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Wu Guoguang: Xi Jinping’s Reversal of the Course, Will China’s Transition be Peaceful or Marked with Bloodshed?

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Cheng Xiaonong: U.S.-China Strategic Relations Have Crystallized

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Xinhua Commentaries: “Exposing the Three Major Political Deficits of the U.S.”

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The CCP’s Performing Arts Troupes in the U.S.

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PLA Officer Advocates Preemptive Strikes Against U.S. in Event of War

Li Li (李莉), a prominent military commentator and esteemed professor at China’s National Defense University, recently made a bold assertion during a televised discussion. In contemplating the prospect of armed conflict, Li recommended that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) consider a proactive “preemptive” approach, targeting U.S. military installations in Japan as a primary strategic objective.

Li’s perspective can be summarized as follows: “In the event of war, our foremost imperative is to preemptively neutralize U.S. military bases situated in Japan.” In her discourse, Li used the term “American imperialism” to refer to the United States and emphasized that “we will not hesitate like Russia did”. She firmly asserted that “only decisive and swift counteraction can guarantee our nation’s survival and sustained progress. We shall not delay in neutralizing U.S. ‘black’ aircraft carriers and ‘black’ bombers. We shall seize the earliest opportunity to take actions and leave the enemy no chance to breathe.”

Source: Aboluo, September 8, 2023
https://www.aboluowang.com/2023/0908/1951318.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military US-China Relations

Huanqiu: Ministry of State Security Commented on the U.S.’ Policies Towards China

Huanqiu published an unexpected commentary by the Ministry of State Security concerning the United States’ policies towards China. Typically, such remarks emanate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The commentary asserts that while the U.S. has shifted its strategy from the “old two approaches” to the “new two approaches” and claims that it is doomed for failure.

The core excerpt from the commentary reads as follows:

In previous decades, the U.S. adhered to the “old two approaches” regarding China, characterized as “Contact + Containment.” This approach entailed on one hand, engaging China within the international system and fostering cooperation, while concurrently executing covert infiltration and containment strategies against China. This dual-handed approach intricately shaped the complexity that has historically marked Sino-U.S. relations.

In the contemporary geopolitical landscape, the rivalry between the two global powers, the United States and China, has unequivocally become the prevailing theme in international politics. Consequently, Sino-U.S. relations have entered a novel phase, with the U.S. unveiling its “Competition + Control Competition” strategy.

The crux of this strategy lies in “Competition,” constituting the primary thrust of the U.S. approach. It encompasses economic decoupling, political coalition-building, security deterrence, information warfare, and norm/rule setting endeavors. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have been steadfast and increasingly assertive in their pursuit of this approach. Looking ahead, the U.S. may well implement even more formidable “competition” measures, with many yet unseen.

Simultaneously, the U.S. has adopted a discernible “Control Competition” tactic. While “Competition” seeks to stymie China, “Control Competition” seeks to manage this suppression without permitting it to spiral out of control. The Biden administration has repeatedly referenced concepts like “guardrails,” “thresholds,” and “parameters,” transitioning from the notion of “decoupling” to “de-risking,” and vocally committing to the “Four No’s and One Unintentional.” All these actions are aimed at maintaining control over the competitive dynamics. “Competition” constitutes a strategic move, whereas “Controlling Competition” is more tactical and serves as a complementary aspect of the overall competitive strategy.

This shift in strategy reflects three underlying objectives of the U.S. government:

  • Dissemination of Ambiguous Signals: By releasing “mixed signals,” the U.S. aims to obfuscate its intentions and make it challenging for its opponent (China) to decipher and evaluate its actions—a fundamental tactic reminiscent of the Cold War era.
  • Mitigating Overreactions: The U.S. endeavors to forestall any excessive reactions from its opponent by exhibiting “self-restraint,” a strategy that has a historical precedent in the annals of great power politics over the past few centuries.
  • Expanding Channels of Influence: The U.S. seeks to create a “dialog window” to augment avenues for influence, thereby fostering limited cooperation with its opponent.

Source: Huanqiu, September 3, 2023
https://world.huanqiu.com/article/4EOkEEy2R3N

Briefings | | |   @CS US-China Relations

China Disclosed the Espionage Case of John Shing-wan Leung

Chinese authorities accused Chinese-American community leader John Shing-wan Leung (梁成運) of espionage and sentenced him to life imprisonment in May. On September 11, the Ministry of State Security unveiled the details of Leung’s case, claiming he had served as a U.S. spy for 30 years under the guise of a Chinese community leader in the U.S. and a purported “patriotic philanthropist” to China.

