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Chinese Authorities Refuse to Renew the License for Two Human Rights Lawyers

BBC quotes Human Rights Watch’s report that the Chinese authorities refused to renew the licenses for two Chinese prominent human rights lawyers, Teng Biao and Jiang Tianyong. The reason is that they offered help for the Tibetans arrested during the 3.14 Event. Teng Biao was the lawyer for Shandong human rights activist Chen Guangcheng. Jiang Tianyong was involved in famous rights activist Hu Jia’s case. Early in April, the Ministry of Justice already threatened that those who expressed to help to Tibetans would be diciplined and have their licenses withheld.

Source: BBC, May 30, 2008
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_7420000/newsid_7427900/7427943.stm

Party Journal: Reform of Power Structure is the Key to Political Reform

On May 21, 2008, Study Times, the Journal of the Party School of Communist Party published an article entitled “Objectives of Political System Reform.” The article holds that there are four aspects to such reform: “One, the building of legal system. Two, the reform of power structure and checks and balances. Three, the reform of personnel system. Four, the reform of administration system. The reform of power structure and checks and balances is the key to the political system reform. The main task is to establish checks and balances and to maintain highly transparent exercise of the power to prevent corruption and abuse of power."

Source: Study Times, May 21, 2008
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/05-21/1257572.shtml

Reservoir May Have Caused the Sichuan Earthquake

Wang Lowei, an expert on water at a German Engineering firm, stated that the construction of Zipingpu Reservoir might have caused the May 12 Sichuan earthquake.  Similar views have been posted online inside China.  Zipingpu Reservoir was built right on top of the Longmenshan Fault. Completed in 2006, Zipingpu Reservoir is one of the larger reservoirs, with a storage capacity of 1.112 billion cubic meters.

Source:
Observe China, May 28, 2008
http://observechina.net/info/artShow.asp?id=49497
Internet Posting, People.com, May 28, 2008
http://bbs.people.com.cn/postDetail.do?view=2&pageNo=1&treeView=1&id=86446095&boardId=2

Party Journal: Dangerious School Buildings Blamed for Student Deaths During Earthquake

Study Times, the journal of the Party School of the Communist Party reported that from 1990 to 2004, schools in 90 counties were damaged during earthquakes. In 2003 alone, over 420,000 students could not attended classes due to damages to schools. Study Times cited most recent examples including over 700 students in Juyuan middle school in Dujiangyan City who were buried and died during the Sichuan earthquake on May 12, 2008. The article attributed these casualties to dangerous school buildings.

Source: Study Times, May 21, 2008
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49156/7272568.html

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Cadres Learn to Control Media

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has found that the development of the Internet has created a challenge to its rule. The CCP uses its official media to hide the truth. As the truth about Chinese society is exposed on the Internet, the truth that was previously concealed is disclosed piece by piece. The publication of the truth is what the CCP most fears, as it directly challenges the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime. When the CCP strives hard to block the Internet, officials face the difficulty of dealing with the Internet media. The upcoming Olympic Games will attract tens of thousands of Western reporters into China, forcing the CCP to consider how to use more refined and more subtle means of media manipulation to control media and public opinion in order to continue to cover up the truth. With regard to the recent events in Tibet, the official media dealt with it by launching a media campaign to incite civil national resentment against the West, thus creating a new situation. Below is the translation of an article by the Central Party School titled “Urgently enhance the ability of leading cadres to deal with the media.” [1]
Urgently Enhance the Cadres’ Ability to Deal with the Media

General Secretary Hu Jintao recently pointed out in a national propaganda ideological work conference, “At every level, the leading cadres should fully realize the importance of news and public opinion, be good at promoting practical work through news propaganda, enthusiastically support the news media’s interviews and reports, correctly manage public opinion, and enhance their ability to deal with the media.” This requires all levels of the leading cadres to enhance their own abilities to deal with the news, be good at promotion work using the media, and use the media as the CCP and the government’s important ruling tool.

I.

Along with the development of our country’s market economy and its reform and open policy, the style of how the government manages society has changed from administrative management to public management. In public administration, the media has become more and more important. It is an important social strength that influences the country’s politics, economy, and many aspects of society, while presenting a new characteristic that is different from the media under the traditional system.

The media is the means for disseminating information. It provides information to the public about world developments in order to meet society’s information needs. The government collects the information about social situations and public opinion through media, transmits the information, and mobilizes and organizes society.

