Secret 2017 Xinjiang Police Manual Reveals Extensive “Return Prevention” System to Control People
A confidential 2017 police document obtained by The Epoch Times reportedly reveals a multilayered system within Xinjiang’s public security apparatus for restricting overseas travel and monitoring people returning from abroad. The document, titled “2017 Work Manual for ‘Preventing Return’ by Public Security Agencies Directly Under Ili Prefecture,” describes a system in which Xinjiang police authorities established 35 categories of people subject to overseas travel restrictions, while Ili’s local authorities added another 17 categories of priority targets.
The restrictions reportedly covered a broad range of groups, including key security targets, people associated with alleged threats to national security, Christians and Catholics, individuals designated as members or associates of the “three forces”—Beijing’s term for terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—as well as relatives of people who had sought political asylum overseas and individuals who frequently communicated with people abroad using foreign or domestic messaging applications. The document also identifies relatives of people killed, executed, or punished for alleged security-related offenses as additional targets.
As part of the “return prevention” campaign, Ili authorities reportedly established eight broad categories of people and nine additional categories of priority targets. These included people involved in terrorism-related activities overseas and their relatives, people who had illegally left China, individuals whose whereabouts were unknown, people who had lived abroad for extended periods and suddenly returned home, individuals who had changed their identities after going overseas, and people who had renounced Chinese citizenship.
According to the document, people on these lists could face intensive monitoring and investigation upon returning to China. Authorities could reportedly flag them at border checkpoints, interrogate them, and inspect their electronic devices and communications. If they passed through border controls without being questioned, an integrated surveillance system could alert local police and community personnel, who were instructed to make face-to-face contact within a specified period and conduct follow-up monitoring for at least 90 days. The reported system illustrates how Xinjiang authorities combined travel restrictions, border screening, digital surveillance, and grassroots monitoring to prevent targeted individuals from returning to the region and scrutinize their overseas contacts, finances, and political and religious activities.
Source: Epoch Times, August 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/25/n14836601.htm
China Weighs Non-Military Strategy as Global Focus Shifts to Asia-Pacific
An article published on China based Guancha.cn, argues that 2026 marks a turning point in global geopolitics as the United States pulls back from Middle East conflicts and redirects military, financial, and diplomatic resources toward the Asia-Pacific. It frames the decades-long, oil-centered Middle East rivalry as fading, with Asia-Pacific’s dense industrial chains, semiconductor and digital sectors, and vast consumer markets becoming the primary arena of U.S.-China competition. The piece contends that great-power rivalry is shifting from military confrontation toward technology barriers, supply-chain competition, and financial rules.
It describes recent Chinese joint military exercises with Belarus (“Sky Hawk-2026”) and Egypt (“Civilization Hawk-2026”) as efforts to build a global buffer network and expand strategic flexibility, while denying any intent to provoke conflict.
The commentary identifies three long-term competitive tracks: technology (chips, industrial software, AI standards), supply chains (regionalization and “friend-shoring”), and finance (U.S. dollar sanctions versus China’s cross-border payment system CIPS and yuan internationalization). It calls for China to pursue self-reliant innovation, diversified supply chains via the Belt and Road Initiative and RCEP, financial autonomy, non-aligned diplomacy, and modernized defense as deterrence rather than offense.
The author outlines three possible trajectories for U.S.-China relations: an optimal path of “competitive coexistence” with limited cooperation; a “neutral” path of persistent friction and gradual decoupling, judged most likely; and a high-risk path of escalating Asia-Pacific crisis if flashpoints like Taiwan intensify. The piece concludes that this rivalry will span two to three decades without swift resolution, and that China’s advantage lies in maintaining internal stability, self-sufficient industry, and a broad network of partnerships rather than in any single military or diplomatic victory.
Source: Guancha.cn, August 16, 2026
https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=1715369
Landslide Disaster Reveals Divergent Information Control Between China and Nepal
A glacier collapse in Nepal’s Himalayas on August 26 triggered a debris flow that swept through the Jilong border crossing in China’s Tibet region. As of September 1, Nepalese and Chinese authorities reported a combined 955 dead and 4,471 missing across both sides, though China had not updated its own casualty figures (16 dead, 546 missing) since August 29.
