There is no question that China is facing an environmental crisis, a crisis so serious that observers dub China "an environmental time bomb.[1]" Even the Chinese government media, ever so evasive in reporting anything negative about China, cannot neglect entirely the expanding deserts, polluted cities, and dying bodies of water.

How deeply entrenched is China’s environmental crisis? What are the fundamental reasons for the crisis? Answering these questions requires "deep reading," to use a phrase from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz—reading below the surface to decipher the fundamental dynamics and root causes.

The Chinese characters wei ji for the English word "crisis" connote two concepts: danger and opportunity. Where is China’s environmental crisis heading? While some optimistic observers and China scholars believe that economic development will eventually lead to environmental conservation and that the Chinese government is showing more concern for the environment than during the reign of Mao Zedong, my exercise in "deep reading" rejects this rosy picture and, instead, draws close connections between the current environmental crisis and the war-like opposition against nature begun during the Mao era.

THE CRISIS – DISINTEGRATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT ITSELF

If we borrow the Buddhist understanding of the cosmos as being composed of the elements of earth, water, fire and wind, China’s "four elements" are disintegrating. Let’s consider just a few examples.

Earth/land

One-third of China’s land area has been degraded. Of China’s grasslands (which occupy 41 percent of China’s land area), 90 percent has been degraded and reduced to sand, and exposed soil has been a source of dust for sandstorms that seriously afflict eastern Asia, including China’s capital city of Beijing.[2] Ten percent of China’s farmland has been contaminated with heavy pollutants, making 12 million tons of grain risky for human consumption.[3]

Water

The withdraw rate of China’s rivers has reached as high as 95 percent, far exceeding the international standard of 40 percent for the maintenance of rivers’ ecological functions.

Seventy percent of lakes and rivers are too polluted for human use, and pollution worsens as 45 billion tons of industrial waste and untreated sewage are dumped annually into rivers and lakes. The groundwater in ninety percent of Chinese cities is contaminated. Close to two hundred million Chinese are drinking unsafe water.[4] {mospagebreak}
Fire

China’s weakened ecosystems are suffering severely in the face of global environmental change. In southwest China’s Chongqing area, last year’s drought and heat, the most severe in 100 years, is being followed by this year’s 115-year record storms and flooding; environmentalists believe that the Three Gorges Dam and human ecological destruction have exacerbated the destructive effects of climate change.[5] In the meantime, China has just topped the United States as the largest emitter of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide.

Wind

Sixteen of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are found in China, as China’s growing economy continues to be fueled by coal, which provides 70 percent of the country’s energy. Every year, air pollution is responsible for respiratory diseases in 20 million Chinese (an OECD estimate) and contributes to about 750,000 deaths.[6]

DEVELOPMENT IS OVERRUNNING THE ENVIRONMENT

What has led to such a severe deterioration of China’s environment? Environmental scholars, including Joshua Muldavin and Elizabeth Economy, point to economic development policies.

"Development is the first urgent task," said Qin Dahe, former Director of the China Meteorological Administration, in arguing for China’s refusal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. "It’s a firm principle and, moreover, we need good and fast development. Only then will we be able to step by step solve the problem" of climate change.[7]

As the world becomes more impressed with China’s economic power at the heels of a recent estimate that China surpasses the United Staes in driving global economic growth,[8] it is even more imperative that the world is aware of the tremendous costs that have come with China’s double-digit growth rate, environmental degradation being paramount. According to estimates, the cost of pollution is at least eight percent of China’s gross product (GDP).[9]

Why development? While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to convince the Chinese people and the world that it operates in the best interests of the Chinese nation, the CCP "has pursued a single-minded strategy that relies on rapid economic growth to maintain its legitimacy and power," according to Minxin Pei, director of the China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Since the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has not managed to extricate itself out of a crisis of legitimacy, according to Roderick MacFarquhar of Harvard University.
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Who will benefit from this development? The top beneficiaries so far have been the Party elites, not the majority of the Chinese people. The gap between the rich and the poor has continued to widen. Millions of farmers have lost land to development, and both rural people and the urban poor are increasingly disenfranchised as China continues to develop. Of late, tens of thousands of protests have sprung up annually in China, testifying that development has gone awry. Nature is another loser in this scenario.

In his book Development as Freedom, Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen argues that a basic constituent of development is freedom to participate in the processes and access to opportunities; development is not simply an economic question as economic deprivation has resulted from political deprivation. This broad view of development considers the basic welfare of the public. China’s deliberate narrowing of the concept of development, equating it to economic growth, only benefits the Party elites, not the public or the environment.

