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Reading China’s Environmental Crisis – “Mao’s War against Nature” Continues

There is no question that China is facing an environmental crisis, a crisis so serious that observers dub China "an environmental time bomb.[1]" Even the Chinese government media, ever so evasive in reporting anything negative about China, cannot neglect entirely the expanding deserts, polluted cities, and dying bodies of water.

How deeply entrenched is China’s environmental crisis? What are the fundamental reasons for the crisis? Answering these questions requires "deep reading," to use a phrase from the anthropologist Clifford Geertz—reading below the surface to decipher the fundamental dynamics and root causes.

The Chinese characters wei ji for the English word "crisis" connote two concepts: danger and opportunity. Where is China’s environmental crisis heading? While some optimistic observers and China scholars believe that economic development will eventually lead to environmental conservation and that the Chinese government is showing more concern for the environment than during the reign of Mao Zedong, my exercise in "deep reading" rejects this rosy picture and, instead, draws close connections between the current environmental crisis and the war-like opposition against nature begun during the Mao era.


If we borrow the Buddhist understanding of the cosmos as being composed of the elements of earth, water, fire and wind, China’s "four elements" are disintegrating. Let’s consider just a few examples.


One-third of China’s land area has been degraded. Of China’s grasslands (which occupy 41 percent of China’s land area), 90 percent has been degraded and reduced to sand, and exposed soil has been a source of dust for sandstorms that seriously afflict eastern Asia, including China’s capital city of Beijing.[2] Ten percent of China’s farmland has been contaminated with heavy pollutants, making 12 million tons of grain risky for human consumption.[3]


The withdraw rate of China’s rivers has reached as high as 95 percent, far exceeding the international standard of 40 percent for the maintenance of rivers’ ecological functions.

Seventy percent of lakes and rivers are too polluted for human use, and pollution worsens as 45 billion tons of industrial waste and untreated sewage are dumped annually into rivers and lakes. The groundwater in ninety percent of Chinese cities is contaminated. Close to two hundred million Chinese are drinking unsafe water.[4] {mospagebreak}

China’s weakened ecosystems are suffering severely in the face of global environmental change. In southwest China’s Chongqing area, last year’s drought and heat, the most severe in 100 years, is being followed by this year’s 115-year record storms and flooding; environmentalists believe that the Three Gorges Dam and human ecological destruction have exacerbated the destructive effects of climate change.[5] In the meantime, China has just topped the United States as the largest emitter of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide.


Sixteen of the world’s 20 most polluted cities are found in China, as China’s growing economy continues to be fueled by coal, which provides 70 percent of the country’s energy. Every year, air pollution is responsible for respiratory diseases in 20 million Chinese (an OECD estimate) and contributes to about 750,000 deaths.[6]


What has led to such a severe deterioration of China’s environment? Environmental scholars, including Joshua Muldavin and Elizabeth Economy, point to economic development policies.

"Development is the first urgent task," said Qin Dahe, former Director of the China Meteorological Administration, in arguing for China’s refusal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. "It’s a firm principle and, moreover, we need good and fast development. Only then will we be able to step by step solve the problem" of climate change.[7]

As the world becomes more impressed with China’s economic power at the heels of a recent estimate that China surpasses the United Staes in driving global economic growth,[8] it is even more imperative that the world is aware of the tremendous costs that have come with China’s double-digit growth rate, environmental degradation being paramount. According to estimates, the cost of pollution is at least eight percent of China’s gross product (GDP).[9]

Why development? While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has tried to convince the Chinese people and the world that it operates in the best interests of the Chinese nation, the CCP "has pursued a single-minded strategy that relies on rapid economic growth to maintain its legitimacy and power," according to Minxin Pei, director of the China Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Since the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has not managed to extricate itself out of a crisis of legitimacy, according to Roderick MacFarquhar of Harvard University.
Who will benefit from this development? The top beneficiaries so far have been the Party elites, not the majority of the Chinese people. The gap between the rich and the poor has continued to widen. Millions of farmers have lost land to development, and both rural people and the urban poor are increasingly disenfranchised as China continues to develop. Of late, tens of thousands of protests have sprung up annually in China, testifying that development has gone awry. Nature is another loser in this scenario.

In his book Development as Freedom, Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen argues that a basic constituent of development is freedom to participate in the processes and access to opportunities; development is not simply an economic question as economic deprivation has resulted from political deprivation. This broad view of development considers the basic welfare of the public. China’s deliberate narrowing of the concept of development, equating it to economic growth, only benefits the Party elites, not the public or the environment.


It is too simplistic to state, however, that the Chinese government has not paid any attention to the environment. In fact, if the CCP’s environmental attitude is judged by environmental laws, regulations, and programs, one would come to conclude that the Chinese government is among the most stringent in dealing with environmental problems.

At the core of the problem is the Party’s unwillingness to enforce environmental policies when such enforcement jeopardizes economic interests. The Party’s control over the state’s regulatory institutions renders environmental laws and regulations mere paper documents.

The Louder the Program Is Praised, the More the Problems

In my own research, informants described the government’s ecological policies this way: "The thunder is loud but the raindrops are small. Those who can read behind the government program reports can tell: The more aggressive the government programs are, the more problems they bespeak."

In 2002 the Chinese government pledged to reduce the emissions of sulfur dioxide, a contributor to acid rain and urban pollution, by 10 percent in three years. In reality sulfur dioxide emissions increased by 27 percent in the same time period.[10] This story is typical, and it reminds me of examples I encountered in my own research.

During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961), Inner Mongolia started a campaign to turn the Mu-Us Sandy Land green. The local government laid out specific goals—including planting shrubs to convert most sandy lands in five years. The same goal of sandy land improvement has been announced repeatedly. Today, after five decades of repeated goal setting, sand still covers about half of the Mu-Us Sandy Land, similar to the coverage five decades ago.
Past failures often belie strong-sounding environmental programs, and there is no reason to expect those failures won’t be repeated. The reason being, these programs are often the results of particular environmental failures and/or political pressures, and, as such, they often disregard ecological limits.

The CCP continues its superb tactic of grand planning. Early in 2006, the government published a national "Environmental Plan" that calls for the cleaning up of heavily polluted regions and the reversal of water, air, and land degradation by 2010.[11] China just put 30 companies on its blacklist of pollution violators, etc., etc. One can only wish they would do more than sound good.

Questionable Commitment

A 2005 article in Economist, "Green Guise," has an apt subtitle: "China protects its trees, devours others." Alarmed by devastating floods of the Yangtze in 1998, China issued orders to protect forests, but its favorable timber import policy has encouraged a flurry of illegal timber trading from southeast Asia that destroy their forests.

A further question emerges: Is China serious in protesting its own trees and preserving its own environment? "Alas, the answer is ‘No’"—to quote from the Economist article. On paper, perhaps, but not in real actions.

The CCP regime’s environmental directives are often triggered by crises, such as the recent pollution of Lake Taihu, the third largest freshwater lake in China, by blue-green algae that make the water undrinkable. The water supply to the near city of Wuxi had to be cut off. To reduce the algae, the government conducted emergency measures such as seeding rain clouds and bringing water from the Yangtze River. Ironically, just prior to the pollution crisis, a local environmental activist, Wu Lihong, who for years had called for a stop to the pollution of Taihu Lake, was arrested on charge of extortion against polluting companies and is allegedly being tortured.[12]

To be sure, polluting factories are constantly being closed; a recent campaign is closing polluting factories along the Yangtze. But they are often reopened after the fuss is over, or simply moved elsewhere. The heavily polluting low-tech township-operated factories in the 1980s are only replaced by state-run or foreign-invested companies that are spewing even more pollutants into China’s waters and air. Polluting factories are like mushrooms that are flourishing on the favorable soil of regulatory failure.

