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Subtle Shifts in Military Protocol Signal Possible Change in Xi Jinping’s Authority Over Chinese Military

The question of whether Xi Jinping has lost some of his power has been a recent topic of hot discussion among Chinese-language media operating outside of mainland China. The following are some points made on this topic analyzing Chinese military activity.

  • From October 24 to 26, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military Commission (CMC), visited Vietnam. He received a high-level reception. Political analysts suggest that Zhang’s visit subtly hints that Zhang may have superseded Xi Jinping in terms of authority over the Chinese military.

On October 24, Zhang’s Vietnamese counterpart General Phan Van Giang welcomed Zhang with a red carpet. During their talks, Zhang did not mention Xi Jinping, stating only that Chinese-Vietnamese relations have been cultivated by “generations of leaders from both countries.” Zhang reportedly “emphasized the need to implement the consensus reached” by the two parties and by “high-level leaders of both countries” (not referring to Xi by name).

On October 25, Vietnam’s top leader To Lam held a meeting with Zhang. To Lam conveyed greetings and well-wishes to Xi Jinping, but Zhang did not mention Xi. Chinese state media claimed that Zhang had passed along Xi’s greetings and well-wishes to To Lam, however. Vietnamese President Luong Cuong also met Zhang on the same day. Luong Cuong mentioned Xi but Zhang did not respond, expressing only congratulations to Luong on the recent start of his presidency and that it was his pleasure to visit Vietnam as Vice Chairman of the CMC.

On October 26, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh also met with Zhang.

  • On October 31, the General Office of the CMC issued a document titled “Guidelines for Developing and Promoting a Strong Military Culture.” The document mentions “strong military culture” and “strong military ideology” but does not include references to “Xi Jinping’s strong military ideology” or the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System” as it used to do in the past. It says that the military should “follow the Party’s command” but not that it should “follow Xi Jinping’s command” or “follow the command of the CMC Chairman.”
  • On October 17, during an inspection of a Rocket Force unit in Anhui Province, Xi Jinping said “We must uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the military… to ensure the troops obey the (CCP’s) Central Committee and CMC at all times and under any circumstances.” He did not emphasize “absolute loyalty” or the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” however
  • On November 4, during Xi’s visit to the Airborne Corps in Xiaogan City, Hubei Province, Xinhua News Agency reported that Xi did not mention “the Party’s absolute leadership over the military” or “obeying the (CCP’s) Central Committee and CMC,” nor did he mention “loyalty.”

Sources:
1. Epoch Times, October 28, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/10/28/n14358971.htm
2. People’s Daily, October 31, 2024
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2024/1031/c1001-40350708.html
3. Aboluo, November 1, 2024
https://www.aboluowang.com/2024/1101/2123502.html
4. Epoch Times, November 6, 2024
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/24/11/5/n14365087.htm