ASSESSING GOVERNMENT ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

It is too simplistic to state, however, that the Chinese government has not paid any attention to the environment. In fact, if the CCP’s environmental attitude is judged by environmental laws, regulations, and programs, one would come to conclude that the Chinese government is among the most stringent in dealing with environmental problems.

At the core of the problem is the Party’s unwillingness to enforce environmental policies when such enforcement jeopardizes economic interests. The Party’s control over the state’s regulatory institutions renders environmental laws and regulations mere paper documents.

The Louder the Program Is Praised, the More the Problems

In my own research, informants described the government’s ecological policies this way: "The thunder is loud but the raindrops are small. Those who can read behind the government program reports can tell: The more aggressive the government programs are, the more problems they bespeak."

In 2002 the Chinese government pledged to reduce the emissions of sulfur dioxide, a contributor to acid rain and urban pollution, by 10 percent in three years. In reality sulfur dioxide emissions increased by 27 percent in the same time period.[10] This story is typical, and it reminds me of examples I encountered in my own research.

During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), Inner Mongolia started a campaign to turn the Mu-Us Sandy Land green. The local government laid out specific goals—including planting shrubs to convert most sandy lands in five years. The same goal of sandy land improvement has been announced repeatedly. Today, after five decades of repeated goal setting, sand still covers about half of the Mu-Us Sandy Land, similar to the coverage five decades ago.
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Past failures often belie strong-sounding environmental programs, and there is no reason to expect those failures won’t be repeated. The reason being, these programs are often the results of particular environmental failures and/or political pressures, and, as such, they often disregard ecological limits.

The CCP continues its superb tactic of grand planning. Early in 2006, the government published a national "Environmental Plan" that calls for the cleaning up of heavily polluted regions and the reversal of water, air, and land degradation by 2010.[11] China just put 30 companies on its blacklist of pollution violators, etc., etc. One can only wish they would do more than sound good.

Questionable Commitment

A 2005 article in Economist, "Green Guise," has an apt subtitle: "China protects its trees, devours others." Alarmed by devastating floods of the Yangtze in 1998, China issued orders to protect forests, but its favorable timber import policy has encouraged a flurry of illegal timber trading from southeast Asia that destroy their forests.

A further question emerges: Is China serious in protesting its own trees and preserving its own environment? "Alas, the answer is ‘No’"—to quote from the Economist article. On paper, perhaps, but not in real actions.

The CCP regime’s environmental directives are often triggered by crises, such as the recent pollution of Lake Taihu, the third largest freshwater lake in China, by blue-green algae that make the water undrinkable. The water supply to the near city of Wuxi had to be cut off. To reduce the algae, the government conducted emergency measures such as seeding rain clouds and bringing water from the Yangtze River. Ironically, just prior to the pollution crisis, a local environmental activist, Wu Lihong, who for years had called for a stop to the pollution of Taihu Lake, was arrested on charge of extortion against polluting companies and is allegedly being tortured.[12]

To be sure, polluting factories are constantly being closed; a recent campaign is closing polluting factories along the Yangtze. But they are often reopened after the fuss is over, or simply moved elsewhere. The heavily polluting low-tech township-operated factories in the 1980s are only replaced by state-run or foreign-invested companies that are spewing even more pollutants into China’s waters and air. Polluting factories are like mushrooms that are flourishing on the favorable soil of regulatory failure.

The state "Environmental Plan" issued in 2006 calls for environmental protection to be included in assessing the performance of local officials.[13] This idea has been incorporated in the Inner Mongolia government since the late 1990s. This all sounds good.
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But this has turned into a numbers’ game, exacerbating ecological neglect. Local leaders are rewarded for the number of trees planted and size of areas seeded. Under the North China reforestation program that started in 1987 and the "Western Regional Development" program since 2000, the Ordos Plateau of western Inner Mongolia has seen many trees planted and many moving sand dunes seeded. But these efforts have met with miserable failure due to their lack of suitability in the desert environment.

In Uxin Ju Township at the center of the Mu-Us Sandy Land, the total area that has been planted or seeded has, since the 1980s, more than doubled the township’s total size, but vegetation cover has remained about 50 percent. One can only imagine the tremendous waste of human effort and resources in this failed endeavor. The government blames the local people for not taking care of planted trees, or nature for the drought, instead of its own erroneous policies.

