In his September 18, 2009, speech at the Fourth Session of the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Hu Jintao admitted that strengthening the 75 million-member Party was an urgent need, and that there were numerous problems within the Party that seriously weakened its power as the ruling party. [1] That same day, the Party passed the “Decision on a Number of Major Issues Regarding Strengthening and Improving the Party’s Growth under New Situations.” Xinhua touted it as “a programmatic document to guide the current and future Party’s growth.” [2]
The decision admits that “some Party members and cadres neglect theoretical studies; their studies and practices are out of touch; ideals and beliefs are shaken; their beliefs in Marxism are not firm and they lack confidence in socialism with Chinese characteristics. … These problems have seriously weakened the Party’s creativity, cohesion, and combat effectiveness; gravely damaged the Party’s close ties with the masses; and seriously affected the consolidation of the Party’s ruling status and governance to achieve its mission. We must alert the entire Party to pay close attention to resolve it.”
However, the CCP’s sense of urgency and insecurity is not new.
Back in June 2006, Beijing released an eight-episode TV documentary series: Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety – Historic Lessons Learned from the Demise of Soviet Communism, a research project of the State’s Chinese Academy of Social Science. [3] The Chinese Communist Party instructed its members across the nation to watch and study the series. [4]
The TV series painted an alarming picture of a dying Soviet Communist Party. “From January 1989 to January 1991, within merely two years, more than 2.9 million CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) members declared their resignations from the Party. Those who stayed had mostly lost their trust in the Party.” [5] “… [W]ith nearly 20 million members, it lost its ruling position, and the Party and country became extinct.” [6] Hu Jintao attributed the failure of Soviet communism to “Khrushchev’s throwing away Stalin’s knife and Gorbachev’s open betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.” [7]
In recent years, China has seen a steady escalation of social unrest. In 2005 China’s Social Blue Book, which is published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), stated that from 1993 to 2003, the number of incidents of large scale social unrest had grown from 10,000 to 60,000 a year. The number of people involved grew from 730,000 to 3.07 million. Since 2006, the Social Blue Book has not published any statistics on large scale social unrest. An official media estimated the 2007 figure to be as high as 80,000, which would mean an incident of large scale unrest occurred almost every 6 minutes.
Growing discontent among the Chinese population against the ruling regime is reflected in the movement to quit the Chinese Communist Party and its affiliated organizations. Practitioners of Falun Gong, a spiritual group, initiated the drive after the regime began its brutal persecution of the practice and abused the group’s human rights. The movement is now snowballing on the main streets of Chinese society.
The senior officials in Beijing have every reason to be concerned about the loyalty of the Party’s 75 million members.
This article will examine recent CCP directives and regulations on Party strengthening and will discuss their implementation through ideological studies, the training of Party members, grassroots Party strengthening, and the training of non-Party members.
Directives, Regulations, and Speeches
Since 2009, in addition to the “Decision on a Number of Major Issues Regarding Strengthening and Improving the Party’s Growth under New Situations,” the Party has issued a series of internal regulations—or directives—focusing on accountability, corruption, inspection, and training.
On July 12, 2009, the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued “On the Implementation of the Interim Provisions on the Accountability of Party and Government Leaders,” which institutionalizes a mechanism to punish Party members who, among other things, fail to curtail or contain social unrest. The Party members under inquisition are subject to suspension and dismissal. [8]
On the same day, “Regulations Concerning the Integrity of Leaders of State-owned Enterprises” was officially released, specifically addressing corruption and replacing the 2004 interim regulation. [9] Government entities such as the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, and state-owned or controlled financial institutions are authorized to enact their own supplementary regulations.
On July 26, 2009, the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee published its “2009 – 2013 Education and Training Regulations for Nationwide Party Members.” [10] Party organizations are required to provide regular education for their members at least annually. Members must complete 16 to 40 credit hours per year, with a priority given to rural branches, new Party members, and village officials who have a college education. Party secretaries are required to teach courses and workshops regularly in the classroom. Party member training will also be conducted through designated programs of national and regional TV channels, online Party schools, cell phone bulletins, and “red” text messages. [11]
On December 14, 2009, the Party leaders issued one more directive, “Views on Being More Strict in Managing Cadres.” [12] It reiterates that the Party must strictly control Party members, and that the key is to control the Party officials. The directive has 4 sections with 14 provisions that contain detailed regulations on standards of conduct, training, control, and performance monitoring.