Chinese authorities have punished internet users for sharing unofficial casualty estimates, labeling posts—such as claims of “over 1,000 dead”—as rumors. Two official notices gave inconsistent accounts of the punishments, describing them alternately as “administrative penalties” and “education and punishment,” without clarifying the discrepancy or releasing formal penalty documents. WeChat groups have also restricted sharing of disaster footage, with one 499-member group reportedly acting after its administrator was taken to a police station.
Observers note a stark contrast in coverage: Nepalese and international media focused on survivors and victims’ families, while Chinese state media emphasized rescue personnel, equipment, and emergency response efforts. Roads near the disaster site have been closed to non-emergency vehicles.
Separately, Jiangsu province’s civil affairs department shut down 12 unregistered civil organizations on August 31, including seven emergency rescue groups. A Beijing-based scholar suggested the timing—close to the Tibet disaster—raises questions, though no direct evidence links the two events. He noted authorities have historically discouraged independent rescue groups from operating in disaster zones, viewing organizations outside state control with suspicion regardless of public support.
Source: Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shehui/2026/09/01/china-tibet-mudslide-information-blockade-banning-of-civilian-rescue-teams/
Xi Jinping’s Apparent Health Issues Draw Attention During Kyrgyzstan Visit
Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping arrived in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 30 to attend the 2026 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and make a state visit to the country.
Footage circulating outside Chinese state media has prompted speculation about Xi’s physical condition. Videos appear to show Xi tightly holding his wife Peng Liyuan’s hand as he descended from the aircraft, with Peng seemingly providing support. Other footage reportedly shows Xi coughing repeatedly during the welcoming ceremony, while security personnel quickly intervened when a photographer attempted to approach him. Some observers said the footage showed Xi appearing unsteady or physically strained, although the videos do not establish what, if any, medical condition he may have.
Xi’s health nevertheless attracts unusual attention because the health of China’s top leadership is highly opaque. Any persistent physical changes observed during high-profile overseas appearances can therefore generate speculation, particularly when official media provide limited information about the leader’s health.
Source: NTDTV, September 1, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/08/31/a104128805.html
China Seeks to Overturn Missouri’s $24.5 Billion COVID-19 Judgment
Hubei Province and the Chinese Academy of Sciences have hired the U.S.-based global law firm White & Case to challenge a $24.5 billion default judgment awarded to Missouri over China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. On August 31, the two Chinese entities asked a federal court in Missouri to set aside the judgment and dismiss the lawsuit. White & Case has assigned Washington-based senior litigation partner Christopher Curran, who has represented foreign governments in U.S. courts, to the case.
Missouri filed the lawsuit in April 2020, accusing China, the Chinese Communist Party, Hubei and Wuhan authorities, the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and other Chinese entities of concealing information about COVID-19 and hoarding personal protective equipment (PPE), contributing to shortages and higher prices in the United States. A federal court initially dismissed the case under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals revived Missouri’s PPE-hoarding claim in 2024.
After the Chinese defendants failed to appear in court, U.S. District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh Jr. issued a default judgment in March 2025. The court initially awarded about $8.16 billion in compensatory damages, with the total subsequently increasing to approximately $24.5 billion under applicable federal law. Missouri Attorney General Andrew Bailey said the state would seek to enforce the judgment by targeting Chinese-owned assets, potentially including farmland in Missouri.
Missouri has argued that China’s challenge comes too late and vowed to continue pursuing the judgment.
Source: Epoch Times, September 1, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/31/n14840304.htm
China National Radio: 10 Key Points of the Newly Revised National Defense Mobilization Law
The newly revised Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Mobilization has been officially promulgated and will take effect on October 1. Based on the law’s provisions, China National Radio highlights the following 10 key points:
1. Defining “national defense mobilization”
The revised law defines national defense mobilization as making adequate preparations and reserves during peacetime and rapidly shifting to a mobilization posture in times of crisis. This involves transforming the country’s human resources, materials, industrial capacity, and technological potential into national defense capabilities.
2. Establishing a “reserve personnel system”
The law distinguishes reserve personnel from reservists and establishes systems for the registration, retention, and mobilization of reserve personnel to support ongoing national defense and military reforms.
Notably, once a mobilization order is issued, designated personnel may not leave their registered place of residence without authorization. Those who are away must immediately return or remain where they are and stand by for mobilization and report for duty as required.
3. Expanding the scope of “national defense service”
The law provides that a broad segment of the population may be required to perform national defense service. Those subject to the obligation include:
- Male citizens aged 18–60
- Female citizens aged 18–55
The law also specifies exemptions. Those required to perform national defense service, particularly individuals who were previously unemployed, may receive certain subsidies.