The reforestation program in North China did achieve limited success, which has been plentifully highlighted in the Party’s propaganda. But success is only found in limited areas, while overall desertification continues unabated and sandstorms in Beijing are becoming even more serious. That is the true "big picture."

"MAO’S WAR AGAINST NATURE" CONTINUES

China observers and scholars have often stated, or at least hoped, that the post-Mao Chinese state would show more respect for the environment. Has the Chinese government stopped its war-like assault on nature that Shapiro described in her book Mao’s War against Nature? While the Chinese people are not forced to fill lakes to make croplands or to cut down forests to fuel backyard furnaces, the Party’s fundamental oppositional attitude toward nature remains unchanged, and the post-Mao Chinese Communist government has followed carefully in its predecessor’s footsteps in the destruction of nature.

Continuing Degradation

Environmental degradation continues during the post-Mao era, sometimes at accelerating rates. In the upper reaches of the Yangtze, for example, forest cover dropped from 30-40 percent in the 1950s to 10 percent in 1998, while in Sichuan Province, forest cover plumbed from 28 percent in the 1970s to 8 percent in the 1990s.[14] Deforestation further reduced the flood regulating capacity of the Yangtze, with record flooding in 1998 and this year bearing witness.

Of the famed Xilingol grasslands in Inner Mongolia, 64 percent has been degraded, and the rate of sandification has only increased. During the 1950s and 1960s, sandy areas expanded by 1,560 square kilometers per year; it increased to 2,100 square kilometers per year during the 1970s-1980s and 2,460 square kilometers in the 1990s. Sandstorms also increased to 23 incidents during the 1990s from five during the 1950s.[15] {mospagebreak}
During the Cultural Revolution, the Inner Mongolia grasslands were seriously assaulted as the Mongols, along with their leader, Ulanhu, were persecuted. Large areas of grassland were opened up for farming—a typical pattern of exploitative land use that leads to serious degradation. Since the 1980s, even though the official rhetoric has paid great lip service to protecting the Mongolian grasslands, grassland conversion has totaled one million ha, matching the area opened during the Cultural Revolution.[16] While the previous conversion destroyed the soil, the newly converted one million ha, much of it irrigated, significantly lowered the groundwater table and damaged the grassland ecosystem.

Pollution continues to batter China’s lakes that were reduced by Mao era’s efforts to fill them in to make fields for crops. In recent years, Lake Taihu and Lake Chao, China’s third and fifth largest freshwater lakes, have been so darkened and fouled by algae, thanks to industrial discharge, untreated wastewater, and farm chemicals, that they have become unsuitable for drinking or recreation.[17]

While Mao’s regime launched a war against nature unprecedented in Chinese history, the post-Mao government has been intent, even if unwittingly, on finishing it off.

Weapons of Natural Destruction: From Politics to Development

Politics was used overtly during the Mao-era to launch an environmental offense. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, with the fall of Inner Mongolia leader Ulanhu, all those who followed his policy of animal husbandry were persecuted—and this included planted grass. In 1967, patches of planted fodder in the Ordos were removed as a way to "uproot" Ulanhu’s influence; the fields were given over to crops that the Party advocated.

In the post-Mao era, the efficacy of politics as an overt weapon has been discredited, and "scientific principles" have been ostensibly promoted in resource management. But, in reality, it is economic development that is dictating management strategies. A softer weapon, but a weapon nonetheless.

Destruction of the environment "post-Mao" in the foregoing examples has been driven by the government’s single-minded pursuit of economic development.

Development is upping the ante in the "war against nature." Woulong Lake, the largest lake and wetland in northeast China’s Liaoning Province, was almost totally destroyed by a great drive to develop the lake area into a tourist site since 1998. Unprecedented dam and road building and fishpond and paddy expansion so damaged the lake that within just five years—by 2003—the amount of water in the lake was reduced from 82 million square meters to a mere 0.2 million. Wetland around the lake was sharply reduced and sandy land expanded in its place.[18] Compared to politics, development as a weapon is sometimes even more effective and expeditious in destroying the environment.
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Nature Planned

One has to give the post-Mao Chinese regime credit for putting ecological concerns on the government agenda—at least on paper. In 1999, China launched a Western Region Development program in order to develop the vast western inlands that had been lagging behind the eastern seaboard. Other than investment policies and infrastructure buildup, the program also involved ecological improvement, such as "grain for green (turning farmland to forest)" and a logging ban.

