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Chinese Electric Vehicle Sales in Europe Decline After EU Imposes New Tariffs

According to statistics from the data platform Dataforce, Chinese Electric Vehicle (EV) brands such as BYD and SAIC Motor’s “MG” registered sales of fewer than 14,000 vehicles in Europe in July, a 64 percent drop from the over 23,000 vehicles sold during June. The July figures represent a 9.7 percent year-on-year decrease (compared with July of the previous year). The share of Chinese EV registrations in the European market dropped from 10.2 percent in July last year to 9.9 percent this year.

Global automotive industry data analytics provider Jato Dynamics showed a similar trend of decline. SAIC’s EV registrations in Europe fell by 38 percent year-on-year in July, with a significant month-on-month decline of 60 percent. BYD’s EV sales in Europe in July doubled year-on-year and were down 5.5 percent compared with the previous month.

The European Union has introduced additional provisional tariffs of up to 38 percent on Chinese EVs starting July 5. It is still negotiating with Beijing, with permanent tariffs set to take effect in November.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, August 30, 2024
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/finance/china/story20240830-4582064

CNA: China’s August PMI Shows Decline for Fourth Consecutive Month

Primary Taiwanese news agency Central News Agency (CNA) recently reported that the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics has announced August manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) figures. The PMI came in at 49.1 percent, down 0.3 percentage points from July. This marks the fourth consecutive month that China’s PMI has been below the 50-percent line. CNA commented that operating pressure on small and medium-sized enterprises has increased.

The PMI’s production sub-index and new order sub-index came in at 49.8 percent and 48.9 percent, respectively, down 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points from July. This indicates that both manufacturer production and market demand have slowed. The PMI of large enterprises remained in the expansion range, at 50.4 percent, a slight decrease of 0.1 percent from July. The PMI sub-indices for small-sized and medium-sized enterprises, on the other hand, were 48.7 percent and 46.4 percent, respectively, down 0.7 and 0.3 percentage points from July. This indicates that small and medium-sized enterprises have been under heavier pressure. In addition, the PMI’s price sub-index continued to fall due to insufficient demand as well as price fluctuations of bulk commodities like crude oil. With a weak housing market and sluggish household consumption, manufacturing has certainly been negatively impacted.

Source: CNA, August 31, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202408310064.aspx

Lianhe Zaobao: “Substitute” Goods Become Trend in China

Singapore’s primary Chinese language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao recently reported that exact, off-brand replicas of some of the world’s most famous fashion items are popping up in the wardrobes of Chinese consumers. The copycat goods range from clones of Lululemon yoga pants to Hermès handbags. They do not bear the branding of the products that they imitate and are much cheaper.

Manufacturers claim these “substitute products” are not “counterfeit” because their quality is comparable to that of the world’s top brands. For example, a herringbone coat from clothing manufacturer Chicjoc claims to use fabrics from the exact same sources as luxury brands Prada and Bottega Veneta, and their leather bags are said to be made of the very same materials as LVMH and Fendi.

As China’s economy slows, consumers continue to look for more cost-effective products and sales of such domestic “substitutes” have soared. According to Lianhe Zaobao, Chinese consumers are embracing a new era of consumption where luxury goods, which traditionally have symbolized social status, are no longer the only acceptable product. Consumers now “tend to shop rationally,” thus promoting the popularity of such “substitute” goods.

Jessica, a 45-year-old programmer at a financial institution, spent RMB 3,700 yuan (around US$522) on WeChat to buy a Hermès-like wallet that would sell for thousands of dollars if its likeness were purchased from a genuine Hermès counter. She said that the leather of the bag was soft and the stitching was exquisite. It “exceeded her expectation in every aspect” and she said she plans to buy more such products.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, August 31, 2024
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20240831-4585205

Impoverished Beijing Graduate Starves to Death in Xi’an, Highlighting Social Inequality and Job Struggles in China

A widely circulated article on Chinese social media disclosed the story of a woman born in a poor, rural area, who graduated from a prestigious university in Beijing. She was not able to find a job, however, and she repeatedly took the public sector tests in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and achieved the highest possible score several times. Nevertheless, she was not hired due to lacking social connections. She eventually went to Xi’an City, Shaanxi Province, to seek employment. She rented an apartment but, due to a lack of money, she starved to death at the age of 33. Her body was discovered approximately 20 days after her death.

Source: Epoch Times, August 18, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/8/18/n14313413.htm

Public Questions China’s New Housing Pension System, Suspects Disguised Property Tax Program

China’s Vice Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, Dong Jianguo, stated at a press conference on August 23 that the government is studying the establishment of a system for building inspections, housing pensions, and housing insurance. Currently, 22 cities, including Shanghai, are conducting trials. He stated that, when purchasing a property, homeowners will have already set up a personal account for payment into a public “residential special maintenance fund.” The focus of the trial is for the government to establish such a fund.