On February 8, 2010, the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee issued “Views on Promoting the Organizational Buildup of a Party of Learning.” The directive suggests that Party members should step up their ideological education on the socialist theoretical system, which includes “Marxism, Mao Zedong’s Thought, Deng Xiaoping’s Theories, Important Ideas of the ‘Three Represents,’ and the Concept of Scientific Development.” [13]
That same month, on February 24, 2010, the Party widely distributed “Certain Criteria for Chinese Communist Party Members and Leading Officials to be Incorruptible in Official Duties.” It includes 18 articles listing many “don’ts” and corresponding punishment for violations. [14]
On March 31, 2010, the CCP’s Central Committee issued another regulation targeting corruption: “Accountability in Selecting and Appointing Leading Cadres of the Party and Government (trial version).” [15]
On July 11, 2010, the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council jointly issued “Provisions for Leading Cadres in the Reporting of Personal Matters,” demanding that officials annually report changes of marital status, relatives/families moving abroad, personal income, real estate purchases, and investments. [16]
That same month, on July 25, 2010, the “Interim Provisions for Strengthening the Management of Government Employees Whose Spouses and Children Have Moved Out of the Country (Territory)” was announced, requiring officials to report to the authorities within 60 days if their spouse or children moved abroad. [17]
On August 17, 2010, about a year after issuing the “2009 – 2013 Education and Training Regulations for Nationwide Party Members,” [18] the General Office of the CCP’s Central Committee published the “2010 – 2020 Reform Program for the Education and Training Cadres.” [19]
In early September 2010, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued the “2010 –2020 Education, Training, Reform, and Development Outline for Non-Party Personnel Representatives.” This was the first special national plan for the education and training of non-Party personnel. [20]
On September 25, 2010, Hu Jintao, the chair of CCP’s Central Military Commission, signed the “Regulations on the Chinese Communist Party’s Military Discipline Inspection Committee.” It is a directive that targets corruption in the military. [21]
Senior Party leaders have made several speeches on the need to make the Party stronger. Notably, on April 6, Hu Jintao gave a lengthy speech on the concept of scientific development at a nationwide Party conference on the “In-depth Study of the Concept of Scientific Development.” [22] On June 21, 2010, at the group study of the Politburo, Hu Jintao spoke to emphasize the “major significance of strengthening grassroots Party organizations.”[23]
Li Yuanchao and Xi Jinping, both Politburo members, on various occasions have highlighted the county Party secretaries’ responsibility in maintaining stability and the role of Party branches in state-owned enterprises, urban neighborhoods, and institutions of higher education. [24]
Reemphasizing Marxist Ideology
As part of the endeavor to strengthen the Party, 2009 saw a clear focus on resolving ideological “confusion” about the foundation of the Party.
