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Chinese Universities Phase Out Civil Engineering Programs Amid Real Estate Crisis

In a significant shift reflecting China’s changing economic landscape, several Chinese universities are discontinuing their civil engineering and architecture programs. This move comes as the country grapples with an ongoing real estate crisis, dramatically altering the job prospects for graduates in these fields.

Once considered a golden ticket to stable employment, civil engineering degrees are now being labeled as “pit” programs by netizens. The real estate sector, long a major employer for these graduates, has seen its boom days come to an end, leaving many students scrambling to transfer out of these programs.

Prominent institutions such as Shandong University, China University of Petroleum, and Beihang University have announced plans to close multiple undergraduate and graduate programs related to civil engineering and architecture. Statistics from universities like Hunan University and Changsha University of Science and Technology reveal a mass exodus of students from these departments, with dozens to over a hundred students transferring out annually.

In response to dwindling enrollment, some universities are adapting their strategies. Southeast University, ranked second nationally in architecture, has opened its doors to liberal arts students for its architecture program. Meanwhile, many institutions have quietly removed civil engineering majors from their admission catalogs.

Interestingly, as traditional programs decline, a new trend is emerging. “Smart construction” and related fields are gaining traction, with 153 universities now offering such majors – more than double the number from three years ago. However, some students report that these new programs are essentially rebranded civil engineering courses with added computer classes, hoping for a genuine shift towards smart technologies in the future.

As China’s education sector adjusts to economic realities, the transformation of these once-popular majors serves as a stark indicator of the broader changes sweeping through the country’s job market and economy.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 15, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202409150056.aspx

China Unveils First Government Debt Report Revealing $9.8 Trillion Obligation

In a landmark move, China’s State Council presented its inaugural report on government debt management to the National People’s Congress (NPC) on January 10, 2024. Finance Minister Lan Fo’an, speaking on behalf of the State Council, disclosed that China’s statutory government debt surpassed 70 trillion yuan ($9.8 trillion) by the end of 2023.

The report, a significant step towards fiscal transparency, revealed a total government statutory debt balance of 70.77 trillion yuan ($9.91 trillion). This figure comprises 30.03 trillion yuan ($4.20 trillion) in national debt and a staggering 40.74 trillion yuan ($5.70 trillion) in local government debt, indicating that local obligations outweigh central government debt.

Based on China’s 2023 GDP of 126.06 trillion yuan ($17.65 trillion), the government debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 56.1%. The national debt is primarily domestic, with 29.70 trillion yuan ($4.16 trillion) in internal debt and 334.6 billion yuan ($46.84 billion) in foreign debt. Local government debt is split between 15.87 trillion yuan ($2.22 trillion) in general debt and 24.87 trillion yuan ($3.48 trillion) in special purpose debt.

The State Council outlined five key areas for strengthening debt management, including scientific determination of debt size and structure, reforms in national debt management, improved local government bond oversight, enhanced supervision processes, and increased cooperation with NPC oversight mechanisms.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 15, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202409150091.aspx

Political Shakeup at China’s Top Social Sciences Institute Over Alleged Dissent

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has reportedly experienced a “political earthquake” in its Institute of Economics. The entire leadership was replaced due to allegations of “inappropriate discussions about the central government.” This marks another political incident at CASS following an “espionage case” over a decade ago.

The event was triggered by the alleged misconduct of Deputy Director Zhu Hengpeng, leading to a complete overhaul of the institute’s leadership. Zhu, 55, was also the director of CASS’s Public Policy Research Center, focusing on public hospital reforms and medical security systems.

By the end of last month, the institute’s director, party secretary, and deputy directors were all replaced. The CASS Party Committee appointed new leadership, including Gong Yun as party secretary, Li Xuesong as director and deputy party secretary, and Song Hong as deputy director.

CASS, China’s highest academic institution for philosophy and social sciences research, also serves as a central think tank and ideological center. This incident follows a previous espionage case involving two CASS researchers over a decade ago.

Beijing officials frequently emphasize that CASS is “first and foremost a political organ, with political nature as its primary attribute and political consciousness as its foremost requirement.”

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 16, 2024
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202409160031.aspx

RFI Chinese: China Steel Production Plummeted in August

Radio France Internationale (RFI) Chinese Edition recently reported that China’s steel output fell more than 10 percent in August from a year earlier. The fall was due to low steel prices and a slump in demand. China’s steel industry, which is the largest in the world, has not seen such low levels of output since 2017.

Major supplier China’s Baowu Steel Group warned that the situation may become increasingly dire. As Chinese steel mills’ losses continue to grow for every ton of steel they produce, more and more mills are choosing to shut down their furnaces. According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Crude steel production fell to 77.9 million tons in August, down 10.4 percent year-over-year.

The country’s decline in demand for steel comes after more than two decades of rapid industrialization and urbanization. Demand has been affected by a continuing slump in construction activity in China this year, especially during the summer. China’s economic woes, from a battered real estate market to weakening consumer confidence, are also weighing on the demand.

Source: RFI Chinese, September 14, 2024
https://tinyurl.com/yum6hw66

Wave of Executive Resignations at Chinese Listed Companies

Since the beginning of August there have been more than 1,100 official resignations tendered by executives at companies with listed A-shares on the Chinese stock markets.

The financial industry accounts for a particularly large proportion of the resignations seen in the current wave, with many bank executives stepping down. This includes Liu Jin, Vice Chairman, who was the Bank of China’s Executive Director, President, and a Member of the Strategic Development Committee of the Board of Directors. Since the beginning of 2024, almost all senior executives positions at the top six state-owned national banks have undergone personnel changes. Moreover, the current trend has seen not only turnover in senior management positions but also among regular employees in the banking industry. According to Wind Statistics, in the first half of 2024, the country’s 42 mainstream banks saw a decrease in headcount of about 60,000 compared with the same period last year.

Like banks, asset management companies in China have performed relatively poorly in recent years. Compared with the wave of resignations in the banking sector, resignations in the securities industry has been relatively more correlated with age. The largest shareholders of China’s leading securities companies are mostly state-owned assets, and these companies have adopted a model of leadership associated with state ownership.

Although most executives who resigned in the recent wave cited personal reasons for stepping down, it cannot be ruled out that many stepped down out of concern that they might take the blame if their companies’ current poor economic performance were to continue. That being said, for an executive to resign would not necessarily provide him or her with full reputational protection.

Source: JRJ, September 11, 2024
https://stock.jrj.com.cn/2024/09/11100143171400.shtml

Financial Shortfall in China’s “Stability Maintenance” Budget: Bottom-Rung Stability Agents Facing Wage Delays

According to a social media report, the government of the Hanjiang District in Putian City, Fujian Province, has not paid grid workers their salaries for six months, and it has recently ceased deposits of workers’ social security contributions as well.

“Grid workers” (网格员) are the lowest level of stability maintenance forces in China. The term “grid worker” or “grid administrator” refers to individuals responsible for managing various subdivisions of neighborhoods within Chinese communities. They are tasked with collecting information on residents, promoting government policies, mediating conflicts, and other miscellaneous tasks. Recently, work conducted by grid workers in China has gone hand-in-hand with collection of big data use of artificial intelligence by the Chinese government. Grid workers played a significant role in enforcing the government’s COVID control measures by conducting inspections, information reporting, health monitoring, and monitoring of “key individuals.” China’s grid workers have been referred to as the ‘capillaries’ and ‘nerve endings’ of the Communist Party’s governance system, and “the most direct embodiment of Xi Jinping’s concept of ‘fine-tuned social management.'”

The social media post regarding the current grid worker budget shortfall in Putian City also revealed that Hanjiang District has around 700 to 800 grid workers, with a monthly salary of 2,200 yuan. A state-controlled media outlet confirmed the report: “on the morning of August 23, the district government coordinated and indeed issued one month’s salary to all grid workers who were owed wages, and efforts are being made to resolve the remaining wage arrears.” Similar issues of delayed wages to grid workers and social workers are reported in Linyi, Shandong. A Radio Free Asia report on this subject commented that “such a confirmation by Chinese state-run media is a rare occurrence.”

The reports indicate that Beijing is running short of stability maintenance funds.

According to 2020 census data, there is approximately one grid worker for every 600 citizens in the Hanjiang District. The ratio of grid workers to citizens is similar in Shenzhen.

Source: Radio Free Asia, August 26, 2024
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/meiti/jj-china-internet-control-08262024103632.html

China Halts Adoption of Chinese Children by Foreigners

The Chinese government has adjusted its policy on international adoption. In the future, no more children will be sent abroad for adoption except for adoption of relatives and stepchildren.

Since 1979, China has implemented a strict “one-child policy” nationwide. This family planning policy led to a large number of baby girls and children with disabilities being abandoned, who were taken in by orphanages. The CCP first allowed adoption of children by families abroad starting in the 1980s. In 2005 Beijing enacted a “Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.” That year, the number of international adoptions of Chinese children by foreign families peaked, with over 13,000 children adopted. In the past few years, China has moved to a “domestic adoption first” policy.

A post from the U.S. State Department’s ShareAmerica social media account on July 18 stated that American families have been the primary adopters of Chinese orphans since China opened up international adoptions in the 1980s. According to statistics from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, 82,658 Chinese children have been adopted by American families since the year 2000, accounting for 29.2 percent of all adoptions of foreign-born children by Americans. Adoptions of Chinese-born children by Americans have dropped to near zero since the COVID pandemic due to the CCP’s suspension of international adoptions.

Source: VOA, September 5, 2024
https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-halts-foreign-adoptions-for-its-children-20240905/7772418.html

Foreign Car Manufacturers Face Cold Winter in China Due to Cutthroat Price War

China’s economy is currently slowing down. Despite supply for electric vehicles (EVs) outpacing demand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has continued to incentivize increased scale of EV production. Some sources have reported China’s economy is currently producing cars at a rate of 40 million units per year, but its domestic consumption is only 22 million units annually, leading to fierce competition among car makers. According to Stephen Dyer of Alix Partners, there were 123 automotive brands that sold at least one electric vehicle in China in 2023. The oversupply of EVs in China has led to accusations that Chinese manufacturers are dumping EVs overseas.

Over the past few decades, foreign automotive manufacturers have enjoyed rapid growth and high profits in the Chinese market. However, they now face serious challenges due to severe competition fueled by the CCP’s subsidies to domestic Chinese auto brands.

Volkswagen had been the top-selling car brand in China since 2000; it lost its top position to Chinese brand BYD last year. Recently, the Volkswagen Group announced that it may have to close its factory in Germany. This would be the first time that the VW group closes a factory in its home country in the brand’s 87-year history. Volkswagen’s car sales in Europe have decreased by 500,000 units annually, equivalent to the output of two car factories. Volkswagen’s sales in China during the first half of 2024 dropped to 1.34 million units, a year-over-year decrease of 7 percent and a drop of more than a quarter compared to three years ago. VW’s joint ventures in mainland China have reported a quarterly loss for the first time in 15 years. China is Volkswagen’s largest market.

As of Q2 2024, Toyota, the world’s largest automaker, saw its revenue from joint ventures in China decrease by 73 percent year-over-year.

The sales of General Motors’ joint ventures in China (which include 10 partnerships) dropped from a peak of 4 million units in 2017 to 2.1 million units last year.

In October 2023, Japan’s Mitsubishi Motors announced it would end production in mainland China due to years of declining sales. Honda (HMC), Hyundai, and Ford have also implemented various cost-cutting measures, including layoffs and factory closures.

In July, the market share of foreign car manufacturers in the Chinese automotive market fell from 53 percent two years ago to 33 percent.

General Motors CEO Mary Barra said of the price competition in China that “frankly, it’s unsustainable, because the amount of companies losing money there cannot continue indefinitely. And really, when you get into the type of pricing war that’s going on now, it’s really a race to the bottom and [it destroys] residuals.”

Source: Epoch Times, September 7, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/9/7/n14326042.htm