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Party Building: Public Security Officials Under Intensive Training

March 20 saw the opening of boot camp training for 472 regional and municipal public security directors at the People’s Public Security University in Beijing. The Minister of Public Security taught the first lecture. The 10 day training will address social stability, the rule of law, and corruption, among other topics. The training was touted as the first since the Communist Party came to power as an important endeavor to safeguard national security and social stability. In 2009, the Ministry of Public Security held similar training for county public security directors to implement a new directive from the Communist leaders to improve party building.

Source: Xinhua, March 22, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-03/22/content_13220070.htm

China and US: Friend or Foe?

China and the U.S. are more foes than friends, says Yan Xuetong, a Chinese international relations scholar. In an interview with the State’s International Herald Leader, Yan stated that while the two do share some economic interests, they have much greater conflicting strategic interests in term of security. While the U.S. continues to support the Dalai Lama, Taiwan independence and East Turkistan independence, China will not allow these groups to succeed. Thus, on the political front, conflicts dominate the Sino-US relationship with few common interests. He expressed that cooperation does not mean China and the U.S. are friends and that the two will continue to pretend to be friends during the Obama administration.

Yan received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley in 1992.

Source: Xinhua, March 22, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/2010-03/22/content_13221096.htm

Xinhua Editorial: Yuan Appreciation Will Not Help

Xinhua published an editorial on international affairs addressing yuan appreciation. It stated that trade deficits that some countries have with China are caused by their domestic structural and policy factors, not the exchange rate with China. The editorial questioned the magnitude of the reported trade deficits, suggesting the increase in Chinese exports may be attributed to the foreign companies in China exporting back to their own home countries.

“From whatever angle, to pressure a substantial appreciation of the yuan within a short time is unwarranted, unfounded and even, it is more useless. Some Western politicians have tirelessly speculated a ‘yuan appreciation’ theory. Its underlying motive is questionable. The financial crisis has brought people to see that the current world economic imbalance is mainly attributed to excess consumption in some developed countries, and to the economic contraction. To pressure for yuan appreciation does not help resolve these issues. In fact, it is developed countries that should make positive policy adjustments to reform their economic structure in order to fulfill their international responsibilities.”

Source: Xinhua, March 18, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2010-03/18/content_13197957.htm

With China’s Rising Power, Japan’s Ability to Interfere with Taiwan Has Weakened

For a long time, Japan has been the second largest external interference factor on the Taiwan issue, next to the United States. Now due to significant changes in a number of factors, Japan’s influence on the Taiwan issue has already begun, and will continue to weaken. The emergence and development of this trend will help reduce Japan’s interference on the Taiwan issue, and thus, in turn, will help Sino-Japanese relations toward a healthy and sustainable direction.

"The Japan-Taiwan relationship" is the basis of Japan’s influence on the Taiwan issue. Since Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency in May 2008, the Japan-Taiwan relationship has undergone the most significant changes in the past decades. The change may even be a turning point. In September 1972, China and Japan established diplomatic relations, while Japan and Taiwan terminated diplomatic ties; this was a turning point in the Japan-Taiwan relationship. However, this turning point might not be as significant and profound as the changes that occurred after May 2008. It is well known that, since Chiang Kai-shek and his son retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the Japan-Taiwan relationship has always been very close. Although Japan, unlike the United States, never publicly protected and supported Taiwan, Japan and the Taiwan authorities kept quiet but close military, political, economic, and cultural contacts over the years. Japan also had close contact with people of all circles in Taiwan. During the two decades when Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were presidents, the Japan-Taiwan relationship was in some ways even closer than the relationship between Taiwan and the United States.

However, the post May 2008 Japan-Taiwan relationship has been very different. In the past more than a year, although Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly proclaimed that he valued the importance of the Japan-Taiwan relationship, and that Japan and Taiwan have a "special partnership," the fact is that the Japan-Taiwan relationship has materially declined. The most important facts are: the Japan and Taiwan conflict worsened over the Senkaku Islands issue; the Japanese Representative in Taiwan openly declared that "Taiwan’s status is undetermined," which caused strong opposition from Ma Ying-jeou; Taiwan strongly opposed Japan’s dispatch of Self Defense Forces stationed in Yonaguni Island. It is clear that the Japanese government strongly distrusts Ma Ying-jeou and has taken repeated measures to pressure him, while Ma Ying-jeou has repeatedly responded strongly. This indicates that the Japan-Taiwan relationship has seriously declined, reaching the lowest level since 1949.