The state "Environmental Plan" issued in 2006 calls for environmental protection to be included in assessing the performance of local officials.[13] This idea has been incorporated in the Inner Mongolia government since the late 1990s. This all sounds good.
But this has turned into a numbers’ game, exacerbating ecological neglect. Local leaders are rewarded for the number of trees planted and size of areas seeded. Under the North China reforestation program that started in 1987 and the "Western Regional Development" program since 2000, the Ordos Plateau of western Inner Mongolia has seen many trees planted and many moving sand dunes seeded. But these efforts have met with miserable failure due to their lack of suitability in the desert environment.

In Uxin Ju Township at the center of the Mu-Us Sandy Land, the total area that has been planted or seeded has, since the 1980s, more than doubled the township’s total size, but vegetation cover has remained about 50 percent. One can only imagine the tremendous waste of human effort and resources in this failed endeavor. The government blames the local people for not taking care of planted trees, or nature for the drought, instead of its own erroneous policies.

The reforestation program in North China did achieve limited success, which has been plentifully highlighted in the Party’s propaganda. But success is only found in limited areas, while overall desertification continues unabated and sandstorms in Beijing are becoming even more serious. That is the true "big picture."


China observers and scholars have often stated, or at least hoped, that the post-Mao Chinese state would show more respect for the environment. Has the Chinese government stopped its war-like assault on nature that Shapiro described in her book Mao’s War against Nature? While the Chinese people are not forced to fill lakes to make croplands or to cut down forests to fuel backyard furnaces, the Party’s fundamental oppositional attitude toward nature remains unchanged, and the post-Mao Chinese Communist government has followed carefully in its predecessor’s footsteps in the destruction of nature.

Continuing Degradation

Environmental degradation continues during the post-Mao era, sometimes at accelerating rates. In the upper reaches of the Yangtze, for example, forest cover dropped from 30-40 percent in the 1950s to 10 percent in 1998, while in Sichuan Province, forest cover plumbed from 28 percent in the 1970s to 8 percent in the 1990s.[14] Deforestation further reduced the flood regulating capacity of the Yangtze, with record flooding in 1998 and this year bearing witness.

Of the famed Xilingol grasslands in Inner Mongolia, 64 percent has been degraded, and the rate of sandification has only increased. During the 1950s and 1960s, sandy areas expanded by 1,560 square kilometers per year; it increased to 2,100 square kilometers per year during the 1970s-1980s and 2,460 square kilometers in the 1990s. Sandstorms also increased to 23 incidents during the 1990s from five during the 1950s.[15] {mospagebreak}
During the Cultural Revolution, the Inner Mongolia grasslands were seriously assaulted as the Mongols, along with their leader, Ulanhu, were persecuted. Large areas of grassland were opened up for farming—a typical pattern of exploitative land use that leads to serious degradation. Since the 1980s, even though the official rhetoric has paid great lip service to protecting the Mongolian grasslands, grassland conversion has totaled one million ha, matching the area opened during the Cultural Revolution.[16] While the previous conversion destroyed the soil, the newly converted one million ha, much of it irrigated, significantly lowered the groundwater table and damaged the grassland ecosystem.

Pollution continues to batter China’s lakes that were reduced by Mao era’s efforts to fill them in to make fields for crops. In recent years, Lake Taihu and Lake Chao, China’s third and fifth largest freshwater lakes, have been so darkened and fouled by algae, thanks to industrial discharge, untreated wastewater, and farm chemicals, that they have become unsuitable for drinking or recreation.[17]

While Mao’s regime launched a war against nature unprecedented in Chinese history, the post-Mao government has been intent, even if unwittingly, on finishing it off.

Weapons of Natural Destruction: From Politics to Development

Politics was used overtly during the Mao-era to launch an environmental offense. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, with the fall of Inner Mongolia leader Ulanhu, all those who followed his policy of animal husbandry were persecuted—and this included planted grass. In 1967, patches of planted fodder in the Ordos were removed as a way to "uproot" Ulanhu’s influence; the fields were given over to crops that the Party advocated.

In the post-Mao era, the efficacy of politics as an overt weapon has been discredited, and "scientific principles" have been ostensibly promoted in resource management. But, in reality, it is economic development that is dictating management strategies. A softer weapon, but a weapon nonetheless.

Destruction of the environment "post-Mao" in the foregoing examples has been driven by the government’s single-minded pursuit of economic development.

Development is upping the ante in the "war against nature." Woulong Lake, the largest lake and wetland in northeast China’s Liaoning Province, was almost totally destroyed by a great drive to develop the lake area into a tourist site since 1998. Unprecedented dam and road building and fishpond and paddy expansion so damaged the lake that within just five years—by 2003—the amount of water in the lake was reduced from 82 million square meters to a mere 0.2 million. Wetland around the lake was sharply reduced and sandy land expanded in its place.[18] Compared to politics, development as a weapon is sometimes even more effective and expeditious in destroying the environment.
Nature Planned

One has to give the post-Mao Chinese regime credit for putting ecological concerns on the government agenda—at least on paper. In 1999, China launched a Western Region Development program in order to develop the vast western inlands that had been lagging behind the eastern seaboard. Other than investment policies and infrastructure buildup, the program also involved ecological improvement, such as "grain for green (turning farmland to forest)" and a logging ban.

As part of this program, the Inner Mongolia government started to make official "ecological plans." A plan originated in 2000 in Uxin Banner located on the Mu-Us Sandy Land projected that by 2005, 2015, and 2050, tree cover would increase from the then-current 19 percent to 27.13, 43.47, and 49.85 percent, and vegetation cover from 55 percent to 59.92, 79.23, and 89.03 percent. (Decimal points are retained to show the seeming accuracy of such ecological planning.) [19]

The goals projected on linear-growth resemble those of China’s five-year economic plans that started in 1953. If the economic plans have been unrealistic, these ecological plans are even more so because tree/vegetation growth has to rely on nature’s constraints—dry, sandy soil with annual precipitation of only 330-360 mm. Water constraints have kept the vegetation cover to a constant percentage, regardless of past efforts to plant and seed.

Of course there is one scenario that would make this ecological plan work: Heaven must bow its head and bestow more water on this piece of land or perform other, similar miracles. How different is this attitude toward nature than the Mao-era slogan exhorting people to "battle with heaven and fight with earth?" The ecological plan will, like Mao-era’s economic plan, lead to human and environmental suffering.

A Crisis of Environmental Consciousness

Since the late 1990s, a catchall notion for rural ecological endeavors is "ecological construction (shengtai jianshe)," another expression with Chinese (read "socialist") characteristics. A biology professor from the University of Wisconsin once told me, "I thought the expression [ecological construction] was an incorrect translation, so I changed ‘construction’ into ‘restoration’ throughout a paper written by a Chinese student."

