On March 19, 2008, Outlook Magazine under the State-run Xinhua New Agency published an article entitled “Why Is the United States Strengthening Control over Exports to China?” The article stated that the strengthened control over exports to China is part of a U.S. military containment strategy. The author of the article is a deputy director, associate researcher at the American Studies Department of China’s Institute for International Issues. The institute is a Chinese Government think tank. Below is the translation of the article. [1]

In recent years, along with new changes in the strategy of yhe United States national security and China’s national defense modernization development, the United States has further tightened its control over exports to China using the areas of legislation, list management, the organization establishment, departmental coordination, multilateral systems and so on.

The first change to occur was the revision of regulations on export and re-export licensing for China and expanding the scope of controlled items. In June 2006, the United States officially announced a new export licensing policy for China. The new regulation requires all exports to China to re-apply for a license when the exported merchandise is suspected to be destined for military use in China. The list of items covers 20 product categories and associated technologies and software such as aircraft and aircraft engines, avionics and inertial navigation systems, lasers, and depleted uranium, as described in 31 entries on the Commerce Control List. Controlled categories may be added as needed. Some products that are not originally on the control list may also be included.

The second was to strengthen the control of “deemed exports.” The U.S. government has stipulated Chinese scholars and researchers must apply for a deemed export license when they will have access to sensitive information and technology. This includes American Chinese citizens and foreign corporations that may bring sensitive technology to China. In 2005, the U.S. Department of Commercial Affairs also proposed restricting individuals who were born in the United States but held another country’s citizenship from obtaining U.S. technology. Although, as a result of strong opposition from the academic community and industry associations, it was eventually abolished, the U.S. Department of Commerce still indicates that it will further tighten the deemed export control. At the year-end of 2006, the Department of Commerce established the Deemed Export Advisory Committee (DEAC), which will advise the Secretary of Commerce on export controls for China. In 2006, the U.S. government reviewed 865 deemed export licenses, 60% of which were held by Chinese citizens.

The third was to strengthen the construction of the export control mechanism, enhance control efficiency, set up new coordination organizations, strengthen the management of the blacklist system; and strengthen the “end-user-visit” system.
{mospagebreak}
The fourth was to strengthen sanctions on corporate and individual violators, both in the United States and foreign countries. This includes the so-called severe punishment of any companies or individual that is suspected of selling sensitive technology to China, strengthening sanctions over foreign corporations, and deliberately bringing public attention to Chinese spy cases. Since 2005, the U.S. has successively brought public attention to the "Mark espionage case," the "Moo Ko-Suen espionage case," and several others. In November 2007, the United State-China Economic and Security Review Commission declared that China has been engaged in espionage to obtain key technologies in the U.S. military industry. It called for immediate action, to conduct comprehensive reviews of China’s “illegal technology transfers,” and to provide additional funding for export control and counter-espionage work.

The fifth was to promote and strengthen multilateral export control systems and obstruct and sabotage the normal military trade and cooperation between China and other countries.

Export control has always been one of the important methods that the United States has employed in maintaining national security and implementation of external strategies. In recent years, the further strengthening of export controls for China has been closely related to the adjustment of the U.S. global security strategy since “911,” and is meant to ultimately serve the U.S. military containment strategy for China.
 
First, the U.S. security concepts went through a fundamental change after “911.”  Anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation have become the core of its global security strategy. The U.S. officials believe export controls for China still have many flaws in the legal system, license approval, and regulation implementation. Some companies have “poor” records. Therefore, it is necessary to implement more restrictive export control policies for China in order to be in compliance with the U.S. “broader national security and diplomatic agenda.”

Next, the United States continues to strengthen the China Containment Policy and ensure its military has technological superiority over China. U.S. officials believe, after entering into the new century, that China’s national defense modernization has accelerated, and China’s national defense foundation industry is approaching or even surpassing the powerful western countries at an unprecedented pace. Certain more advanced technologies like the nuclear industry and man-in-space flight technology have reached the world’s leading level. Therefore, it is necessary for the U.S. to globally prevent advanced military technology and equipment from getting into China, to hinder the modernization advancement of China’s national defense, and to safeguard the U.S. military’s hegemony.
{mospagebreak}
Thirdly, U.S. existing laws and regulations lag behind and it is difficult for the laws and regulations to catch up with the steps of technical upgrades and proliferation. U.S. officials believe that the U.S. military is no longer the main source of the advanced dual-purpose technology. Now many leading technologies are flowing from private enterprises to the military, which makes it difficult for the government to define military technology and therefore include it in the control list. This makes it more complex for monitoring.  Following the rapid Internet development, the methods of obtaining technical information have become more convenient, and technical proliferation has increased exponentially. Multinational corporations seek investments, production, and sales throughout the world. As a result, production and work process technology flow to overseas subsidiary companies and it is inevitable that dual-purpose technology transfers overseas.

In addition, multilateral export control mechanisms have various holes and problems and need to be amended. After the end of the cold war, priorities in many countries shifted from security to economic welfare and business competition. The U.S. and allied countries differ on export controls. The Wassenaar Arrangement replacing Batumi is the result of such a difference. It does not officially list the countries that are subject to export control, nor has it a strict control mechanism. The organizational structure is extremely loose. A member of the allied countries makes his/her own decisions in carrying out export control based on common control policies and a detailed list, and in granting export licenses. U.S. officials think it is difficult for the above system to monitor the dual-purpose technology exports. “It is time to start the coordination of licensing policies in all countries in order to minimize the differences in international export control systems.” Therefore, the United States urges to revise some provisions, so as to better coordinate member countries’ export licensing policies and close the loopholes of the multilateral export control system.

