Skip to content

Reports - 41. page

The Chinese Military’s Emergency Preparedness Plan

In November 2006, the Central Military Commission authorized and issued a “General Emergency Preparedness Plan” for the armed forces to manage sudden outbreaks. [1]  What worth noting is that the People’s Liberation Army has always been the troop for fighting against the foreigners. The People’s Armed Police are usually in charge of the domestic suppressions. But “the 2006 Emergency Preparedness Plan became the common program for both the PLA and PAP. This document is the guiding principle and standard for the arm forces to respond to various domestic societal conflicts in the two years prior to the Olympic Games. [1] Below is a China News Agency’s report on the promulgation of the document.

The Chinese Military Issued a “General Emergency Preparedness Plan” for the Armed Forces to Direct Sudden Outbreaks

Bejing, China – 18:09, November 14, 2006.  Several days ago, the Central Military Commission (CMC) authorized and implemented  “A General Emergency Preparedness Plan” for the armed forces to control sudden outbreaks. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) are both involved in managing sudden outbreaks with the same guiding principle and standard.

The Emergency Preparedness Plan stipulates that the five major tasks of controling sudden military outbreaks, assisting local social stabilities, handling major terrorists or destructive incidents, joining local disaster relief and handling sudden public security incidents are the basic tasks of military involvement in sudden outbreaks. Under emergency situations, division and regiment level troops and above can skip the lines of communication to report to higher levels directly, and higher levels can also skip the lines of communication to directly command the lower levels. The Emergency Preparedness Plan also stipulates that during initial major outbreaks, the news should be proactively publicized.

Today the official news media quoted the person in charge of the office of military-handling-sudden-outbreaks leadership group, “The military is a major force in handling sudden domestic outbreaks, and has played an important role in handling
various sudden outbreaks. The Emergency Preparedness Plan absorbed lessons learned from decades of experience in handling sudden outbreaks and referenced related foreign military laws and regulations. It has strong operational qualities and applicability, and will make the operational procedures clearer, more prompt, more obvious in results; it can effectively upgrade the military’s ability to handle sudden outbreaks.

This person in charge stated that the Emergency Preparedness Plan is an important component of the country’s general emergency response preparedness plan. It has, for the first time, regulated military involvement in government-organized operations. In the past, when the military was involved in local disaster relief and rescue operations, there were no related laws, policies or regulations; therefore, coordinations and links were relatively poor. The Emergency Preparedness Plan provides an effective basis for military involvement in handling major sudden outbreaks. It also formulated the military’s functional tasks into several preparedness plans that can be either carried out alone or as a whole.
This responsible person mentioned that when it comes to critical moments, involving a country’s sovereignty and the safety of people’s lives and properties, cutting the middle links will enable the military respond more rapidly to sudden outbreaks. In addition, during major outbreaks, military leaders in the regions of the outbreak can also “pre-handle” the outbreak; that is, reporting while handling. This way, it can minimize the losses to people’s lives and property, to public security, etc. caused by the sudden outbreak. It is also a necessity for a human-based [2], harmonious society.

The Emergency Preparedness Plan stipulates that news should be proactively publicized during initial major outbreaks. This person in charged said that society pays close attention to major sudden outbreaks; therefore, we should release the real situation to the society without delay, using the release of authoritative information to avoid guessing and social panic caused by irresponsible reporting.

[1] China News Services, November 14, 2006
[2] According to Baidu (a popular search engine) Encyclopedia, “The human-based idea is proposed by our Party [after] abandoning the limitations of landlord class, capital-owning class [as] found in the of old philosophical idea of humanism and the defects of historical idealism.” The purpose of proposing human-based scientific development is to have human development uniformly lead the development of economics, social development, so as to align the result of societal development with our Party’s character and aim.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Cadres Learn to Control Media

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has found that the development of the Internet has created a challenge to its rule. The CCP uses its official media to hide the truth. As the truth about Chinese society is exposed on the Internet, the truth that was previously concealed is disclosed piece by piece. The publication of the truth is what the CCP most fears, as it directly challenges the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime. When the CCP strives hard to block the Internet, officials face the difficulty of dealing with the Internet media. The upcoming Olympic Games will attract tens of thousands of Western reporters into China, forcing the CCP to consider how to use more refined and more subtle means of media manipulation to control media and public opinion in order to continue to cover up the truth. With regard to the recent events in Tibet, the official media dealt with it by launching a media campaign to incite civil national resentment against the West, thus creating a new situation. Below is the translation of an article by the Central Party School titled “Urgently enhance the ability of leading cadres to deal with the media.” [1]
Urgently Enhance the Cadres’ Ability to Deal with the Media

General Secretary Hu Jintao recently pointed out in a national propaganda ideological work conference, “At every level, the leading cadres should fully realize the importance of news and public opinion, be good at promoting practical work through news propaganda, enthusiastically support the news media’s interviews and reports, correctly manage public opinion, and enhance their ability to deal with the media.” This requires all levels of the leading cadres to enhance their own abilities to deal with the news, be good at promotion work using the media, and use the media as the CCP and the government’s important ruling tool.


Along with the development of our country’s market economy and its reform and open policy, the style of how the government manages society has changed from administrative management to public management. In public administration, the media has become more and more important. It is an important social strength that influences the country’s politics, economy, and many aspects of society, while presenting a new characteristic that is different from the media under the traditional system.

The media is the means for disseminating information. It provides information to the public about world developments in order to meet society’s information needs. The government collects the information about social situations and public opinion through media, transmits the information, and mobilizes and organizes society.

The media is a society’s early warning tool. Using its antennas that spread through the entire society, the media frequently monitors society for the slightest sign of trouble and promptly informs the public. It has become modern society’s true watchdog.
The media is the main foundation of public administration. Although the media does not have a superintendent status equal to the government’s, it is an important coordination entity and constitutes a multi-dimensional society management structure with the government, for citizens, and other non-government public organizations.

The media is the government’s inspector general. It represents the public, monitors the government’s rights, lowers costs and increases efficiency. It plays a vital non-replaceable role in enhancing government’s work efficiency, revealing society’s failings, and purifying the party’s cadre troop.

The media is a market competitor. Under the operation pattern of the enterprise commercialization management, the media not only undertakes the mouthpiece function, but also positively participates in the market competition to survive and develop. The media has become an inseparable part from the country’s market economy, and its industrial characteristic is revealed day by day.

The media is a platform for public participation in the government and deliberation over government affairs. In the course of our country’s  advancement in the democratization of politics, the public’s consciousness is enhanced through public participation in government and through deliberation over government affairs. However, the ability of individual opinion expression and intervention in politics is limited. The media provides the public with a platform for the exchange of information and for public discussion, and advances the transparency and publicity of public policy formulation, execution, and revision.

The media is a gambling stage for social benefits. It plays the important roles of communication, coordination, and the maintenance function in the social structural balance. Whoever controls the media, controls multitudinous social resources. In order to strive for a bigger leading power in public administration, each kind of social strength often carries public relations, contention, and the capture of word power to gain more supporting strength. Therefore, media becomes a battlefield for the benefit of all parties.

Along with the evolution of the media’s nature, status, and function, the relationship between the government and media has changed dramatically. The government is facing more and more of a media challenge.

The way media has developed has broken the management pattern. The central committee, the provinces, and propaganda media from outside of China all compete for the local media market. This creates a multi-structured and complex administrative subordination relationship for the media. The local party committee government does not have a subordinate relationship with the media, and cannot manage these media by administrative leadership; it should instead consider doing crosswise coordination.
Media marketing increases the difficulty of media management. Survival and development may cause media to neglect the social responsibility that it shoulders. Its drive for economic profit, may cause it to curry the world’s favor, use vulgar content to attack the “eyeball,” and even appear deviant in its guidance. It is a stern challenge to the party’s control of the media and of public opinion.

The development of networks has affected traditional methods of managing the media. Before the networks appeared, traditional news management was very effective. A propaganda department instruction could get media not to report or print details about an event. But the appearance of networks enables every network user to become a free information disseminator, and the propaganda department is unable to carry on the instruction-like management that it did in the past.

Media supervision of public opinion is a test of government management. The supervision of public opinion is an obligation of social development, the responsibility of news work, people’s hope, and a method for the party and government’s work to improve. The news media plays a bigger and bigger role in the government’s monitoring public opinion, yet the environment becomes more and more loose. The government not only is the media superintendent, also is the object of media surveillance. The government must learn how to do its work under this media surveillance.

Overseas media coming to the Olympic Games brings a new challenge. It is estimated that 30,000 overseas reporters will come to Beijing during the Olympic Games. Their interviews will not be limited to the Olympic Game’s content, and may involve every aspect of our government work and social life. All levels of government can continue to use the traditional management norms to deal with the overseas media, but they must follow international conventions, do well at receiving, servicing, and welcoming the overseas media, and must demonstrate a new image of China’s democracy, opening, civilization, and progress.

Obviously, the government and media relationship has undergone a big change. Managing and being managed can no long reflect their relationship. The media has, more and more, challenged the government. All levels of the party committees and governments must transform their thoughts, improve their methods, and face the new challenge brought about by the new media environment.