As part of this program, the Inner Mongolia government started to make official "ecological plans." A plan originated in 2000 in Uxin Banner located on the Mu-Us Sandy Land projected that by 2005, 2015, and 2050, tree cover would increase from the then-current 19 percent to 27.13, 43.47, and 49.85 percent, and vegetation cover from 55 percent to 59.92, 79.23, and 89.03 percent. (Decimal points are retained to show the seeming accuracy of such ecological planning.) [19]

The goals projected on linear-growth resemble those of China’s five-year economic plans that started in 1953. If the economic plans have been unrealistic, these ecological plans are even more so because tree/vegetation growth has to rely on nature’s constraints—dry, sandy soil with annual precipitation of only 330-360 mm. Water constraints have kept the vegetation cover to a constant percentage, regardless of past efforts to plant and seed.

Of course there is one scenario that would make this ecological plan work: Heaven must bow its head and bestow more water on this piece of land or perform other, similar miracles. How different is this attitude toward nature than the Mao-era slogan exhorting people to "battle with heaven and fight with earth?" The ecological plan will, like Mao-era’s economic plan, lead to human and environmental suffering.

A Crisis of Environmental Consciousness

Since the late 1990s, a catchall notion for rural ecological endeavors is "ecological construction (shengtai jianshe)," another expression with Chinese (read "socialist") characteristics. A biology professor from the University of Wisconsin once told me, "I thought the expression [ecological construction] was an incorrect translation, so I changed ‘construction’ into ‘restoration’ throughout a paper written by a Chinese student."

There exists a stark contrast between ecological construction, an aggressive effort to rebuild the environment, and ecological restoration, an environmental movement in the US that adopts non-aggressive methods to restore natural ecosystems. The word "construction" comes from the "socialist construction" movement of the early 1950s. Its goal was the transformation of the Chinese people into new beings of socialist ideology. The notion of human reformation and domination has now been carried over into "ecological construction" projects, fostering aggressive attitudes toward nature. The essential meaning, connectivity, and limits of ecology have been totally cast away.
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The concept of "ecological construction" has been used by the Party to frame ecological consciousness in the minds of the Chinese people. The Party has, fitting for its nature, blamed the local people for environmental problems, citing the "population of being poorly educated" or "backward consciousness." Even some Chinese scholars are following this logic to "blame the victims." In reality, the socialist project has been, from the start, a project to reform people’s consciousness. During the Mao era, the Party instilled political ideology in the minds of the Chinese people by force, destroying traditional cultural values. In the reform era, while political ideology education has failed miserably (such as Jiang Zemin’s "three represents" and Hu Jintao’s "maintaining advancement"), other education efforts, such as in market consciousness and ecological consciousness, continue to twist the Chinese minds.

Lack of freedom in the media ensures that alternative notions of ecology do not have space to grow.

On the dry lands of Inner Mongolia, for example, people have equated ecology with "planting trees and grass," after having been "educated" through the government "ecological construction" projects that have focused narrowly on planting and seeding, a focus that fits well with the Party’s economic standpoint and that boosts local leaders’ achievement scores. But what about the ecosystem itself? Scientists have pointed out that trees are not suitable for this arid land because they use up too much water and can make adjacent vegetation wither. Repeated failures in planting and seeding also testify that aggressive "improvement" does not work. While ecological projects can "construct" trees in limited locations, they have not stopped the continuation of wholesale degradation.[20]

At an international workshop on China’s environmental activism that I attended in 2004, some journalists proudly announced their environmental participation by "planting trees in Inner Mongolia’s desert areas." Hearing this, I had to marvel at the sheer effectiveness of the official ecological education. Yet, the very success of the Party’s education on the public’s environmental consciousness is a disaster for the environment itself.

To be sure, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [21] on the environment are growing in China, especially in Beijing and southwest China. But these organizations have largely been confined to certain areas, such as urban energy saving and recycling, biodiversity conservation, and environmental education, and they have not been able to affect major policies.[22] These NGOs are having a growing influence on popular views about nature in urban settings, but in the vast countryside where the ecosystems are deteriorating, they are in no way providing a viable force to counter the influence of the Party’s propaganda.

A WAY OUT?

It is widely acknowledged that environmental problems come not from a lack of understanding of environmental processes, but from a lack of political will and social commitment. China’s environmental crisis is a crisis of both politics and consciousness.
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The CCP’s narrow and instrumental view of the environment has led to policies that rank the environment subordinate to development, and the environment is made to bleed. The CCP government has actively channeled public environmental consciousness toward aggressive attitudes and acts against nature. The post-Mao government has continued to write and enact policies that only further the damage to the environment begun in Mao’s time.