There exists a stark contrast between ecological construction, an aggressive effort to rebuild the environment, and ecological restoration, an environmental movement in the US that adopts non-aggressive methods to restore natural ecosystems. The word "construction" comes from the "socialist construction" movement of the early 1950s. Its goal was the transformation of the Chinese people into new beings of socialist ideology. The notion of human reformation and domination has now been carried over into "ecological construction" projects, fostering aggressive attitudes toward nature. The essential meaning, connectivity, and limits of ecology have been totally cast away.
The concept of "ecological construction" has been used by the Party to frame ecological consciousness in the minds of the Chinese people. The Party has, fitting for its nature, blamed the local people for environmental problems, citing the "population of being poorly educated" or "backward consciousness." Even some Chinese scholars are following this logic to "blame the victims." In reality, the socialist project has been, from the start, a project to reform people’s consciousness. During the Mao era, the Party instilled political ideology in the minds of the Chinese people by force, destroying traditional cultural values. In the reform era, while political ideology education has failed miserably (such as Jiang Zemin’s "three represents" and Hu Jintao’s "maintaining advancement"), other education efforts, such as in market consciousness and ecological consciousness, continue to twist the Chinese minds.

Lack of freedom in the media ensures that alternative notions of ecology do not have space to grow.

On the dry lands of Inner Mongolia, for example, people have equated ecology with "planting trees and grass," after having been "educated" through the government "ecological construction" projects that have focused narrowly on planting and seeding, a focus that fits well with the Party’s economic standpoint and that boosts local leaders’ achievement scores. But what about the ecosystem itself? Scientists have pointed out that trees are not suitable for this arid land because they use up too much water and can make adjacent vegetation wither. Repeated failures in planting and seeding also testify that aggressive "improvement" does not work. While ecological projects can "construct" trees in limited locations, they have not stopped the continuation of wholesale degradation.[20]

At an international workshop on China’s environmental activism that I attended in 2004, some journalists proudly announced their environmental participation by "planting trees in Inner Mongolia’s desert areas." Hearing this, I had to marvel at the sheer effectiveness of the official ecological education. Yet, the very success of the Party’s education on the public’s environmental consciousness is a disaster for the environment itself.

To be sure, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [21] on the environment are growing in China, especially in Beijing and southwest China. But these organizations have largely been confined to certain areas, such as urban energy saving and recycling, biodiversity conservation, and environmental education, and they have not been able to affect major policies.[22] These NGOs are having a growing influence on popular views about nature in urban settings, but in the vast countryside where the ecosystems are deteriorating, they are in no way providing a viable force to counter the influence of the Party’s propaganda.


It is widely acknowledged that environmental problems come not from a lack of understanding of environmental processes, but from a lack of political will and social commitment. China’s environmental crisis is a crisis of both politics and consciousness.
The CCP’s narrow and instrumental view of the environment has led to policies that rank the environment subordinate to development, and the environment is made to bleed. The CCP government has actively channeled public environmental consciousness toward aggressive attitudes and acts against nature. The post-Mao government has continued to write and enact policies that only further the damage to the environment begun in Mao’s time.

In her well-known book Mao’s War against Nature, Professor Judith Shapiro from American University argues that the Chinese regime’s oppression of the people and of the environment went hand in hand. And they still do today. When we read about China’s continuing abuse of human rights, its reinforcement of a "digital iron curtain" (the "golden shield" Internet policing system), its persecution of dissidents and Falun Gong practitioners, we can see the root cause of China’s environmental plight.

The ruthless policy of top-down political control offers no accountability to the people or the environment, and it can only lead to societal and environmental decay.

Is there a way out? Let me end this article with a statement from Tang Xiyang, a renowned Chinese intellectual and environmentalist, who, in response to the question of China’s biggest environmental problems, replied, "Democracy. If you don’t have democracy, you can’t have real environmental protection."[23]

 The Mu Us Sandy Land

The Ordos Plateau is a dry area located in western Inner Mongolia. The southern part is covered by the Mu Us Sandy Land, with its "hearth" located in Uxin banner. Given the name, the area is dry and sandy, with average annual rainfall of 300-350 mm.

Over the last six decades, under the control of the Chinese Communist Party, the Ordos Plateau has seen significant landscape changes. Notable are two campaigns to transform the sandy land.

One is a desert campaign that started in 1958 to make the sandy land green. At the start of the Great Leap Forward, to follow Mao’s call to build socialism "greater, faster, better, and more economically" (duo kuai hao sheng), Inner Mongolia, under pressure from the central government, launched the campaign in the socialist legacy of "altering the heaven and changing the earth (gaitian huandi). The campaign attempted to plant trees on the moving sand dunes and to turn desert into forests and oases.

Uxin Ju of Uxin banner was on the forefront of the desert campaign. People there removed a toxic grass from the grassland and planted trees on the sand dunes. While much of the effort went wasted facing the stubborn dune sand that insisted on moving, certain small-scale success was established, much like today’s tree planting effort in northern China, whereby small-scale success is mixed in large-scale degradation. Uxin Ju’s engagement earned it a model status in 1965, when, after the Shanxi model village of Dazhai, Uxin Ju was named a "pastoral Dazhai."

The legacy of that campaign was echoed in the entire Mao-era China: Human beings will conquer nature. The legacy continued in the second campaign, namely, tree planting campaign since the 1980s, prompted by the North China afforestation and "Western Regional Development" programs.

Instead of political motivations, the post-Mao tree planting campaign follows an economic logic of development under the decollectivized household responsibility system. The state control of land use remains gripping, as the government uses regulations, financial rewards or punishments, and ideological exhortations to encourage tree planting. For example, state-funded projects award money and other incentives to tree planting—especially planting over large continuous areas; regional government mandates that each laborer has to spend 20 days annually in tree planting, violators will be fined.

Failure in planting is reminiscent of the effort-wasting endeavors of the Mao-era campaign.

My analyses show that during the 1970s-1990s, while trees increased from 200-300 to over 2,500 per household on Uxin Ju’s originally treeless landscape, area of moving sand almost doubled and that of water body was halved. Landscape diversity was reduced, and regeneration capacity was compromised. Clearly, tree planting has not helped to deter the continuing degradation.

Noteworthy is, the Mu Us Sandy Land, while dry on surface, has fairly good supply of groundwater. In low-lying areas, groundwater table is shallow, thus allowing trees to grow. The problem is, trees and cropland irrigation have drawn down the groundwater table, exacerbating the degradation of the area’s best grassland on the lowland and worsening the water condition of the entire sandy land ecosystem.



[1] John Boudreau: Rising threat,, July 23, 2007.
[2]  State Environmental Protection Agency: Zhongguo shengtai baohu (Ecological Protection in China), June 5, 2006.
[3]  John Boudreau: Rising threat,, July 23, 2007.
[4]  John Boudreau: Rising threat,, July 23, 2007; Elizabeth Economy: The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future. Cornell University Press, 2005. 
[6]  Qi Zhifeng: Zhongguo huanjing ehua de genyuan hezai (What is the root cause of China’s environmental deterioration)? Voice of America – Chinese, July 27, 2007. 
[7]  Elizabeth Economy: China vs. Earth. The Nation, May 7, 2007.
[8]  Patrice Hill: China powering world economy. Washington Times, July 26, 2007. 
[9]  Xinmin Pei: The high cost of prosperity. International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2007.
[10]  Economy: China vs. Earth.
[11]  The Associate Press: China offers environmental plan; focus is sustainable development. International Herald Tribune, February 15, 2006. 
[12]  Geoff Dyer: Activist held in China pollution battle, Financial Times, August 3, 2007.
[13]  The Associate Press: China offers environmental plan; focus is sustainable development. 
[14]  Economy: The River Runs Black.
[15]  Zhou Tong: Zhongguo shengtai ehua (China’s Ecological Deterioration),, June 22, 2004.
[16]  Hong Jiang: Grassland management and views of nature in China since 1949: Regional policies and local changes in Uxin Ju, Inner Mongolia. Geoforum 36 (5): 641-653, 2005.
[18]  Ding Dong: Wuolong hu kuai cheng sihu le (Wuolong Lake is about to Die). Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily), November 17, 2003. Since 2004 efforts have been made to revive Woulong Lake, but the ecosystem has not recovered.
[19]  Hong Jiang: Decentralization, ecological construction, and the environment in post-reform China: Case study from Uxin banner, Inner Mongolia. World Development 34 (11): 1907-1921, 2006.
[20]  Jiang: Decentralization, ecological construction, and the environment in post-reform China.
[21]  Instead of true NGOs, they are GONGOs, Government-Operated Non-Governmental Organizations, and are placed under government control.
[22]  Elizabeth Economy, 2003. China’s Environmental Challenge: Political, Social and Economic Implications. Testimony before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, January 27, 2003
[23]  Economy: The River Runs Black. p.141

