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CCP Pilots Ethnic Interpenetration Policy in Xinjiang

The Xinjiang Daily reported on December 14, 2023 that the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in Xinjiang has enacted “Regulations on Promoting Interaction, Communication, and Integration among Various Ethnic Groups.” Consisting of 19 articles, the legislation aims to commingle diverse ethnic groups together. This would serve as a pilot implementation of the “ethnic interpenetration” policy endorsed by the Chinese Communist Party in 2014.

Critics pointed out that forcing various ethnic groups to live and mix together plays to the CCP’s policy of eliminating minority ethnic cultures and implementing more complete control populations living in China. For example, when members of the Han ethnic group (the majority population in China) are imported to Xinjiang and mixed with the Uighur ethnic group, the Han people’s acceptance of CCP culture will naturally manifest itself in daily life and thereby reduce the religious and cultural cohesion of the Uighur people.

Per the CCP’s ideology, forcible mixing of different ethnicities and cultures is used to foment conflicts between those cultural and ethnic groups. This aids the CCP in “inciting struggle among the people,” e.g. provoking conflicts between the Han and Uighur ethnicities. The resulting instability and incohesion makes it easier for the CCP to implement control.

Such ethnic interpenetration policies also enable the CCP to more conveniently organize intelligence operations and strengthen surveillance over minority ethnic groups.

Source: Radio Free Asia, December 22, 2023
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/yehuazhongnanhai/gx-12222023161033.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Government/Politics Social Stability

Sing Tao Daily: At Least 30 Generals Involved in Rocket Force Corruption Case

China recently announced the removal of nine senior generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from the National People’s Congress for their involvement in the Rocket Force’s corruption case. Three Lieutenant Generals were among the indicted: former Air Force Commander Ding Laihang, and former Commanders and Commisar of the Rocket Force Li Yuchao and Zhou Yaning.

Hong Kong-based Sing Tao Daily reported that the involved people also include former Defense Minister General Li Shangfu and General Wei Fenghe, as well as over 30 generals, and many more officers at the divisional level and above.

Source: Sing Tao Daily, December 31, 2023
http://tinyurl.com/4bnss7r7

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Government/Politics

Guangming Daily: China and Latin America’s Activities in 2023

Guangming Daily, a major mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP), reviewed the development in the relationships between China and Latin American countries in 2023:

In 2023 there were many high-level exchanges between China and Latin American countries. Leaders from ten countries paid visits to China: Brazil, Honduras, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Barbados, Suriname, Cuba, and Uruguay. President Xi Jinping met with the Presidents of Mexico and Peru in San Francisco, USA. China established diplomatic relations with Honduras, elevated bilateral relations with Venezuela to the status of “all-weather strategic partnership,” with Colombia and Nicaragua to “strategic partnerships,” and with Uruguay to “comprehensive strategic partnership.” China also deepened its cooperation with Cuba under the banner of “building a shared destiny.”

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held exchanges with Latin-American political parties. [Representatives of] many Latin-American political parties attended the high-level dialogue between the CCP and the world’s political parties in March, 2023; China and Cuba held their fifth communist theory conference in Beijing in April; and China held the third China-Latin America Poverty Reduction and Development Forum in July.

From January to October 2023, trade between China and Latin America reached 2.835 trillion yuan (US$ 390 billion), a 6 percent increase from the same period during the previous year. Chinese companies actively invested in Latin America, particularly in the fields of new energy and the digital economy. On May 11, China and Ecuador signed a free trade agreement. From May 30 to June 2, China and Peru held their fifth round of negotiations for the upgrade of the China-Peru Free Trade Agreement. On July 4, China and Honduras launched negotiations for a free trade agreement. On August 31, China signed a free trade agreement with Nicaragua, making Nicaragua China’s fifth free trade partner in the Latin American region. In addition, China initiated free trade agreement negotiations with El Salvador last year, and negotiations with Uruguay are also underway.

Honduras joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2023; it is the 22nd Latin American country in the BRI circle. Countries like Cuba, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay signed specific cooperation plans with China. Latin American nations actively participated in the third BRI Cooperation Summit Forum, with the President of Chile attending the forum three times consecutively. By September 2023, China implemented over 200 infrastructure projects in Latin America, including roads, railways, light rails, schools, hospitals, sports venues, bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, and power facilities.

China and Latin American countries, all being developing nations, collaborated extensively in addressing international issues, global challenges, and promoting the reform of the global governance system. Close coordination between China and Brazil supported Argentina in joining the BRICS family (Editor’s Note: this article was written before Argentina officially announced that it would not join BRICS). Latin American countries actively supported the “Three Major Global Initiatives” (Editor’s Note: this refers to Xi Jinping’s Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative), with several countries joining the “Friends of the Global Development Initiative” group. China and Latin American countries actively consulted and reached broad consensus in addressing hot issues such as the Ukraine crisis and the Israel-Palestine conflict. China supported Brazil’s bid for the 30th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2025, and advocated for the establishment of a “Climate Compensation Fund” for vulnerable economies in Latin America.

Source: Guangming Daily, December 26, 2023
https://news.gmw.cn/2023-12/26/content_37051988.htm

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

China Faces Food Supply Risks

China is intensifying efforts to address food security concerns. Following recent discussions at the Central Economic Work Conference and the “San Nong” (agriculture, rural areas, farmers) work conference, Xi Jinping stressed that the local party and government organs share “joint responsibility for food security.”