It is widely believed that Ma Ying-jeou’s "anti-Japanese" attitude led to the serious decline of the relationship. Ma Ying-jeou is the leader of the Taiwan region. His philosophy and position will significantly influence Taiwan’s policies. However, the major and profound change in the Japan-Taiwan relationship is obviously due not only to the change of leadership in Taiwan, or to their individual ideas, positions and policies. The turning-point change in the Japan-Taiwan relationship is the result of a number of combined factors. Ma Ying-jeou’s taking office accelerated and amplified the changes.

From Taiwan’s perspective, while there may have been some "historical connections" between Japan and Lee Teng-hui, there was only pure mutual interest between Chen Shui-bian and Japan. The interest based relationship between Chen Shui-bian and Japan was extremely unequal. Japan fully regards Taiwan as a bargaining chip in its policy toward China, while Chen Shui-bian tried to use Japan as another external protector and supporter for his "Taiwan independence" and separatism. Therefore, during the eight years when Chen Shui-bian was in office, the "Japan-Taiwan relationship" seemed to be "close," but actually it was Chen Shui-bian that was groveling and pleasing Japan at the expense of Taiwan’s core interests. After eight years of Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, the Japan-Taiwan relationship had become a model that Taiwan was totally dependent on Japan’s interests and policies. After Ma Ying-jeou took office, in fact, he has not had any anti-Japanese attitude or policy, but instead has been trying to more effectively protect Taiwan’s interests in the Japan-Taiwan relationship.

In the future, if Ma Ying-jeou and other KMT members continue to "govern," the Japan-Taiwan relationship will definitely not return to the situation of the past two decades. However, if Japan changes its tough measures toward Taiwan, the Japan-Taiwan relationship will ease and improve. The ruling of the Democratic Party in Japan provides a realistic possibility. If the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) again took office in Taiwan, it is still uncertain whether it would repeat Chen Shui-bian’s policy in the Japan-Taiwan relationship. We must point out that Chen Shui-bian’s pro-Japan policy is part of the "Taiwan independence" policy. If the DPP continues its "Taiwan independence" policy, it is bound to be pro-Japan, and they will certainly end up having the same fate as Chen Shui-bian.

Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue is the main driver behind Japan’s influence on the Taiwan issue. The greater the ability is, the greater its impact on Taiwan, and vice versa. Fundamentally and in the long run, Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue depends on the Sino-Japanese comprehensive national power, and the rise and fall of the two nations.

Over the sixty years since 1949, Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue, has experienced a process of going from weak to strong, and from strong to weak. In fact, this is precisely the change in Japan’s impact on Taiwan. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Japan-Taiwan relationship was very close. Japan was a strong supporter of Taiwan, second only to the U.S. However, Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue was not outstanding. First of all, Japan had not yet completely come out of the shadow of being a defeated country. Not only was its ability to interfere with the Taiwan issue limited, but it was also hard for Japan to publicly conduct many activities. For example, Japan could only send military advisors to Taiwan in a secret and unofficial way. Second, at that time Japan was totally affiliated with the United States politically, militarily and diplomatically. Without its own independent policy, Japan completely followed the United States on the Taiwan issue. These two factors determined that Japan didn’t have outstanding abilities to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue at the time.

During the seventies and eighties of the last century, due to the establishment of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations and subsequent significant improvement of the relationship, Japan’s interference with Taiwan was generally measured and limited, albeit never discontinued. As a result, its intervention and interference did not come under the spotlight.

The important changes started in the mid-nineties of the last century, and continued to May 2008. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has regarded China as its main competitor for dominance in Asia. The Taiwan issue has become one of its key strategic tools to contain China. This led to an unprecedented, strong attempt to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue by investing increased resources. Since the Cold War, U.S. policy toward China has been constantly adjusted between two ends. Japan thus attempted to take advantage of the inconsistency in the U.S.’s China policy to up its intervention and interference in the Taiwan issue, in order to achieve a strategic advantage over China. One of the important manifestations was trying to include Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait into the scope of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Because the anti-"Taiwan independence" and anti-separatist struggles intensified cross-strait relations for a long period, the room for Japan to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue expanded. Thus the relationship between Japan and Taiwan became close again, with the former’s influence in Taiwan significantly enhanced. These changes have led to clearly stronger abilities for Japan to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue than during the fifties or sixties of the last century.