Hong Jiang, Ph.D., is a faculty member in the geography department at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She has done research on China’s human-environmental issues for over two decades, and her work has been published in journals and books.

Beijing’s Security Bars 43 Categories of People from the Olympics

As the clock is ticking the minutes until the 2008 Beijing Olympics, now only one-year away, China is also stepping up its security for the games. On May 16, 2007,, one of the largest news websites in China, published a report indicating that Beijing will have the (Beijing) Olympic Intelligence Center administer tight background checks and risk evaluations on all of the athletes and officials who will attend. Anyone who fails to pass this check will not be given a visa and will be prohibited from entering China.

Zhang Shuyuan, deputy secretary of the Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee and vice director of Security Department,said that the Intelligence Center will observe the principle of "non-explanation." That is, the center will not give anyone any reason for its decision to deny entry into the country.

These secret background checks are intended to keep all potential dissidents completely out of sight during the Olympics. Included are a long list of individuals and organizations that the regime regards as enemies. According to sources in China’s Ministry of Public Security, in April 2007, the Ministry issued an internal secret directive called "Notification on Strictly Carrying Out Background Investigations on Candidates for the Olympics and Performing Pre-Selection Screening." The notice went to all of its local offices in China and to embassies and consulates overseas. The directive lists 43 categories of people who will be investigated and barred from the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Categories include such groups as overseas hostile forces, counter-revolutionary figures, the Dalai Lama and affiliates, Falun Gong, religious groups, individuals who instigate disapproval of the Chinese Communist Party through the Internet, any media that publishes anti-communist articles and, in most instances, any relatives or affiliates of anyone in these categories (an excerpt of the directive is attached at the end of the article).

China is also keeping and eye on foreign organizations that might mount protests during the Olympics. AP reported from Beijing on July 24, 2007, that China’s intelligence services and think tanks are compiling lists of potentially troublesome foreign organizations. They are looking at human rights groups that have long been critical of Beijing. They include evangelical Christians eager to end China’s religious restrictions, activists wanting Beijing to use its oil-buying leverage with Sudan to end the strife in Darfur and environmental campaigners angry about global warming.

Back in 2001 when Beijing was bidding for the right to host the 2008 Olympics, Chinese authorities promised to improve its human rights in order to quiet the opposing voices, such as Reporters Without Border, but once they won the Olympics, the Chinese regime never fulfilled its commitment.

On June 28, 2007, Reporters Without Border re-launched its "Beijing 2008" campaign with a graphic of the Olympic rings replaced by handcuffs. Reporters Without Border has been one of the staunchest opponents of the Beijing Olympics, citing the communist regime’s poor and worsening human rights record.
In its recent letter to IOC President Jacques Rogge, of Reporters Without Border says, "Throughout the world, concern is growing about the holding of these Olympics, which have been taken hostage by a government that balks at taking action to guarantee freedom of expression and respect for the Olympic Charter’s humanistic values." The organization also vows to use its sections and networks to distribute this campaign ad all over the world for one year without any let-up.

Apart from terrorist attacks, the Chinese regime will not allow any "different" voices at this major event. It will do whatever it takes to make sure that the Olympics Games are a glorious event under its reign.

Joshua Lee is a correspondent for Chinascope.


Appendix: An excerpt of the directive by China’s Ministry of Public Security

Notification on Strictly Carrying Out Background Investigations on Candidates for the Olympics and Performing a Pre-Selection Screening

I. Background Investigations on Individuals:

1. International Olympic Committee ("IOC") members, including:

(1) IOC members and guests who the Officials of international sports associations invited.

(2) Officials of the International Single Item Sports Association, referees and their invited guests.

(3) National and regional IOC members, including athletes, officials of delegations and officials attending the Olympics.

(4) Officials of the Executive Committee in the Organization Committee of the Host Country, the host city mayor, host city leadership in the government and their invited important guests.

(5) The Host city for the next Olympics and representatives from other cities applying for hosting the next Olympics.

(6) Sponsors who have signed contracts with the IOC.

(7) Athletes and Delegations.
2. Media: Media who purchased broadcasting rights and institutions who purchased broadcasting rights.

3. All Olympic staff members, including IOC employees, volunteers, contractors, security and temporary staff, and all others falling in this category.

II. Benchmarks for Background Investigation:

Anyone who falls into the following 43 categories, subdivided further into 11 different subcategories, must be excluded from the Olympics Games and competitions:

1. China’s Enemies:

(1) Overseas hostile forces and hostile organization members.

(2) Key individuals in ideological fields.

(3) Individuals who disturb social stability.

(4) Hostile individuals in Mainland China.

(5) Individuals who were handicapped during riots, those who endanger society and family members of deceased people.

(6) Individuals who were sentenced because they committed anti-revolutionary or other crimes and are thus considered a threat to national security, close relatives of such individuals, and individuals who have close ties to them.

(7) Individuals who escaped overseas and any of their suspicious associates.

2. Falun Gong and Other Cult Organization and Members of Other Harmful Qigong

(1) Falun Gong and other cult organization members, associated organization who are supporting Falun Gong.

(2) Members of 14 organizations that are evil cult organizations and have assumed the mantle of religions, those that were identified by relevant state agencies and members of seven other existing evil cult organizations.
(3) Members of the 14 risky qigong associations that were identified by state agencies.

3. Religious Extremists and Members of such Religions

(1) Members of illegal organizations, whether they reside locally or abroad.

(2) Individuals who were arrested or sentenced for being engaged in unlawful religious activities.

(3) Individuals who are active in illegal religious activities.

(4) Individuals who distribute illegal religious books and audio-video products.

(5) Individuals who form unlawful religious groups, organizations, schools and other such sites, as well as other religious entities not sanctioned by the state.

4. National Separatists

(1) Members of the "Three Forces" in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and individuals supporting them locally and abroad.

(2) The Dalai Lama’s Government of Tibet in Exile and members of its affiliated organizations.

(3) Individuals who partake in parades, demonstrations and protest activities with the goal of breaking up nations.

(4) People who offer financial support to national separatist groups or activities.

5. Media People who endanger the Olympic Games:

(1) The staff of any foreign media that is hostile to the People’s Republic of China.

(2) The staff of any media that publishes anti-communist articles and those who viciously slander the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government.

6. Non-governmental organizations involved in activities that pose a threat to the Olympic Games:
(1) Foreign non-governmental organizations that are supported by foreign governments and are known to be involved in penetrating, overthrowing and destroying the CCP and the Chinese government.

