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Cross-Region Fiscal Transfer Puts Poor Regions In More Debt

An article by a Chinese author was circulating on the Internet. The article pointed out that. although China implemented a cross-region fiscal transfer mechanism, the better developed regions provide a large amount of financial aid to the underdeveloped regions to help them develop their economy. This system does not make the poor region prosperous but rather, it puts them in more debt.

The article used Qinghai Province as an example. Qinghai received a “fiscal transfer” (aid) of 147 billion yuan (US$ 21 billion) in 2022, 7.6 times what it received in 2010. However, its disposable income per capita was 27,000 yuan in 2022, only 3.1 times the amount in 2010. This indicates that the “transferred” money didn’t directly get into people’s wallets. The reason was because the receiving regions spent the money on large projects instead, which may not directly lead to improving people’s livelihoods or may cause unnecessary waste. In the meantime, the receiving regions also borrowed additional money to finance those projects (the transferred money was not enough). As a result, the more the “transfer” money comes, the more the receiving region is in debt.

Source: China Digital Times, May 16, 2023
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/696035.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

China’s Police Shared Experiences on Conducting Operations Overseas

Recently overseas media reported that Chinese police from Qingtian County, Zhejiang Province published their “successful” experiences in conducting operations in other countries. The article was published in the second issue of the Zhejiang Police College Publication in 2019.

There are 330,000 Chinese from Qingtian County who live in 128 foreign countries and regions. These diasporas have established 314 diasporas associations.

The police experience article talked about their work of combining “one concept, two overall plannings, three collaborations, four major mechanisms, and five areas of governance.”

“Two overall plannings” included the planning for domestic and overseas,words, two battlefields. Domestic planning – visit the relatives (inside China) of the overseas “stability maintenance” targets (usually the political activists/dissidents whom the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views as a threat to its rule in China). Overseas planning – send working groups abroad to meet with the Chinese diasporas.

“Three collaborations”: One is to collaborate with Chinese embassies and consulates and  them to reach out to local Chinese diaspora groups. Two is to collaborate with the leaders of diaspora associations – Qingtian police has established regular collaborative mechanism with 230 Chinese diaspora associations and maintained regular contacts with 150 influential diaspora leaders. Three is to collaborate with the people who were the former police officers or relatives of former police officers.

The article also talked about strengthening the party’s leadership, including expanding the party organization’s reach to the overseas Chinese diaspora associations and establishing a party structure inside the Chinese diaspora associations via the party organs at China’s embassies and consulates.

The Qingtian police created a “Police-Diaspora Station” service center. Its online system started operation in 2018. The Qingtian police led the efforts, with Chinese diaspora associations participating in and providing offices. The service center has organized video conferences, information sharing sessions, regular meetings, and timely service. It created 15 sub-centers in 11 countries including Spain, Italy, and France.

The “four major mechanisms” includes establishing a “grid-management” mechanism, with larger diaspora associations as the base, and diaspora leaders, diasporas who are party members, and overseas police liaisons as the expanding points, to manage the diaspora communities. It has “successfully” handled 15 cases of a few diasporas’ protests against the CCP or its leader’s visit.

The “five areas of governance” listed anti-Falun Gong as its first area. It quoted that Qingtian police guided the “World Chinese Diaspora Anti-Cult Association in Spain” to protest the Shen Yun performance held in Barcelona in 2014.

Source: Epoch Times, May 25, 2023
http://cn.epochtimes.com/gb/23/5/25/n14003947.htm

China’s New Cognitive War against Taiwan

Epoch Times reported that Beijing has adopted new cognitive warfare tactics against Taiwan. In the past it used to directly or indirectly buy Taiwan’s major media including newspaper, television, and radios to spread its message. Now, however, it has switched to using Internet media, such as TikTok, YouTube, and influential webcast hosts.

One tactic is to release fake news via its controlled Taiwanese media, causing other Taiwanese media who want to keep up on news reporting but do not verify the validity of news to follow up on the fake topic. China has established a “Public Opinion Control Center” inside its military and has a 2 million strong “Internet army” (people who monitor the Internet posting and post propaganda or fake news on the Internet). This can stir up issues or debates in Taiwan media that can lead to conflicts and divisions among the Taiwanese people.

Beijing also provides scripts to people who have their own (news or other topic) channels on the Internet. Those people will replace those words commonly used in the mainland but which are uncommon in Taiwan with those commonly used in Taiwan, to make it appear to have been “created in Taiwan.”

For webcasts, China’s “Public Opinion Control Center” can arrange a mass Chinese “Internet Army” (say 100,000 people) to listen to a Taiwanese webcaster and each to pay the webcaster a small amount of money to influence the webasterc. Collectively however, the webcaster receives a large amount of money and it is hard to trace the money source.

Source: Epoch Times, June 7, 2023
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/23/6/7/n14011845.htm

Xi’s Speech Revealed Beijing Is Preparing for the Possibility of Being Excluded from the International Market

Xinhua reported Xi Jinping’s visit to Inner Mongolia from June 6 to 9. In one speech he gave, Xi stated that China’s talk of domestic economic circulation (focusing on the domestic economy) is the strategy when China is excluded from the international market, indicating that the top Chinese leaders are discussing and preparing for such a possibility.

The Xinhua report said:

In the midst of various foreseeable and unforeseeable “storms” and “turbulent waves,” the most important thing for us is to do well is our own thing. General Secretary Xi Jinping gave important words to use: “To build a new (economic) development pattern, the first thing is to get the major domestic circulation right, which is the fundamental solution. (Talking about a) ‘double circulation’ economy (business with other countries and business within China) is not to close the door (of China), but rather when others do not open the door to us, we can still live and live better. We open our door. Whoever comes to cooperate with us is welcome.”

General Secretary Xi Jinping talked about the road to (China’s) rejuvenation under the new situation: “Some countries want to do hegemony; they want to do monopoly, and want us to follow them as their vassals. Our Chinese nation must revive! We must continue to overcome difficulties and go to the next level!”

Source: China’s Government Site, June 10, 2023
https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202306/content_6885568.htm

India Takes Legal Action against Xiaomi, Seizes over 55 Billion Rupees

According to a report from China’s Southern Metropolis Daily, Indian authorities investigating financial crimes have accused Xiaomi India, as well as the company’s director and three banks, of violating the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA). As a result, Xiaomi’s funds of RMB 4.81 billion (US$0.67 billion) have been confiscated.

The Indian Enforcement Directorate (ED) alleges that Xiaomi India and its senior executives were involved in the illegal transfer of funds. Additionally, the three banks, Citibank, HSBC, and Deutsche Bank, were charged for not conducting proper due diligence and allowing royalty payments to be remitted out of the country.

Consequently, approximately RMB 4.81 billion (55.5 billion rupees) of Xiaomi’s funds were frozen in the banks, effectively being seized by the authorities.

Xiaomi had experienced significant success in the Indian market since its entry in 2014, reaching the number one spot in 2017. The company had announced plans to invest $1 billion in Indian start-ups over five years. However, as the five-year plan was nearing completion, law enforcement agencies took action against Xiaomi’s Indian branch.

In May of the previous year, the Indian Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) accused Xiaomi and its Indian subsidiary of violating foreign exchange control laws. The AMLO claimed that, since 2015, Xiaomi had sent money to three overseas entities in the form of royalty payments, leading to the freezing of the subsidiary’s account assets.

Xiaomi India was also investigated for tax-related issues in December 2021, with the Indian Tax Intelligence Bureau notifying the company that it owed 6.53 billion rupees in import duties for the period between April 2017 and June 2020. A complaint filed by Xiaomi was rejected by the local Karnataka High Court in April of this year.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 13, 2023
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202306130089.aspx

China’s Marriage Rate in 2022 Plummets to a 37-Year Low

China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs has released its quarterly statistics, revealing that the number of marriages in 2022 was 6.833 million, representing a decrease of 10.5 percent or 803,000 marriages compared to 2021. This marks the lowest number of marriages recorded since 1986 when the statistics were first published. It also marks the ninth consecutive year of decline since the peak in 2013 when there were 13.469 million marriages, indicating a significant drop of 49.3 percent over the past nine years.

Several factors contributed to this rapid decline in marriages. First, there is a trend of postponing marriage and childbirth, leading to a rise in the average age of first marriages. The average age of first marriages in China was 24.89 years in 2010, but it increased to 28.67 years in 2020. Second, there has been a decline in the number of individuals of marriageable age, affecting the pool of potential spouses. Additionally, changes in societal attitudes and the impact of the epidemic are also influencing factors.

The declining marriage rate will have profound implications for China’s future birth rate, particularly the first-child birth rate, which fell below 5 million for the first time in 2021, reaching 4.683 million births. The National Health Commission attributes this decline to the prolonged education and increased employment pressure faced by the younger generations born in the 1990s and 2000s, many of whom grew up and worked in urban areas.

Overall, the decreasing number of marriages in China indicates a significant shift in societal dynamics and will have long-term consequences for the country’s demographics.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 12, 2023
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202306120030.aspx

China’s Unannounced Cremated Remains in Q4 2022

The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) has released civil affairs statistics for the fourth quarter of 2022 after a significant delay. However, unlike previous years, they did not disclose the cumulative number of “cremated remains” for the entire year of 2022. This has raised suspicions about the number of people who died from the epidemic during that period.

China’s National Bureau of Statistics had previously announced that 10.41 million people would die in 2022, based on data collected from November 2021 to October 2022. This data did not include the COVID-19 outbreak that occurred from November to December of the same year.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs has typically published civil affairs statistics every quarter, and the statistics for the fourth quarter are usually released by April of the following year at the latest. However, the statistics for the fourth quarter of 2022 were not released until June 9, and the cumulative number of “cremated remains” for 2022 was not disclosed as usual.

The ministry has not provided any explanation for the delay or the omission of the cremation data. Some independent media outlets have highlighted this unusual situation but have refrained from criticizing the authorities for potentially hiding the number of COVID-19 deaths.

According to previously released data from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the number of cremated remains in the first three quarters of 2022 was 4.776 million, a 10 percent increase compared to the same period in 2021.

The cremation rate in China for 2021 was 58.8 percent, showing a 3.1 percentage point increase from 2020. However, the ministry has not announced the cremation rate for 2022, although estimations from the funeral industry suggest it could be over 60 percent.

Since the Ministry of Civil Affairs has not disclosed the number of cremated remains for the fourth quarter of 2022, it is impossible to estimate the number of deaths during that period. Therefore, the exact number of people who died from the epidemic during the outbreak remains unknown.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 13, 2023
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202306130381.aspx

China’s May Total Exports Declined while Exports to Russia Increased

Well-known Chinese news site Sohu (NASDAQ: SOHU) recently reported that China’s General Administration of Customs just released import and export data for May. In U.S. dollar terms, China’s exports fell 7.5 percent year-over-year in May, turning negative again after two months. The impact of the pandemic is in the past, but the troika that promotes China’s economic development, investments, consumption and exports – have all encountered tremendous pressure this year. Also in May of this year, China’s total imports and exports reached US$501.19 billion, a year-over-year decrease of 6.2 percent. The trade surplus was US$65.81 billion, narrowing from last year’s by 16.1 percent. The fastest growing export destination for China in May was Russia, with an increase of 114.32 percent year-over-year, hitting a new record high. Exports to Africa increased by 12.94 percent, and exports to the UK increased by 3.73 percent. Other than those, exports to other major countries, regions, and economies all fell sharply in May. Exports to the United States, the European Union and ASEAN fell by 18.2 percent, 7.0 percent and 15.9 percent year-over-year respectively. The ten countries/regions/economies with the fastest year-over-year decline in cumulative exports from January to May were Taiwan, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Italy, France, Hong Kong, Germany, the European Union, and the Netherlands. Also, China’s share of U.S. foreign trade has  declined, continuing its downward trend. China accounted for 15.4 percent of U.S. goods imports in the 12 months through April, the smallest share since October 2006.

Sources:
(1) Sohu, June 7, 2023
https://www.sohu.com/a/682988626_114984
(2) Lianhe Zaobao, June 8, 2023
https://www.kzaobao.com/cngov/2023-06/08140491.html