The media is a society’s early warning tool. Using its antennas that spread through the entire society, the media frequently monitors society for the slightest sign of trouble and promptly informs the public. It has become modern society’s true watchdog.
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The media is the main foundation of public administration. Although the media does not have a superintendent status equal to the government’s, it is an important coordination entity and constitutes a multi-dimensional society management structure with the government, for citizens, and other non-government public organizations.

The media is the government’s inspector general. It represents the public, monitors the government’s rights, lowers costs and increases efficiency. It plays a vital non-replaceable role in enhancing government’s work efficiency, revealing society’s failings, and purifying the party’s cadre troop.

The media is a market competitor. Under the operation pattern of the enterprise commercialization management, the media not only undertakes the mouthpiece function, but also positively participates in the market competition to survive and develop. The media has become an inseparable part from the country’s market economy, and its industrial characteristic is revealed day by day.

The media is a platform for public participation in the government and deliberation over government affairs. In the course of our country’s  advancement in the democratization of politics, the public’s consciousness is enhanced through public participation in government and through deliberation over government affairs. However, the ability of individual opinion expression and intervention in politics is limited. The media provides the public with a platform for the exchange of information and for public discussion, and advances the transparency and publicity of public policy formulation, execution, and revision.

The media is a gambling stage for social benefits. It plays the important roles of communication, coordination, and the maintenance function in the social structural balance. Whoever controls the media, controls multitudinous social resources. In order to strive for a bigger leading power in public administration, each kind of social strength often carries public relations, contention, and the capture of word power to gain more supporting strength. Therefore, media becomes a battlefield for the benefit of all parties.

Along with the evolution of the media’s nature, status, and function, the relationship between the government and media has changed dramatically. The government is facing more and more of a media challenge.

The way media has developed has broken the management pattern. The central committee, the provinces, and propaganda media from outside of China all compete for the local media market. This creates a multi-structured and complex administrative subordination relationship for the media. The local party committee government does not have a subordinate relationship with the media, and cannot manage these media by administrative leadership; it should instead consider doing crosswise coordination.
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Media marketing increases the difficulty of media management. Survival and development may cause media to neglect the social responsibility that it shoulders. Its drive for economic profit, may cause it to curry the world’s favor, use vulgar content to attack the “eyeball,” and even appear deviant in its guidance. It is a stern challenge to the party’s control of the media and of public opinion.

The development of networks has affected traditional methods of managing the media. Before the networks appeared, traditional news management was very effective. A propaganda department instruction could get media not to report or print details about an event. But the appearance of networks enables every network user to become a free information disseminator, and the propaganda department is unable to carry on the instruction-like management that it did in the past.

Media supervision of public opinion is a test of government management. The supervision of public opinion is an obligation of social development, the responsibility of news work, people’s hope, and a method for the party and government’s work to improve. The news media plays a bigger and bigger role in the government’s monitoring public opinion, yet the environment becomes more and more loose. The government not only is the media superintendent, also is the object of media surveillance. The government must learn how to do its work under this media surveillance.

Overseas media coming to the Olympic Games brings a new challenge. It is estimated that 30,000 overseas reporters will come to Beijing during the Olympic Games. Their interviews will not be limited to the Olympic Game’s content, and may involve every aspect of our government work and social life. All levels of government can continue to use the traditional management norms to deal with the overseas media, but they must follow international conventions, do well at receiving, servicing, and welcoming the overseas media, and must demonstrate a new image of China’s democracy, opening, civilization, and progress.

Obviously, the government and media relationship has undergone a big change. Managing and being managed can no long reflect their relationship. The media has, more and more, challenged the government. All levels of the party committees and governments must transform their thoughts, improve their methods, and face the new challenge brought about by the new media environment.

The development of the Internet has challenged CCP rule. The CCP’s official media is used mainly to cover the truth. When the truth about Chinese society is exposed on the Internet, the previously concealed truth is disclosed little by little. The publication of the truth is what the CCP is most afraid of, as it directly challenges the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime. When the CCP strives hard to block the Internet, officials at various levels are stuck in the plight of facing the media on the Internet. The upcoming Olympic Games will attract tens of thousands of Western reporters into China, forcing the CCP to consider how to use more refined and more subtle means of media manipulation to control the media and public opinion in order to continue to cover up the truth. On the recent events in Tibet, the official media launched a media campaign to incite civil national sentiments against the West. It appeared to be an exercise in how to deal with the new situation. Below is the translation of an article by the Central Party School titled “Urgently enhance the ability of leading cadres to deal with the media.” [1] {mospagebreak}
II.

As the relationship between the government and the media is changing, the leading cadres are no longer able to deal with media using conventional ways of thinking and management. They should fully recognize the importance of the media, straighten out their relationship with the media, and consistently enhance their ability to deal with the media through practice. To learn to deal with the media, one should focus on the following six aspects.

The first is to take a new look at the media. As society has developed, the media has undergone a great change. The transformation of society and the government has made the position and role of media in social management more prominent. Development pattern requires the media to positively promote the building of a harmonious society. The ruling party has raised the requirements for governing the media, as it is the mouthpiece of the party, the government and the people; it is the main channel for transmitting information in society; it is the reflection of public opinion; it represents a wealth of knowledge, culture and values; it is an important resource and tool for the government’s public management; it guards community supervision; it is the people’s entertainment venue; and it is the backbone of the cultural industry and the bridge for the dissemination of Chinese culture.

The second is to attach great importance to the media. To promote a positive constructive role for the media is a critical step for building the party and the government’s ability to govern. We must firmly establish a sense of urgency and get control of the media; we need to have a strong sense of responsibility as the vast embankment could be destroyed by an ants’ hole; we should enhance our awareness, and our ability and level to deal with media.

The third is to be good at taking advantage of media. It is essential to plan and to use the media as positive propaganda; to supervise and to the use media to monitor public opinion; to emphasize public opinion and to use the media for the government’s decisions and investigations; and to design and to use the media to shape the government’s image.

The fourth is to actively guide the media: through the news agenda to actively guide media reporters; to use news conferences to feed information to reporters; to use news planning to prepare the reporters with prior policy explanation; to timely share the first draft with reporters when dealing with sudden events; to transmit transpositional thinking to reporters through horizontal communication; to use incentives to encourage the media to promote the theme of the times.

The fifth is to learn to treat the media kindly. The news media and propaganda are connected, but are also different. We should not simply control news in the same way as managing propaganda. Government and the media should mutually understand and cooperate to seek mutual benefits. The government should learn to tolerate public opinion, support monitoring the media and tolerate the inevitable inaccuracies in media supervision and monitoring. The government should foster a sense of service, in order to provide the media with sources of information, policy support, logistical support and other services to create conditions for the mainstream media to produce big and strong reports.
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The sixth is to seriously study the media. Nowadays the relationship between the government and the media is becoming more and more complicated. The government should not only strengthen how it governs the media, but also accept supervision of the media; it should not only be aware of public opinion and social conditions through the media, but also firmly grasp the guiding role on public opinion; it should not only use the media as a tool of the government, but also provide service to the media; it should not only respect the news freedom of the media, but also prevent the media’s power from becoming alienated; it should not only promote the development of the media as an industry, but also avoid the tendency toward mediocrity that the market brings about; it should not only interview foreign media, but also seize the right to speak among world public opinion. To properly handle the relationship between the government and the media, we must seriously study the media, master the media’s laws, and be good at dealing with challenges. Thus we will truly establish a benign interaction and mutually-beneficial collaboration with the media.

III.

The former English Prime Minister, Tony Blair said, “Most of our work today, except the most central decision-making issues, involves dealing with the media, whether measured by importance, time or by energy.” The US professor Bennett said, “In modern times, dealing with media relations has been transformed from an original art that can be managed by personal talents to a science that requires skillfully trained specialists to handle.” To correctly grasp the methods and techniques of dealing with media has become the indispensable nutrient for government officials in the world to engage in public management. On their first day of entering politics, the politicians and officials from Western countries started their course of dealing with the media. They know that winning the media is winning the votes. From participating in an election to the end of their duties, dealing with media is an important part of their political life, and is a skill that they appear to have been born with. For a long period of time, the media in our country has been an extension of the political structure, such that the government can direct the media just by using an executive order. Thus there has not been an issue of dealing with media. Therefore in previous training of cadres, there were no courses to teach the leaders and cadres how to deal with the media, nor was there a discipline to provide this kind of training. There was no media-related content in public management courses; nor did Journalism teach how to be an editor or a reporter. These are important reasons that the party and government officials of different ranks demonstrate a critical lack of ability when dealing with the media.