(2) All members of different non-governmental organizations who are likely to jeopardize the Beijing Olympic Games.

7. Dangerous elements, consistent appealers and other individuals who are known to be strongly discontent with the CCP

(1) Individuals who show strong discontent with the CCP and Chinese government.

(2) Individuals who file consistently troublesome lawsuits or appeal to higher authorities for support.

(3) Individuals who bring foreign lawsuits in cooperation with overseas forces.

8. Individuals who filed for investigation and prosecution by judicial authorities, or those under criminal and administrative orders.

(1) Individuals who filed a complaint with the public security authorities

(2) Individuals who are under residential surveillance and out on bail while awaiting trial and those with restricted liberty.

(3) Individuals who were once detained or arrested on suspicion of criminal activities and were released without being fully cleared.

(4) All individuals at large and escapees.

(5) Individuals with warrants against them and individuals under investigation.

(6) Those the border control suspects of being criminals.

9. Criminal elements who are on parole or on probationary supervision, who are awaiting sentencing, who are released on parole, who are leased on bail for medical treatment, who are deprived of political rights, others who have received a sentence but are under home detention and those who were sentenced to labor re-education and rehabilitation and whose labor re-education sentence or other type of sentence was commuted.
(1) Criminals who are sentenced to home detention and are under supervision, whose political rights were taken away and who were given a suspended sentence.

(2) Criminals who were sentenced and released on parole, and whose sentence was commuted to temporary home detention but continue to be under surveillance and who are serving criminal detention outside a detention center.

(3) Individuals who are sentenced to serve labor re-education outside the re-education labor center.

(4) Individuals who were released on bail for medical treatment and those who asked to be released under such a program.

10. Violent terrorists

(1) Members of terrorist organizations.

(2) Individuals who offer support and assistance to terrorist organizations or their members.

(3) Relatives of members of terrorist organizations or individuals known to have a close relationship with such members.

11. Members of illegal organizations

(1) Individuals who are members of unlawful political organizations.

(2) Individuals who carry out activities in the name of organizations that are not lawfully registered.

(3) Individuals serving an illegal organization in any capacity. Individuals who establish ties with such an organization and individuals who use the Internet to instigate discontentment toward the CCP.

“2006 Taiwan Report” Puts Anti-Bian Campaign in Focus

[Editor’s note: Early in 2007 Xiamen Star (a satellite TV station in Xiamen, Fujian Province) issued a "2006 Taiwan Report" authored by a group of "experts" and scholars from Mainland China and Taiwan. Those from Mainland China suggest that Taiwan has entered a new period of political turmoil, that "color revolution" is taking place in Taiwan, and that public opinion will decide who is the winner in the Taiwan election. ("Color revolution" usually means a democratic liberalization from an authoritarian society in post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. [1] Here the term is borroed to imply that Taiwan’s democratic society is being overturned by red (pro-communist) forces.)

Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) obtained the exclusive right of publication. Here is a translation of excerpts of the report that Southern Weekend published on January 11, 2007. [2]]

Liu Hong: Taiwan Has Entered a New Period of Political Turmoil

Liu Hong, a senior researcher at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, [3] believes that Taiwan politics has intensified and entered a new period of political turmoil. "Anti-corruption and elections were the leading themes of the 2006 Taiwan political evolution and will continue into 2007." "Taiwan’s political situation has entered a new period of turmoil."

Li Jiaquan: Color Revolution Is Taking Place in Taiwan

Li Jiaquan, another senior researcher at the Institute of Taiwan studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that Taiwan had a "color revolution."

Li observed that in the months of September and October 2006, over a million people in Taiwan wearing red shirts took to the streets in support of the anti-corruption campaign meant to bring down Chen Shui-Bian. "Although it has now come to an end for the time being, one cannot ignore its far-reaching implications, i.e., Taiwan’s so-called ‘color revolution’ has emerged. Sooner or later, the revolution will likely rekindle in Taiwan and spread throughout the entire island."

The two most important colors in the Taiwan’s political arena are the Democratic Progress Party’s (DPP’s) green and the KMT’s blue. "Now all of a sudden, over a million red shirts have emerged." "The ‘red’ rises above and beyond the ‘blue’ and ‘green.’" "Isn’t it wonderful when red, blue and green integrate together as one symbol of the harmony and cooperation of the future of Taiwan society?"

"Taiwan’s so-called ‘red’ originally referred to the Communist Party. When blue battles with green, the green DPP frequently caps its opposition with ‘red hat’, i.e. ‘pro-Communist.’ Being ‘pro-Communist’ used to amount to ‘betraying Taiwan’ and ‘do not love Taiwan.’ Since 2006, the tide has reversed. In particular over a million red shirts have taken to the streets and paraded around the island. Even the commander of the red shirts, Shih Ming-teh, a former DPP chairman wore red all over. More surprisingly some small businesses, hawkers, and small shops, have hung small five-star red flags [the national flag of Mainland China] on their doors, without any fears whatsoever. Then there are others who drive convertibles around the island with five-star red flags, singing the PRC’s national anthem. The communities have had no negative reactions. This was inconceivable in the past."
"The colors of flags represent ideologies. If we take out the color and ideologies, what is left is that we are all Chinese. That we are all Chinese is the common denominator shared by both sides of the Taiwan Straits. If we all acknowledge this denominator, then, many issues pertaining to Taiwan and cross-Strait relations can readily be resolved." "To sum it up, the island would be harmonious, both sides of the Straits would be reconciled and peace would rein in Taiwan Straits. Isn’t it wonderful?"

Li was a drafter and a participant of the White Book on Taiwan that the Chinese government issued in August 1993 and February 2000, respectively. [4]

Zou Zhengdong: Public Opinion Will Decide Who The Winner Is

Zou Zhengdong, an adjunct professor in the Media Department at Xianmen University, suggests that it is still too early to tell who will win over public opinion in the media war.

1. The Main Stream of the Public Opinion

"The most important change in Taiwan public opinion in 2006 was the rise of independent public opinion, represented by the ‘million men to bring down Bian.’ This is the largest mass movement independent of any party since Taiwan lifted the martial law (i.e., the ‘Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion’ from 1948 to 1987). It goes beyond the blue and green and beyond the parties, representing the rise of public opinion a new force."

2. The Concerns of Public Opinion

"What public opinion is concerned about is a barometer of the political situation and a weather vane of social changes. The most notable change in Taiwan’s 2006 public opinion is the relative weakening of "unification or independence."

3. Media Forms

"The most notable change in Taiwan’s public opinion in 2006 was that public opinion became increasingly artistic, in particular the ‘million men to bring down Bian’ campaign has become a controversial carnival, indicating Taiwan’s public opinion has entered a new era that utilizes the technique of art design such as advertisement (so it becomes more creative, delicate, and effective)."

4. Tactics of the media war

"The most important feature of the media war in 2006 was that it had no strategy, only tactics. Neither the DPP nor the KMT could see any strategy." "Whoever can master the changes and go along with Taiwan public opinion will take control of public opinion in the future. From a wandering Taiwan to a hopeless Taiwan, there is nothing that can touch the heart of the Taiwanese people as much as the future of Taiwan does. What future does Taiwan need? Who can promise Taiwan a future? Perhaps history has an answer ready. But who will be the prophet?"

