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In July’s episode of the “China Insider” podcast hosted by Miles Yu, who served as principal China policy and planning adviser under former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Yu talked about how Xi Jinping misjudged U.S.-China relations this year. According to Yu, Xi’s main concern has not been specific U.S. policies but rather how U.S. political ideology might influence the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) regime. Xi wished to secure a series of commitments from U.S. leadership, but what Xi asked for was not easy for the U.S. to carry out concretely. Thus Xi’s perceived stumbling blocks in U.S.-China relations have not been addressed.

In a March 2023 phone call, Biden agreed to several abstract requests made by Xi, including commitments regarding U.S. geopolitical influence over China and Taiwan. Biden’s administration has not followed up with concrete actions, however. Yu points out that Xi operates within communist China’s authoritarian and dictatorial model, so he has been unable to understand why his demands are unrealistic from the perspective of the U.S. model of government.

Yu said that Xi made several strong demands of Biden during their phone call in March.

• First, Xi hoped that the U.S. government would clearly state that it does not seek “regime change” in China. Biden thought for a moment and gave a commitment on that.
• Second, Xi demanded that the Biden government assure China that it won’t organize “anti-China alliances.” Biden thought about this request and said that the U.S. has a strong alliance system worldwide, but there is no alliance system specifically targeting a particular country. So Biden agreed to this request by Xi.
• Third, Xi Jinping asked Biden to promise not to support Taiwan independence. Biden agreed.

Following the phone call, Xi believed that he had secured some fundamental ideological commitments from the U.S. government. The Biden administration, on the other hand, felt that Xi’s demands were abstract and unrealistic (hard or impossible to implement) — this is why Biden was willing to agree to them.

After the phone call, the U.S. government didn’t take any concrete measures based on Xi’s demands — they couldn’t be implemented. China has been complaining that President Biden has not kept his promises and hasn’t taken concrete actions. Under pressure from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Biden administration sent cabinet-level members to China to visit, hoping to implement some measures from the March phone call. However, these officials (including Antony Blinken, Janet Yellen, and John Kerry) focused on specific, practical matters and did not address the larger strategic issues that were irking Xi. Indeed, in Yu’s assessment, Xi and the CCP have a misguided understanding about how the U.S. political system works — despite a series of cabinet-level visits to China, Xi’s demands couldn’t be addressed.

Source: Hudson Institute Website, July 28, 2023
https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/zhongguoneimu

Huanqiu published an unexpected commentary by the Ministry of State Security concerning the United States’ policies towards China. Typically, such remarks emanate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The commentary asserts that while the U.S. has shifted its strategy from the “old two approaches” to the “new two approaches” and claims that it is doomed for failure.

The core excerpt from the commentary reads as follows:

In previous decades, the U.S. adhered to the “old two approaches” regarding China, characterized as “Contact + Containment.” This approach entailed on one hand, engaging China within the international system and fostering cooperation, while concurrently executing covert infiltration and containment strategies against China. This dual-handed approach intricately shaped the complexity that has historically marked Sino-U.S. relations.

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the rivalry between the two global powers, the United States and China, has unequivocally become the prevailing theme in international politics. Consequently, Sino-U.S. relations have entered a novel phase, with the U.S. unveiling its “Competition + Control Competition” strategy.

The crux of this strategy lies in “Competition,” constituting the primary thrust of the U.S. approach. It encompasses economic decoupling, political coalition-building, security deterrence, information warfare, and norm/rule setting endeavors. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have been steadfast and increasingly assertive in their pursuit of this approach. Looking ahead, the U.S. may well implement even more formidable “competition” measures, with many yet unseen.

Simultaneously, the U.S. has adopted a discernible “Control Competition” tactic. While “Competition” seeks to stymie China, “Control Competition” seeks to manage this suppression without permitting it to spiral out of control. The Biden administration has repeatedly referenced concepts like “guardrails,” “thresholds,” and “parameters,” transitioning from the notion of “decoupling” to “de-risking,” and vocally committing to the “Four No’s and One Unintentional.” All these actions are aimed at maintaining control over the competitive dynamics. “Competition” constitutes a strategic move, whereas “Controlling Competition” is more tactical and serves as a complementary aspect of the overall competitive strategy.

This shift in strategy reflects three underlying objectives of the U.S. government:

• Dissemination of Ambiguous Signals: By releasing “mixed signals,” the U.S. aims to obfuscate its intentions and make it challenging for its opponent (China) to decipher and evaluate its actions—a fundamental tactic reminiscent of the Cold War era.
• Mitigating Overreactions: The U.S. endeavors to forestall any excessive reactions from its opponent by exhibiting “self-restraint,” a strategy that has a historical precedent in the annals of great power politics over the past few centuries.
• Expanding Channels of Influence: The U.S. seeks to create a “dialog window” to augment avenues for influence, thereby fostering limited cooperation with its opponent.

Source: Huanqiu, September 3, 2023
https://world.huanqiu.com/article/4EOkEEy2R3N