4. Requisition and protection of civilian resources
If national defense mobilization is implemented and existing reserves are insufficient, the government may legally requisition civilian resources, including vehicles, facilities, and equipment.
However, the law establishes an exemption list covering personal and household necessities and residences, as well as essential goods and accommodations needed by childcare, elderly-care, child-welfare, and assistance institutions serving children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups.
Requisitioned property must be returned promptly after use, while modified property must be restored before being returned. Fair and reasonable compensation must be provided for damaged or destroyed property and direct economic losses. All requisitions must be registered and documented.
5. Special controls following national defense mobilization
Once national defense mobilization is implemented, authorities may impose controls in relevant areas over transportation, telecommunications and networks, energy, food, and other sectors, including restrictions on the movement of people and goods.
6. Mobilization in emerging fields
The revised law adds provisions promoting the application of advanced technologies in national defense mobilization and the development of mobilization capabilities in emerging fields. The move reflects the growing importance of emerging and new types of combat capabilities in modern warfare.
7. Greater opportunities for civilian companies to participate in military production
The law calls for a mobilization system covering military research and development, production, maintenance, and support. It also requires security assessments of military-industrial and supply chains and promotes the standardization, serialization, and modularization of military products, as well as the socialization of military maintenance and support.
These provisions could create greater opportunities for civilian enterprises to participate in military research, production, maintenance, and support.
8. Stricter legal responsibilities and enforcement
The law establishes penalties for refusing to fulfill mobilization obligations, evading mobilization, delaying requisitions, falsifying information, or obstructing mobilization efforts. It strengthens accountability and enforcement to safeguard national defense requirements.
9. Recognition and rewards for contributors
Organizations and individuals who make outstanding contributions to national defense mobilization will be eligible for commendations and rewards. The law emphasizes the honor of serving the country and seeks to enhance the dignity and social recognition of active-duty personnel, veterans, reservists, and militia members.
10. Improving supporting regulations and systems
Relevant military and civilian authorities will formulate or revise supporting policies and regulations based on the revised National Defense Mobilization Law and actual requirements.
Provincial governments will also develop and improve regulations and policies within their jurisdictions, with the goal of establishing a comprehensive and integrated legal and regulatory framework for national defense mobilization in the new era.
Source: China National Radio, August 30, 2026
https://military.cnr.cn/jq/20260830/t20260830_527798615.shtml
Article Highlights Policy Priorities for Emerging “New New Three” Industries
A Chinese policy article says the rise of the “new three” industries—new-energy vehicles, lithium batteries, and solar products—and the emerging “new new three”—robots, artificial intelligence, and innovative drugs—shows that technological breakthroughs, deeper application scenarios, new factor inputs, and targeted policy support are key to rapid industrial growth.
The article calls for more focused government support, replacing scattered subsidies with targeted assistance for priority industries. It also urges a shift from imitation and incremental improvements toward original and disruptive innovation, while expanding real-world applications in factories, business services, and public services.
For investment and business development, the article advocates greater government leadership and long-term investment, as well as cultivating companies of different sizes rather than focusing exclusively on industry leaders. It also calls for a more coordinated and flexible regulatory system, including stronger cross-departmental and cross-regional cooperation and more “inclusive and prudent” regulation of emerging industries.
Source: People’s Daily, August 25, 2026
http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0825/c1004-40785486.html
Spanish Media Highlights Viral Robot Mishaps at Beijing’s World Humanoid Robot Games
Sohu published a Chinese translation of a Spanish report on the World Humanoid Robot Games, which opened in Beijing on August 22.
A total of 666 teams and 2,056 robots from 16 countries participated in the event. The five-day competition featured 51 events designed to test humanoid robots in realistic environments.
The event also produced numerous viral moments of robots falling, losing balance, colliding with walls, and struggling to coordinate their movements. One robot that reportedly broke Usain Bolt’s 100-meter world record drew particular attention after it was unable to stop at the finish line and continued running along a wall.
The widely shared footage highlighted persistent limitations in humanoid robots, particularly their stability, coordination, and ability to respond to unexpected situations. China has promoted itself as a global leader in humanoid robot development and manufacturing, but the mishaps exposed some of the technology’s remaining shortcomings.
Source: Sohu, August 28, 2026
https://timeline.sohu.com/news/AI3ut1Yhxm