[1] Color revolutions or Flower revolutions are the names given collectively to a series of related movements that developed in post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Some observers have called the events a revolutionary wave. Participants in the color revolutions have mostly used nonviolent resistance to protest against governments seen as corrupt and/or authoritarian, and to advocate democracy and national independence. These movements all adopted a specific color or flower as their symbol. The color revolutions are notable for the important role of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and particularly student activists in organizing creative nonviolent resistance.
[2] Southern Weekend (nanfang zhoumou), January 11, 2007
[3] The Institute of Taiwan Studies was founded in 1984 with over 90 research associates. Over 20 of them are senior researchers.
[4] China Taiwan Net

Translated by Chinascope.

Chinese Media Ranks the Performances of Foreign-Owned Companies

[Editor’s note: On November 22, 2006, China’s Southern Weekend newspaper announced its report of "Ranking of the World’s Top 500 International Companies Invested in China" at a press release held at Beijing News Plaza Hotel following a one-year-long investigation. The report is based on how well the world’s top 500 companies in China have performed in terms of their business activities and records of fulfilling social responsibility. This is the second such report by Southern Weekend in two consecutive years. [1,2] The report said that foreign companies performed poorly in China with regards to fulfilling social responsibility and caused a number of hidden problems for China. The following two articles about the investigation report are translated from the website of The China Machinery Industry Federation, a government sponsored trade association, serving as China’s official reading of teh investigation report.]

Six Major Hidden Troubles Found in Foreign Owned Companies in China [3]

"The two-year consecutive ranking by Southern Weekend for the ‘World’s Top 500 Companies Conducting Businesses in China’ show that while direct foreign investments in China have played a major role in China’s economic development, they have also brought non-neglectable, far-reaching negative impacts to China’s economic and social development.

"The ranking covers four aspects of the business these companies do in China, including each company’s accumulated investments in China, their business performance in China, their contributions to the local economy, their social responsibility, and their brand images in China.

"Southern Weekend‘s two-year-long investigation revealed that the foreign companies have brought six major hidden problems to China:"

"1. Foreign Investments’ Monopoly Threatens China’s Economic and National Security

"The multinational companies have an advantage (over domestic companies) because they have deep pockets, advanced technologies, highly efficient management, and excellent development strategies. They can easily accumulate huge market shares in the host country, squeeze the living space of the host country’s domestic enterprises, monopolize the market, control the industries, and threaten the host country’s industrial and economic security. Lately foreign-owned multinational companies have dominated China’s film, elevator, soft drink, cell phone, computer, Internet infrastructure, and computer chips industries, etc. Domestic companies have nearly disappeared in many of these industries. The widespread invasion of the multinational companies has damaged domestic companies and hindered the formation of large Chinese enterprises that can compete internationally. In addition, because these multinational companies control the technologies critical to the development of China’s economy, they have (negatively) impacted China’s industrial and national economic security.
"2. Favoring foreign investors over domestic ones is harmful to a fair competitive environment and to national confidence. 

"In the initial stage of economic reform, in order to solve the problem of capital and foreign currency shortages, China treated foreign investors with favorable tax policies, and gave them favorable treatment in actual operations. These policies artificially caused unfair competition between domestic and foreign companies, seriously damaging the fair market competition environment.

"3. Trade transfer has made China an export-manufacturing base.

"In 2005, the exports to the United States, Hong Kong, the European Union, and Japan by foreign companies in China were 24.59, 20.37, 17.74, and 12.59 percent of the total exports of these enterprises, respectively. These foreign companies largely use China as their manufacturing base and export platforms to provide products to the United States and the European Union. They shift their own trade surpluses with Europe and the United States to China’s trade surpluses, thus amplifying the trade frictions between China and Europe and the United States. As the manufacturing and packaging bases of these foreign companies, China mainly does packaging and only makes a tiny profit in the whole manufacturing chain.

"4. ‘Favoring competition,’ vicious competition among local governments harms the national interest.

"Since the amount of foreign investments is one of the major criteria in assessing the performance of various local government officials, local governments try their best to attract foreign investments at the expense of their area’s ecosystems and their local residents’ interest. They promise excessively favorable terms to foreign investors so that the foreign investors will have the absolutely decisive edge at the negotiation table and be able to squeeze every inch from the local government’s bottom line. In the meantime, due to the lack of consideration for the local people’s interest, it also became a factor of causing an unharmonious social environment.

"5. Environmental pollution—a situation unbearable to China.

"Because they discharge large amounts of polluted water, polluted gases and hazardous materials, some multinational companies investing in China’s heavy-pollution sectors have caused the local environment to deteriorate and made sustained growth of the local economy impossible. Having an urgent desire to attract foreign investments to help the local economy develop, some local authorities blindly introduce projects that enable the developed nations to transfer their highly polluting and sun setting industries to China. Such industries have not only damaged China’s natural environment, but have also harmed the health of the Chinese people, and damaged the sustained growth of China’s economy. In terms of environmental protection, the top-500 multinational companies do a relatively better job than the small to medium foreign companies in China. The majority of the world’s top 500 companies in China have passed the ISO14000 or ISO14001 certification [international standard of environment management system].
"6. The pricing transfer accelerates China’s loss of income.

"Employing the strategy of reporting a ‘fake loss,’ or a ‘loss on the surface but an actual profit,’ a number of multinational companies transfer their profits from their China subsidiaries to their parent companies abroad in order to evade taxes in China. In addition, some foreign companies exploit the loophole of China’s tax exemption and reduction policy for foreign investments. Once the tax exemption or reduction period expires, they close the operation and then open a new one in another region to repeatedly enjoy the tax exemption policy."

The investigation by Southern Weekend concludes that "while recognizing the positive impact of foreign investments in China, (China) must pay great attention to the problems that the foreign investments have brought to China, treat domestic companies the same as their foreign counterparts, and apply certain restrictions on foreign companies in terms of industries and sectors."

The World’s Top 500 Companies in China Ranked Poorly in Fulfilling Social Responsibility [4]

"According to Southern Weekend newspaper’s one-year-long investigation, a considerable amount of the world’ top 500 multinational companies have performed poorly; some even violated or openly opposed China’s laws and regulations."

"They performed poorly in the following five areas:

1. They have not followed China’s Trade Union Law and refuse or even oppose establishing trade unions in their companies;

2. They have major environmental violations;

3. There have been serious problems in the quality of their services;

4. China’s consumers have many and/or major complaints about the quality of their products;

5. Some bribe Chinese officials and executives or take bribes from them, directly violating Chinese law."

The article continues, "Southern Weekend selected 126 multinational companies that are top-performers based on their revenues in China, gross exports, gross income before tax, and the accumulated investments in China since 2005. Then these companies were evaluated with regard to how they handle basic social responsibilities, including ‘abiding by the law and business morality,’ ’employee rights and labor protection,’ ‘product and service quality,’ ‘environmental protection,’ ‘charitable contributions,’ etc. The companies fell far short of expectations." Following is a summary of the survey results:
— 21 (17 percent) have committed major environmental offenses as determined by the Chinese environmental authorities.

— 39 (30.95 percent ) have product quality issues,

— 40 (31.7 percent) have had Chinese consumers report multiple major complaints about their products.

— 57 (45.2 percent) refuse to establish trade (labor) unions as required by China’s Trade Union Law. This is the most serious issue of all."

Southern Weekend claims that the survey data is from China’s relevant authorities, consumer associations, labor unions, and information publicly disclosed by domestic media. In addition, they also claim to have confirmed their findings with the companies.