From June 1 to 12, 2009, the Bureau of Theory under the Party’s Propaganda Department published a series of articles, later compiled into a book, addressing “six fundamental questions,” such as why Marxism must dominate instead pluralism, why China cannot have democratic socialism or capitalism, why China cannot have a separation of powers system, and why China cannot allow a multi-party political system (the “Six Whys” series). [25]
The Propaganda Department issued a directive on May 30, requiring the CCP’s propaganda organs at lower levels to “better organize the study time and lectures.” “All colleges and universities should take the ‘Six Whys’ as important supplementary material for ideological and political theory courses, so as to promote the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics in teaching materials, classrooms, and the mind.” [26] For instance, in the fall semester of 2009, 64 classes of 9,150 students at Shanghai University took courses on the “Six Whys” series as part of the mandatory curriculum. [27]
The global financial crisis, which started at the end of 2007, also gave Beijing an opportunity to prove the superiority of Communism over Capitalism and reinforce the ideological campaign. This has been very prominent in many theoretical papers that are part of the Party and government’s core publications. A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) article said, “The international financial crisis triggered a rethinking of capitalism. The non-Western developmental model has received attention. The left wing forces have manifested vitality during the crisis. The world socialist movement is facing a new opportunity.” “The shift in international opinion and the measures to cope with the crisis have, once again, proved the rationality of socialism, enhanced the attractiveness of socialist theories, and provided a good ideological and public opinion environment for the development of the world socialist movement.”[28]
Massive, Unprecedented Training
In late 2008, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched an unprecedented campaign throughout China to train and reeducate its grassroots directors and chiefs. For a period of 6 months—from the end of 2008 until the middle of 2009—intensive boot-camp style training sessions reached over 600,000 village Party secretaries; 3,500 county procurators; 2,000 county Party secretaries; 3,000 county public security directors; 2,000 county Party disciplinary committee directors; and 600 prison wardens. [29]
Ye Tuzhu, a professor from the Party School of the Central Committee of the China Communist Party, summed up how critical the training campaign is: “The competence of grassroots card holders is a matter of the prosperity of the Communist cause and a matter of the long-term stability of our country.” [30]
On July 8, He Guoqiang, one of the nine-member Politburo standing committee and head of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, gave a talk to over 850 local Party secretaries in charge of disciplining Party members. It was the third training session for Party secretaries in “Discipline and Inspection,” following the first training of 2,000 at the county level in 2009, and 400 at the city level in June 2010. [31]
On June 10, 2009, 325 prison wardens completed a10-day course. It was the first of a series of workshops that the China Ministry of Justice planned for its grassroots leaders. The Minister of Justice reviewed and approved the curriculum, and the top 4 Ministry officials personally taught the classes.
From February 18 through the end of May 2009, close to 3,000 county public security directors went through a similar training.
On February 26, 2009, the opening ceremony at the National Prosecutors College kicked off the first session of the national grassroots Procuratorate rotation classes. As of September 2009, 6 sessions had been completed. This was the first time in history that the Supreme People’s Procuratorate organized training for lower level public prosecutors. By the end of 2010, more than 3,500 public prosecutors will have attended the intensive training.
From August 25 to 28, 2010, over 430 directors of local CCP organizations from throughout China gathered in Beijing for 4 days of intensive training. Li Yuanchao, the head of the Organization Department of the CCP’s Central Committee, and several senior officials personally attended and gave lectures. Eight such training sessions for officials of the Party’s different departments were held from early September through November 2009. [32]
This was the first time for training of this magnitude to be held in the entire 80 years of the Party’s history.
Grassroots Campaigns
In a September 2010 visit to Henan Province, Liu Yunshan, a senior official of the CCP and head of its Propaganda Department, called on Party members to “seriously study the new situations and new issues facing their propaganda efforts and their ideological and cultural work.” He indicated that the Party members should “reach out to the grassroots level, … allocate more resources at the grassroots level, extend the service network to the grassroots level, and promote the ideological and cultural advocacy work being done at the grassroots to a new level.” [33]
The Communist Party leaders designated certain breakthrough points to focus on at the grassroots, such as college graduates, the non-State sector, law firms, the police forces, the military, and colleges.
College Graduates Sent to Lead Party Branches in Villages
In October 2007, during the 17th National Congress of the CCP, the Party made a strategic decision. In the next 5 years they would recruit 100,000 college graduates to serve for three years as officials in villages to stabilize the vast rural areas. The move was one of the four priorities in the “2009 – 2013 Education and Training Regulations for Nationwide Party Members.” [34] On March 20, 2008, Li Yuanchao, head of the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, spoke at a national kickoff rally and emphasized that the intent was to “train the backbone for the construction of the new socialist countryside.” [35]
The college-graduates-turned-village-Party-secretaries are “an important force to strengthen the Party’s grassroots organizations and promote the building of a new socialist countryside and are also an important source of reserves for the Party and the government.” [36]
In 2009 alone, the central government recruited 20,000 college graduates and assigned them to the posts of village officials, 80% of whom are Party members. [37] Such selected village officials must go through boot camp at a Party school, with practical training in “model” villages prior to reporting to their posts, followed by a minimum of 40 hours of annual training. [38]
The positions for these village officials are not part of the regular government civil service, but were created for these college graduates. They are funded by special subsidies from the central government. Usually the students serve as assistants to the Party secretaries or to the village directors. [39]
The Non-State Sector
Expanding the Communist Party branches or subsidiaries to the non-State sector of Chinese society has become one of the Party’s focal efforts. In July 2009, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce also called on its local counterparts to expand Party memberships in the non-State sector (the private sector). [40]
One example is Nanchong City, a mid-sized city in central China’s Sichuan Province. According to the province’s official paper, Sichuan Daily, a separate Party branch has been established in each of 180 large-scale private enterprises and 403 mid-to-small-size enterprises and social organizations. In 100 additional mid-to-small size enterprises and social organizations, industrial or business ties enabled 11 joint Party branches to be set up. The city’s Party committee dispatched 731 cadres to the non-State companies and organizations to provide guidance and to work as liaisons with Party superiors. [41]
In February 2010 Xinhua reported that, during the campaign to increase Communist Party members in non-State entities, 12,000 Party branches were established with another 24,000 in the pipeline. New memberships rose to 65,000. [42] The Party organizations have tracked down 73,000 members who did not contact local Party organizations due to transfer of jobs or retirement. Some local Party organizations have set up dedicated offices for Party building in the non-State sector. Close to 30,000 targets have been identified, and 145,000 Party instructors were dispatched to them. [43]
As another example, Kunshan City in Jiangsu Province established its first Party branch in 1987 in a foreign owned business. Over 20 years later, the number of branches was close to 2,000. 98% of businesses in Kunshan are not State-owned, and all have Party branches. For instance, 51 of the largest 500 companies in the world now have Party branches in their Kunshan subsidiaries. [44] In response to the social crisis, the Kunshan Party Committee issued a directive: “One Party organization stabilizes one business.” Since the late 1980s, it has urged local officials to conduct Party strengthening with the same zeal that it uses in attracting foreign investments. In 2002, the Kunshan Party Committee started to provide monetary incentives to those who work at the Party branches. Over 360 people received special emergency money. Party secretaries receive 30 to 300 yuan in monthly subsidies. In 2009 Ms. Zhang, the Party secretary in a food processing business, was rewarded for her service with 81,000 yuan in retirement subsidies. [45]
As of the end of 2008, there were 92,308 Party branches that were members of the Association of China Individual Laborers. [46]
Law Firms and Accounting Firms
There are over 7,500 accounting firms in China, with up to 90,000 certified public accountants, employing nearly 300,000 people. These CPAs have not been ignored in the campaign to strengthen the Party.
In November 2009, the State’s China Institute of Certified Public Accountants announced that it would establish Party branches in every accounting firm in China by the end of 2010. At the time, 14% of the accounting firms had Party branches and 11% of the employees were Party members. Earlier, in October 2009, the Ministry of Finance established a Party Commission for China’s CPA profession and urged diligence and online courses to expand the Party’s presence in the CPA firms. [47]
In the past several years, a growing number of lawyers have attracted international recognition for their representation of victims of government corruption and repression, such as Falun Gong practitoners and underground Christian churchgoers. They, too, are on the top of the list for the Party strengthening campaign. Legal Daily, a Ministry of Justice Publication, reported that, as of May 2009, the Ministry of Justice had established Party branches in over 90% of the 14,222 law firms in China. The article’s heading was, “Where There Is a Law Firm, There Is the Communist Party.” From April 2008 to April 2009, Party organizations doubled their presence in law firms. Party branches are wherever there is a Party member. For those with no Party branches, Party instructors are on-site recruiting Party members. “With red flags flying over law firms and lawyers who are Party members shining at their posts, strengthening our Party has moved to a new level in the legal community,” said a Ministry of Justice official. [48]
Public Security and Police Forces
There are over 2 million police officers in China, and over 70% of them are Party members. Given the instrumental role they play in quashing social unrest, the Party recognizes that a primary task of public security is to keep a tight rein on police officers. [49]
In late August 2010, the Party Organization Department within the Ministry of Justice held a 10-day training session, which 2,799 directors of judicial bureaus at municipal and county levels attended. The main topic of discussion was carrying out the “ key-works:” covering the reduction of social conflict, renovating social management, practicing clean government, and enforcing social justice. It also included topics on maintaining social harmony and stability and promoting economic development. Over a dozen experts and professors from the Central Party School conducted forums on strengthening Party development at the grassroots level and on measures to handle unexpected incidents and guide public opinion. [50]
March 20, 2010, saw the opening of boot camp training for 472 regional and municipal public security directors at the People’s Public Security University in Beijing. The Minister of Public Security gave the first lecture. The 10-day training addressed social stability, the rule of law, and corruption, among other topics. The training was touted as the first since the Communist Party came to power and as an important endeavor to safeguard national security and social stability. In 2009, the Ministry of Public Security held a similar training for county public security directors to implement a new directive from the Communist leaders to better strengthen the Party. [51]
Earlier, in July 2009, the Ministry of Public Security issued another plan to train local public security directors throughout China between July 2009 and June 2010. [52] It was issued after 3,000 county public security directors had gone through boot camp training in May 2009. The focus of the second round of the 10-day training was public security chiefs at the county level and below, primarily police station chiefs, detention center directors, national security chiefs, criminal investigation chiefs, and traffic police chiefs. [53]
As part of the training, police force personnel were directed to swear a loyalty oath to the Party. On November 3, 2009, a group of high-level police directors led by senior Party leaders visited Jinggangshan, Jiangxi Province, known as the birthplace of the Chinese Red Army and the “cradle of the Chinese revolution.” A swearing-in ceremony was held for them to pledge their loyalty to the Party. [54]
From the Party to the Military
In May 2009, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party issued a directive to high-ranking military officers on reinforcing the Party in the military. Notably, it stated that the military high-ranking cadres must truly understand the extreme importance of making the Party stronger, strengthening it in the military under new situations and ensuring—ideologically, politically and organizationally—that the military remains under the Party’s absolute leadership at all times. It also alerted them that hostile forces had wasted no time in advocating an apolitical, non-Party, and nationalized military force (i.e., the military should not be used for political purposes and should serve the country, instead of the Party), with the ultimate goal being to weaken the Party’s absolute control of the military. [55]
The CMC directive set forth several implementation measures. One was to establish an accountability mechanism to hold seniors responsible for their misconduct, an unprecedented move in the history of the Chinese military. Another was to conduct inspection tours. The General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army has since dispatched inspection teams to local commands. The Commander-in-Chief at the Second Artillery Base now spends one-third of his official time with the soldiers on the front lines. [56]
In January 2010, an editorial in the People’s Liberation Army Daily further warned against disobeying the Party. “Resolutely put an end to 1) expressions of opinion inconsistent with the Party’s policies and decisions and with the directives of the Central Military Commission, 2) unauthorized modifications of instructions from higher levels, 3) taking action in non-emergency situations without seeking directions from above, 4) illegal group activities, 5) establishing or participating in different social groups and organizations without prior approval, and 6) incorrect behavior of fabricating, listening to, or disseminating rumors and information that undermine the image of the Party’s leadership.” [57]
Institutions of Higher Education
On August 17, 2009, the Ministry of Education issued a directive mandating that 220 million middle and primary school students watch a TV program on patriotic education as the first class for the fall. The theme for this TV program was to teach patriotism and guide the students to put patriotism into their daily lives. [58]
The State’s Tibetan Daily interpreted the meaning of patriotism as follows: “When formulating patriotic education activities in Tibet, the Party Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region states that, to be patriotic in contemporary China, the most fundamental thing is to love the Chinese Communist Party and love the socialist system.” [59]
In the first two weeks of March 2010 alone, the three provinces of Guizhou, Jilin, and Heilongjiang held Party strengthening conferences for all the institutions of higher education in their respective provinces, underscoring the priority of Party strengthening among the students. [60]
Media and Public Relations
Re-educating media staff and increasing the market share of the Party’s publications have been among the top items of the agenda to make the Party stronger.
In August 2009 the Propaganda Department and the International Communication Office of the Central Committee of the Party, along with other State organizations, co-sponsored a trip by over 100 State media reporters to visit Jinggangshan, the so-called “holy land of the Chinese revolution.” The trip was designed for these reporters to receive “education on the revolution” and to “enhance their sense of responsibility and sense of mission, thus ensuring their reporting (will be) along the Party line.” [61]
In October 2009, the Party held its annual national conference to promote Party publications as a means to strengthen and consolidate the ruling party. The publications are: People’s Daily, Qiushi Journal, Guangming Daily, and Economic Daily. The China Post Office was directed to conscientiously implement measures to deliver these publications to the hands of the public, and to explore new ways to increase the market share and influence of these Party publications. [62]
On June 30, 2010, spokespersons from 11 agencies under the CCP Central Committee appeared in the briefing room of the International Communication Office of the CCP’s Central Committee in front of domestic and foreign journalists. The agencies represented included the Commission for Discipline Inspection, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the United Front Work Department, the International Liaison Department, the Taiwan Work Office, the International Communication Office, the Party School, the Party Literature Research Center, the Party History Research Center, and the Archives Bureau. [63] The spokesperson system, which all lower-level Party and government bodies quickly adopted, is a new effort to lead public opinion toward the CCP’s agenda in an era when the Party can no long control 100% of the information flow in China.
Party Strengthening Going High Tech
The Internet and cell phones are the new tools for strengthening the Party. Most local branches have their own websites to spread the Party’s policies and agenda. In Anhui Province, online Party schools are open to offer political courses. In Jiangsu Province, the Internet has been used to track Party members. [64]
A September 20, 2010, a Study Times article urged local Party branches to take on the challenge of using the Internet to help make the Party stronger. The paper suggested that the Internet could be a tool for Party propaganda. For example, the Party branch in Tongxin County, Guizhou Province, invited Party members, wherever they were throughout the country, to have access to a training platform on a Party Strengthening Website and to select the Party courses that would benefit them the most. The call is out for the Internet to become a “platform for leading and influencing mainstream ideology.” In Dongguan County, Guangdong Province, 21 online Party branches were established to track and connect Party members. Everyone was asked to participate in the online Party study program. [66]
In Chongqing, Sichuan Province, City Party Secretary Bo Xilai, who is also a Politburo member, texted pro-Party messages via cell phone to the Chongqing public. He stated that the Party should take control of the short message service (SMS) market to fully use SMS to spread socialist core values. [66] In Chongqing, Party strengthening news has been sent out via cell phone every day.
Jiangsu Province established a “Party branch on the cell phone” to keep in close contact with its members.[67] The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region started to use cell phone text messaging to train Party members and recruit new members. [68]
Hu Jintao opened a personal blog on the State People’s Daily website on February 21, 2009. [69] In early January 2010, Vice President of China and Standing Member of the Politburo Xi Jinping texted greetings to over 1 million grassroots Party secretaries via the Party strengthening cell phone system. “On behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, I am extending my cordial greetings to the nationwide grassroots Party secretaries and college graduate village officials.” [70] The message marked the launch of the mobile phone information system for national grassroots Party development work. The system, which comprises one million cell phone numbers belonging to CCP officials at the province, city, township, and village levels, has been initiated to strengthen Party organizations through the use of modern technology. [71]
Quality assurance practiced in private businesses has found its way into strategies to strengthen the Party. Ningyang County in Shandong Province has in place a quality assurance certification process for its Party branches. As of end of 2009, 983 of the 1,486 Party branches in the county received AAA certifications. Certification covers five areas: organizational structure, institutionalization of implementing Party directives and duties, increasing membership, and record keeping. The process includes self-inspection, application for certification, review by higher Party organizations, and final scoring. A perfect score is 1,000. 800 or above is certified AAA, 750 to 800 is AA, and 700 to 750 is A. No certification is given for any score below 700. [72]
Training Extended to Non-Party Personnel