The development of the Internet has challenged CCP rule. The CCP’s official media is used mainly to cover the truth. When the truth about Chinese society is exposed on the Internet, the previously concealed truth is disclosed little by little. The publication of the truth is what the CCP is most afraid of, as it directly challenges the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime. When the CCP strives hard to block the Internet, officials at various levels are stuck in the plight of facing the media on the Internet. The upcoming Olympic Games will attract tens of thousands of Western reporters into China, forcing the CCP to consider how to use more refined and more subtle means of media manipulation to control the media and public opinion in order to continue to cover up the truth. On the recent events in Tibet, the official media launched a media campaign to incite civil national sentiments against the West. It appeared to be an exercise in how to deal with the new situation. Below is the translation of an article by the Central Party School titled “Urgently enhance the ability of leading cadres to deal with the media.” [1] {mospagebreak}

As the relationship between the government and the media is changing, the leading cadres are no longer able to deal with media using conventional ways of thinking and management. They should fully recognize the importance of the media, straighten out their relationship with the media, and consistently enhance their ability to deal with the media through practice. To learn to deal with the media, one should focus on the following six aspects.

The first is to take a new look at the media. As society has developed, the media has undergone a great change. The transformation of society and the government has made the position and role of media in social management more prominent. Development pattern requires the media to positively promote the building of a harmonious society. The ruling party has raised the requirements for governing the media, as it is the mouthpiece of the party, the government and the people; it is the main channel for transmitting information in society; it is the reflection of public opinion; it represents a wealth of knowledge, culture and values; it is an important resource and tool for the government’s public management; it guards community supervision; it is the people’s entertainment venue; and it is the backbone of the cultural industry and the bridge for the dissemination of Chinese culture.

The second is to attach great importance to the media. To promote a positive constructive role for the media is a critical step for building the party and the government’s ability to govern. We must firmly establish a sense of urgency and get control of the media; we need to have a strong sense of responsibility as the vast embankment could be destroyed by an ants’ hole; we should enhance our awareness, and our ability and level to deal with media.

The third is to be good at taking advantage of media. It is essential to plan and to use the media as positive propaganda; to supervise and to the use media to monitor public opinion; to emphasize public opinion and to use the media for the government’s decisions and investigations; and to design and to use the media to shape the government’s image.

The fourth is to actively guide the media: through the news agenda to actively guide media reporters; to use news conferences to feed information to reporters; to use news planning to prepare the reporters with prior policy explanation; to timely share the first draft with reporters when dealing with sudden events; to transmit transpositional thinking to reporters through horizontal communication; to use incentives to encourage the media to promote the theme of the times.

The fifth is to learn to treat the media kindly. The news media and propaganda are connected, but are also different. We should not simply control news in the same way as managing propaganda. Government and the media should mutually understand and cooperate to seek mutual benefits. The government should learn to tolerate public opinion, support monitoring the media and tolerate the inevitable inaccuracies in media supervision and monitoring. The government should foster a sense of service, in order to provide the media with sources of information, policy support, logistical support and other services to create conditions for the mainstream media to produce big and strong reports.
The sixth is to seriously study the media. Nowadays the relationship between the government and the media is becoming more and more complicated. The government should not only strengthen how it governs the media, but also accept supervision of the media; it should not only be aware of public opinion and social conditions through the media, but also firmly grasp the guiding role on public opinion; it should not only use the media as a tool of the government, but also provide service to the media; it should not only respect the news freedom of the media, but also prevent the media’s power from becoming alienated; it should not only promote the development of the media as an industry, but also avoid the tendency toward mediocrity that the market brings about; it should not only interview foreign media, but also seize the right to speak among world public opinion. To properly handle the relationship between the government and the media, we must seriously study the media, master the media’s laws, and be good at dealing with challenges. Thus we will truly establish a benign interaction and mutually-beneficial collaboration with the media.


The former English Prime Minister, Tony Blair said, “Most of our work today, except the most central decision-making issues, involves dealing with the media, whether measured by importance, time or by energy.” The US professor Bennett said, “In modern times, dealing with media relations has been transformed from an original art that can be managed by personal talents to a science that requires skillfully trained specialists to handle.” To correctly grasp the methods and techniques of dealing with media has become the indispensable nutrient for government officials in the world to engage in public management. On their first day of entering politics, the politicians and officials from Western countries started their course of dealing with the media. They know that winning the media is winning the votes. From participating in an election to the end of their duties, dealing with media is an important part of their political life, and is a skill that they appear to have been born with. For a long period of time, the media in our country has been an extension of the political structure, such that the government can direct the media just by using an executive order. Thus there has not been an issue of dealing with media. Therefore in previous training of cadres, there were no courses to teach the leaders and cadres how to deal with the media, nor was there a discipline to provide this kind of training. There was no media-related content in public management courses; nor did Journalism teach how to be an editor or a reporter. These are important reasons that the party and government officials of different ranks demonstrate a critical lack of ability when dealing with the media.

At present, as the voice for open government information gets higher and higher, press release work is attracting more and more attention. The theory training in how a news spokesperson practices professional skills has gradually improved. However, it has not yet been able to train all leaders and cadres on their ability to deal with news media. With the ever-increasing influence of the media, to generally raise the ability of leaders and cadres to deal with media has become an important project to enhance the party and the government’s ability to govern.
First, we must deepen and universalize "Government Journalism" academically. “Government Journalism” is a cross-discipline between public relations and journalism. It starts with the laws of public management and dissemination of the media, to study how contemporary government consciously and effectively promotes the important role of the media in building a harmonious society. As the media rapidly develops, as the public requirement for information increases, and as management targets and the content of the government changes its way of dealing with new situations and new problems in dealing with media, it is necessary to deepen and improve the theoretical and practical research of “Government Journalism,” to include "Government Journalism" in the content of the training of cadres, and to popularize and promote the concepts and literacy of "Government Journalism," so that government officials at all levels will fully understand the importance and urgency of news governance, and thereby comprehensively upgrade their capacity and level of dealing with the media.
The second is simulated training with the scenario of dealing with the media in a targeted manner. The purpose of raising news literacy is to eventually use it in dealing with the media. Thus, through the method of training in specific cases and scenarios, the leaders and cadres put themselves in the positions of spokesmen to handle unexpected events, and set the government news agenda. Thereby they will experience the importance of the media, grasp the characteristics of the media, and learn the methods of dealing with the media.

Third, we should make raising the quality of news literacy an important item in selecting and testing leading cadres. We should establish a mechanism of positively communicating with the media, and actively using the media to initiate work; enhance the enthusiasm and motivation of the leading cadres in interacting with media; and increase their opportunity to interact with the media. Thus, dealing with the media will become an important part of the work, and they will constantly enrich their experience and capacity in dealing with the media. (The author is a standing committee member of the CPC Nanjing Municipal Party Committee and the director of the Propaganda Department).

[1] Chinese Communist Party Central School, April 11, 2008.

China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force (Part II)

Editor’s Note: Published in New York, “Beijing Spring” is a Chinese monthly magazine founded in June, 1993. Its goal is to promote human rights, democracy and social justice in China. In September 2006, Mr. Lu Gengsong wrote an article titled “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force,” which gives a detailed analysis of China’s police system. Mr. Lu, a member of China’s Democratic Party in Zhejiang Province, has written a number of articles to examine China’s political system as a freelance writer. In August 2007, Public Security Bureau in Hangzhou City (capital city of Zhejiang Province) arrested him. In January 2008, local procuratorial authorities accused him of “inciting the subversion of state power.” The following is the translation of Mr. Lu’s article “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force.” [1]

Part II

Not a Typical Army but Similar to an Army; Not a Typical Police Force but more than a Police Force

The PAP used to be treated as “auxiliary division” within China’s military system. However, after Jiang Zemin took office, this “auxiliary division” became the “normal division”. Over the time, the size of the PAP grew larger and larger; the equipments became more and more sophisticated; the official perks it enjoyed got better and better. It almost became “The Central Army” or “The Privileged Core”. In 1988, when the military ranks were initially assigned, Commander of the PAP at Headquarters(HQ) level Li Lianxiu was Lieutenant General, and the Political Commissar Zhang Xiufu was Major General. The Commanders and Political Commissars of the PAP Corps under the PAP HQ were Senior Colonels or Colonels. Now, the ranks of the Commanders and the Political Commissars of the PAP at HQ level are all Generals while the ranks of the Commanders and the Political Commissars of the PAP Corps at levels of Province, Autonomous region or major municipality are all Major Generals. And also the ranks of the Directors and Political Commissars of the PAP at commander-in-chief’s office level for Gold Mining Troops, Hydro Power Troops, Forestry Troops, Transportation Troops, Xinjiang Construction Regiment, and Three Georges Dam Project of Yangtze River are all Major Generals. Although the PAP technically is at the Grand Military Region level with a size of 1.5 million people – half of the total PLA force. Expanding the PAP to such a large organization was to satisfy Jiang Zemin’s personal agenda. During his reign, the PAP was turned into his private military force as it was called “Jiang’s Family Army”. Jiang took office with fear after the June 4th Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Without military experience and the prestige like Mao or Deng, he was extremely afraid that the Military would not listen to him and he be out of control. Under the political pretense of “stability supercedes everything”, he kept the PAP under his control. He appointed his confidant Ba Zhongyan (former Commander of Shanghai Garrison) as Chief Commander of the PAP HQ. Meanwhile, Jiang expanded the PAP and turned it into his private army. Jiang’s restructuring of the PAP was based on the following considerations: Firstly, he didn’t have any military power or experience; if difficult to establish his reputation in the military in a short time, it would be better to create a new force as his own private army in promoting his reputation in the military.
Secondly, one of the PAP’s responsibilities was to guard the safety of leaders of the Party and the Central Government. Through the PAP security duties, Jiang could subject other central government leaders under his surveillance. Thirdly, under the international community’s pressure for disarmament, by just converting part of the military force into armed police, he would still be able to keep the same amount of armed force while earning himself the international reputation of the cooperation in disarmament and winning the support from the part of the military that’s been kept. Finally, when the military was used to suppress the Students Movement in 1989, even Deng’s decision was opposed by senior military officials. However, if the PAP were used, it would be by the book, since one of the main duties of the PAP is to suppress domestic rebellions.

When Jiang was restructuring the PAP, he had another intention: to contain the PLA. Albeit Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), he had never led troops in a war, so he had to worry about the possible situation when the military turns back against him. If there was a riot and face-to-face fight, the PAP, equipped with short-range weapons and martial arts, had a natural advantage over the PLA that were only good at long-range weapons. In 1992, it was reported that the Ministry of National Security acquired an intelligence report for the White House from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The report said that after Deng’s death, Chinese communist regime would face a great threat. If any incident like June 4th Tiananmen Students Movement in 1989 happened again, the Chinese Communist Party would lose its power for sure. In the report CIA concluded that Deng’s death would signify the end of the CCP’s ruling by military strongmen who believed in “political power from the gun”. Under such situation, if any incident like June 4th Tiananmen Students Movement in 1989 should happen again, the Chinese leaders would not have the abilities or the guts to order the military to suppress people, let alone, with group leadership, for all top leaders of the CCP to agree on such a matter unanimously. As long as one or two leaders should disagree, the CCP would fall apart. In other words, the CCP’s power was maintained by its military forces. When it suddenly lost its powerful leader with guts and ability to marshal the military forces, the consequence would be inconceivable. This was what Jiang feared the most. Therefore, with strategies from Zeng Qinghong and other advisors, Jiang started to get into the PAP business and the business went “better and better”.

The PAP was formally created in 1983. During its first 20 years, its name, structure and designation had not changed much. In October of 1996, the CMC converted 14 PLA infantry divisions to be part of the PAP, directly under the leadership of the PAP HQ as the mobile division of the PAP [Internal] Security Troops.  In the beginning of 1999, the PAP specialty troops that previously reported to various state ministries – the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops, the Transportation Troops and the Forestry Troops – were completely changed to the direct leadership of the PAP HQ, creating at the HQ level the PAP Forestry Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Hydro Power Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Transportation Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Gold Mining Commander-in-Chief’s Office and the PAP Xinjiang Production and Construction Regiment Commander-in-Chief’s Office. In the beginning of 20th Century, the PAP Three Gorges Dam Project Commander-in-Chief’s Office was also created.
The PAP system has three major components: the Border Patrol Troops, the Fire Fighting Troops and the Security Troops are under the Public Security system; the Internal Security Troops is under the military system; the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops, the Transportation Troops and the Forestry Troops are under various ministries. The Internal Security Troops, consisting of the PAP corps at the levels of province, autonomous region and provincial-level city, and mobile divisions, is the essential force of the PAP. Different levels of the Internal Security Troops are governed by the local party committees, administrative authorities, and their superiors inside the PAP system. The operation of the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops and the Transportation Troops are managed by the Ministry of Public Security and their related ministries – the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Metallurgy and Ministry of Transportation. The Forestry Troops is subject to dual leadership of mainly the Forestry Ministry system and the Ministry of Public Security system, and also subject to the leadership of both central and local governments, but mainly local governments. What’s more, there is a specialty corps in the PAP system, called the PAP Specialty Police Corps. There are two types of Specialty Police Corps, one under the PAP and one under the Public Security system. The Specialty Police Corps under the Public Security system does not belong to the PAP system but under local Police Departments. The Specialty Police Corps under the PAP was actually called “The PAP Beijing Specialty Police College” (a unit at the administrative level of Lt. General /Deputy Governor, i.e., [Grand] Military Region/Provincial level). This is a new kind of specialty police corps that can be called a corps or college, and is a combination of both. The predecessor of the PAP Specialty Police Corps was the “Anti-Hijack Specialty Police Corps” established on July 22, 1982, code-named “Police Corps #727 of the Ministry of Public Security”. In 1983, the Corps was changed to be under the PAP HQ and was renamed as “China PAP Specialty Police Group”. Its tasks were explicitly defined to be anti-hijack, anti-terrorism and anti-riot. Later on, its name was changed to “China PAP Specialty Police School” according to the regulatory/policy directives issued regularly by State Council and Ministry of Public Security. In September of 1985, the school recruited its first batch of students. In August of 1999, the renowned “Specialty Policewomen’s Unit of the PAP Sichuan Corps” moved to Beijing and became the first specialty policewomen’s combat unit in the “PAP Beijing Specialty Police School”. In May of 2005, it changed its name to the “PAP Beijing Specialty Police College” according to the CMC’s approval. The College had two specialties – specialized policing and reconnaissance. It consisted of three cadet units and was a three-year college. Since 2004, it started to recruit cadets for Bachelor’s Degrees. After their graduation, some of them were assigned to the Combat Division of the PAP Beijing Specialty Police College; the majority of the cadets were assigned to the PAP Specialty Police Corps at provincial level as the essential members in training or combating; some were assigned to be commanders with mobile divisions. In nature, the PAP specialty police was internal security service.

During the period when Jiang Zemin was in power, the PAP suddenly became dominant. Not only did they become CCP’s favorite among the military but also came across as the overbearing big brother with police force. It turned out that they were not a typical army but similar to an army, not a typical police force but more than a police force. The head counts of the PAP were half of the PLA and were about the same as the police force. But its weaponry was much better than that of the police force.
At the same time, its light weaponry was also better than that of the military. And its jurisdiction spanned that of the military and the police force. The critical functions of the PAP for the CCP are the guard and internal security service. The internal security service functions as the guards for the CCP officials and top leadership organizations.  The PAP Security Troops has a nickname – “Commander’s Nine City Gates Infantry” which, of course, refers to the armed police force in Beijing. The CCP top leaders are all cowards. Beijing’s security force is a multi-layered organization that consists of the Central Security Bureau, the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security, the Beijing PAP Corps and the Beijing Garrison. The Central Security Bureau is also called the Ninth Bureau of the General Office of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCCCP), which is directly controlled by CMC. Its responsibility is to safeguard the leaders above the levels of Standing Committee of the Politburo of CCP and CMC.  The Ninth Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP was the former Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP, created in April, 1949 in Xibaipo Village.  In March of 1950, it was expanded and became the Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP, also called the Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security.  The responsibilities of the Eighth Bureau covered many areas. At that time, the Director was Liu Wei and the Deputy Directors were Wang Dongxing (concurrently as the Chief of the First Division of the General Office of CCCCP), Meng Zhaoliang and Yue Xin. There were security, health and supply sections under the Eighth Bureau. In 1953, to change the situation that the Eighth Bureau had too many duties, it was divided into two components. Those who were in charge of the internal security of Zhongnanhai Compound in the First Division became the Zhongnanhai Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP (the Ninth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security). Its Director was Wang Dongxing and Deputy Director was Zhang Yaoci. It was responsible for the internal security service for Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, and other leaders in Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP and General Secretary of CCP Central Committee, including also the security for the Zhongnanhai Compound and other critical CCP and State offices, ministries or departments. After the Ninth Bureau branched out, the Director of the Eighth Bureau was still Liu Wei and the Deputy Directors were Liu Huishan and Zhang Tingzhen. The Eighth Bureau was to direct the security services in provinces and cities, and responsible for the security services of the senior leaders other than those covered by the Ninth Bureau, so called “Four VPs and Two Supremes” – Vice-Chairman of National People’s Congress (NPC), Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice-Premier of State Council, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China, Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate and President of Supreme People’s Court, leaders of CMC, visiting foreign leaders, and large scale public events. In April of 1964, the Eighth Bureau and the Ninth Bureau were combined as the new Ninth Bureau with Wang Dongxing as Director, Zhang Yaoci, Li Shuhuai, Mao Weizhong, Yang Dezhong, Hao Ruoyu and Wang Shengrong as Deputy Directors. In October of 1969, the Ninth Bureau and the Central Security Regiment (Unit 8431, established in 1942 from the Security Battalion and Central Instructors Group) were combined as the Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP, under the military system, promoted to the corps level. The Chief of the Division was Wang Dongxing and 16 people were Deputy Chiefs.
In 1977, the Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP expanded the Central Security Regiment to become the Central Security Division. The Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP became the Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP, Central Security Bureau in short (currently called the Security Bureau of General Staff Department). Wang Dongxing was the Director. In 1979, the Central Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP was reorganized. Deng Xiaoping appointed his trusted subordinate, Yang Dezhong, as the Director. Zhang Yaoci who used to be responsible for Mao Zedong’s security was appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff of Chengdu Military Region. Former Deputy Directors Wu Jianhua, Wu Jicheng, Mao Weizhong and Di Fucai were all promoted to positions at provincial military region’s level. This personnel restructuring was called “The Big Personnel Reshuffle of Palace Guards”.  In August of 1994, Jiang Zemin appointed his trusted subordinate, You Xigui, as the Director of Central Security Bureau (concurrently as the Chief of the Central Security Division), and Yang Dezhong was kicked out. Shortly before the CCP’s 16th National Congress, Jiang Zemin’s trusted subordinate, Wang Gang, the Party Secretary of Central Security Bureau, and You Xigui strongly urged Jiang Zemin to be the Head of the Central Security Bureau “on behalf of” all the officials and soldiers of the Central Security Bureau. Thus, a new position was created – First Political Commissar of Central Security Bureau. By October 15, 2002, the restructuring of the Central Security Bureau was done. The new Central Security Force consisted of the Specialty Police Corps from the Chengdu Military Region, the Security Corps from Shenyang Military Region and the Second Artillery Corps, totaling 5600 officials and soldiers.

In the beginning of November, 2002 (right before the CCP’s 16th National Congress), CCCCP and the CMC announced that Jiang Zemin was appointed First Political Commissar of Central Security Bureau. It was reported that the Central Security Bureau was restructured again completely in all different levels, from squad, platoon, company, battalion to division, before Hu Jintao’s visit to U.S. on April 18, 2006. Although the information on the internet still indicated that You Xigui was the Director and Zhang Baozhong, Ma Jinhu, Zhao Liujiang, Sun Zhigong, Yan Min, Jiang Guangqing and Li Hongfu were Deputy Directors. In fact, the Bureau was already restructured again. You Xigui was only responsible for Jiang Zemin’s personal security. The daily operation of the Central Security Bureau was under Sun Zhigong, Hu Jintao’s personal security chief. It was reported that this was another “Big Personnel Reshuffle of Palace Guards”. In July of 2005, the top leaders of the PAP HQ were also changed: the former Deputy Chief of Staff, Liu Hongjun, was promoted as Deputy Commander, the former Deputy Commander, Liu Shimin, was appointed as Deputy Political Commissar, the former Deputy Director of Political Department, Li Qingyin, was promoted as Deputy Political Commissar. The local PAP corps were also restructured, including the top leaders at military corps/provincial level, such as Sichuan Province, Jilin Province and Qinghai Province. It was reported that this restructuring of the PAP force was one of Hu Jintao’s measures to consolidate his power.
After the restructuring, the Eight Bureau was under the PAP system, and its correspondent local subordinates, such as the Eighth Divisions at the levels of Provincial Public Security Offices and City Public Security Bureaus, are all under the PAP system; but they are under the jurisdiction of Public Security system. The Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security is now called the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Its Director is the PAP Major General Dong Fuyuan. It is still responsible for the so-called “Four VPs and Two Supremes” – Vice-Chairman of National People’s Congress (NPC), Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice-Premier of State Council, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China, Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate and President of Supreme People’s Court, and important foreign affairs events.

The responsibilities of the Central Security Bureau and the Security Bureau of MPS are to safeguard the top leaders of CCP. However, Beijing is a place with a lot of top officials and it is also a political, economical and cultural center. The security services for those latter aspects in Beijing are entrusted with the Beijing PAP Corps and Beijing Garrison. In June of 1949, before the CCP took power, the Pingjin Garrison HQ was established. Later in January of 1959, it was changed to be the Beijing Garrison under the Beijing Military Region. At the same time, the Beijing Garrison was also the military service office for Beijing Municipal CCP Committee and the military conscription service work-unit for Beijing City Government. It was under the dual leadership of Beijing Military Region as well as the Beijing Municipal CCP Committee and Beijing City Government. Beijing Garrison had reduced its size quite a bit when the PAP was established. It used to have four full-size Type-A Security Divisions, but now it only has two Security Divisions (First Security Division and Third Security Division), one In-reserve Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, one Anti-Chemical Weapon Regiment and some training and instruction groups. The First Security Division is responsible for the security of important locations of military headquarters, CMC leaders’ residences and other important head offices and divisions. The Third Security Division is actually a Motorized Infantry Division without any security service duties.

The Beijing PAP Corps is responsible for internal security service. It provides security services for CCCCP leaders who do not live in the Zhongnanhai Compound, Beijing city level non-military governmental organizations, foreign missions, etc. Currently, the Beijing Garrison and the Beijing PAP Corps are of the same military rank without any type of affiliation. However, the First Division of the Beijing PAP Corps is the former Second Security Division of Beijing Garrison. In 1999, the former First Beijing PAP Corps (promoted to military vice-corps level in 1993) and the Second Beijing PAP Corps were combined and became the new Beijing PAP Corps (at military corps level, subordinating the First Division, the Second Division and several military brigade level units). Later, two more divisions were added to the Beijing PAP Corps. Among all the PAP corps in provinces, autonomous regions or provincial-level cities, only the Beijing PAP Corps is at the rank of full military corps level. It has four divisions and close to 20 division level units, which indicates the importance of Beijing municipality.
Forces responsible for the [internal] security services are actually police forces in military uniforms. Their duties are not law enforcement but rather, to suppress citizens. During recent years, the PAP security corps or troops have been used to suppress the ordinary Chinese citizens who appeals to the government for their human rights. It was reported that, in 2005, the PAP troops were ordered to have carried out suppression tasks 21,076 times; 818 counts for casualties in the process of carrying out those suppression orders, of which, of course, the targeted ordinary citizen death toll was not counted in. Observers believe that when Jiang Zemin created the PAP, his main purposes were to suppress the Uyghurs who sought independence in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the millions of workers who lost their jobs and who were not satisfied with the on-going reduction of their income due to state-owned enterprises going out of businesses or lackluster profit performances, and the farmers who had been protesting because of illegal land confiscation by government officials; to eliminate qigong organizations; and to repress the Hui ethnic group, Tibetans and those “not well-behaved” students. After Hu Jintao came into power, he inherited Jiang Zemin’s policy and used the PAP even more frequently.

PRC Expert: U.S. Strategic Capabilities Are Declining

The following article was written by a professor from the Beihang University Research Center of Strategic Issues. It points out that, “The outdated and ill-mannered western conduct is a reflection of their insufficient self-confidence. Not only are they reluctant to let go of the opportunity for the Olympic Game; they use the Olympics to criticize China.  Effective diplomacy is uttering fine words while holding weapons to dominate the enemy. However, the West is only cursing on the streets, while holding no weapons to dominate China. At the same time, the West is dependent on strategic cooperation with China.” Below is the translation of the original article. [1]

The culture of strategy belongs to the category of soft power. In this respect, the East and West each have their own characteristics. Hence the large Eastern and Western countries have different national strategic capacities, different characteristics and different national fates.

With a culture of reunification (a unified culture), Modern China has witnessed (in the area of economics) the development of Marx’s maxim, “One day equals 20 years.”

The West is the home of metaphysics. Dialectics is the way of the East. However, Westerners often seem clumsy when they come across the Eastern dialectics. Metaphysics solves problems mainly by using incremental approaches. Let’s look at how Bush Jr. fights Iraq. His strategy emphasizes the superficial form, with little change, fighting in a single way from the beginning to the end and using tons of gold to hit countless targets. Except for those addicted to a foreign country’s way, true Asians usually are not like that. Asians know that “If you are winning the war, fight; if you are not winning the war, leave.” They thus take the initiative. They have an understanding of Mencius’ words: “The answer is already within me. Therefore whatever happens, I will not be unhappy.”

Different cultures bring different results to their countries. Modern China’s development started at a very low point, but the rate of [economic] improvement is rare among the world’s countries. This is, to a large extent, related to our profound cultural advantages accumulated over 5,000 years of history, not to mention the rapid changes in the 20 year period from the 1901 “Xin Chou Treaty” to the victory of the Northern Expedition in China. The history before and after the Pacific war (World War II) is sufficient to illustrate the point. In 1940, when China was at the lowest point in relation to the allied countries, China was divided into a number of political entities. Those political entities merged into two major entities in 1945 when China, in one stride, became one of the four big victory countries. By 1949, except for Taiwan, China had basically achieved national reunification. In 1953, China defeated the insufferably arrogant Americans in the battlefield of North Korea. In 1964, China became one of the world’s few nuclear countries. It only took 24 years for China to complete these miraculous transformations.
The same situation also appeared in Europe, albeit with the exact opposite results. In 800, Emperor Charlie unified Europe, similar in significance to the reunification of China by China’s first Emperor, Qin Shihuang. However, in 843, Emperor Charlie’s three grand children signed the “Treaty of Verdun” and divided Europe into three parts. Thereafter the European geographical sections were divided into smaller and smaller pieces like “Calculus.” This laid a deeply broken foundation for the European geo-political section that has been extremely difficult to repair to date and which Britain, Russia and the United States very easily manipulate. Why is it so? It is the different ways of thinking. Westerners emphasize analysis, like the “Calculus” of metaphysics, while Asians emphasize integration, the integration of grand unification. This is the essence of the Eastern philosophy, and also the essence of the Oriental spirit.

It is precisely because of the humanistic spirit of unification and anti-secession that in 1945, despite Marshall’s advice not to go northward across the river, Chiang Kai-shek decided he would rather resign than not re-unify China. Whereas in the north, Mao Zedong did not listen to Stalin’s advice not to go southward across the river. After winning the Northeast and with the notion of “With our courage unspent pursue the overthrown foe to the end; do not fish like the Herculean King for reputation, while letting the enemy go,” he continuously fought across the river to the south and reunified China. This is Chinese people’s grand philosophy: fight rather than separate. It is precisely because of this unification culture that modern China has achieved rapid development. Like Marx said: “One day equals 20 years.” What was the determining factor? It is not mainly the material force—China was weak in this regard then. It was the Asian-specific humanistic spirit of re-unification and anti-secession, based on China’s great historical and great philosophical legacy. Stalin had told Chiang Ching-kuo, “As long as China is reunified, you will make progresses faster than any other country.” Clearly, the dialectical thinking of Oriental culture with the premise of reunification should be the most profound basis of our strategic research.

