China’s PLA Holds 10-Week Anti-Corruption Training Camp for Senior Officers
China’s People’s Liberation Army Daily reported that the first PLA-wide senior officer training program, lasting 10 weeks, was held at the National Defense University in Beijing from April 8 to June 16. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping attended the opening ceremony in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Military Commission and delivered a speech, according to the state military newspaper’s front-page account.
At the opening, Xi declared that any thoughts or actions motivated by self-interest or corruption are fundamentally incompatible with the nature and purpose of the CCP, which he described as a Marxist political party representing the broadest interests of the people and claiming to hold no special interests of its own. He also stressed that the military must have no room for those who are disloyal to the Party or for corrupt elements, and that senior officers must take the lead in resisting corrupt practices.
The training program adopted a blended learning model combining expert instruction, group study sessions, and individual self-study, with more than 40 theoretical lectures and over 10 focused readings of key texts. Participants also watched cautionary educational films on corruption, studied CCP disciplinary regulations, and reviewed Central Military Commission guidelines on strengthening oversight and management of senior military officers.
During the first week, trainees participated in an activity titled “Revisiting the Beginning of Soldierhood and Reflecting on the Responsibilities of Commanders,” which included re-taking the Party oath, re-singing the “Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention,” and drilling basic military formations during morning exercises.
The report noted that participants unanimously affirmed the need to uphold the “CMC Chairman Responsibility System,” and that the Central Military Commission attached great importance to the training program. The article was published ahead of the PLA’s centenary in 2027, framing the initiative within Xi’s broader anti-corruption campaign in the military, which has targeted figures up to the level of vice chairman of the CMC and defense minister since he took power in November 2012.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 24, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202606240105.aspx
Russia Expands Road Freight Routes to Asia and Middle East to Offset European Trade Loss
Russia’s road freight sector is actively expanding cargo transport routes to China, Mongolia, Iran, and other countries, seeking to compensate for losses incurred after being forced to halt European trucking operations, according to the Russian Ministry of Transport.
The announcement came during a general assembly of the International Road Transport Union (IRU) held in Moscow. The ministry acknowledged that Russian transport companies have faced serious challenges in recent years following European Union sanctions. With IRU involvement, the Russian government responded to these restrictions by implementing a cargo transfer and transshipment system at border crossings for carriers from “unfriendly” countries, allowing Russian firms to continue participating in freight movement between Russia and European nations.
“This has enabled domestic companies to continue participating in international cargo transport between Russia and European countries,” the ministry said in a statement. “Today, transport operations to countries such as China, Mongolia, and Iran are actively developing. This helps offset the losses sustained by Russian road transport after being compelled to cease European routes.”
Deputy Transport Minister Alexei Shilo attended the assembly and expressed confidence that continued cooperation with the IRU would further advance freight development along major international transport corridors, including the North-South and East-West routes, as well as other promising directions.
The ministry’s remarks reflect Russia’s broader strategic pivot toward non-Western trade partners amid sustained Western sanctions, with overland freight corridors to Asia and the Middle East becoming increasingly central to the country’s logistics infrastructure.
Source: Sputnik News, June 19, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260619/1071946329.html
China Turns to Underground Utility Network Upgrades to Boost Growth
Amid a prolonged property market downturn and slowing economic growth, Beijing is once again turning to government-led infrastructure investment to stimulate the economy. After years of large-scale spending on highways, high-speed rail, and airports, government is shifting its focus underground. Upgrading urban utility networks has been identified as a key infrastructure initiative for 2026—the first year of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030)—with planned investment exceeding RMB 5 trillion (US$700 billion).
According to the draft “Urban Renewal 15th Five-Year Plan,” China aims to build or renovate approximately 770,000 kilometers of underground utility networks during the plan period, including natural gas, water supply, wastewater, drainage, and district heating pipelines. To support the initiative, the central government has allocated RMB 160 billion in ultra-long-term special treasury bonds for 2026—RMB 25 billion more than the previous year—with funding earmarked for underground pipeline projects.