Leung, aged 78, was apprehended in China on April 15, 2021 and convicted of espionage by a local court on May 15. His sentence includes life imprisonment, a lifelong deprivation of political rights, and the confiscation of 500,000 RMB (US$ 69,000) in personal assets.

According to a report from the WeChat account of the “Ministry of National State Security,” Leung was born in Hong Kong in 1945 and relocated to the United States in 1983, where he operated a restaurant in a Midwestern city. U.S. intelligence personnel initiated contact with him in 1986 and formally established a cooperation agreement in 1989, recruiting him as an informant. Leung received a monthly payment of $1,000, with additional performance-based bonuses. In the same year, he acquired U.S. citizenship.

The U.S. embellished Leung’s academic credentials in the U.K., his alleged role as a U.N. official, and his purported involvement in the Vietnam War to enhance his profile. Leung was also directed to make donations to American state legislators to bolster his influence.

With financial support from the U.S., Leung held leadership positions in various overseas Chinese organizations, thereby amplifying his sway within the Chinese diaspora. He was tasked with making charitable donations in China, effectively projecting the image of a “patriotic philanthropist.”

Through social gatherings and community events, Leung cultivated close connections with Chinese diplomatic missions and personnel in the U.S., gathering intelligence, and monitoring Chinese nationals and diaspora communities. Whenever he learned of Chinese officials visiting the U.S. for official purposes, he promptly reported them to U.S. intelligence agencies. Following their directives, he would arrange meetings with them in restaurants or hotels equipped with surveillance equipment to collect information, even including setting up sexual traps to coerce those Chinese individuals.

Under the direction of multiple American intelligence operatives, Leung reportedly accumulated a substantial volume of intelligence related to China and assisted U.S. intelligence agencies in fabricating “Chinese spy cases.” He was even bestowed with a “Medal of Merit” by the head of the U.S. intelligence agency.

In 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic and the suspension of international flights, U.S. intelligence agencies urgently required Chinese intelligence. Consequently, they directed Leung to travel to China at the end of 2020, where he actively participated in various social activities to gather intelligence.

The report concludes by advising overseas Chinese individuals who may be “coerced by foreign intelligence organizations” to promptly report their situations to Chinese diplomatic missions or, upon entering China, to inform national state security agencies. Those who demonstrate remorse may be granted leniency in prosecution.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 11, 2023
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202309110037.aspx

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations

Li Qiang Announced China’s Leadership Training Programs for ASEAN Countries

Chinese Premier Li Qiang, speaking at the annual summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, unveiled China’s initiatives to train future leaders for ASEAN nations.

Li stated, “Fourthly, we will work together to expand humanistic exchanges. China is willing to work with ASEAN to continue to build a solid foundation of public opinion in our relations, implement the Global Civilization Initiative, and take next year’s co-hosting of the China-ASEAN Year of Humanistic Exchanges as an opportunity to further strengthen exchanges in the areas of culture, tourism, training, and youth, so as to continue to deepen the blending of civilizations and people-to-people exchanges. In the next three years, China will build 10 “China-ASEAN Modern Craftsman Institute” in ASEAN countries, continue to carry out the “Bridge of the Future” China-ASEAN Youth Leaders Training Program, and launch the “Ten Thousand People Training and Seminar Program,” to train 10,000 talents for ASEAN countries in the fields of governance, anti-corruption, and green development.”

Source: China’s Foreign Ministry website, September 7, 2023
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/tyb/gdxw/202309/t20230907_11139468.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

Chinese Singer Accusing Ukraine for Killing Its Own People

Chinese singer Wang Fang blamed Ukraine for killing its own people, creating episode number two after her visit to the Mariupol Opera House in Ukraine, where she sang the Russian patriotic song “Katyusha.” The actions of Wang and the group she was with, known as the “Chinese self-media delegation,” drew strong criticism from the Ukrainian government and the international community, since Russia bombed the Opera House, resulting in the deaths of hundreds, including many children.

Upon returning to Moscow, the four people from the group held a press conference. Wang said, “When I saw that the Ukrainian Nazis were killing the children in the Donbass, a wave of anger went through me, so I decided to come to the Donbass to help the children.” Her husband, Zhou Xiaoping, an internet writer known for promoting communist and leftist ideologies, placed blame on Ukraine rather than Russia for the destruction of the theater. He also echoed Russian propaganda by asserting that Russia was protecting the local population from NATO attacks.

Source: China News Center, September 11, 2023

王芳、周小平接受俄罗斯媒体采访，声称马里乌波尔歌剧院是北约轰炸的

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Explains China’s Foreign State Immunities Act

China recently passed the Foreign State Immunities Act, and the Chinese Embassy in the United States provided an explanation from the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson regarding this legislation.

Question: The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China has recently considered and adopted the Law on Immunity of Foreign States. The Law adjusts China’s previous position of “absolute immunity” to authorize Chinese courts to accept cases in which a foreign State is the defendant. May I ask why China has made this adjustment?

Answer: …

The Law on the Immunity of China and provides exceptions to it, making it clear that Chinese courts may exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits arising from the non-sovereign acts of foreign States, such as lawsuits involving disputes over commercial activities, related personal injuries and property damages, and may, under strictly limited conditions, take coercive measures against property of a foreign State in connection with its commercial activities. This is fully consistent with international law and the practice of States.

As a responsible Power, China firmly upholds the principle of the sovereign equality of States, will protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal persons, and will respect the immunities that foreign States are entitled to under international law.

Source: Chinese Embassy at the U.S. website, September 5, 2023
http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/lcbt/wjbfyrbt/202309/t20230905_11138002.htm

Briefings | | |   Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

Scholar: China’s Gender Imbalance Leaves Over 30 Million Men Without Prospects for Marriage

China has had a persistently high sex ratio at birth (more males than females) for around 40 years. This gender imbalance has led to over 30 million Chinese men being unable to find wives, according to Professor Yuan Xin of Nankai University. By 2021, there were around 239 million single people aged over 15 in China, but Yuan says 15 is too young to define “single” and the real number is lower. However, the decades-long gender imbalance has created many “passive singles” – men who cannot find wives due to the shortage of women. From 1980-2021 around 35 million more males were born than females. This means at least 30 million men will not be able to marry locally. The competition for marriage is increasing, with rises in bride prices and marriage costs. The stability of marriages may also decline. Young single men may cause social instability and older single men will lack family support. Restoring a normal sex ratio at birth is very difficult now. The gender imbalance will persist throughout life cycles, so a coordinated national response is needed. It is inaccurate to say singles have higher spending power – they may just meet basic needs and not stimulate consumption. If desire is universally low, consumption will not rise. In summary, China’s long-term gender imbalance has created many involuntary single men, posing economic and social challenges that require an active policy response.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 11, 2023
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202309110243.aspx

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources

Chinese Capital Sweeps Japan and U.S.’s ‘Friendship-Shoring’ Countries

Chinese companies are aggressively investing in and shifting production to countries like Vietnam, Thailand and Mexico – areas seen by Japan and the US as alternatives to rely on instead of China. This is part of Japan and the US’s efforts towards “friend-shoring”, moving supply chains to friendly nations, but China is gaining ground.

From January to June 2023, China’s direct investment in Vietnam rose 37% year-on-year to $2.7 billion, far exceeding other countries like South Korea. Chinese firms offer wages in Vietnam more than twice the average to attract workers, making it hard for Japanese companies to maintain production bases. Overall, China’s direct investment balance in major ASEAN countries reached $52 billion in 2021, surpassing the US.

In Thailand, China’s direct investment from January to June accounted for over 20% of the total, ranking first and 70% higher than Japan. Thailand is becoming a production base for Chinese EV companies, shaking Japan’s auto dominance there. Similarly in Mexico, Chinese auto parts companies are increasing investments, approaching the levels of the US in 2022.

This illustrates risks to supply chains as China dominates certain critical materials like gallium and nickel. For example, 70% of nickel smelters in Indonesia, which produces half of global nickel, are owned by Chinese firms. Japan is losing ground, with Sumitomo abandoning a planned refinery to be replaced by a Chinese company.

While Japan and the US aim to exclude China from material processing and parts production, China’s dominance means it could choke exports. This risks Japan and the US’s goals for EV production if China limits exports. To compete, Japan and the US need to adopt strategies like joint R&D with local nations rather than just focus on friend-shoring. Overall, China is gaining advantage over Japan and the US in critical supply chain investments across Asia and Latin America.

Source: Nikkei Chinese, September 11, 2023
https://zh.cn.nikkei.com/china/ccompany/53259-2023-09-11-08-42-52.html

Briefings | | |   Geo-Strategic Trend