On Cross-Straits Relations
The Impact of the Nine Commentaries on China’s Army
An Interview with Mr. Lin Zhenyang, a Veteran of the East China Sea Fleet and Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Veterans Association
Mr. Lin Zhenyang, currently residing in Seattle, served in the East China Sea Fleet of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for five years. He was discharged from military service in 1989 and came to the United States soon thereafter. In 1992, he founded the “Overseas Chinese Veterans Association,” and chaired the “Frontier for People’s Rights in China.” Mr. Lin has been actively promoting soldiers’ rights to those who are in military service in China, including veterans’ benefits and the rights and responsibilities of soldiers in democratic countries. He has been striving hard to educate soldiers in China that the military in a modernized nation serves only as the supporting machinery for a nation’s constitution, not as the servant of a certain political party. To make China a truly democratic, liberal, and prosperous nation, China’s military must avoid the fate of becoming the servant of any political party.
The Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party published by The Epoch Times has recorded in depth the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including the CCP’s history of controlling the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to massacre its own innocent citizens. Having learned that Mr. Lin has been actively observing the impact of the Nine Commentaries and the resulting wave of people renouncing their CCP membership, the author interviewed Mr. Lin.
Lost in Translations: A Report on An Aborted Village Election
In 1987, the Chinese National People’s Congress passed a law calling for direct elections in the country’s rural villages, where 900 million people live. It instantly caught China observers’ attention. Some view the village elections as a sham to fool the world, since in fact the Communist Party is in complete control. Others see elections as a dramatic step forward on the road to democracy, hailing it as a “training ground for democratization.”
Yet, when a grass-roots cadre in a rural area of Sichuan Province, China, seized the opportunity and pushed for a general election for the key posts in Pingba Town, where he lived, the result was devastating. Instead of being promoted for his successful experiment, his boss delivered a dreadful blow to this fledgling political apprentice: “You’re fired.” What went wrong?
Wrongful Conviction Cases Expose Serious Defects in China’s Legal System
Ten years ago, twenty-year-old Nie Shubin was a shy, stuttering, and well-behaved young factory worker. None of the villagers believed that Nie could have committed the murder and rape police had charged him with. Ten years later, the arrest of another man revealed the true murderer, but it was too late for Nie and his family.
Inside the Bubble: A Glimpse at China’s Real Estate Industry
The Richest Industry and an Industry for the Rich
Starting in the late 1990s, China started to switch from a welfare-oriented public housing distribution system to commercialized housing. As homeownership rates have skyrocketed, real estate prices have been rising from several hundred yuan per square meter to 2,800 yuan (US$337) per square meter. According to the Shanghai Statistics Bureau, the price of Shanghai commodity housing in 2004 was 6,385 yuan (US$769) per square meter, 14.6% higher than that of 2003, while marketing companies estimated it to be 7,472 yuan (US$900) per square meter.
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao Form New Propaganda Strategy
From December 17 to 19, 2004, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held a national conference for propaganda chiefs. Although Hu Jintao did not attend the meeting, he oversaw the entire preparation of the conference. Either he directly approved all of the documents distributed at the meeting, after discussion with the Politburo, or they were distributed following his directions. Therefore, his absence is not an indication of lack of interest. On the contrary, the conference revealed the determination and framework of Hu and Wen in their effort to renew the CCP’s propaganda campaign.
How Much Longer Can Hu Jintao Survive?
In the spring of 2005, China’s political situation appears delicate and complicated. Since the Two Conferences (the National People’s Congress and the Political Consultative Conference), a series of events such as Zhao Ziyang’s death, the Anti-Secession Law and China’s anti-Japanese campaign have had a big impact on Hu Jintao, the new leader in Zhongnanhai. Before mid-April, the government initiated and manipulated an anti-Japanese movement. With its tacit consent, it then spread to the entire country. On April 17, however, Hu Jintao told the Foreign Ministry and the military to stop their encouragement, support and instigation of this anti-Japanese sentiment. At the same time, under Hu’s orders, the Party Central Propaganda Ministry instructed the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Guangming Daily and other Party propaganda media to restrain their reporting on the anti-Japanese movement. Hu Jintao also asked the Ministry of Public Security police to intimidate any anti-Japanese demonstrators. Yet the spontaneous anti-Japanese movement continues to evolve on its own, and activists have formed networks to call for all “patriots” to gather in Tiananmen Square on the May 4th anniversary to express “patriotic appeals.”
On the morning of April 21, 2005, in order to gain insight into the current situation in Beijing, the author, an editor for Democratic China, visited Mr. Lu Nan (pseudonym, for security reasons), a retired senior communist official in Beijing.