The role of the US is increasingly transforming from a world manipulator to a “strategic scavenger” for other countries

Shortly after the Soviet Union disintegrated, the position of the US in Middle Asia was advantageous to the US. At that time the Taliban was checking and balancing the five republics in the North of the former Soviet Union, with the Soviet Union on the north and Iran on the west. Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban and Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein were Sunnis, while Iran was Shiite. The Taliban and Saddam were containing Iran, a major rival of the Americans, from the east and from the west. In the Gulf War, the United States defeated and retained Saddam Hussein and used him to constrain Iran; they used the liberated Kuwait to contain Saddam from the south. The United States also used minimum force to achieve their maximum strategic interests in the Middle East. After Bush Jr. gained power, however, the United States defeated the Taliban, while instead allowing the Russian forces to enter the south of Afghanistan. The toppling of Saddam granted the victory to the Iraqi Shiites and instead resulted in the expansion of Iran’s territory.
Moreover, before the expiration of his presidency, after toppling the Taliban and Saddam for Russia and Iran, Bush Jr. shifted from the Middle East to Europe to actively support the independence of Kosovo, further eliminating the strategic obstacles for the rise of the Europeans. Accounting for the shaking effect of the Euro against the U.S. dollar, the United States is now self-destructing the foundation established in the Yalta system after World War II, which was beneficial for the US as world hegemony. In World War II America not only wanted to defeat German’ and Japanese’ fascism, but also wanted to use the war to destroy the European hegemony. For these reasons, Roosevelt supported Marshall’s plan in Normandy on the east coast of the Atlantic Ocean, rather than launch a second battlefield in Italy on the north coast of the Mediterranean. This naturally left east Europe to the Soviet Union. The consequence of the Normandy landing was the rise of the Soviet Union’s forces and the large-scale squeezing of Europe’s strategic space. Since then, the great Europe of history has become the now “Western Europe” caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. West Europe subsequently became a political vassal of the US.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Americans were overjoyed like children and unconsciously took the job of “strategic scavenger” for Europe. In 1999, the US promoted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO. In the same year the US led NATO to launch the Kosovo War that separated Kosovo from Serbia. In 2004, the European Union (EU) achieved the largest eastward expansion in history and its member countries increased from 15 to 25. On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly adopted the Declaration of Independence; the United States subsequently declared the formal recognition of Kosovo independence. If we look at the map, we will be surprised to find that if Kosovo finally achieved “independence” or de facto independence, the European forces and their geographical basis would again be close to overlapping the great European map that existed before World War II. Thus, the geographical layout of the “mini Europe” that Roosevelt and Marshall designed to squeeze out the Europeans was lost.

Studying the Kosovo issue in the post-war Yalta pattern, we will find that the Kosovo event drew a perfect period for the resumption of Europe’s political map at the North Atlantic Ocean before World War II. Europe’s new rise will again create strategic pressure on the US similar to that before World War II. Such pressure will force the United States to further implement the Nixon style contraction strategy from the west bank of the North Pacific. If taking into account the U.S. defeat in the Middle East and the resulting rise of the Euro and the decline of dollar, it is reasonable to believe that this shrinkage will be considerably large-scale. The changes on the two sides of the North Atlantic Ocean inevitably leave greater expansion space for China—and of course for Japan, who has been extremely fragile in the current geo-political situation—in the West Atlantic Ocean area. It will also create a more proactive, free and relaxed geo-political environment for China to resolve the Taiwan issue.
The West’s outdated anti-China practice indicates that Westerners no longer have the self-confidence they had before

The strategic capability of the US is in decline. On the contrary, after experiencing confusion and difficulties a few years ago, China and Russia are on the rise in their national strategic capabilities. The rise of China has once again aroused the narrow-minded complex jealous mentalities of Westerners who once admired Chinese civilization. Their unique mentality of old city households that have now finally lost control have been transformed to curses and abuses on the streets in the course of the Olympic torch relay. Viewed throughout history, we have found that cursing on the streets and beating people when upset are not novel to the Europeans and were exactly the way Europeans treated the United States, with the consequence of forcing the United States to become a world power. Interestingly, today’s Americans also have the same kind of mentality that the Europeans had in the past. The outdated and ill-mannered Western conduct is a reflection of their insufficient self-confidence, so that they are even reluctant to let go of the opportunity of the Olympic Games. Effective diplomacy is uttering fine words while holding weapons to dominate the enemy. Today the West is only cursing in the street with absolutely no weapons to dominate China; meanwhile it is dependent on strategic cooperation with China. This indicates that the current western anti-China diplomacy, if not mentally retarded, is showing the “the trick of an empty city.”[2]

In July 1897, Russia’s Finance Minister Witt talked about Europe to the visiting German Emperor William II, “In the near future, the angel-like Europe admired by scholars and artists will become a senile and trudging old woman.” An old woman always gossips about “Cinderella” because she has lost the confidence of a young woman. It now appears that today’s United States is not far from that day. (The author Zhang Wenmu is a professor in BHU Research Center for Strategic Issues. The original article was published on April 30, 2008 in Global Times)

[1]. Xinhua News Agency, April 30, 2008
[2] According to a famous intelligence story of about the wise Chinese, ZhuGe Liang, during the three country period after the Han dynasty, ZhuGe faced total defeat and could not go home. Therefore, he played the Empty City trick on his opponent SiMa. Both were intelligent and knew each other well. When SiMa saw ZhuGe’s city was empty, he was afraid it was a trick, and withdrew his army. Thus ZhuGe could safely go home. Thus the “Empty City trick” here implies there is no substantial threat.

The Development Plan of China’s International Broadcasting Station

A recent issue of Qiu Shi Magazine published an article by Wang Gengnian, manager of China’s International Broadcasting Station and the editor-in-chief of the publication. This article is helpful to understand the foreign strategy of the Chinese official broadcasting station. Below is the translation of the article [1].

Let China’s Voice and Information Spread Further and Broadly

Wang Gengnian

General Secretary Hu Jintao in the 2008 National Propaganda Ideological Work Conference emphasized to pay special attention to strengthen the foreign propaganda as the overall national development strategy mission, to form the strength of foreign dissemination to match the level of our country’s economic and social development and international standing, and to let China’s voice and information spread further. International broadcasting is an important field of public opinion and an important part of foreign dissemination. Strengthening the construction of the modern international broadcast system; powerfully strengthening foreign broadcast propaganda; enhancing the influence and competitive ability in foreign broadcasting; serving well the reform and open policy and modernization; and promoting bigger contribution to the motherland reunification, world peace, and the progress of humanity are the international broadcasting’s overall and strategic tasks.

Since the reform and open policy, our county’s economic and social development has obtained a magnificent achievement. However, compared with our country’s international standing and international influence enhancing day by day, the strength of our foreign dissemination is still insufficient. The pattern of world consensus of “the West is stronger and we are weaker” has not changed fundamentally. In the last 10 years, America and other Western countries using broadcast, satellite TV, Internet, and other emerging media have established a multi-dimensional surrounding net. In our country’s peripheral locality, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, British BBC, Voice of Germany, France International Broadcasting Station, and Japanese NHK have set up several dozens of relay stations and hundreds of frequency channels to broadcast to our country. Facing all sorts of challenges, the standing and function of strengthening our country’s foreign propaganda work appear more important.

China’s International Broadcasting Station is an organization that specially undertakes the duty of international broadcasting. In 66 years of development, it has made great achievements. However, compared with the world-famous international dissemination organizations, China’s International Broadcasting Station still has a long way to go. First, along with the change in the development and dissemination pattern of the media environment, new media technology based on the Internet [is growing by] leaps and bounds.
The world’s main international broadcasting media have made a strategy adjustment as a goal of developing new media. In the situation of the day-by-day high-tech, who controls the newest media methods, whose information will disseminate quickly and broadly, and who influences and controls power, will be stronger. Overall, China’s International Broadcasting Station that specifically undertakes the foreign propaganda task is stronger in the traditional media but weaker in the new pattern of media. It is stronger in the channel dissemination but weaker in the multimedia dissemination. Only if we speed up new media development and walk the synthesis media development path, can we meet the rapid development needs of the international media dissemination model. Second, entering the 21st century, international broadcasting has entered a development period that has online broadcasting of new media as the main method. After 66 years of development, China’s International Broadcasting Station has almost reached the development level of British Broadcasting Corporation, Voice of America, and a few other world main international media in terms of the broadcasting languages, time periods, broadcasting target rates, and other measures. However, there is a big disparity in the launch retransmission, the service constitution, the human resources, the ground coverage, the funds safeguards, and the technical support, and so on. Speaking overall, our country’s foreign broadcasting cannot meet the needs of the new round of competition with the world’s main international broadcasting media.

The Central Party Committee headed by the general secretary, Comrade Hu Jintao, highly values our country’s foreign broadcast work. In 2004, when Li Changchun and Liu Yunshang inspected China’s International Broadcasting Station, they emphasized that we should surround the goal of enhancing China’s international voice. Through “two hands grasp and two legs walk,” on one hand pays special attention to radio broadcasting, and on the other hand pays special attention to online broadcasting, and quickly establishes the modern international broadcasting system. During the celebration of China’s International Broadcasting Station’s 65 years of establishment, the general secretary, Hu Jintao, pointed out in the written comment, “actively constructing a modern international broadcasting system, unceasingly enhancing our country’s foreign broadcasting quality and level, diligently establishing a bridge of friendship that promotes the mutual understanding between Chinese people and people in other countries, and building a harmonious and friendly world consensus environment for a well-off society.” This symbolizes a new historical period, and our country’s international broadcast has an explicit developmental strategy and goal.

According to the Central Party Committee’s strategic plan and the world’s main media development situation, and based on China’s international broadcasting reality, we have formulated “China’s International Broadcasting Station ‘11.5’ Development Plan Summary.” We will strive to form a bare-bones modern international broadcasting system by 2010. We will catch up on the whole or partially reach the level of the BBC and Voice of America in services, new media development, equipment level, frequency quantity, broadcasting time periods, abroad grounding, abroad stationed organization, audience feedback,
human resources, funds safeguards, research standards, and other important measures. We will build a new media entity combining radio broadcasting, online broadcasting, and multimedia broadcasting, and play a vital role in the competition for world consensus. Presently, we begin with several important aspects, actively advance the modern international broadcasting system construction, and promote the core competitive ability of China’s international broadcasting.

Complete the transition from the sole media to comprehensive media. In transnational and cross-culture information dissemination, the sole media production and transmission platform can no longer comply with the trend of the media development globalization. Currently, the world’s main international broadcasting media are all comprehensive media, and the sole media of the radio, TV, or newspaper is rare. They have all established multimedia information sharing platforms, through the coordination of all kinds of media to share the resources and therefore reduce the dissemination cost. China’s International Broadcasting Station has the sound, audio, network, newspaper, and publication media intelligence, and initially formed a comprehensive media form from first to fifth media means to cover the newspaper, broadcasting, television, the network, the new media, and so on. But for various reasons, the comprehensive influence and competitive abilities need the enhancement of the newspaper, magazine, and television. We must learn from the world’s main international broadcast development direction, fully display the language and the superiority of talented persons, adjust the foreign dissemination work, build the multi-ways and broad coverage for the foreign dissemination network, expand the dissemination space, and gradually form a multimedia development pattern to enhance the overall effect of the international broadcasting. The pattern is centered by the new media services and based on television, newspaper, publication, and magazine business with a reasonable structure, complete classification, disposition science, and smooth operation.

Complete the transformation from the traditional media to the modern media. Coordinate the development of traditional media and modern media, utilizing new and high technologies, especially digital and network technologies, to upgrade traditional media and develop modern media. Based on wireless radio, in worldwide important countries and regions, setup English, Chinese, and multilingual global radio broadcasting by the end of the “11.5” period (2004), and build a good audience of English, Chinese, and local official languages listeners. Based on the frame of online radio, by using the Internet’s features of high-speed, borderless, big-capacity, and openness, develop “International Online” into our country’s online broadcasting center to foreign countries, become the important means and new tools of participating in international media competition. As the direction of new media development, from the high point of controlling cultural communication, mastering ideological propaganda in the information age, use new and high technologies to create new ways of cultural communication, make great efforts to develop new media enterprises based on online radio, TV, cell-phone broadcasting, cell-phone TV, actively control the new media technologies, make more efforts to develop and produce new media contents and programs, establish a united multimedia platform, actively broaden new frontlines of propaganda to foreign countries, accelerate the building of a rapid and broad cultural broadcasting system, and constantly enhance the effectiveness of the new media propaganda to foreign countries.
Complete the transformation from the overseas broadcasting to the international media. International media is an audience-oriented mode, and such a model is obviously very different from our self-oriented overseas broadcasting model. In international media, from the reality of China’s social development, close to the foreign audience’s need of China’s information, close to the foreign audience’s way of thinking, insist on the media notion of “China’s perspective, worldwide view, and humankind’s point of view.”

The so-called “China’s perspective” is to use Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and “Three Represents” as the guide, thoroughly carry on the Scientific Development View, closely staying with the big picture of the Party’s work, 100 percent carry out the strategic decision of the Central Committee, show the core values of socialism from the media propaganda, broadcast the thoughts and spirits that are good to the might of the country, rising of the nation, happiness of the people, and social harmony.

The so-called worldwide view is from the global angle and view to objectively introduce all aspects of China to the world, introduce the ideas and practice of our Party’s Work-for-the-People, Work-for-the-Public, the great achievement of our country’s reform and openness, and socialist modern construction; introduce the peaceful development road, policy and proposal to push to build a harmonious world, introduce the long history and richness of Chinese culture, win the acceptance and understanding of China by the international society.

The so-called humankind’s point of view is to carry on the international broadcast from the standpoint of all of human society, respect and accept cultural differences; respect the values, political attitudes, religious beliefs, living ways, and thinking traditions of different countries, races, and regions.

Establish the broadcast ideology of for-the-audience, care-for-the-audience, understand-the-audience, guide-the-audience; based on the need, reform the programs’ format, optimize programs’ structure, adjust programs’ editing and arrangements, enhance targeting of the programs, increase the attractiveness of the programs; follow the foreign audience’s way of thinking and learning, use international common practice and easy-to-accept languages to foreigners, increase the attractiveness of overseas broadcasting, work hard to combine the targeted audience with China’s view of propaganda, constantly enlarge the international clout of greater China’s culture in the globalization and information ages.

(Author: Manger and Editor-in-Chief of the China’s International Broadcasting Station)

1. Qiushi Magazine,May 1, 2008

Media Strategy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Prior to The Olympics Games

More than 30,000 foreign journalists are expected to enter China during the August 2008 Olympics Games.  This presents a challenge to the CCP, known for its stringent media control.  The CCP, from the central authorities to the local governments, has started to prepare for the media challenge.  Below is a translation of an article from Xinahua Net (Zhejiang Channel) ) [1].

Promote Friendliness to the Foreign Media While Enhancing Self-Capabilities

The Jianggan District Party Committee Center organized a special seminar to enhance the strategies and skills of dealing with the media for the leading cadres. On April 16, Zhang Baogui, Deputy Director of the Provincial Party Committee Propaganda Department, lectured at a special seminar presided over by Zheng Guilan, Member and Propaganda Chief of the Center. All attendees watched the informational film, “Beware of the Political Scheme Under The Olympic Flag (The Five Interlocking Rings).”

Zhang gave an overview of three aspects:  “The policy changes that relaxed restrictions on foreign media interviews, [the goal of] treating them with kindness, [and] dealing with them squarely and skillfully.”  He pointed out that the new policy relaxes the requirements for foreign press-correspondents to come to China, relaxes the control of foreign reporters on their interviews and relaxes the feasibility of foreign reporters to employ local Chinese citizens.  The policy also simplifies the screening procedures for foreign reporters and their equipment.  These changes of the policy, allows each local government to make full use of foreign media for our own propaganda, but also subjects us to “the trouble making" of these [reporters].  Especially during the period of the Olympics Games, more than 30,000 foreign correspondents will be coming to China.  Although these reporters are coming for the Olympics, we cannot exclude the possibility that some western hostile influences will be sneaking in and seizing the opportunity to link China’s social problems with the Olympics, to politicize the Olympics and to cause social unrest.  Local officials should be prepared to deal with these situations.

He emphasized that local authorities should implement the policy of improving media relations while recognizing that media relations is like “a marriage of cooperation between information client and the competitor.”   Second, they should also follow the news dissemination rule; namely, guarantee the authority, authenticity and effect of the information. Third, they should learn to make use of the media to direct public opinions according to information from the government.  When dealing with sudden incidents, the government should act according to "The Five Rapids" and "The Five Avoiders." "The Five Rapids" are to establish  a media control organization, to appoint a media spokesperson, to set up a local news center for foreign media  to conduct interviews, to standardize official releases to the media and to follow the information in media and the internet rapidly. "The Five Avoiders” are to avoid passive propaganda, falling into reporter’s question traps, being angered by reporters, refusing reporter’s inquiries and getting into direct conflicts with the press.
Deputy Director Zhang’s lecture was very well received.

Participants of the seminar included the core members of the Jianggan District Committee, leaders of various units at the levels of communities, towns, news spokespersons, propaganda committee members, news liaison officers and so on.  (Source: Jianggan Government Net)

[1] Xinhua, April 17, 2008

An Analysis Report on China’s Future Risks

It is an article published on the website of Dajun Center for Economic Observation and Study based in Beijing. In the article, the author lists future risks posed to China. The conclusion of the article points out, “China has three-key major risks. First, the blind spot in China’s political wisdom is expanding; second, China lacks a system to make plans to handle risks; third, China lacks the ability of flexible and dynamic management.” [1]

An Analysis Report on China’s Future Risks

Like all other countries, China is also facing many risks.  It’s only that different countries face different risks on account of each of their own conditions. As a whole, the world is a place full of risks. The history of all countries tells us however many risks there are, however many opportunities there are. The key is how to foresee, understand and manage the risks. I believe, the unpredictable risks are often deeply hidden under a safe and smooth surface, thus becoming a blind spot of human wisdom in this society. Therefore, usually we have no way to detect that trap right in front of us beforehand. From this perspective, the only approach for risk prevention is to try to minimize the blind spot, and try our best to turn risk into an opportunity for the development of the society.

The only approach to manage risks is to exert one’s utmost effort to do our best today and will be able to handle what may happen tomorrow.

I.  The Political Risks

China’s Major Political Risks Are:

1.    The Blind Spot in Our Political Wisdom.  For this risk lies in a place where it is   beyond our political wisdom, it is the biggest as well as the most dangerous one.  That’s why I list it as the primary risk. The only way to resolve the issue of the blind spot in our political wisdom is to train us ourselves to use the diverse- parallel-logic pattern, characterized by a divergent-logic system and the closed-
circle reasoning. Its key is the programmed-logic and verification.
2.    The multitudes of different theories have imposed a sweeping threat to the Mao ideology.  The loss of the spiritual elements among the majority of people has brought tremendous risk to China’s political system. Such a risk is the most serious internal trauma to the Chinese political stability, for what it has brought about is the deterioration of the fundamental values in the society; as a result, people are at lost as to by what standard they should make choices.  Please note that Mao’s ideology is not only an ideology, it is also a methodology and theory of knowledge. In addition, it is spiritual; that is, it is the spiritual belief of the Chinese people; it is the spiritual destiny of the people in China.
3.    All kinds of overseas forces infiltrate into China by setting up different types of foundations. On one hand, they sponsor their respective spokespersons to advocate their political ideologies; on the other hand, they infiltrate into all levels in the society, with a direct or an indirect impact on political decision making or planning.