China has officially claimed that its supply of staple foods exceeds 100 percent self-sufficiency and is “absolute secure.” However, “staple foods” typically refer to only rice and wheat. China still imports significant amounts of other essential grains including corn, sorghum, and legumes. A report from the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has warned of a potential grain gap of 130 million tons by the end of the “14th Five-Year Plan” period (2021-2025), with a cereal gap of about 25 million tons. A report from the China Macroeconomic Forum last year indicated that “more than one-third of all food [consumed in China] is now reliant on imports.” China’s food self-sufficiency rate has declined over the past 20 years, dropping from 93.6 percent in 2000 to the current rate of 65.8 percent. The rate for soybeans was 62.4 percent in 2000 and has since fallen to 16.6 percent.

China’s network of food imports is dependent on a few countries, primarily the United States. Beijing no doubt sees this as a geopolitical risk. To diversify imports, China seeks to “enhance cooperation” with over 140 countries.

China’s second strategic worry is the vulnerability of the sea-based food transportation routes on which it relies. As of 2023, the majority of food imported to China traveled through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca (which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea). Transport through the Suez Canal is currently disrupted by Houthi military activity in the Red Sea, forcing ships bound for China to travel a much longer route circumnavigating Africa. A sea blockade at the Strait of Malacca would cause further delays or disruption to China’s food import network.

Source: Voice of America, December 26, 2023
https://www.voachinese.com/a/7412613.html

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics

Where Did China’s Newly-Printed Money Go?

A posting on social platform X discussed why the record high of 28 trillion yuan (US$4 trillion) currency that China issued in 2023 didn’t lead to the expect result of boosting economy:

The excess currency, primarily intended to circulate through loans, encountered a lack of demand. Individuals and businesses refrained from borrowing, causing the money to passively flow back, resulting in passive deleveraging. Traditionally, a significant portion of loans flowed into real estate which would drive up development and consumption. But this time the reduced demand (and the dismal projected return) for property purchases and land acquisitions led to idle funds in commercial banks. Consequently, most of the 28 trillion yuan were returned to China’s central bank. The government became the primary borrower, with local governments issuing new city investment bonds to replace old bonds approaching maturity. The total amount of investment bonds issued by city governments in China now exceeds 65 trillion yuan.

Source: Twitter, @TheXiangYang

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics

Xi Asked Chinese Diplomats to Continue Being “Wolf Warriors”

On December 29, 2023, Xi Jinping met with the diplomats attending the 2023 Annual Conference of Foreign Envoys and delivered a speech. Xi urged Chinese diplomats to continue being “wolf warriors”. Some key points from the speech are translated below:

  • “First, remember the original mission of the communist party and be loyal to the party. Loyalty to the Party, loyalty to the country, and loyalty to the people are the glorious traditions of the diplomatic front.”
  • “Second, be a daring and courageous innovator. Actively confront challenges and come up with practical solutions.”
  • “Third, dare to struggle and be skilled in struggles, to be defenders of national interests.”

Source: China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, December 29, 2023
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202312/t20231229_11215237.shtml

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

CCP’s Tactics to Influence People in Taiwan

The director of Taiwan’s Black Bear Institute, Shen Boyang, revealed new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) tactics focused on influencing Taiwan’s elections and shaping public opinion. Shen outlined the CCP’s “raising, enticing, and attacking” strategy, part of the CCP’s united front work, where the CCP first supports individuals financially then pressures them to promote CCP-friendly narratives in Taiwan.

Starting 2014, the CCP changed its strategy to focus primarily on Taiwanese youth. The new strategy is known as “three middles and one youth” (“三中一青”): focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises, middle and low-income groups, central and southern regions, and youth. To target young people, the CCP’s online army (“the 50 cent army”) upload content to each of approximately 200 YouTube channels every day.

For example, during the COVID pandemic, the CCP created a channel to attack the policy and efforts of Chen Shih-chung, then Taiwan’s Minister of Health and Welfare. The channel had 30 million views in Taiwan. The CCP also created the supporting group accounts of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and Vice President Lai Ching-teh on Facebook. After attracting a large number of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters there, the CCP started to post messages attacking Taiwanese politicians and policies.

Shen Boyang mentioned two series on TikTok – one called “DPP Resign” and another called “The DPP’s Domestic Policies Are Incompetent”. These two series garnered a total of 52 million views in Taiwan this year. Shen warned that ifTikTok users see that 99% of the news is about one party’s problems, he might think that the party is truly incompetent [being influenced by the Chinese propaganda].

Source: Epoch Times, December 31, 2023
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/23/12/31/n14147377.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

CCP Central and Local Governments Both Talk About Living Under Tight Budgets

As the Chinese economy continues to show signs of fatigue, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central and local organs are both talking about the need to tighten budgets.

The public communique of China’s National Financial Work Conference in Beijing on December 22 mentioned the term of “living under a tight budget” six times:

  • “adhere to the party and government offices’ living under a tight budget,”
  • “enhancing the quality and efficiency of work is to implement the living under a tight budget,”
  • “form the concept of living under a tight budget, establish a system to live under a tight budget,”
  • “rigorously implement the living under a tight budget,” and
  • “strengthen the supervision of living under a tight budget.”

At the local level, Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province, and Xiamen City of Fujian Province have all introduced regulations or issued directives requiring party and government offices to “live under a tight budget.”

Source: Epoch Times, December 23, 2023
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/23/12/23/n14142236.htm

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics