Skip to content

China’s Reaction to Trump’s Election Win

Read More ...

Xinhua Commentary Series: Spotlight on the U.S. Presidential Election

Read More ...

Wu Guoguang: Xi Jinping’s Reversal of the Course, Will China’s Transition be Peaceful or Marked with Bloodshed?

Read More ...

Cheng Xiaonong: U.S.-China Strategic Relations Have Crystallized

Read More ...

CCP’s Dark Operations: County Party Secretary’s Sexual Assault of Subordinate Township Party Secretary

Recently, a Chinese case of sexual assault within the CCP has generated significant discussion online. The case involves Mao Qi, the CCP Party Secretary of Wannian County, Shangrao City, Jiangxi Province, who is accused of sexually assaulting Li Peixia, the party secretary of a subordinate local township.

On July 25, Li Peixia’s father reported online that Mao Qi had continuously molested and sexually assaulted his daughter. Li’s father stated that, on May 23, Li Peixia had a dispute with Mao Qi and declared that she would report him to the disciplinary inspection commission. However, three days later, the Wannian County disciplinary inspection and supervision commission took Li Peixia away. She has been out of contact and has not been seen in public ever since.

Li’s father traveled to a different province (to avoid being blocked by the local authorities) and then posted three audio recordings online; the recordings were evidence of Mao’s sexual assault against Li. Li Peixia had left her family a USB drive with eight recordings and said that, if something were to happen to her, this USB drive could save her life. The following day, a joint investigation team from Shangrao City met with Li’s father. He handed over the evidence and requested to see his daughter. So far his request has not been honored.

On the evening of July 26, the Jiangxi authorities announced that Mao Qi had voluntarily confessed and was under disciplinary review and supervisory investigation. Netizens, reviewing Mao Qi’s resume online, noted that he has gone through rapid promotions over the years, suggesting that he is likely to have backing by CCP members at higher ranks.

On July 29, Internet commentator Cai Shenkun revealed on the X platform that Lan Yun, the Secretary of the Wannian County Discipline Inspection Commission, confessed to the higher-level disciplinary inspection commission that Mao Qi called her into his office at 7 PM on May 25 and said that Li Peixia had been disobedient and was incapable. Lan said that Mao told her that Li had threatened to report Mao to higher authorities. Mao ordered Lan to take several actions immediately: 1. Issue a document ordering removal of Li Peixia from all of her positions on the grounds of serious violations; 2. Arrest Li on that evening and interrogate her regarding her corruption; 3. Seize all of Li’s phones and computers to prevent her from disseminating information; 4. Detain her for a few months, even if no problems are found, in order that there would be sufficient time to find some issues with her; 5. Monitor Li’s family movements and control them if they attempt to petition on Li’s behalf.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has silenced discussion of these topics on the Internet. Li’s whereabouts, and whether she is still alive, are currently unknown.

This case exposes the internal corruption and dark operations within the CCP:

  1. Mao’s orders to the disciplinary inspection commission to take a comprehensive actions against Li Peixia shows that, within the CCP system, higher-ups can act with impunity and order opaque operations, leaving individuals with no security.
  2. Shangrao City joint investigation team promised Li’s father a “fair and thorough investigation,” took his evidence from him, and requested that he delete the audio recordings that he posted online. They said they would report his request to see his daughter to higher authorities, but they have since been unresponsive. Their actions may simply be a result of following the CCP’s “stability maintenance” strategy, which means protecting the image of the government and officials by quickly blocking dissemination of information and “calming” public opinion online.
  3. The fact that Mao was able to order the disciplinary inspection commission to arrest Li Peixia reveals that the disciplinary inspection commission is not an independent oversight body but rather a tool of the CCP used for internal purges.
  4. Li Peixia was clearly aware of the risks posed by going against Mao. She knew that, once she had a falling out with higher-level officials, Mao and the CCP system could go to any lengths to silence her, including potentially killing her. Thus, her only hope was to go to the internet and to hope that public opinion might be able to save her life. It seems that publicly airing evidence of her plight was not sufficient to save her, however.

Source: Epoch Times, August 3, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/8/3/n14304155.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Government/Politics

China Plans to Issue National ID Intermediating Citizens’ Internet Access

The Chinese authorities have announced the “National Network Identity Authentication Public Service Management Measures (Draft for Comments),” jointly issued by the Ministry of Public Security and the National Internet Information Office. According to the document, the “network number” (网号) is composed of letters and numbers and is linked to each person’s individual identity. The “network certificate” (网证) refers to the network authentication credential that carries the “network number.” These pieces of information, issued by authorities at the national level, can verify a natural person’s true identity when they use internet services.

Since 2017, Beijing has mandated a comprehensive real-name registration system for Chinese users of the internet. This enables the CCP to control people’s interactions online, as users are required to use their real identity when registering accounts on any major online platform. Each online platform has thus has collected users’ critical personal information. The authorities state that the recently-announced national “network number” and “network certificate” system will allow users to verify their identity using a government-issued app, meaning that individual commercial internet platforms will no longer need to be responsible for verification of users’ identities.

Although the draft specifies that the deadline for feedback is August 25, the “National Network Identity Authentication Pilot Version” app has already been launched on several mobile app stores in China. Users can now verify their identity and obtain an electronic network identity certificate with a “network number.” This pilot includes 10 government service apps and 71 internet apps, including Taobao, WeChat, and Xiaohongshu.

Critics pointed out that there is no legal basis for the government to require people to use “real name” to access Internet, and that requiring the use of a national-level identity will make it easier for authorities to completely block a person from using the internet.

Source: BBC, August 6, 2024
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-69244432

Briefings | | |   @CS Information/Technology Social Stability

Lianhe Zaobao: China Plans to Issue Unified Internet IDs to Netizens

Singapore’s primary Chinese language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao recently reported that the Chinese government plans to issue unified internet ID numbers and certificates to members of the Chinese public in order to verify the true identity of users. This raised concerns over control of speech.

China’s Ministry of Public Security and the Chinese Cyberspace Administration just released a document titled “National Internet Identity Authentication Public Service Management Measures (Draft for Comments).” According to the document, the purpose of the internet ID is “to strengthen the protection of people’s personal information.”

Some scholars said that the implementation of internet identification numbers and certificates will help avoid information leakage, reduce network violence, and combat telecommunications fraud. Skeptics expressed the belief that this is yet another way for the authorities to tighten control over speech. Some netizens commented that “in the future, if the government wants to block anyone, it only needs to block an online ID to ban the user across the entire network. Isn’t it scary?”

China has fully implemented an online real-name system since 2017. There have been many suspected database leaks. Some people found that their real personal information registered with Chinese social media platforms had been leaked to the dark web.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, July 29, 2024
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20240729-4389461

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics Information/Technology Social Stability

US House Bans Use of All ByteDance Apps on Staffer Devices, Extending Policy Beyond TikTok

Well-known Chinese news site NetEase (NASDAQ: NTES) recently reported that, according to a memo sent to staff by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 30, all apps from TikTok’s Chinese parent company ByteDance will be banned from all House staffers’ devices in two weeks. ByteDance’s flagship product, TikTok, has been banned from official U.S. government devices since 2023. Now, the policy will be extended to ByteDance’s other products, including Lemon8, Capcut, Lark and Hypic.

The Congressional Cybersecurity Office will follow up with staff, asking them to remove any ByteDance apps on official devices. The memo explains that all ByteDance products will be blocked and removed from House-managed devices, starting with mobile devices.

The move comes after the Senate approved a House measure in April that would force ByteDance to divest TikTok in the U.S. lest the app be banned from Google’s and Apple’s app stores. President Biden later signed the measure into law. ByteDance has vowed to fight the bill in court. Oral arguments on a potential injunction against the new law will be held on September 16.

Source: NetEase, July 31, 2024
https://www.163.com/dy/article/J8DJ2PHN0511A6N9.html

Briefings | | |   Information/Technology US-China Relations

Chinese Manufacturing PMI Continued Decline in July

National Business Daily (NBD), a Chinese national daily newspaper on business news, recently reported that, according to data just released by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, the July manufacturing purchasing managers index (PMI) was 49.4%, another decrease of 0.1 percent from June. Among the five sub-indexes that make up the manufacturing PMI, the production index (50.1%) is higher than the critical point of 50 percent, and the new order index (49.3%), raw material inventory index (47.8%), employment index (48.3%) and supplier delivery time index (49.3) are all lower than the critical point. It’s worth noting that the production index is 0.5% below last month’s number. Analysts expressed the belief that the manufacturing PMI remaining in the contraction range for three consecutive months was mainly due to the continued downturn in the real estate industry which directly inhibits demand for steel, cement and other building materials products.

Meanwhile, Caixin released its official Chinese Manufacturing PMI numbers for July. Caixin PMI is a well-respected economic indicator monitored globally by financial institutions. Caixin’s China Manufacturing PMI recorded 49.8 for July. Caixin’s report indicated that the prosperity of China’s manufacturing industry dropped significantly in July, with supply still outpacing demand. Domestic demand has been weak, the purchase volume sub-index has fallen below the critical point, and the raw material inventory sub-index has dropped accordingly. This is the first time for Caixin’s manufacturing PMI to drop below 50 since November 2023. Wang Zhe, Caixin’s senior economist, pointed out that, insufficient domestic effective demand and weak market optimism are still the most prominent problems at present.

Sources:
(1) NBD, July 31, 2024
https://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2024-07-31/3486571.html
(2) Caixin, August 1, 2024
https://pmi.caixin.com/2024-08-01/102222126.html

Briefings | |

Japanese Automakers Face Uphill Battle in China’s EV-Dominated Market

Honda is reducing car production capacity in China for the first time, as Japanese automakers face declining market share due to competition from local electric vehicle (EV) manufacturers. The slow adaptation to EV technology has proven costly for Japanese companies, leading to a shrinking supply chain in China.

Chinese automakers, particularly BYD, are aggressively pricing their vehicles to gain market share, even in segments traditionally dominated by foreign gasoline-powered cars. In 2023, Chinese brands held 56.2% of the passenger car market in China, while Japanese brands fell to 14.7%. Toyota’s Vice President predicts “difficult years” ahead in the Chinese market.

The Chinese government has been strategically promoting the transition from gasoline to electric vehicles, described as “changing lanes in a race” by a former minister. This includes offering subsidies and preferential policies to encourage the shift to “new energy vehicles.”

Japanese companies supplying parts and materials to automakers in China are also feeling the impact. Some, like Nippon Steel, are withdrawing from joint ventures with Chinese partners. A 2023 survey shows Japanese business expansion in China at its lowest level in a decade.

Japanese firms acknowledge the rapid technological advancement of Chinese companies and stress the need for continuous innovation and cost competitiveness. While Japanese automakers are determined to improve their EV offerings, they face significant challenges in regaining their position in the Chinese market.

Source: Kyodo News, July 26, 2024
https://china.kyodonews.net/news/2024/07/6c47f1ecf945-ev-.html

Briefings | | |   Geo-Strategic Trend

China Launches Qianfan Satellites, Advancing in Space Race and Challenging Starlink

China successfully launched the first group of satellites for its “Qianfan” low-Earth orbit internet constellation using a Long March 6 rocket. This project, managed by the state-owned Shanghai Yuxin Satellite Technology Co., aims to launch 108 satellites this year.

The Qianfan constellation is China’s attempt to compete with SpaceX’s Starlink project, which has launched about 5,500 satellites providing global internet coverage. Low-Earth orbit satellites, operating between 300-2,000 km altitude, are cheaper and more efficient than higher orbit satellites.

These satellites have strategic significance, as demonstrated by Starlink’s crucial communication role in the Russia-Ukraine war. Chinese military-affiliated media have published editorials claiming Starlink threatens China’s interests and represents U.S. attempts to establish space military dominance.

China has made significant strides in the space race recently. Besides the Qianfan launch, the Chang’e-6 mission successfully returned samples from the far side of the moon. In 2022, China sent three astronauts to its Tiangong space station for a six-month mission. With the International Space Station expected to retire in 2031, Tiangong will become the only space station in orbit.

Source: Radio Free Asia, August 6, 2024
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/kejiaowen/tj8-china-launches-sattellites-08062024125506.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

China’s Marriage Rate Hits New Low in First Half of 2024, Continuing Decade-Long Decline

According to recent statistics, China experienced a significant decline in marriage registrations during the first half of 2024. The country recorded 3.43 million marriages, which is 498,000 fewer than the same period in 2023, marking a new low in recent years.

The data, reported by The Paper citing the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs’ Q2 2024 civil affairs statistics, also showed 1.274 million divorce registrations in the first two quarters of 2024. This represents a decrease of 43,000 divorces compared to the first half of 2023.

This downward trend in marriages continues a pattern observed over the past decade. Marriage rates in China have been declining since 2014, with notable milestones including:

– 2019: Marriages fell below 10 million annually
– 2021: Dropped below 8 million
– 2022: Reached a low of 6.835 million

However, there was a slight uptick in 2023 with 7.68 million marriages registered.

The current figures for the first half of 2024 suggest that the marriage rate in China may continue to face challenges, despite the brief recovery observed in 2023.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 4, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202408040114.aspx

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources