China has increasingly employed fishing vessels as part of its so-called “maritime militia” strategy, using civilian boats to assert control at sea while creating legal and moral dilemmas for its opponents. In January 2026, Beijing assembled roughly 1,400 Chinese fishing vessels into a floating maritime barrier stretching about 320 kilometers—widely interpreted as a rehearsal for a potential blockade of Taiwan. Similar operations in the past have reportedly involved more than 2,000 vessels arranged in formations exceeding 400 kilometers in length.
Independent media commentator Wen Zhao outlined three tactics of this maritime militia strategy.
Version 1.0:
Chinese fishing boats deliberately crossed other countries’ maritime “red lines,” provoking responses from foreign maritime law-enforcement agencies. When vessels were detained or crews arrested, China’s coast guard intervened under the pretext of defending fishermen’s rights, leading to standoffs, ramming incidents, and water-cannon exchanges. In some cases, naval forces were drawn in, creating a three-layered escalation model—fishing boats, coast guard, then navy. This approach has been used since 2012 in areas such as Scarborough Shoal against the Philippines and tends to be effective against countries with weaker maritime enforcement capabilities.
Version 2.0:
Against stronger maritime enforcers such as Japan, Chinese fishing vessels shifted from symbolic legal presence to active provocation. These boats deliberately cut across or collide with foreign coast guard patrol vessels, especially when Chinese maritime law-enforcement ships are nearby. According to Japanese police, the fishing boats often make sudden turns to block enforcement vessels, and if collisions occur, Chinese operators film and selectively edit footage to support its propaganda narratives against the foreign “bully.”
Version 3.0:
This method involves massing large numbers of fishing vessels into coordinated formations to support a blockade of Taiwan or to obstruct U.S. and Japanese military intervention. These slow-moving, densely packed formations exploit a legal gray zone, as military forces cannot lawfully attack civilian vessels. U.S. think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have analyzed such scenarios and suggested countermeasures such as declaring military zone to prevent vessels from coming in, waiting for them to weaken due to fuel constraints, disrupting inter-vessel communications through electronic warfare, transiting the area before formations fully coalesce, or taking a detour route to bypass the formations.
Source: Gan Jing World, January 19, 2026
https://www.ganjingworld.com/video/1i8p0lkkjje6G3cHANsOJdBWk1n51c?playlist_id=1galt8gs0ti1LGq7DHJ5BZQ1q00p