In early September 2010, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee issued the “2010–2020 Education, Training, Reform, and Development Outline for Non-Party Personnel Representatives.” This was the first special national plan for the education and training of non-Party personnel. Du Qinglin, the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), stated that the “outline” reflects the Party and the government’s vision of their human development strategy and the foresight of consolidating the patriotic united front. In recent years, to showcase the diversity of the regime’s political spectrum, Beijing has arranged for more and more non-Communist members to enter the political arena, including government departments at all levels, in central and important positions. At the same time, control over these people has been strengthened. Since 2004, the united front authorities at and above the provincial level, and other agencies, have provided over 5,600 educational sessions and trained more than 220,000 people outside the Party. [73]
Conclusion
Over the past few years, the CCP has done quite a lot in order to reclaim the loyalty of its 75 million members. Its sense of insecurity and urgency are seen everywhere. The facts included in this article are only part of what’s going on, and Beijing continues to do more to that end. On the one hand, it’s unclear whether all these practices will truly solidify the CCP’s status as the only ruling Party; on the other hand, there has been no sign that the CCP has any intent to relinquishing its power. Although the regime’s ability to control Chinese society under Hu and Wen is weaker than it was under Mao’s or Deng’s reign, Beijing is still trying every tactic, effective or not, to prolong the time that the CCP stays in power, a power which is not to be shared with any other political party or with its people.
Endnotes:
[1] Qiushi, January 1, 2010, http://www.qstheory.cn/qswz/200912/t20091230_18088.htm [2] Xinhua, October 15, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-10/15/content_12240057.htm [3] Chinese version of the eight-episode series, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=99228.For full translation of the narrative of the eight-episode TV documentary series, see http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/2011/76/
[4] Sichuan Provincial Water Resources Department, December 25, 2006, http://www.scwater.gov.cn/info_detail.jsp?cid=15&id=5244;Hunan Academy of Social Sciences, http://www.hnass.cn/shownews.asp?newsid=128;
Qingdao Salt Administration, http://www.qdsalt.gov.cn/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=684;
Ningxia University, March 9, 2007, http://zzb.nxu.edu.cn/news_disp.asp?zzi=1131&type=%D7%EE%D0%C2%B9%AB%B8%E6;
Sate-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Gansu Provincial Government, March 39, 2010, http://www.sasacgs.gov.cn/html/1/16/1079.htm
[5] Eight-Episode TV Documentary Series: Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety, Episode Four, http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/2071/92/ [6] Eight-Episode TV Documentary Series: Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety, Episode One, http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/2037/92/ [7] Eight-Episode TV Documentary Series: Preparing for Danger in Times of Safety, Introduction, http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/2011/92/ [8] Xinhua, July 12, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/12/content_11696805.htm [9] Xinhua, July 13, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/13/content_11698059.htm [10] Xinhua, July 26, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/26/content_11775323.htm [11] Xinhua, July 26, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/26/content_11775323.htm [12] Xinhua, December 14, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-12/04/content_12589225.htm [13] Xinhua, February 8, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-02/08/content_12955104_2.htm [14] Xinhua, February 23, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-02/23/content_13034576.htm [15] Xinhua, March 31, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-02/23/content_13034576.htm [16] Xinhua, July 11, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-07/11/c_12321707.htm [17] Xinhua, July 25, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-07/25/c_12371043.htm [18] Xinhua, July 26, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/26/content_11775323.htm [19] Xinhua, August 17, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-08/17/c_12455898.htm [20] People’s Daily, September 2, 2010, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/12610483.html [21] Xinhua, September 25, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-09/25/c_12604321.htm [22] Xinhua, April 6, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-04/06/c_1219752.htm [23] Xinhua, June 22, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-06/22/c_12247867.htm [24] Xinhua, July 31, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/31/content_11805314.htm;Xinhua, August 17, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/17/content_11898273.htm;
Xinhua, October 27, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-10/27/content_12342476.htm;
Xinhua, December 24, 2009 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-12/24/content_12700534.htm.