We believe that Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with Taiwan is decreasing. This is the inevitable result of the long-term and determinant factor that China has a comparatively stronger comprehensive national power. Although starting from the late last century, China had an advantage in comprehensive national power over Japan, it was not prominent due to Japan’s being ahead of China in the economy, science, and technology. This was the deep-seated cause behind Japan’s increased intervention and interference in the Taiwan issue. Entering into the 21st century, as China’s economy, science, and technology have maintained a fast development momentum since 1978, China’s total GDP is close to Japan’s, and will possibly exceed Japan. Therefore, comparing their comprehensive national powers, China already has an obvious and ever enlarging advantage over Japan. As a result, enhancing Sino-Japanese mutual trust and developing Sino-Japanese friendship and cooperation is bound to be a focus of Japan’s external strategies and policies. Reducing and avoiding the negative impact of the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese relationship will inevitably be Japan’s Democratic Party’s policy toward China and Taiwan. It can be expected in the future for quite a long period of time, that, although Japan will not completely stop intervening and interfering with the Taiwan issue, its intensity will be substantially reduced. Correspondingly, Japan’s ability to intervene and interfere with the Taiwan issue will also show a weakening trend.

Some Japanese have attempted to make a "deal" with China, using the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese relationship. They seem to recognize the importance of the Taiwan issue, but actually do not understand the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese relationship. China will never make any "deal" with Japan on the Taiwan issue. Currently and in the future, Japan’s weakened influence on the Taiwan issue is obviously beneficial to the improvement and development of the Sino-Japanese relationship.

The fact that Japan’s influence on the Taiwan issue has weakened will prompt people to calmly and clearly realize that, as external disturbance factors, the impact on the Taiwan issue from Japan, and from the United States, is not only limited, but also will entirely possibly be weaker.  Therefore, no matter under what circumstances, we should not over emphasize these external factors. The most important thing is, in any case, that we must enhance our comprehensive national power, and focus on the formulation and implementation of correct and mature Taiwan policies and strategies.

Endnote:
[1] Global Times, November 22, 2009
http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/opinion/2009-11/639334.html

Global Times: Currency Exchange Rate Fight Is an Informational War

The Global Times published an article by a professor from the National Defense University titled, “Currency Exchange Rate Fight Is an Informational War.” The author argued that the U.S. pressure on China to appreciate the Renminbi is an information war with China in a broader sense. U.S. war tactics include information control and system integration. Its goal is to devalue the US dollar so as to pay less to China. The U.S. has set and controlled the tone of the information. It also tries to enlist allies to jointly fight China. China needs to improve its informational war capability by disclosing more true information on the Renminbi exchange rate and increasing China’s “speaking power” with international society.

The author also pointed out that every 1% appreciation of the Renminbi eats 1% of the profit for Chinese companies. Since Chinese export factories live on the average on a 3-5% profit margin, the currency exchange rate battle is critical to China’s economy.

Source: Global Times, March 23, 2010
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-03/753215.html

China Facing Serious Land Supply Shortage

Beginning on March 5, the Ministry of Land and Resources sent 30 research groups, led by nearly 100 bureau-level senior officials, to 30 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities to research land usage by local governments. Their reports showed that the local governments have a strong desire to take farm land for urbanization. There is a great land supply shortage. For example, Anhui Province has a need for 83,000 acres of land for construction, but its land usage quota from the central government was only half of that amount. It’s a common problem among other provinces. There are also tough issues in land management, mineral resource integration, and farmland management system reform.

Source: China News Service, March 23, 2010
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/estate/estate-tdxw/news/2010/03-23/2185501.shtml

Jia Qinglin: Increasing Political Trust Across the Strait

On March 18, Jia Qinglin, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) stressed the importance of increasing political trust between the two sides of the strait (Taiwan and Mainland China). Jia made his remarks during a meeting with the Taiwan delegation headed by Yao Eng-chi. Jia stated that it had become the mainstream opinion in Taiwan that support for the equal consultation and cooperation and peaceful relationship with Mainland China is important. The economic and financial cooperation between the two sides should proceed to a new height. Also the cultural and educational exchange should be further developed to strengthen cultural and national identity and promote cross-strait cultural, social, and thoughts and ideas integration.

The Taiwan delegation visited on the invitation of the CPPCC’s Committee for Liaison with Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Overseas Chinese.

Source: Global Times, March 19, 2010
http://taiwan.huanqiu.com/liangan/2010-03/749790.html

Internet Plays Important Role in Lives of Middle School Students

Juveniles Internet Usage Research recently released its 2009 report. The report shows that the Internet is now an important channel for Chinese middle school students for knowledge, social issues and entertainment. The research found 64.9% of the students typically spend one hour each time they log onto the Internet. The most frequent uses of the Internet are “information research” (32.3%), “chatting” (31%), “downloading music and pictures” (29.4%) and “internet gaming” (19.8%). Among the “most liked” websites are those for entertainment (54.5%), games (37.1%), and literature (30.1%). The research was based on 9,000 questionnaires in 9 provinces.

Source: Xinhua, March 18, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2010-03/18/content_13194400.htm