At present, as the voice for open government information gets higher and higher, press release work is attracting more and more attention. The theory training in how a news spokesperson practices professional skills has gradually improved. However, it has not yet been able to train all leaders and cadres on their ability to deal with news media. With the ever-increasing influence of the media, to generally raise the ability of leaders and cadres to deal with media has become an important project to enhance the party and the government’s ability to govern.
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First, we must deepen and universalize "Government Journalism" academically. “Government Journalism” is a cross-discipline between public relations and journalism. It starts with the laws of public management and dissemination of the media, to study how contemporary government consciously and effectively promotes the important role of the media in building a harmonious society. As the media rapidly develops, as the public requirement for information increases, and as management targets and the content of the government changes its way of dealing with new situations and new problems in dealing with media, it is necessary to deepen and improve the theoretical and practical research of “Government Journalism,” to include "Government Journalism" in the content of the training of cadres, and to popularize and promote the concepts and literacy of "Government Journalism," so that government officials at all levels will fully understand the importance and urgency of news governance, and thereby comprehensively upgrade their capacity and level of dealing with the media.
 
The second is simulated training with the scenario of dealing with the media in a targeted manner. The purpose of raising news literacy is to eventually use it in dealing with the media. Thus, through the method of training in specific cases and scenarios, the leaders and cadres put themselves in the positions of spokesmen to handle unexpected events, and set the government news agenda. Thereby they will experience the importance of the media, grasp the characteristics of the media, and learn the methods of dealing with the media.

Third, we should make raising the quality of news literacy an important item in selecting and testing leading cadres. We should establish a mechanism of positively communicating with the media, and actively using the media to initiate work; enhance the enthusiasm and motivation of the leading cadres in interacting with media; and increase their opportunity to interact with the media. Thus, dealing with the media will become an important part of the work, and they will constantly enrich their experience and capacity in dealing with the media. (The author is a standing committee member of the CPC Nanjing Municipal Party Committee and the director of the Propaganda Department).

[1] Chinese Communist Party Central School, April 11, 2008.
http://www.ccps.gov.cn/dxrd.php?col=161&file=5170

China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force (Part II)

Editor’s Note: Published in New York, “Beijing Spring” is a Chinese monthly magazine founded in June, 1993. Its goal is to promote human rights, democracy and social justice in China. In September 2006, Mr. Lu Gengsong wrote an article titled “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force,” which gives a detailed analysis of China’s police system. Mr. Lu, a member of China’s Democratic Party in Zhejiang Province, has written a number of articles to examine China’s political system as a freelance writer. In August 2007, Public Security Bureau in Hangzhou City (capital city of Zhejiang Province) arrested him. In January 2008, local procuratorial authorities accused him of “inciting the subversion of state power.” The following is the translation of Mr. Lu’s article “China’s Armed Police and Nationalization of the Police Force.” [1]

Part II

Not a Typical Army but Similar to an Army; Not a Typical Police Force but more than a Police Force

The PAP used to be treated as “auxiliary division” within China’s military system. However, after Jiang Zemin took office, this “auxiliary division” became the “normal division”. Over the time, the size of the PAP grew larger and larger; the equipments became more and more sophisticated; the official perks it enjoyed got better and better. It almost became “The Central Army” or “The Privileged Core”. In 1988, when the military ranks were initially assigned, Commander of the PAP at Headquarters(HQ) level Li Lianxiu was Lieutenant General, and the Political Commissar Zhang Xiufu was Major General. The Commanders and Political Commissars of the PAP Corps under the PAP HQ were Senior Colonels or Colonels. Now, the ranks of the Commanders and the Political Commissars of the PAP at HQ level are all Generals while the ranks of the Commanders and the Political Commissars of the PAP Corps at levels of Province, Autonomous region or major municipality are all Major Generals. And also the ranks of the Directors and Political Commissars of the PAP at commander-in-chief’s office level for Gold Mining Troops, Hydro Power Troops, Forestry Troops, Transportation Troops, Xinjiang Construction Regiment, and Three Georges Dam Project of Yangtze River are all Major Generals. Although the PAP technically is at the Grand Military Region level with a size of 1.5 million people – half of the total PLA force. Expanding the PAP to such a large organization was to satisfy Jiang Zemin’s personal agenda. During his reign, the PAP was turned into his private military force as it was called “Jiang’s Family Army”. Jiang took office with fear after the June 4th Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Without military experience and the prestige like Mao or Deng, he was extremely afraid that the Military would not listen to him and he be out of control. Under the political pretense of “stability supercedes everything”, he kept the PAP under his control. He appointed his confidant Ba Zhongyan (former Commander of Shanghai Garrison) as Chief Commander of the PAP HQ. Meanwhile, Jiang expanded the PAP and turned it into his private army. Jiang’s restructuring of the PAP was based on the following considerations: Firstly, he didn’t have any military power or experience; if difficult to establish his reputation in the military in a short time, it would be better to create a new force as his own private army in promoting his reputation in the military.
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Secondly, one of the PAP’s responsibilities was to guard the safety of leaders of the Party and the Central Government. Through the PAP security duties, Jiang could subject other central government leaders under his surveillance. Thirdly, under the international community’s pressure for disarmament, by just converting part of the military force into armed police, he would still be able to keep the same amount of armed force while earning himself the international reputation of the cooperation in disarmament and winning the support from the part of the military that’s been kept. Finally, when the military was used to suppress the Students Movement in 1989, even Deng’s decision was opposed by senior military officials. However, if the PAP were used, it would be by the book, since one of the main duties of the PAP is to suppress domestic rebellions.