In her well-known book Mao’s War against Nature, Professor Judith Shapiro from American University argues that the Chinese regime’s oppression of the people and of the environment went hand in hand. And they still do today. When we read about China’s continuing abuse of human rights, its reinforcement of a "digital iron curtain" (the "golden shield" Internet policing system), its persecution of dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners, we can see the root cause of China’s environmental plight.

The ruthless policy of top-down political control offers no accountability to the people or the environment, and it can only lead to societal and environmental decay.

Is there a way out? Let me end this article with a statement from Tang Xiyang, a renowned Chinese intellectual and environmentalist, who, in response to the question of China’s biggest environmental problems, replied, "Democracy. If you don’t have democracy, you can’t have real environmental protection."[23]

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References: 

[1] John Boudreau: Rising threat, insidebayarea.com, July 23, 2007. http://www.insidebayarea.com/ci_6437388
[2]  State Environmental Protection Agency: Zhongguo shengtai baohu (Ecological Protection in China), June 5, 2006. http://env.people.com.cn/GB/1074/4434414.html
[3]  John Boudreau: Rising threat, insidebayarea.com, July 23, 2007.
[4]  John Boudreau: Rising threat, insidebayarea.com, July 23, 2007; Elizabeth Economy: The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Cornell University Press, 2005. 
[5]  http://epochtimes.com/gb/7/7/28/n1785756.htm
[6]  Qi Zhifeng: Zhongguo huanjing ehua de genyuan hezai (What is the root cause of China’s environmental deterioration)? Voice of America – Chinese, July 27, 2007.   http://www.voanews.com 
[7]  Elizabeth Economy: China vs. Earth. The Nation, May 7, 2007.
[8]  Patrice Hill: China powering world economy. Washington Times, July 26, 2007. 
[9]  Xinmin Pei: The high cost of prosperity. International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2007.
[10]  Economy: China vs. Earth.
[11]  The Associate Press: China offers environmental plan; focus is sustainable development. International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2006. 
[12]  Geoff Dyer: Activist held in China pollution battle, Financial Times, August 3, 2007.
[13]  The Associate Press: China offers environmental plan; focus is sustainable development. 
[14]  Economy: The River Runs Black.
[15]  Zhou Tong: Zhongguo shengtai ehua (China’s Ecological Deterioration), zhengjian.org, June 22, 2004.
[16]  Hong Jiang: Grassland management and views of nature in China since 1949: Regional policies and local changes in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia. Geoforum 36 (5): 641-653, 2005.
[17]  http://news3.xinhuanet.com/local/2007-07/23/content_6416297.htm
[18]  Ding Dong: Wuolong hu kuai cheng sihu le (Wuolong Lake is about to Die). Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily), November 17, 2003. Since 2004 efforts have been made to revive Woulong Lake, but the ecosystem has not recovered.
[19]  Hong Jiang: Decentralization, ecological construction, and the environment in post-reform China: Case study from Uxin banner, Inner Mongolia. World Development 34 (11): 1907-1921, 2006.
[20]  Jiang: Decentralization, ecological construction, and the environment in post-reform China.
[21]  Instead of true NGOs, they are GONGOs, Government-Operated Non-Governmental Organizations, and are placed under government control.
[22]  Elizabeth Economy, 2003. China’s Environmental Challenge: Political, Social and Economic Implications. Testimony before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, January 27, 2003
[23]  Economy: The River Runs Black. p.141

Hong Jiang, Ph.D., is a faculty member in the geography department at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She has done research on China’s human-environmental issues for over two decades, and her work has been published in journals and books.

As the clock is ticking the minutes until the 2008 Beijing Olympics, now only one-year away, China is also stepping up its security for the games. On May 16, 2007, sina.com, one of the largest news websites in China, published a report indicating that Beijing will have the (Beijing) Olympic Intelligence Center administer tight background checks and risk evaluations on all of the athletes and officials who will attend. Anyone who fails to pass this check will not be given a visa and will be prohibited from entering China.

Zhang Shuyuan, deputy secretary of the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee and vice director of Security Department，said that the Intelligence Center will observe the principle of "non-explanation." That is, the center will not give anyone any reason for its decision to deny entry into the country.

