it’s a common belief that the standards for goods for domestic consumption should be improved, he believes that implementing those new standards will encounter many problems.
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Mao said, "For example, many of the companies may be forced out of business. This year, the price of food itself is rising sharply. If we factor in the improvement of the processing technique and other investments, as well as training personnel and the management team, the cost will be high. It will bring a huge change to the market. If we cannot adjust to the change, the price may go up 100%, not just the 5%, 10% or 30% that we are experiencing right now. It may bring about some social problems."

Long Yongtu, the current general secretary of the Boao Forum for Asia, was the leading negotiation representative when China joined the WTO. Long also shared his opinion on this subject. He believed there was no need to have two different standards. "We had no other choice when China was a poor country." Long added, "Now things have changed. Chinese civilians’ well-being is as important as that of foreigners."

Endnote
[1] Voice of America, January 9, 2008
http://www.voanews.com/chinese/w2008-01-09-voa39.cfm

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