When Jiang was restructuring the PAP, he had another intention: to contain the PLA. Albeit Chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC), he had never led troops in a war, so he had to worry about the possible situation when the military turns back against him. If there was a riot and face-to-face fight, the PAP, equipped with short-range weapons and martial arts, had a natural advantage over the PLA that were only good at long-range weapons. In 1992, it was reported that the Ministry of National Security acquired an intelligence report for the White House from U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The report said that after Deng’s death, Chinese communist regime would face a great threat. If any incident like June 4th Tiananmen Students Movement in 1989 happened again, the Chinese Communist Party would lose its power for sure. In the report CIA concluded that Deng’s death would signify the end of the CCP’s ruling by military strongmen who believed in “political power from the gun”. Under such situation, if any incident like June 4th Tiananmen Students Movement in 1989 should happen again, the Chinese leaders would not have the abilities or the guts to order the military to suppress people, let alone, with group leadership, for all top leaders of the CCP to agree on such a matter unanimously. As long as one or two leaders should disagree, the CCP would fall apart. In other words, the CCP’s power was maintained by its military forces. When it suddenly lost its powerful leader with guts and ability to marshal the military forces, the consequence would be inconceivable. This was what Jiang feared the most. Therefore, with strategies from Zeng Qinghong and other advisors, Jiang started to get into the PAP business and the business went “better and better”.

The PAP was formally created in 1983. During its first 20 years, its name, structure and designation had not changed much. In October of 1996, the CMC converted 14 PLA infantry divisions to be part of the PAP, directly under the leadership of the PAP HQ as the mobile division of the PAP [Internal] Security Troops.  In the beginning of 1999, the PAP specialty troops that previously reported to various state ministries – the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops, the Transportation Troops and the Forestry Troops – were completely changed to the direct leadership of the PAP HQ, creating at the HQ level the PAP Forestry Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Hydro Power Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Transportation Commander-in-Chief’s Office, the PAP Gold Mining Commander-in-Chief’s Office and the PAP Xinjiang Production and Construction Regiment Commander-in-Chief’s Office. In the beginning of 20th Century, the PAP Three Gorges Dam Project Commander-in-Chief’s Office was also created.
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The PAP system has three major components: the Border Patrol Troops, the Fire Fighting Troops and the Security Troops are under the Public Security system; the Internal Security Troops is under the military system; the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops, the Transportation Troops and the Forestry Troops are under various ministries. The Internal Security Troops, consisting of the PAP corps at the levels of province, autonomous region and provincial-level city, and mobile divisions, is the essential force of the PAP. Different levels of the Internal Security Troops are governed by the local party committees, administrative authorities, and their superiors inside the PAP system. The operation of the Hydro Power Troops, the Gold Mining Troops and the Transportation Troops are managed by the Ministry of Public Security and their related ministries – the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Metallurgy and Ministry of Transportation. The Forestry Troops is subject to dual leadership of mainly the Forestry Ministry system and the Ministry of Public Security system, and also subject to the leadership of both central and local governments, but mainly local governments. What’s more, there is a specialty corps in the PAP system, called the PAP Specialty Police Corps. There are two types of Specialty Police Corps, one under the PAP and one under the Public Security system. The Specialty Police Corps under the Public Security system does not belong to the PAP system but under local Police Departments. The Specialty Police Corps under the PAP was actually called “The PAP Beijing Specialty Police College” (a unit at the administrative level of Lt. General /Deputy Governor, i.e., [Grand] Military Region/Provincial level). This is a new kind of specialty police corps that can be called a corps or college, and is a combination of both. The predecessor of the PAP Specialty Police Corps was the “Anti-Hijack Specialty Police Corps” established on July 22, 1982, code-named “Police Corps #727 of the Ministry of Public Security”. In 1983, the Corps was changed to be under the PAP HQ and was renamed as “China PAP Specialty Police Group”. Its tasks were explicitly defined to be anti-hijack, anti-terrorism and anti-riot. Later on, its name was changed to “China PAP Specialty Police School” according to the regulatory/policy directives issued regularly by State Council and Ministry of Public Security. In September of 1985, the school recruited its first batch of students. In August of 1999, the renowned “Specialty Policewomen’s Unit of the PAP Sichuan Corps” moved to Beijing and became the first specialty policewomen’s combat unit in the “PAP Beijing Specialty Police School”. In May of 2005, it changed its name to the “PAP Beijing Specialty Police College” according to the CMC’s approval. The College had two specialties – specialized policing and reconnaissance. It consisted of three cadet units and was a three-year college. Since 2004, it started to recruit cadets for Bachelor’s Degrees. After their graduation, some of them were assigned to the Combat Division of the PAP Beijing Specialty Police College; the majority of the cadets were assigned to the PAP Specialty Police Corps at provincial level as the essential members in training or combating; some were assigned to be commanders with mobile divisions. In nature, the PAP specialty police was internal security service.