[2] Chinascope, issue March/April 2007, p40-42

Translated by Chinascope.

Hong Kong Universities Gain in Popularity with Chinese Students

College entrance exams in China began on June 7 this year. To many hopeful parents, this marks a great milestone in their children’s careers. According to national statistics, the number of high school students taking the exams in China is around 10.1 million, vying for 5.67 million enrollment spots in all Chinese universities—both figures record highs. Apart from Tsinghua and Beijing University though, this time Hong Kong universities have become a new hot favorite for Chinese students.

According to national surveys, 65.53 percent of applicants and parents are inclined to apply to Hong Kong universities, surpassing that of most, if not all, popular universities in China. The taunt "Hong Kong University will make Beijing University and Tsinghua University into second-class universities" was even seen on the web. In 2006, even though all the Hong Kong universities accounted for only 2,000 available spots, they received more than 30,000 "first choice" applications from China.

New Enrollment Procedure for Hong Kong Universities

In 2007, besides the eight Hong Kong universities from last year, four other universities—Hong Kong Shue Yan University, The Open University of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts, and Chu Hai College of Higher Education—have also joined the ranks in admitting students from China.

Chen Xiuye, Beijing high school examination top scholar with a score of 687, was admitted by Tsinghua University and Hong Kong Technological University. After careful consideration, he chose the latter. Liu Yang, top scholar from Guangdong Province, also gave up Fudan for Hong Kong Technological University. Li Yang, top scholar from Hainan City, was admitted into Hong Kong City University after moving home resulted in his being rejected by Tsinghua University. Such stories have abounded within Chinese education circles over recent years.

In response to attacks from the Chinese media of "stealing the elite," Hong Kong universities have decided to offer pre-enrollment for applicants from China, and they have also modified their admission criteria. Instead of only recruiting those that place Hong Kong universities as their first choice, they have decided to offer pre-enrollment, before mainland Chinese universities. Ten universities, including Hong Kong University, Hong Kong Technological University, and Hong Kong Institute of Technology, have also begun independent admission procedures. Students enrolled in these universities will also not be considered by Chinese universities. Analysts believe that this was arranged to prevent Hong Kong universities from being labeled as "stealing the elite" from mainland universities.

The Attraction of Hong Kong Universities

Last year, more than 10 percent of high school applicants from the renowned People’s University Affiliated High School in Beijing chose Hong Kong universities as their top choices. To them, Beijing University and Tsinghua University located right down the block are no longer much of an enticement. The greater attraction comes from Hong Kong universities due to their flexible admission criteria, hefty scholarships, new education system, and better prospects for future development.
Hong Kong Chinese University alone is offering 100 full scholarships out of the 250 positions it will fill. The scholarships include four years of tuition, a residence, and stipends totaling more than HKD$500,000(US$64,900). Hong Kong City University is also providing more than HKD$320,000(US$41,000) worth of scholarships to attract students. Xue Mingyu from Shenzhen, even though he was offered admission to Beijing University after winning the gold medal in an international chemistry competition, decided to apply to Hong Kong University. He said, "I don’t think Beijing University is not as good as Hong Kong University, but if they pay for my school fees and even give me a stipend, why would I not go there instead?"

Of course, this mostly applies to the elite. For the majority of mainland Chinese parents, decades of devoted saving is necessary to provide their children an opportunity to survive in the grueling Chinese society.

On the other hand, some students like Hong Kong for its education system. An English education and flexible credits, as well as more up-to-date education materials, are some of the reasons many students are attracted.

In reality, most people treat a Hong Kong education as a springboard for higher education or even residency in Hong Kong. According to statistics by Hong Kong City University, 67 percent of mainland Chinese students remain in Hong Kong or travel overseas for higher education after graduation. The best have traveled to Columbia, Princeton, MIT, and many other top institutions, and others have found jobs with Microsoft, Citibank, MetLife, and other major corporations.

Chinese Students in Hong Kong

To the mainland student, it is no easy task to study in Hong Kong. Besides language, a new culture and other factors, independence is another big challenge for them. Some Hong Kong professors have even proclaimed that mainland Chinese students are only good at nothing but taking examinations.

Many mainland Chinese media have reported cases of students unable to assimilate to their new life in Hong Kong: "They never participate in any social clubs or faculty events, they do not mingle with local students, and everyday after school they would rush home to play computer games. After four years, they are only comfortable within their small social circle and have made no improvement whatsoever in their Cantonese and English skills."

Some students have even been expelled. Tan Heyin, Vice-President of Hong Kong Technology University, gave the example of a student from Shanghai who was expelled after making three C minus’ in a row. "Simply getting the letter of admission is no guarantee of graduation."

The CCP Influence on Hong Kong Campuses
In general, Hong Kong media have been rather indifferent to recruiting mainland students. Hong Kong special columnist Shen Yuan once declared during an interview that "it is not a good thing" for mainland Chinese students to come to Hong Kong due to the backward education and culture in mainland China, and more importantly, how the CCP Party Culture might be exported.

Not long ago, Hong Kong media reported a 25-year-old female PhD student who inserted HKD $10,000(US$1,280) worth of cash in a professor’s mailbox in exchange for good grades. Not only did this shock the entire Hong Kong education world, it raised many doubts on the social benefits of recruiting mainland students.

Secondly, Hong Kong universities have found that many of its admitted students are also members of the Communist Youth League. Silently, they have crept into leadership positions in Hong Kong university student unions. Many university leaders are worried that these CCP youth members will try to erase memories of the Tiananmen Massacre and democracy in Hong Kong student communities.

Wang Anran, former Professor at Hong Kong Chinese University and critic, describes that it is already an open secret that CCP spies have infiltrated Hong Kong university campuses—especially graduate students dispatched years ago. He said that they all have very special backgrounds and some have been well-trained by the CCP. He gave the example of a former classmate, Wang Zhenmin, current Associate Dean at the Faculty of Law in Tsinghua University.

"The CCP will definitely use the Hong Kong universities as a way to infiltrate Hong Kong so as to service them. I caution Hong Kong universities in admitting Chinese students to Hong Kong."

Education Problems at Home

Wu Daqi, Associate Dean at the School of Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, believes that there are a whole series of problems with mainland Chinese high schools. "If you go on the Internet, you can see that over the past few years, many Chinese schools have had crazy problems with research. Some professors even skip lectures. Many people are discontented with mainland institutions of higher learning, yet they use this to attack Hong Kong universities."

Renowned Chinese mathematician Qiu Chengtong also criticizes the mainland Chinese system. "Most institutions of higher learning in China are just in it for the money. They just want the funds and never bother about real research. There are just too many incidents of bribery and corruption in Chinese institutions—whether they are well known professors, fellows, or students, they’re not ashamed of these things at all."

To this end, many Chinese students sense an entirely different atmosphere in Hong Kong. On May 4, 2007, students from 10 Hong Kong universities offered flowers for the brave Chinese students who gave their lives for the betterment of China during the May 4, 1919, and June 4, 1989, incidents.
Some analysts believe that the admission heat in Hong Kong universities is a battle between two opposing education systems. Tao Jie, social critic in Hong Kong, believes that after these mainland Chinese elite come to Hong Kong, they can freely read Apple Daily, Easy Finder, Southern Weekly, and many other papers banned in mainland China.