Beijing views the initiative as both an economic stimulus and a long-term urban modernization strategy. Officials estimate the program could generate RMB 7.5–10 trillion in economic output by boosting demand for construction materials, equipment manufacturing, and smart infrastructure services, while supporting approximately 2.8 million jobs annually. The project is also intended to strengthen urban resilience, expand the use of underground space, and advance China’s green and low-carbon development objectives. Source: Xinhua, June 17, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260617/7f81574d81d6426888124259dfc30598/c.html
Chinese Firm Markets AI-Powered Cross-Border VPN Detection System for Universities
China maintains one of the world’s most sophisticated internet censorship systems, commonly known as the “Great Firewall.” To access blocked foreign websites and information, many Chinese internet users rely on Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and other circumvention tools, a practice commonly referred to as “climbing the wall” (翻墙).
A recently deleted white paper published by the WeChat account “Guoji Beisheng Edu,” affiliated with Guoji Beisheng (Nanjing) Technology Development Co., described a “Cross-Border VPN Detection System” designed to identify and monitor unauthorized VPN usage at Chinese universities. The product is marketed as a tool to help institutions comply with regulatory requirements issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the Ministry of Education aimed at detecting and preventing internet circumvention on campus.
According to the white paper, the system uses packet metadata, traffic classification, machine-learning models, and behavioral analysis to identify suspected VPN traffic in real time. By analyzing network flows, protocols, timestamps, and traffic patterns, the platform generates risk scores and determines whether connections exceed predefined violation thresholds. It also maintains a database of known VPN-related traffic signatures, enabling rapid identification of previously observed circumvention methods.
The platform operates through traffic mirroring from a university’s core network switch, allowing it to analyze encrypted traffic without directly sitting in the data path. It can identify suspected proxy server IP addresses, generate real-time alerts, and create user profiles based on connection timing, ports, proxy usage, and network behavior. The white paper also highlights features such as user profiling, violation tracking, forensic analysis, and risk dashboards.
Although the original article was removed, a copy was preserved by China Digital Times.
Source: China Digital Times, June 18, 2026
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/728351.html
UK Court Sentences Two Men for Assisting Chinese Intelligence Operations
A UK court on June 18 sentenced two men for assisting activities linked to Chinese intelligence operations in Britain. Chi Leung “Peter” Wai, 40, a former UK police officer and Border Force official, was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while Chung Biu “Bill” Yuen, 65, received an eight-year sentence. Both were convicted under the UK’s National Security Act for assisting a foreign intelligence service.
Prosecutors said the pair participated in what police described as a “shadow policing operation” conducted on behalf of Hong Kong authorities and, ultimately, the Chinese state. The case has heightened concerns about foreign interference in the UK and the ability of hostile states to obtain personal information on individuals residing in the country. Counter Terrorism Policing London stated that such activities “will not be tolerated” in the United Kingdom.
Wai, who joined the UK Border Force at Heathrow Airport in 2020, used his access to government databases to collect information on Hong Kong activists and dissidents who had relocated to the UK following Beijing’s crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. Yuen, a former Hong Kong police officer who later served as an office manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London, acted as an intermediary between Wai and Chinese authorities.
The investigation also involved former Royal Marine and Border Force officer Matthew Trickett, who allegedly participated in surveillance operations targeting prominent Hong Kong activist Nathan Law. Trickett was charged alongside Wai and Yuen but was later found dead in an apparent suicide. An inquest into his death is scheduled for November.
Source: BBC, June 18, 2026
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/c0lyn1zep14o/simp
PLA Unit Pilots “Smart Barracks” System to Reduce Reliance on Manual Guard Duty
A recent report in People’s Daily highlighted a Beijing Garrison regiment’s efforts to modernize base management through a “Smart Barracks” pilot program. While personnel continue to guard critical and sensitive locations, the unit has introduced biometric access controls, high-definition surveillance systems, backup power supplies, and independent alarm networks to supplement or replace manual guard duty at warehouses, armories, kitchens, and other facilities.