During the period when Jiang Zemin was in power, the PAP suddenly became dominant. Not only did they become CCP’s favorite among the military but also came across as the overbearing big brother with police force. It turned out that they were not a typical army but similar to an army, not a typical police force but more than a police force. The head counts of the PAP were half of the PLA and were about the same as the police force. But its weaponry was much better than that of the police force.
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At the same time, its light weaponry was also better than that of the military. And its jurisdiction spanned that of the military and the police force. The critical functions of the PAP for the CCP are the guard and internal security service. The internal security service functions as the guards for the CCP officials and top leadership organizations.  The PAP Security Troops has a nickname – “Commander’s Nine City Gates Infantry” which, of course, refers to the armed police force in Beijing. The CCP top leaders are all cowards. Beijing’s security force is a multi-layered organization that consists of the Central Security Bureau, the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security, the Beijing PAP Corps and the Beijing Garrison. The Central Security Bureau is also called the Ninth Bureau of the General Office of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCCCP), which is directly controlled by CMC. Its responsibility is to safeguard the leaders above the levels of Standing Committee of the Politburo of CCP and CMC.  The Ninth Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP was the former Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP, created in April, 1949 in Xibaipo Village.  In March of 1950, it was expanded and became the Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP, also called the Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security.  The responsibilities of the Eighth Bureau covered many areas. At that time, the Director was Liu Wei and the Deputy Directors were Wang Dongxing (concurrently as the Chief of the First Division of the General Office of CCCCP), Meng Zhaoliang and Yue Xin. There were security, health and supply sections under the Eighth Bureau. In 1953, to change the situation that the Eighth Bureau had too many duties, it was divided into two components. Those who were in charge of the internal security of Zhongnanhai Compound in the First Division became the Zhongnanhai Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP (the Ninth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security). Its Director was Wang Dongxing and Deputy Director was Zhang Yaoci. It was responsible for the internal security service for Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Chen Yun, and other leaders in Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP and General Secretary of CCP Central Committee, including also the security for the Zhongnanhai Compound and other critical CCP and State offices, ministries or departments. After the Ninth Bureau branched out, the Director of the Eighth Bureau was still Liu Wei and the Deputy Directors were Liu Huishan and Zhang Tingzhen. The Eighth Bureau was to direct the security services in provinces and cities, and responsible for the security services of the senior leaders other than those covered by the Ninth Bureau, so called “Four VPs and Two Supremes” – Vice-Chairman of National People’s Congress (NPC), Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice-Premier of State Council, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China, Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate and President of Supreme People’s Court, leaders of CMC, visiting foreign leaders, and large scale public events. In April of 1964, the Eighth Bureau and the Ninth Bureau were combined as the new Ninth Bureau with Wang Dongxing as Director, Zhang Yaoci, Li Shuhuai, Mao Weizhong, Yang Dezhong, Hao Ruoyu and Wang Shengrong as Deputy Directors. In October of 1969, the Ninth Bureau and the Central Security Regiment (Unit 8431, established in 1942 from the Security Battalion and Central Instructors Group) were combined as the Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP, under the military system, promoted to the corps level. The Chief of the Division was Wang Dongxing and 16 people were Deputy Chiefs.
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In 1977, the Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP expanded the Central Security Regiment to become the Central Security Division. The Security Division of the General Office of CCCCP became the Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP, Central Security Bureau in short (currently called the Security Bureau of General Staff Department). Wang Dongxing was the Director. In 1979, the Central Security Bureau of the General Office of CCCCP was reorganized. Deng Xiaoping appointed his trusted subordinate, Yang Dezhong, as the Director. Zhang Yaoci who used to be responsible for Mao Zedong’s security was appointed as Deputy Chief of Staff of Chengdu Military Region. Former Deputy Directors Wu Jianhua, Wu Jicheng, Mao Weizhong and Di Fucai were all promoted to positions at provincial military region’s level. This personnel restructuring was called “The Big Personnel Reshuffle of Palace Guards”.  In August of 1994, Jiang Zemin appointed his trusted subordinate, You Xigui, as the Director of Central Security Bureau (concurrently as the Chief of the Central Security Division), and Yang Dezhong was kicked out. Shortly before the CCP’s 16th National Congress, Jiang Zemin’s trusted subordinate, Wang Gang, the Party Secretary of Central Security Bureau, and You Xigui strongly urged Jiang Zemin to be the Head of the Central Security Bureau “on behalf of” all the officials and soldiers of the Central Security Bureau. Thus, a new position was created – First Political Commissar of Central Security Bureau. By October 15, 2002, the restructuring of the Central Security Bureau was done. The new Central Security Force consisted of the Specialty Police Corps from the Chengdu Military Region, the Security Corps from Shenyang Military Region and the Second Artillery Corps, totaling 5600 officials and soldiers.