[25] People’s Daily, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/145802/ [26] People’s Daily, June 1, 2009, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/9385720.html [27] People’s Daily, September 21, 2009 http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/10091009.html [28] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, October 22, 2009, http://www.cass.net.cn/file/20091022243944.html,Translation published by Chinascope: http://chinascope.org/main/content/view/2432/92/
[29] Xinhua, June 16, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/19/content_11567018.htm [30] Xinhua, June 19, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/19/content_11567018.htm [31] Xinhua, July 8, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-07/08/c_12313918.htm [32] News of the Chinese Communist Party, August 30, 2010, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/164113/12574039.html [33] Xinhua, September 22, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-09/22/c_12596837.htm [34] Xinhua, July 26, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/26/content_11775323.htm [35] News of Communist Party of China, March 24, 2008, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/7033487.html [36] News of Communist Party of China, June 9, 2009, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/94156/119760/index.html; http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/117103/9454705.html [37] Xinhua, May 22, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-05/22/content_11415899.htm [38] China News Service, July 26, 2009, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2009/07-26/1790992.shtml [39] News of Communist Party of China, August 14, 2009, http://cpc.people.com.cn/cunguan/GB/9858374.html [40] Xinhua, July 2, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/02/content_11640304.htm [41] Sichuan Daily, June 10, 2010, http://www.sichuandaily.com.cn/2010/06/10/20100610657394028338.htm [42] Xinhua, February 25, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-02/25/content_13048138.htm [43] Ibid. [44] Xinhua, November 18, 2009 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-11/18/content_12485622.htm [45] Ibid. [46] Xinhua, July 2, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/02/content_11640304.htm [47] Huanqiu, November 23, 2009, http://china.huanqiu.com/roll/2009-11/640412.html;The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, November 25, 2009, http://www.cicpa.org.cn/news/200911/t20091125_20032.htm;
Xinhua, November 25, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-11/25/content_12538678.htm;
Xinhua, November 26, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-11/26/content_12544990.htm
[48] Legal Daily, May 22, 2009, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2009-05/22/content_1094411.htm;for more updated numbers, see Xinhua, June 24, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-06/24/content_11595103.htm
[49] News of the Communist Party of China, November 17, 2009, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/10336906.html [50] Legal Daily, August 23, 2010, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/China_legalaid/content/2010-08/23/content_2254379.htm [51] Xinhua, March 22, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-03/22/content_13220070.htm [52] Ministry of Public Security, August 3, 2009, http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1237/n1342/n803715/2000939.html [53] Ibid. [54] Xinhua, November 05, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-11/05/content_12394516.htm [55] Xinhua, May 25, 2009, http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/content_4720.htm [56] Ibid. [57] Qiushi, January 26, 2010, http://www.qstheory.cn/gf/jdsxlljs/201001/t20100126_19738.htm [58] Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, August 17, 2009, http://www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/48/info1251192835649348.htm;China Central Television, August 23, 2009, http://finance.cctv.com/20090823/103288.shtml
[59] Tibetan Daily, June 6, 2009, http://www.chinatibetnews.com/pinglun/2009-06/06/content_255252.htm [60] People’s Daily, http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/11152430.html;http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/11131987.html;
http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/11065204.html
[61] Xinhua, August 22, 2009, http://www.jx.xinhuanet.com/news/2009-08/22/content_17474013.htm [62] People’s Daily, October 17, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10208257.html [63] Xinhua, June 30, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2010-06/30/c_12282719.htm [64] Outlook, September 14, 2009, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64099/10048109.html [65] Study Times, September 20, 2010, http://www.studytimes.com.cn:9999/epaper/xxsb/html/2010/09/20/01/01_26.htm [66] Xinhua, April 28, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2009-04/29/content_11276544.htm [67] Ibid. [68] Xinhua, September 18, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/18/content_12075007.htm [69] Xinhua, February 22, 20010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2010-02/22/content_13023353.htm [70] People’s Daily, January 7, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/113795/10725539.html [71] china.com.cn, January 6, 2010, http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2010-01/06/content_19190206.htm [72] Xinhua, February 19, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-02/19/content_13006832.htm [73] People’s Daily, September 2, 2010, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/12610483.html