Netizens have widely discussed this “Housing Pension System” topic, speculating that the system could be a disguised form of property tax. The official “Construction Magazine” WeChat account of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development published an editorial on August 26 stating that Vice Minister Dong’s original statement regarding the new pilot program mentioned that “the focus of the trial is for the government to establish a public account,” and that this public account does not require contributions from the public.

Mainland Chinese netizens are not convinced, however. Some have questioned why there is a rush to raise additional funds as there is already a “residential special maintenance fund” in place.

Source: Epoch Times, August 24, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/8/26/n14317935.htm

Chinese Restaurant Industry Faces Crisis: From “Golden Era” to Struggle for Survival

The Chinese restaurant industry is facing significant challenges. For example, Taiwanese dumpling chain restaurant Din Tai Fung will close 14 branches across several cities in China by October 31st. This decision has sparked widespread concern about the industry’s struggles since the pandemic.

China’s restaurant sector is experiencing a collective downturn, despite that fact that COVID-19 restrictions have now been lifted in China. In the first half of 2024, over a million Chinese restaurants closed, nearly doubling the figure seen in 2022. Many business owners have lost their investments and have been forced to exit the market.

Even large restaurant chains are struggling. Nayuki expects losses of 420-490 million yuan (US$59 – 69 million), Haidilao projects losses of at least 260 million yuan (US$36 million), and Luckin Coffee’s profits have dropped by 50% compared to last year.

The industry faces rising costs for taxes, social security, and wages, while prices and profits are declining. Most large restaurant companies are experiencing profit declines, with Xiabu Xiabu seeing the most significant drop – a 133-fold increase in net loss.

Luckin Coffee, despite opening thousands of new stores and increasing revenue by 38%, saw its net profit fall by 50%, illustrating the phenomenon of “increasing revenue but not increasing profit.”

As price wars continue, the Chinese restaurant industry has entered a low-profit era. The once “golden” market is no longer, and experts predict that the situation may become even more challenging in the future.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 26, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202408260296.aspx

RFA: Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges Adjust Information Disclosure Mechanism

Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently reported that the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have adjusted their information disclosure mechanisms, ceasing publication of daily net trading volume data and other data starting from August 19. This has cut off information on the flow of foreign funds into China’s A-shares market through the Hong Kong markets. Thus, it is now impossible to calculate the flow of foreign capital in and out of Mainland China.

Under the new reporting mechanism, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges will not let investors know the net buying and selling data of the overall northbound (direction of mainland) funds or the flows for the top ten active stocks on a given day. The Hong Kong Stock Connect program has been adjusted accordingly.

The RFA quoted a scholar saying that data on foreign investment in China are critical long-term indicators that play an important role in observing the Chinese economy. The Chinese government understands that making the data regarding the country’s stock market more opaque will only lead to faster withdrawal of foreign capital from China, yet it has still taken this step, showing that there must not be much foreign investment left in the Chinese stock market. It seems that China is preparing measures to prevent the further withdrawal of foreign capital. This is just like how China stopped disclosing unemployment data when the unemployment rate was rising sharply.

The new disclosure mechanism makes it easier for the government to fabricate market data in accordance with its political and economic needs, influencing retail investors who do not have a full picture of the market.

Source: RFA, August 19, 2024
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/ec-stockmarket-foreigncapitalwithdraws-08192024053127.html

The Impact of China’s Consumption Tax Reform

According to a Decision reached during the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, China will “move the collection stage of the country’s consumption tax to later stages,” and will also “gradually  allocate revenue from consumption tax to local governments.” Chinese media outlet The Paper reported that this decision to “delay the collection stage of the consumption tax” is meant to shift the tax source and collection point from the place of production to the place of consumption, meaning that a great part of tax revenue will be collected in the jurisdiction of the end consumer.

This policy change will have two main impacts. First, the base price for the consumption tax will increase from the factory price to the wholesale or retail price, which means that the Chinese government will collect more revenue from consumption tax. Second, the tax source will shift from the place of production to the place of consumption, resulting in a decrease in tax revenue for major production provinces (e.g. Shanghai, Guizhou, Yunnan, Hubei, Hunan) and an increase in tax revenue for provinces with large populations and large amounts of consumption (e.g. Guangdong, Shandong, Henan, Zhejiang, Sichuan).

“Allocating to local governments” means that the central government of China will no longer be the sole beneficiary of such consumption taxes; consumption tax revenue will now be shared with local governments. The northeastern, central, and western regions of China are likely to receive greater consumption tax than the eastern regions.

Sources:
1. The Paper, July 19, 2024
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28110425
2. Radio Free Asia, July 22, 2024
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/lu-china-third-plenum-tax-policy-07222024155434.html