In the beginning of November, 2002 (right before the CCP’s 16th National Congress), CCCCP and the CMC announced that Jiang Zemin was appointed First Political Commissar of Central Security Bureau. It was reported that the Central Security Bureau was restructured again completely in all different levels, from squad, platoon, company, battalion to division, before Hu Jintao’s visit to U.S. on April 18, 2006. Although the information on the internet still indicated that You Xigui was the Director and Zhang Baozhong, Ma Jinhu, Zhao Liujiang, Sun Zhigong, Yan Min, Jiang Guangqing and Li Hongfu were Deputy Directors. In fact, the Bureau was already restructured again. You Xigui was only responsible for Jiang Zemin’s personal security. The daily operation of the Central Security Bureau was under Sun Zhigong, Hu Jintao’s personal security chief. It was reported that this was another “Big Personnel Reshuffle of Palace Guards”. In July of 2005, the top leaders of the PAP HQ were also changed: the former Deputy Chief of Staff, Liu Hongjun, was promoted as Deputy Commander, the former Deputy Commander, Liu Shimin, was appointed as Deputy Political Commissar, the former Deputy Director of Political Department, Li Qingyin, was promoted as Deputy Political Commissar. The local PAP corps were also restructured, including the top leaders at military corps/provincial level, such as Sichuan Province, Jilin Province and Qinghai Province. It was reported that this restructuring of the PAP force was one of Hu Jintao’s measures to consolidate his power.
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After the restructuring, the Eight Bureau was under the PAP system, and its correspondent local subordinates, such as the Eighth Divisions at the levels of Provincial Public Security Offices and City Public Security Bureaus, are all under the PAP system; but they are under the jurisdiction of Public Security system. The Eighth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security is now called the Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). Its Director is the PAP Major General Dong Fuyuan. It is still responsible for the so-called “Four VPs and Two Supremes” – Vice-Chairman of National People’s Congress (NPC), Vice-President of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice-Premier of State Council, Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China, Procurator-General of Supreme People’s Procuratorate and President of Supreme People’s Court, and important foreign affairs events.