Endnote:
[1] Xinhua, March 20, 2008
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-03/20/content_7824003.htm

On February 29, 2008, the Chinese Ministry of Defense signed an agreement on setting up a direct confidential telephone line with its U.S. counterpart in Shanghai. It was widely believed that the Sino-U.S. military hotline would be opened within a month, and that it would be the first military hotline between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and another country. However, to everyone’s surprise, it was Russia that became the first country to which the PLA wanted to make a direct phone call. The International Herald Leader, a newspaper under Xinhua, published an article called “The Chinese and Russian Military Hotline.” [1]

Sino-Russia Military Hotline Successfully Set up

While the Sino-U.S. military hotline still waits to be finalized, the phone line connecting Beijing and Moscow is already open.

On March 14, the day when China’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense formally established a direct phone line, China’s Minister of Defense General Cao Gangchuan had a phone conversation with his Russian counterpart Serdyukov for the first time.
 
It was 14 days after an agreement on setting up a direct confidential military telephone line between China and the United States in Shanghai. It was widely believed that the Sino-U.S. military hotline would be opened within a month, and that it would be the first military hotline between the PLA and another country. However, to everyone’s surprise, it was Russia that first connected China by phone line.
 
A Manifestation of Political Trust between Two Countries

“The launching of a hotline before the Sino-U.S. direct phone line shows the closeness of relationship between China and Russia,” Teng Jianqun, deputy secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association told the International Herald Leader, “The launch sent a signal, implying that everything including the military hotline is built upon the foundation of mutual trust.”

On March 3, the U.S. Department of Defense released the “2008 China Military Power Report,” which, as usual, disseminates the “theory of Chinese military threat” by charging PLA for lack of transparency.

“In my impression, there has not been any ‘theory of Chinese military threat’ in Russia.” Teng added that it was obvious China and Russia have a much deeper mutual trust. As said by Minister Cao in the telephone conversation with Serdyukov, the direct phone line between China and the Russian Ministry of Defense is a reflection of bilateral trust and strategic cooperation.
{mospagebreak}
Major Difference from Sino-U.S. Hotline

Mutual trust is determined by a bilateral diplomatic relationship. “Whether in mutual trust, or level of maturity, the Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership is more constructive than that between China and the U.S.,” Major General Luo Yuan, the deputy director of the World Military Research Division of China Academy of Military Science, told the reporter.

These differences directly affect the attitudes toward the two major military hotlines. In Teng’s opinion, “China and Russia share common positions on issues such as arms control, national security, and U.N. disarmament talks. Therefore, communications between the two countries are easier. The Sino-U.S. communications, however, is shadowed with more precaution because China does not feel assured because of the actions of distrust from the U.S. side.”

The strains are felt in the negotiations of the technical aspects of the Sino-U.S. hotline. “How should the hotline be placed? Where to put it? When should the line be connected? What is the duration? Who is responsible?” Teng said, these are all technical barriers that the Sino-U.S. hotline needs to overcome, while none of them exist between China and Russia.
 
The two hotlines also differ on the goal of communications. The purpose of the Sino-Russia hotline, as stated by Cao, “is to the advantage of prompt communications of important issues related with bilateral military contacts and cooperation, and of timely exchange of views and coordination of positions on international and regional hot issues.”
 
Teng explains, a major issue of “important issues related with bilateral military contacts and cooperation” is to strike terrorist and separatist groups on the border so as to jointly safeguard border security. The goal of the Sino-U.S. military hotline, however, “is in a hope of solving the crisis by means of dialogue, avoiding antagonizing each other,” according to Luo.

Nevertheless, the two hotlines do have something in common. “It is clear that the establishment of Sino-Russia and Sino-U.S. military hotlines have special meaning during the dangerous periods across the Taiwan strait,” Major General Luo Yuan explains. “President Hu Jintao recently stressed that separatist activity for ‘Taiwan independence’ has become the largest danger to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the largest obstacle to the development of cross-strait relations, and the biggest threat to the regional peace and stability. Under these circumstances, China certainly needs to exchange views and coordinate positions with other countries to safeguard peace, stability, and strategic benefits.”
{mospagebreak}
What is Behind ‘Sudden’ Open Is Inevitable

What impress people are not only the vast differences in the attitude toward the two military hotlines, the contents of communications, but the suddenness of the opening of the Sino-Russia hotline. It is hard to trace the origin of the negotiations either by searching the documentations or consulting experts. In Teng’s view, it is not unexpected. The hotline is “actually an extension of the mutual trusts of Sino-Russia military.”

The bilateral military trust wass built starting in April 1990, when China, Russia, Kazak, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement on mutual reduction of military forces in border areas. Two years later, when then Russian President Yeltsin visited China, China and Russia issued The Joint Declaration on the Foundation of Bilateral Relationship, confirming the friendly status between the two countries.

The following two years, the bilateral military relationship continued to advance. In 1993, the Ministry of Defense of both countries signed a cooperation agreement. In 1994, both countries announced to develop “equal and trustable strategic cooperation partnership geared toward the 21st century” by signing a joint declaration that neither country would be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and would target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other. China, Russia, Kazak, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan also signed an agreement on strengthening military trust in border areas.
 
In 2007, the joint military exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization pushed the Sino-Russia military relationship to a new height. Teng said that the relationships between the two countries are both “bilateral” and “multilateral”. It is obvious from the bilateral military exchanges that the launch of the hotline is a natural result.

Endnote:
[1] International Herald Leader, 2008 March 18
http://news.xinhuanet.com/herald/200803/18/content_7812332.htm