The regiment has adopted an “external sentry plus intelligent monitoring” model across multiple locations. Smart technologies are used to monitor food consumption and storage conditions, calculate ammunition transportation requirements, manage vehicle key distribution, and automatically transmit operational records to duty offices, improving efficiency and reducing manpower demands.
Training activities have also been digitized. Intelligent timing and performance-tracking systems automatically record soldiers’ training results, reducing administrative workloads and enabling commanders to devote more attention to refining training methods and improving operational readiness.
Source: People’s Daily, June 20, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2026/0620/c1011-40743877.html
People’s Daily: “Changing Lanes to Overtake” Is Key to China’s Technological Advancement
People’s Daily published a commentary arguing that “changing lanes to overtake” (换道超车)—pursuing alternative technological pathways rather than competing directly with established leaders—has become a key pillar of China’s innovation strategy. The article highlights recent examples, including Huawei’s proposed “Tau (τ) Law,” which seeks to improve semiconductor performance through “time scaling” rather than traditional transistor miniaturization, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ development of the RISC-V-based “Xiangshan” open-source computing system and “Ruyi” operating system to bypass technological and ecosystem barriers associated with dominant instruction-set architectures.
The commentary argues that direct competition with established leaders is often constrained by technological barriers, industry standards, and entrenched market positions. By pursuing differentiated development paths and leveraging its own comparative advantages, China can reduce competitive disadvantages, create new opportunities, and gain greater strategic initiative.
As examples of successful “lane changing,” the article points to Chinese television manufacturers’ shift from OLED technology to Mini LED displays, which improved display quality while lowering costs. It also highlights China’s humanoid robotics industry, which has adopted electric-drive systems and rapid application-based iteration rather than following traditional hydraulic-driven development models. According to the commentary, these cases demonstrate how alternative technological pathways can help China bypass existing barriers, accelerate innovation, and achieve technological catch-up.
Source: People’s Daily, June 9, 2026
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0609/c461529-40736329.html
Chinese State-Owned Energy Firms Accelerate Divestment of Renewable Energy Assets
In the first half of 2026, 37 equity transactions involving renewable energy companies were completed in China, with a combined asking price of 1.17 billion yuan (US$163 million). Major state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including State Grid, China Southern Power Grid, China Three Gorges Corporation, CGN, PowerChina, Energy China, China State Shipbuilding Corporation, and SDIC Power, participated in the divestments. Approximately 65 percent of the sellers were state-owned entities, while 60 percent of the transactions involved transfers of controlling stakes.
Several deals drew attention for their exceptionally low valuations. In some cases, SOEs transferred substantial stakes in renewable energy subsidiaries for nominal prices, including multiple transactions listed at just 1 yuan (US$ 0.15). Most of the assets involved small-scale distributed solar and decentralized wind projects, which often face high operating costs and limited economies of scale. The prevalence of full exits and controlling-stake transfers suggests a broader effort by SOEs to streamline portfolios and shed underperforming assets.
Analysts attribute the divestment wave to three factors. First, Beijing has continued to push central SOEs to dispose of non-core businesses and low-efficiency assets. Second, market conditions have become increasingly challenging. Rapid capacity expansion, solar-sector oversupply, falling equipment prices, and the phaseout of subsidies have compressed returns, with some projects reportedly falling below SOEs’ investment thresholds.
However, the article claimed the asset sales reflect a strategic reallocation of capital rather than a retreat from renewable energy. Chinese SOEs are increasingly directing investment toward large-scale clean energy bases, grid infrastructure, and emerging sectors such as green power and hydrogen energy.
Source: Sina, June 16, 2026
https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2026-06-16/doc-inicrivk6098566.shtml