The responsibilities of the Central Security Bureau and the Security Bureau of MPS are to safeguard the top leaders of CCP. However, Beijing is a place with a lot of top officials and it is also a political, economical and cultural center. The security services for those latter aspects in Beijing are entrusted with the Beijing PAP Corps and Beijing Garrison. In June of 1949, before the CCP took power, the Pingjin Garrison HQ was established. Later in January of 1959, it was changed to be the Beijing Garrison under the Beijing Military Region. At the same time, the Beijing Garrison was also the military service office for Beijing Municipal CCP Committee and the military conscription service work-unit for Beijing City Government. It was under the dual leadership of Beijing Military Region as well as the Beijing Municipal CCP Committee and Beijing City Government. Beijing Garrison had reduced its size quite a bit when the PAP was established. It used to have four full-size Type-A Security Divisions, but now it only has two Security Divisions (First Security Division and Third Security Division), one In-reserve Anti-aircraft Artillery Division, one Anti-Chemical Weapon Regiment and some training and instruction groups. The First Security Division is responsible for the security of important locations of military headquarters, CMC leaders’ residences and other important head offices and divisions. The Third Security Division is actually a Motorized Infantry Division without any security service duties.

The Beijing PAP Corps is responsible for internal security service. It provides security services for CCCCP leaders who do not live in the Zhongnanhai Compound, Beijing city level non-military governmental organizations, foreign missions, etc. Currently, the Beijing Garrison and the Beijing PAP Corps are of the same military rank without any type of affiliation. However, the First Division of the Beijing PAP Corps is the former Second Security Division of Beijing Garrison. In 1999, the former First Beijing PAP Corps (promoted to military vice-corps level in 1993) and the Second Beijing PAP Corps were combined and became the new Beijing PAP Corps (at military corps level, subordinating the First Division, the Second Division and several military brigade level units). Later, two more divisions were added to the Beijing PAP Corps. Among all the PAP corps in provinces, autonomous regions or provincial-level cities, only the Beijing PAP Corps is at the rank of full military corps level. It has four divisions and close to 20 division level units, which indicates the importance of Beijing municipality.
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Forces responsible for the [internal] security services are actually police forces in military uniforms. Their duties are not law enforcement but rather, to suppress citizens. During recent years, the PAP security corps or troops have been used to suppress the ordinary Chinese citizens who appeals to the government for their human rights. It was reported that, in 2005, the PAP troops were ordered to have carried out suppression tasks 21,076 times; 818 counts for casualties in the process of carrying out those suppression orders, of which, of course, the targeted ordinary citizen death toll was not counted in. Observers believe that when Jiang Zemin created the PAP, his main purposes were to suppress the Uyghurs who sought independence in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, the millions of workers who lost their jobs and who were not satisfied with the on-going reduction of their income due to state-owned enterprises going out of businesses or lackluster profit performances, and the farmers who had been protesting because of illegal land confiscation by government officials; to eliminate qigong organizations; and to repress the Hui ethnic group, Tibetans and those “not well-behaved” students. After Hu Jintao came into power, he inherited Jiang Zemin’s policy and used the PAP even more frequently.

Xinhua Criticizes Actress Sharon Stone of Her Comments on the Earthquake

On May 27, Xinhua posted a front page article attacking actress Sharon Stone for her comments on the earthquake. The article called Sharon Stone “inhuman”, “ignorant” and “inconsiderate of other people’s feelings, which has made the people questioning Hollywood’s moral standards”. It said: “Sharon made those remarks because she is a friend of the Dalai Lama and felt she needs to stand up for him. While the world attention has recently shifted from Dalai to the earthquake, Sharon Stone was there to help (the Dalai Lama) to regain the focus back so as to keep him on the world star status”.

During an interview with a Hong Kong television station at the Cannes Film Festival last Thursday, Sharon said she was wondering whether the devastating earthquake might have been ‘karma’ for the regime’s treatment of Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

Source: Xinhua, May 28, 2008
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2008-05/28/content_8266328.htm

Xinhua Blasts Radio Free Asia for Reports on Tibet

On May 26, Global Times, which operates under Xinhua accused the Washington, DC based Radio Free Asia of lying about Tibet and acting as a spokesperson for the Dalai Lama and Tibet Independence. The Global Times article listed RFA reports on Tibet since January 2008 and stated that Radio Free Asia broadcasts reports from the United States and European countries supporting the Dalai Lama and criticizing China. The article alleged, “The mission and broadcasting content is meant to interfere with domestic affairs of targeted countries.”  The RFA program “Different Voices” was cited as an example.

Source: Global Times, May 26, 2008
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/7299712.html