These secret background checks are intended to keep all potential dissidents completely out of sight during the Olympics. Included are a long list of individuals and organizations that the regime regards as enemies. According to sources in China’s Ministry of Public Security, in April 2007, the Ministry issued an internal secret directive called "Notification on Strictly Carrying Out Background Investigations on Candidates for the Olympics and Performing Pre-Selection Screening." The notice went to all of its local offices in China and to embassies and consulates overseas. The directive lists 43 categories of people who will be investigated and barred from the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Categories include such groups as overseas hostile forces, counter-revolutionary figures, the Dalai Lama and affiliates, Falun Gong, religious groups, individuals who instigate disapproval of the Chinese Communist Party through the Internet, any media that publishes anti-communist articles and, in most instances, any relatives or affiliates of anyone in these categories (an excerpt of the directive is attached at the end of the article).

China is also keeping and eye on foreign organizations that might mount protests during the Olympics. AP reported from Beijing on July 24, 2007, that China’s intelligence services and think tanks are compiling lists of potentially troublesome foreign organizations. They are looking at human rights groups that have long been critical of Beijing. They include evangelical Christians eager to end China’s religious restrictions, activists wanting Beijing to use its oil-buying leverage with Sudan to end the strife in Darfur and environmental campaigners angry about global warming.

Back in 2001 when Beijing was bidding for the right to host the 2008 Olympics, Chinese authorities promised to improve its human rights in order to quiet the opposing voices, such as Reporters Without Border, but once they won the Olympics, the Chinese regime never fulfilled its commitment.

On June 28, 2007, Reporters Without Border re-launched its "Beijing 2008" campaign with a graphic of the Olympic rings replaced by handcuffs. Reporters Without Border has been one of the staunchest opponents of the Beijing Olympics, citing the communist regime’s poor and worsening human rights record.
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In its recent letter to IOC President Jacques Rogge, of Reporters Without Border says, "Throughout the world, concern is growing about the holding of these Olympics, which have been taken hostage by a government that balks at taking action to guarantee freedom of expression and respect for the Olympic Charter’s humanistic values." The organization also vows to use its sections and networks to distribute this campaign ad all over the world for one year without any let-up.

Apart from terrorist attacks, the Chinese regime will not allow any "different" voices at this major event. It will do whatever it takes to make sure that the Olympics Games are a glorious event under its reign.

Joshua Lee is a correspondent for Chinascope.

I. Background Investigations on Individuals:

1. International Olympic Committee ("IOC") members, including:

(1) IOC members and guests who the Officials of international sports associations invited.

(2) Officials of the International Single Item Sports Association, referees and their invited guests.

(3) National and regional IOC members, including athletes, officials of delegations and officials attending the Olympics.

(4) Officials of the Executive Committee in the Organization Committee of the Host Country, the host city mayor, host city leadership in the government and their invited important guests.

(5) The Host city for the next Olympics and representatives from other cities applying for hosting the next Olympics.

(6) Sponsors who have signed contracts with the IOC.

(7) Athletes and Delegations.
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2. Media: Media who purchased broadcasting rights and institutions who purchased broadcasting rights.

3. All Olympic staff members, including IOC employees, volunteers, contractors, security and temporary staff, and all others falling in this category.

II. Benchmarks for Background Investigation:

Anyone who falls into the following 43 categories, subdivided further into 11 different subcategories, must be excluded from the Olympics Games and competitions:

1. China’s Enemies:

(1) Overseas hostile forces and hostile organization members.

(2) Key individuals in ideological fields.

(3) Individuals who disturb social stability.

(4) Hostile individuals in Mainland China.

(5) Individuals who were handicapped during riots, those who endanger society and family members of deceased people.

(6) Individuals who were sentenced because they committed anti-revolutionary or other crimes and are thus considered a threat to national security, close relatives of such individuals, and individuals who have close ties to them.

(7) Individuals who escaped overseas and any of their suspicious associates.

2. Falun Gong and Other Cult Organization and Members of Other Harmful Qigong

(1) Falun Gong and other cult organization members, associated organization who are supporting Falun Gong.

(2) Members of 14 organizations that are evil cult organizations and have assumed the mantle of religions, those that were identified by relevant state agencies and members of seven other existing evil cult organizations.
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(3) Members of the 14 risky qigong associations that were identified by state agencies.

3. Religious Extremists and Members of such Religions

(1) Members of illegal organizations, whether they reside locally or abroad.

(2) Individuals who were arrested or sentenced for being engaged in unlawful religious activities.

(3) Individuals who are active in illegal religious activities.

(4) Individuals who distribute illegal religious books and audio-video products.