One PhD student, surnamed Li who came to Hong Kong to study describes that his biggest joy in coming Hong Kong is to be able to read and express himself freely. "The Tiananmen Massacre, Falun Gong, and many other issues have all been censored in mainland China." He recalls many mainland Chinese family and friends encouraging him to read banned books and papers in Hong Kong, and he has already become a window to the outside world for his entire family.

Can Sun is a correspondent for Chinascope.

China Initiates New Campaign to Control Use of Satellite Dishes

In recent months, Chinese authorities have launched another round in its campaign to hunt down and smash "the woks"—the satellite dishes that households have installed to watch TV programs that are unavailable from official TV stations.

Publicly, the campaign is billed as "cleaning out pornography" and "removing unstable elements," and it is carried out by local governments, the police, industry and commerce bureaus, radio and TV broadcasting authorities, and cultural departments.

Behind the campaign, the authorities may have other real concerns. As Huang Qiuju, the deputy mayor of Guangsui City in Hubei Province put it in the working meeting about implementing the campaign on April 19, 2007: To remove these dishes is "an urgent response to overseas hostile forces that attempt to infiltrate and divide us. It is a necessary measure to enhance the control of the ideological field." [1] The campaign is to carry out the No.79 decree by State Council to "prohibit satellite woks from entering the market place," according to a news report by the Guangsui local TV station. [2]

In a news report about removing the satellite dishes in Shaya County of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, it stated that Shaya County (authorities) come down hard on the illegal installation of commercial satellite dishes by way of monitoring oversea programs and individual satellite receiving instruments, in order to …prevent Falun Gong members and Christian groups to spread their religious activities. [3]

Many "Woks" Were Smashed

Across the country, the authorities have been seeking out those who sell or use satellite dishes to receive overseas TV programs.

Mr. Zheng from Qiaotou Village, Guangfeng County, Jiangxi Province, stated that local authorities recently visited and destroyed a number of woks in several neighboring villages.

Ms. Dou from Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, indicated that between February and April, several local government departments held a joint action to "smash woks."

In mid February 2007 local authorities including police in Xiangfan City, Hubei Province, made unannounced visits to electronics wholesale markets to confiscate satellite dishes.

According sources in Ji County, Hebei Province, the county government recently issued a public notice banning satellite dishes.

The Industry and Commerce Bureau in Luchuan County, Guangxi, confiscated satellite dishes and other accessories between April and May in a dedicated campaign.
Guangzhou City in Guangdong Province has installed advanced equipment to monitor satellite receivers in the city: "No personal shall install satellite dishes without permission."

What Do the People Say?

"The government does not want us to watch satellite channels because they are afraid that we, the people, would like a democratic system. I bet those who are banning satellite dishes all have the dishes installed at their homes. They just want to fool us, the common people," said Mr. Jin in Shenyang City, Liaoning Province.

A Mr. Wang from Ji County, Hebei Province, finds too much Party education in the domestic TV programs. "I really want to see what overseas TV programs look like."

Mr. Shen in Guoan City, Hebei Province, said "I have not watched (Chinese official) CCTV programs for a long time. With a wok, I can watch whatever I want. (Overseas) news reports are more real (than CCTV). The excuse for the ‘wok-cleaning’ campaign is ‘cleaning up pornography.’ Does it mean that satellite channels like Discovery and CNN are porn?"

In spite of the authorities’ efforts to ban satellite dishes, the retailers of satellite dishes are as busy as ever. Promotions are all over the place in cell phone text messages, Internet deals, flyers, door-to-door direct marketing, and underground trades. From households to businesses, from the remote countryside to inner-city communities, satellite dishes of different sizes and models are spreading like a prairie fire.

The upward trend, as China analysts put it, points to an increasing demand from Chinese citizens for information outside Chinese-controlled media. The authorities’ repressive censorship has driven the satellite dish market underground.

To evade confiscation by their local governments, the users install their dishes either under the window of a balcony, beside the air-conditioner, or even inside the house. Some install a reflecting plate in the house to face the window and then have the dish opposite the plate to receive the satellite signals. As a dish user puts it, "Many departments are sharing the responsibility for monitoring satellite dish use. But once there are too many parties involved, it’s very hard to control. You have your policy; I have my way (to cope with it)."

For Consumers, the Wok Saves Money

In some rural areas like Guizhou, Southwest China, TV programs are the only entertainment available. The cost for cable installation is prohibitive, and local TV signals are weak. That leaves satellite dishes as the only meaningful alternative.

In Chongqing City, Sichuan Province, the cost for digital TV is high while the cable programs are swamped with ads. With the one-time purchase of a dish, one can watch TV programs for free.
Economics drives consumption. According to local vendors, the best selling pitch is "free channels." The cost of a dish is about one or two years’ in cable fees. The lowest priced dish costs only 300 yuan, for example, in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, and over 100 TV programs are available, including almost all the Chinese domestic channels and many foreign channels. All free after the one-time initial cost of the dish. To sweeten the deal, vendors offer free delivery and free installation.



Xiao Tian is a correspondent for Chinascope.

China is Moving Up the Value Chain

Just when you think you’ve got the Chinese economy figured out, it undergoes a profound structural transition in the seeming blink of an eye. For the last several years we have come to think of China as the workshop of the world. In this view, China tends to import huge amounts of raw materials and intermediate goods from abroad, combine them with super-cheap labor and virtually free capital, and then turn around and ship an armada of assembled products out to the rest of the world—particularly to the US and the European Union.

Until very recently, Chinese imports and exports have indeed tended to move in tandem (Figure 1), bolstering the view of those who saw China as a giant assembly line. Sure China ran a substantial (and growing) trade surplus with the US and to a lesser extent the European Union, but that surplus was nearly offset by a trade deficit with China’s neighbors in Asia (which exported intermediate and capital goods to China) as well as the world’s major commodity producers.


China will always need to import a large share of its raw materials. However, we have now entered an era where China no longer needs to import huge amounts of intermediate goods. Since 2000, Chinese production of industrial boilers has doubled; its production of chemical fiber, steel, and plastics has roughly tripled; and its production of semiconductors has surged nearly seven-fold. Moreover, detailed analysis of China’s trade data show that for a number of important processing industries—such as machinery, white goods, autos, and office equipment—the ratio of final exports to imported components has surged in recent years, suggesting that China is increasingly supplying its export machine.

China has funded this breakneck industrial development by channeling a huge pool of captive domestic savings into fixed asset investment, which now exceeds 50% of GDP (compared to 20-30% in most other economies in Non-Japan Asia). China has also sucked up the lion’s share of foreign direct investment (and the technical expertise that often accompanies it) from its neighbors in Asia. Chinese FDI has increased from $4 billion in 1990, to $41 billion in 2000 to $70 billion in 2006.

What are the implications of this new phase of Chinese development? We can think of a few possibilities. First, we would expect the prices of intermediate goods worldwide to face downward pressure in the coming years just as prices of assembled goods have been squeezed over the last decade. A bit further down the road, we will start to see substantial disinflation or even deflation in the price of capital goods as well.

While China has clearly reduced its reliance on important components, its economic policies remain much too heavily focused on the supply side of the economy. Ironically, the development of its supplier base makes it even more imperative that China wean itself from export-led growth. Export-dependent industries now account for an increasingly high proportion of China’s economic growth, thus making the economy more vulnerable to shock in external demand or the exchange rate. We would strongly advise individuals not to base their China strategy on the presumption of a strong RMB. Moreover, absent a substantial expansion of domestic demand in the next few years, a Chinese growth recession will morph from a possibility into a probability.

Edward Klaff is a Boston-based economist.