4.    All antagonist forces at home and abroad launch a series of activities to separate China.

5.    Officials are generally corrupted; the people, cruelly oppressed; complaints and hatred accumulating with emotional conflicts from all over the land;

6.    The political power, turned into capitalists, and the new elite with private assets lead to the systematic problems for the Central government to tackle;

7.    The gap between the rich and the poor has widened. The differences between the different regions have also come to an extreme;

8.    Conflicts between the capitalists and the labor force;

As a matter of fact, the economic risks listed below should also be categorized as part of political risks, because the economic problems are all political problems at a fundamental level when we look at it as a domestic issue. In the eyes of the international community, foreign powers would view these problems as their opportunity to gain interests, as a result of hegemony ideology.

II. The Economic Risks

9.    Risks in financial industry;

10. Long-term risks brought about by enterprises purchased by foreign funds;

11. Spokespersons for domestic and foreign capitalists lobby and infiltrate decision-makers, influencing or misleading the decision-making;

12.    Risks in stock market;

13.    Risks in real estate market;

14.     Concerted actions of groups with common interests;

III. Risks between the Mainland and Taiwan

15.  The “Taiwan Independence” force strives to make Taiwan a member of the U.N. and advocates public vote. If the Mainland government does not take a clear and firm stance, Taiwan people will likely get into an irrational state. Therefore, Chinese government must take a clear and decisive stance towards those who advocates “Taiwan Independence,” leaving them no room for negotiation, confining Taiwan people into a rational scope. At the same time, we are informing the U.S. government that any supportive act, assisting Taiwan gain independence will have a serious consequence. This is because Chinese people will duly punish those who support “Taiwan Independence” to defend our dignity. If we do not resolve the Taiwan issue well, the adversary forces in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Tibet, and Xinjiang, will all use their wild imagination to make troubles, bringing disaster to our society.

IV. Risks Lying in the Conflict between the U.S. and China

16. There is only conflict between the U.S. and China; there is no friendship to speak of between us, for the U.S. society is operated under the rules depicted by businessmen. How much gain there would be is the only criterion the U.S. society uses to make decisions. Social justice and moral values are the cards the U.S. plays only when it tries to gain profits when dealing with international issues. Therefore, the U.S. will not stay silent when China is making rapid progress, simply because it wants to maintain its position as the sole hegemony, so as to gain more profits in the international community. The weakest point of the U.S. lies in its interests. In order to achieve its goal in attaining interests, the U.S. can resort to any means. It is only a matter of by what means and to what extent the Americans would go, based on their judgment of the price they need to pay and the interests they can gain. Therefore, in terms of the relationship between the U.S. and China, if we fail to fully take advantage of its weakness and simply sacrifice the interests on our part, the Americans would go ahead and take more advantage from us.

I believe that Mao took the right approach in dealing with Sino-U.S. relationship. He said, “You hammer down a nail at my vital point (Mao is referring to Taiwan,) I strangle your weak point and never loosen my hand.” His right strategy led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China, as well as Americans learning to dance the “loyalty” steps. (Translator’s note: The “loyalty dance” is a dance showing absolute loyalty to Mao.)

V. The Risks in Science, Technology and Culture

Today’s world is full of competitions in science and technology.  It is said: The country that has the key technology will be the superpower and gain more interests. It is an indisputable fact that no one can change it. If we are determined to change our current situation, the only path is to improve the research in science and technology, mastering more key techniques. China has taken a detour in decision-making in science and technology; as a result, we lag far behind international society. We must stay alert not to make the same mistakes again.
The second competition is cultural. The key element of culture is the spirit of majorities. That is, only if the culture represents the desire and aspiration of the majority of people in the world, can it be competitive in the international communities. It will have the power to attract and unite more people. The failure of the U.S. is a result of its constant pursue of more interests. Democracy and freedom is only a card the U.S. plays to gain interests. China is very weak in being creative and innovative in cultural development. Inside China, our culture lacks the power to unite all Chinese citizens; outside China, our culture is not attractive enough. It is caused by the loss of spiritual elements among the majority of people and they only pursue sensational satisfaction and utilitarianism.

Therefore, China must change this status as soon as possible, striving to become a leading power and a strong nation in cultural innovation.

The Conclusion

We have listed a number of risks. In actuality, China has three-key major risks. First, the blind spot in China’s political wisdom is expanding; second, China lacks a system to make plans to handle risks; third, China lacks the ability of flexible and dynamic management. The key to making efficient plans to handle risks is the high-level unison and synchronization. The only way to achieve this is holding responsible persons liable.

After the Communist Party took power, China’s history has shown us that without a system to hold officials liable for their conducts, these officials who live in an environment wherein the majority of people have lost their spiritual pursuit, will not have any sense of responsibility. For example, Chinese officials refuse to be subjected to any supervisory control; it is a manifestation of their strong tendency to shift responsibilities and unwillingness to fulfill their job responsibilities.

The reason for China’s lack of the ability of flexible and dynamic management is the blind spot in our wisdom. We fail to realize the key to management is to satisfy the aspiration and pursuit of majority of people; we fail to see that social conflicts are the inner driving force for societal development; we fail to see that the best approach to solve the conflicts is not to suppress or repress these conflicts, but to solve these problems in a democratic system, building a platform for people from all levels of society to appeal for their rights peacefully. Democracy is not only a spiritual belief. It is also the best way to govern a society.

[1] Prepared by Tian Zhongguo of the Dajun Center for Economic Observation and Study, Beijing, on February 18, 2008, (

China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force

Editor’s Note: Published in New York, “Beijing Spring” is a Chinese monthly magazine founded in June, 1993. Its goal is to promote human rights, democracy and social justice in China. In September 2006, Mr. Lu Gengsong wrote an article titled “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force,” which gives a detailed analysis of China’s police system. Mr. Lu, a member of China’s Democratic Party in Zhejiang Province, has written a number of articles to examine China’s political system as a freelance writer. In August 2007, Public Security Bureau in Hangzhou City (capital city of Zhejiang Province) arrested him. In January 2008, local procuratorial authorities accused him of “inciting the subversion of state power.” The following is the translation of Mr. Lu’s article “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force.” [1]

Part I

In December last year (2005), Chinese authorities in Guangdong Province dispatched massive armed police force to suppress farmers in Shanwei Village, resulting in the death and missing of several dozen people. This year, authorities in Zhejiang Province dispatched armed police to suppress Christians in Xiaoshan City on July 29. On August 2, as a group of people from Xiangyin County of Hunan Province appealed to city government for local officials embezzling the compensation for their reallocation, local government again dispatched massive armed police to suppress these petitioners. It was said that the armed police shot and killed more than 100 petitioners on the spot. So, what kind of force is China’s armed police? What role does it play in China’s political arena?

De Facto “Schutzstaffel”

On June 21, 2005, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) held its First National Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress. The CCP Committee that came into being as a result of the Congress was a humongous organization:

– The Secretary General of the CCP Committee of PAP:
  Sui Mingtai, the Political Commissar of the PAP Headquarters

– The Deputy Secretary General of the CCP Committee of PAP:
  Wu Shuangzhan, Commander-in-Chief of the PAP

– All Deputy Commanders-in-Chief, Deputy Political Commissar, Chief of Staff, Director  
   of Political Department, and Director of Logistic Department are members of the 
   Standing Committee of the CCP Committee of the PAP.
– Commanders-in-Chief and Political Commissars of the PAP Corps in all Provinces, 
  Autonomous Regions, and major Municipalities are members of the CCP Committee of 
  the PAP.

– Commanders and Political Commissars of the PAP Mobile Divisions are members of  
   the CCP Committee of the PAP.

– Commanders and Political Commissars of the PAP Corps under Xinjiang Construction
   Corps are members of the CCP Committee of the PAP.

With more than 100 members, the PAP’s CCP Committee is the largest CCP committee, only second to the CCP’s Central Committee. The PAP’s CCP Committee is under direct leadership of Zhou Yongkang, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of CCP Central Committee, secretariat of CCP Central Committee, Minister of Public Security as well as the First Political Commissar of the PAP. He is also the First Secretary of the PAP’s CCP Committee. It is quite thought-provoking. The PAP had been under the dual leadership of State Council and CCP’s Central Military Committee (CMC). For a long time, there had never been a CCP Committee set up within the PAP. Why did Hu Jintao decide to establish the CCP Committee – what’s more, a humongous one, last year? It is not difficult to see that it has some important hidden political message in the decision.

On July 16, 1999, the PAP launched a political campaign called “Striving to Be Loyal Defenders for the CCP and the People.” Jiang Zemin, then Party Chief, wrote an inscription for the campaign: “Be Loyal Defender for the CCP and the People Forever.”

Since Hu Jintao came into power, he repeatedly emphasized “to build the PAP to be a politically reliable, solid, civilized armed force; to train the PAP officers and the soldiers to be loyal defenders of the Party and the people.” At the PAP’s First National Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress last year, Zhou Yongkang, then Minister of Public Security, the First Secretary of the PAP’s CCP Committee, and the First Political Commissar of the PAP, stressed “to truly construct the PAP to be a politically reliable, solid, civilized armed force that strengthen the ruling position of the Party, defend the national security and social stability.” Chief Commander Wu Shuangzhan and Political Commissar Sui Mingtai published an article at Qiushi magazine [2], stating that “only by building the PAP to be a politically reliable, solid, civilized armed force, by training the PAP officers and the soldiers to be loyal defenders of the Party and the people, can we handle our enemies at ease wherever they are making troubles for us, and effectively strike them hard no matter how they change tactics to sabotage us.” In this article, Wu Shuangzhan and Sui Mingtai expressively identified groups such as Taiwan’s pro-independence group, Tibetan independence movement, East Turkistan movement (Uyghur independence), Chinese democratic activists, and Falun Gong group as enemy forces and instructed the PAP to “handle with ease” and “strike with efficiency.” As a matter of fact, added onto their enemy list are human rights defenders for farmers who lost their land and involuntary early retired workers, as well as religious activists who have not been sanctioned by the government.
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao require the PAP to “be loyal defenders for the CCP and the people forever.” Leaving alone the fact that they put the CCP in front of the people, the word “people” itself is a mere pretense. As proven by the 85-year history of the CCP, the Party and the people have always been as incompatible as water and fire. They never were and will never be a unity. Therefore, this requirement can only be interpreted as to “be a loyal defender for the CCP forever.” When Zhou Yongkang spoke of the three major tasks of the armed police as “to strengthen the ruling position of the CCP, to defend the national security, and maintain social stability,” only the first task “to strengthen the ruling position of the CCP” is for real. It is a deceiving propaganda to mislead the officers and soldiers in the armed police force so that they would follow the CCP blindly and sacrifice their lives for the CCP. When Hu Jintao came into power, he initiated a training class for high-ranking officers in the PAP studying the important ideology of “Three Represents,” at which he proposed that the PAP must do well in two “historical tasks,” i.e., “competent to conquer the enemy” and “never change the nature [of the PAP].”

What does the two “tasks” mean? Why did Hu raise these issues at such a high level as “historical?” Being able to conquer the enemy means the PAP is competent and able to fight at the front line; while “never changing the nature” means it is always conforming to the Central CCP Committee in ideology and political goals; in other words, the PAP must strictly follow the leadership of the CCP under all circumstances.

From the above instructions, we can see that the regime now exerts tighter control over the PAP than Peoples’ Liberation Army and normal police (Public Security). On the other hand, the PAP is most loyal to the CCP, as the loyalty is determined by the nature of the PAP. As the function of PLA is to defend the country when foreign invasion occurs, army officers and soldiers understand that army is part of the government branch. Police or Public Security are dealing with civilians on daily basis. Most of the police types, such as public transportation police, criminal justice police and domicile registration enforcement police, are serving the society. The only exceptions are the “State Security” and “610 Office”, which are running dogs of the CCP. The PAP is an armed force for domestic issues. It has the function of both an army and the police. This is a force without which the totalitarian regime cannot live. Some people compare the PAP to the ancient “palace guards” or “royal army”; some compared it to gendarmerie in certain countries; while most people believe it is quite right to compare the PAP to Nazi German’s Schutzstaffel.

The Predecessor of the PAP: The CCP’s Political Protection Squadron

The establishment of the PAP can be traced back to the 1930s. Following the Soviet Union’s Cheka organization, the CCP formed Guard Battalion, Guard Regiment, Security Regiment, Security Corps, Protection Corps, Protection Troop, Guard Troop, Political Protection Troop, and Traitor-Eliminating Regiment. These organizations mainly carried out the tasks including guarding the military and political heads of the CCP, protecting CCP’s political and military organizations, assassinations, guarding criminals, and maintaining local social security. At that time, these organizations had the combined functions of public security, state security, and armed police. Deng Fa, Kang Sheng and Li Kenong all had served as the heads of this terrorist organization. Even the veteran CCP members would feel frightened upon hearing their names. On August 31, 1949, the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC) ordered to establish the Central Corps of Chinese People’s Public Security under the Minister of Public Security, with the role of guarding the security of Central CCP Committee, Central Government and Beijing. At the same time, in large cities, units such as Public Security General Corps, Public Security Corps, General Pickets Corps were formed by People’s Liberation Army soldiers. At provincial and county level, Guard Battalion, Guard Company, Public Security Corps, Guard Troops and Law Enforcement Troops had been established. Railroad Armed Police Force was formed along the railroad. Most of these armed forces were under the jurisdiction of Public Security authorities at different levels; some belonged to the military system. Among them, the Central Corps of Chinese People’s Public Security was the predecessor of the PAP.
The Common Platform passed at the First Plenary Session of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference included a Stipulation on Establishing a Centralized Army for People’s Republic of China: People’s Liberation Army and People’s Public Security Force. In December 1949, a Plan to Consolidate the People’s Public Security Armed Forces at All Levels was made at the First National Conference on Public Security. From January to May of 1950, all public security armed forces were reorganized to Chinese People’s Public Security Army (CPPSA), under the jurisdictions of public security authorities at all levels. CPPSA was composed of the Central Corps of Chinese People’s Public Security (including two divisions and one regiment), three public security divisions, twelve Public Security General Corps, one General Pickets Corps, one Guard Regiment, three provincial Public Security Regiments, and several Public Security Corps, Squadrons, and Troops. During the period, the central public security authorities started to build border administrative authorities and armed forces.

After that, the names and governance of the public security armed forces underwent various changes. (Changes such as: In 1951, CMC decided to reorganize the border forces and local Public Security Forces into Public Security Forces of PLA, under the jurisdiction of CMC; in 1955, the Ministry of Defense reorganized the army and renamed the Public Security Forces of PLA into PLA’s Public Security Corps (PSC). After this reorganization, the Public Security Armed Forces at county level were under the jurisdiction of local Public Security authorities and renamed as the People’s Armed Police. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) established Armed Police Bureau; departments of Public Security at provincial level established the Armed Police Section, basically the same structure as before 1952. In 1957, the CCP’s Central Committee decided to rename PLA’s PSC to Chinese People’s Public Security Army (CPPSA). In 1958, the CCP’s Central Committee and CMC decided to reorganize the CPPSA into the People’s Armed Police. In 1963, the CCP’s Central Committee approved Luo Ruiqing’s [3] “Report on Renaming the People’s Armed Police to Public Security Army”, and decided to recover the name of CPPSA. The organizational system and jurisdictional relationship remained unchanged, i.e. under dual leadership of the military system and public security.)

At the eve of the Great Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong ordered to eliminate the whole CPPSA, make it part of PLA. The headquarters of the CPPSA were rearranged to become the headquarters of Second Artillery Corps under PLA. The national Public Security armed forces were rearranged to independent divisions, regiments, battalions, companies, and squadrons, under the jurisdictions of provincial military districts or metropolitan garrisons. On July 31, 1979, CCP’s Central Committee approved Wu Lanfu’s [4] Report at National Border Defense Working Conference by building a uniform border defense armed police force. On June 19, 1982, according to “A ‘Report to request Instructions on Administration of the People’s Armed Police Force’ from the CCP Committee of MPS approved by CCP’s Central Committee”, the People’s Armed Police were restructured, incorporating PLA’s local Internal Guard Service to be under the MPS together with Border Defense Armed Police Force, and Fire Fighters. On April 5, 1983, the PAP was formally established in Beijing. The PAP headquarters was located inside the MPS. The PAP Corps were set up under Department of Public Security at provincial level. The PAP Divisions were set up under Bureau of Public Security at city level. At county level, the PAP Groups or Squadrons were set up under the Section of Public Security.
What’s the most complicated is the governing system for the PAP, which is under direct leadership of the State Council and CMC, while at the same time subject to the local administrations and commands of the Party committee, local government, and public security authorities at different levels. First, the PAP is under the paramount leadership of CCP; second, it is under dual leadership of the State Council and CMC; third, it is subject to the jurisdiction of Political and Law Committee of CCP; fourth, it has to follow the orders from Party committees, local government, and public security authorities at different levels; finally, the PAP troops at lower levels is under the command of the PAP offices at higher levels. In March 1995, the State Council and CMC made a major adjustment to the governing system of the PAP. Under the new governing system, the State Council and CMC carry the role of overall leadership and administration over the PAP, assisted by Pubic Security authorities at different levels. This adjustment strengthened the CMC’s control of the PAP. In December 1996, CMC promoted the official rank of the PAP from Deputy Military Region level to Military Region level. During the years between 1995 and 1999, CMC promoted the PAP Corps at a provincial level up to the level of deputy army commander level.

One can see from the evolution of the PAP that the names of the PAP have been changed among “Public Security Forces,” “Public Security Army,” and “Armed Police”, while the naming the PLA and Public Security have been relatively stable. The frequent changes were because of the unique nature of the PAP. A normal government only needs an army to fight invaders and a police force to maintain social order. There is no need to maintain the armed police force that has both the function of an army and that of a police force. However, as the CCP seized power by violence, they fear that such a regime can also be overthrown by others by violence, as history has repeatedly proven. As the CCP wants to govern the country forever, it has to resort to violence. Although the CCP has a gigantic army force, an army can not be casually dispatched, especially by local officials. In all other countries, as the Chinese saying goes, the government “trains an army for a thousand days but use it for an hour.” To the contrary, the CCP has to “maintain an army for a thousand days and use it for a thousand days.”  The PAP officers and soldiers ridicule themselves for being used for “a thousand days.” It is precisely the most prominent characteristic of China’s Armed Police. Without this characteristic, there would be no need to maintain such an armed force.

(To be continued)

[1] Beijing Spring, September 2006
[2] Qiushi magazine, the official mouthpiece publication of CCP’s Central Committee.
[3] Luo Ruiqing, then Deputy Minister of Defense, member of Standing Committee of CCP’s Central Military Committee, Secretary-general of CMC, and Chief of General Staff.
[4] Wu Lanfu, then head of United Front Work Department of CCP’s Central Committee