(5) Individuals who form unlawful religious groups, organizations, schools and other such sites, as well as other religious entities not sanctioned by the state.

4. National Separatists

(1) Members of the "Three Forces" in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and individuals supporting them locally and abroad.

(2) The Dalai Lama’s Government of Tibet in Exile and members of its affiliated organizations.

(3) Individuals who partake in parades, demonstrations and protest activities with the goal of breaking up nations.

(4) People who offer financial support to national separatist groups or activities.

5. Media People who endanger the Olympic Games:

(1) The staff of any foreign media that is hostile to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) The staff of any media that publishes anti-communist articles and those who viciously slander the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government.

6. Non-governmental organizations involved in activities that pose a threat to the Olympic Games:
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(1) Foreign non-governmental organizations that are supported by foreign governments and are known to be involved in penetrating, overthrowing and destroying the CCP and the Chinese government.

(2) All members of different non-governmental organizations who are likely to jeopardize the Beijing Olympic Games.

7. Dangerous elements, consistent appealers and other individuals who are known to be strongly discontent with the CCP

(1) Individuals who show strong discontent with the CCP and Chinese government.

(2) Individuals who file consistently troublesome lawsuits or appeal to higher authorities for support.

(3) Individuals who bring foreign lawsuits in cooperation with overseas forces.

8. Individuals who filed for investigation and prosecution by judicial authorities, or those under criminal and administrative orders.

(1) Individuals who filed a complaint with the public security authorities

(2) Individuals who are under residential surveillance and out on bail while awaiting trial and those with restricted liberty.

(3) Individuals who were once detained or arrested on suspicion of criminal activities and were released without being fully cleared.

(4) All individuals at large and escapees.

(5) Individuals with warrants against them and individuals under investigation.

(6) Those the border control suspects of being criminals.

9. Criminal elements who are on parole or on probationary supervision, who are awaiting sentencing, who are released on parole, who are leased on bail for medical treatment, who are deprived of political rights, others who have received a sentence but are under home detention and those who were sentenced to labor re-education and rehabilitation and whose labor re-education sentence or other type of sentence was commuted.
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(1) Criminals who are sentenced to home detention and are under supervision, whose political rights were taken away and who were given a suspended sentence.

(2) Criminals who were sentenced and released on parole, and whose sentence was commuted to temporary home detention but continue to be under surveillance and who are serving criminal detention outside a detention center.

(3) Individuals who are sentenced to serve labor re-education outside the re-education labor center.

(4) Individuals who were released on bail for medical treatment and those who asked to be released under such a program.

10. Violent terrorists

(1) Members of terrorist organizations.

(2) Individuals who offer support and assistance to terrorist organizations or their members.

(3) Relatives of members of terrorist organizations or individuals known to have a close relationship with such members.

11. Members of illegal organizations

(1) Individuals who are members of unlawful political organizations.

(2) Individuals who carry out activities in the name of organizations that are not lawfully registered.

(3) Individuals serving an illegal organization in any capacity. Individuals who establish ties with such an organization and individuals who use the Internet to instigate discontentment toward the CCP.

[Editor’s note: Early in 2007 Xiamen Star (a satellite TV station in Xiamen, Fujian Province) issued a "2006 Taiwan Report" authored by a group of "experts" and scholars from Mainland China and Taiwan. Those from Mainland China suggest that Taiwan has entered a new period of political turmoil, that "color revolution" is taking place in Taiwan, and that public opinion will decide who is the winner in the Taiwan election. ("Color revolution" usually means a democratic liberalization from an authoritarian society in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. [1] Here the term is borroed to imply that Taiwan’s democratic society is being overturned by red (pro-communist) forces.)

Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) obtained the exclusive right of publication. Here is a translation of excerpts of the report that Southern Weekend published on January 11, 2007. [2]]

Liu Hong: Taiwan Has Entered a New Period of Political Turmoil

Liu Hong, a senior researcher at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, [3] believes that Taiwan politics has intensified and entered a new period of political turmoil. "Anti-corruption and elections were the leading themes of the 2006 Taiwan political evolution and will continue into 2007." "Taiwan’s political situation has entered a new period of turmoil."

Li Jiaquan: Color Revolution Is Taking Place in Taiwan

Li Jiaquan, another senior researcher at the Institute of Taiwan studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that Taiwan had a "color revolution."

Li observed that in the months of September and October 2006, over a million people in Taiwan wearing red shirts took to the streets in support of the anti-corruption campaign meant to bring down Chen Shui-Bian. "Although it has now come to an end for the time being, one cannot ignore its far-reaching implications, i.e., Taiwan’s so-called ‘color revolution’ has emerged. Sooner or later, the revolution will likely rekindle in Taiwan and spread throughout the entire island."

The two most important colors in the Taiwan’s political arena are the Democratic Progress Party’s (DPP’s) green and the KMT’s blue. "Now all of a sudden, over a million red shirts have emerged." "The ‘red’ rises above and beyond the ‘blue’ and ‘green.’" "Isn’t it wonderful when red, blue and green integrate together as one symbol of the harmony and cooperation of the future of Taiwan society?"

"Taiwan’s so-called ‘red’ originally referred to the Communist Party. When blue battles with green, the green DPP frequently caps its opposition with ‘red hat’, i.e. ‘pro-Communist.’ Being ‘pro-Communist’ used to amount to ‘betraying Taiwan’ and ‘do not love Taiwan.’ Since 2006, the tide has reversed. In particular over a million red shirts have taken to the streets and paraded around the island. Even the commander of the red shirts, Shih Ming-teh, a former DPP chairman wore red all over. More surprisingly some small businesses, hawkers, and small shops, have hung small five-star red flags [the national flag of Mainland China] on their doors, without any fears whatsoever. Then there are others who drive convertibles around the island with five-star red flags, singing the PRC’s national anthem. The communities have had no negative reactions. This was inconceivable in the past."
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"The colors of flags represent ideologies. If we take out the color and ideologies, what is left is that we are all Chinese. That we are all Chinese is the common denominator shared by both sides of the Taiwan Straits. If we all acknowledge this denominator, then, many issues pertaining to Taiwan and cross-Strait relations can readily be resolved." "To sum it up, the island would be harmonious, both sides of the Straits would be reconciled and peace would rein in Taiwan Straits. Isn’t it wonderful?"

Li was a drafter and a participant of the White Book on Taiwan that the Chinese government issued in August 1993 and February 2000, respectively. [4]

Zou Zhengdong: Public Opinion Will Decide Who The Winner Is

Zou Zhengdong, an adjunct professor in the Media Department at Xianmen University, suggests that it is still too early to tell who will win over public opinion in the media war.

1. The Main Stream of the Public Opinion

"The most important change in Taiwan public opinion in 2006 was the rise of independent public opinion, represented by the ‘million men to bring down Bian.’ This is the largest mass movement independent of any party since Taiwan lifted the martial law (i.e., the ‘Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion’ from 1948 to 1987). It goes beyond the blue and green and beyond the parties, representing the rise of public opinion a new force."

2. The Concerns of Public Opinion

"What public opinion is concerned about is a barometer of the political situation and a weather vane of social changes. The most notable change in Taiwan’s 2006 public opinion is the relative weakening of "unification or independence."

3. Media Forms

"The most notable change in Taiwan’s public opinion in 2006 was that public opinion became increasingly artistic, in particular the ‘million men to bring down Bian’ campaign has become a controversial carnival, indicating Taiwan’s public opinion has entered a new era that utilizes the technique of art design such as advertisement (so it becomes more creative, delicate, and effective)."

4. Tactics of the media war

"The most important feature of the media war in 2006 was that it had no strategy, only tactics. Neither the DPP nor the KMT could see any strategy." "Whoever can master the changes and go along with Taiwan public opinion will take control of public opinion in the future. From a wandering Taiwan to a hopeless Taiwan, there is nothing that can touch the heart of the Taiwanese people as much as the future of Taiwan does. What future does Taiwan need? Who can promise Taiwan a future? Perhaps history has an answer ready. But who will be the prophet?"
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References:

[1] Color revolutions or Flower revolutions are the names given collectively to a series of related movements that developed in post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Some observers have called the events a revolutionary wave. Participants in the color revolutions have mostly used nonviolent resistance to protest against governments seen as corrupt and/or authoritarian, and to advocate democracy and national independence. These movements all adopted a specific color or flower as their symbol. The color revolutions are notable for the important role of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and particularly student activists in organizing creative nonviolent resistance. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Color_revolution
[2] Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoumou), January 11, 2007 http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20070111/xw/tx1/200701110012.asp
[3] The Institute of Taiwan Studies was founded in 1984 with over 90 research associates. Over 20 of them are senior researchers. http://www.cass.net.cn/y_03/y_03_50twyjs.html
[4] China Taiwan Net http://www.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5267389/index.html

Translated by Chinascope.