China Launches First AI Capacity-Building Program for Officials from 37 Developing Countries
At the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence (AI) Conference in Shanghai in July, Xi Jinping announced that China would provide 5,000 AI training opportunities to developing countries over the next five years.
As part of the initiative, China opened its first AI capacity-building seminar in Beijing on September 7, bringing together senior government officials and AI policymakers from 37 developing countries, including Kazakhstan, Russia, Algeria, and Brazil. The six-day program was hosted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry and organized by Peking University.
The seminar focused on AI safety and governance, technological advances, innovative applications, and international cooperation. In addition to seminars and roundtable discussions, participants visited Chinese AI research and industrial sites, including the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, Zhongguancun, a humanoid-robot data-training center, and the Shougang Park technology hub. The program is intended to showcase China’s AI capabilities and development model, covering areas ranging from AI for Science and embodied intelligence to research, innovation ecosystems, and industrial applications.
Source: International Center for Science and Technology Innovation website, September 9, 2026
https://www.ncsti.gov.cn/kjdt/xwjj/202609/t20260909_255655.html
China Introduces Interest Subsidies for First-Home Mortgage Loans
On September 29, China’s Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China, and the National Financial Regulatory Administration issued a notice introducing a mortgage interest subsidy program for homebuyers. The policy, which takes effect on October 1, focuses on first-time homebuyers purchasing smaller, lower-priced homes and is intended to reduce their mortgage interest costs.
Under the policy, eligible households must use a newly issued commercial personal housing loan to purchase their first home, with both new and second-hand homes qualifying. The home must be no larger than 120 square meters (1,292 square feet) and priced at no more than RMB 1.5 million (US$220,000). The government will subsidize interest on up to RMB 1 million of the mortgage at an annual rate of 1 percentage point for up to five years. Based on current first-home mortgage rates, the subsidy is equivalent to roughly one-third of the interest rate. For a RMB 1 million long-term mortgage, it could reduce total interest payments by nearly RMB 50,000.
The policy will initially remain in effect for one year, from October 1, 2026, through September 30, 2027. During the implementation period, all households meeting the eligibility requirements will receive the subsidy, with no overall cap on the amount of fiscal funds available. The government said sufficient funds have been budgeted, with subsidies to be settled based on actual eligible claims.
Source: National Financial Regulatory Administration website, September 29, 2026
https://www.nfra.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=1273762&itemId=915
Belgium Detains Chinese-Belgian Suspect in Semiconductor Espionage Case
Belgian prosecutors said a 52-year-old man identified as H.L., who holds Chinese and Belgian citizenship, has been in pretrial detention since May on suspicion of semiconductor-related espionage. H.L., a former senior executive at Belgian chipmaker BelGaN, was arrested at Brussels Airport on May 10 while preparing to fly to Beijing. He is suspected of illegally transferring proprietary intellectual property and trade secrets related to gallium nitride (GaN) chip production overseas. BelGaN, which developed GaN chips used in electric vehicles, aerospace, and military applications, declared bankruptcy in July 2024, resulting in approximately 420 job losses.
Belgian media reported that investigators suspect BelGaN’s Chinese owners, who took control of the company in 2021, may have sought to transfer its technology to China rather than revive the company. H.L. allegedly also held a senior position at Chinese semiconductor company Gankool (Fuzhou Jiagu Semiconductor) while working at BelGaN. Investigators reportedly found similarities between Gankool’s production technology and BelGaN’s and suspect an arrangement to transfer BelGaN’s intellectual property and trade secrets to Gankool. A second suspect remains at large, while BelGaN’s former CEO, Chinese national Alan Zhen Zhou, is also reportedly under investigation. H.L. faces allegations including espionage, unlawful disclosure of trade secrets, participation in a criminal organization, misuse of company assets, and violations of bankruptcy law.
Source: Epoch Times, September 7, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/7/n14844378.htm
Study Times: Strengthening Public Opinion Guidance and Management
Qin Lu, deputy director of the Central Party School’s Department of History and Culture, argues that China’s rapidly changing media environment has made public opinion a growing source of social tensions and a major governance challenge. He proposes the following measures for the authorities to strengthen public-opinion management:
- Shift from emergency response to routine governance: Rather than treating public-opinion incidents as isolated “emergencies,” authorities should integrate public-opinion management into the broader national governance system.
- Address problems before they become public-opinion crises: Qin emphasizes that resolving underlying social and livelihood problems should be the foundation of public-opinion management. Governments should use social-governance centers, the 12345 government-service hotline, public-opinion monitoring, and government social-media platforms to identify public concerns, respond to grievances, and defuse potential tensions.
- Build an integrated system: He proposes combining regular press briefings, daily public-opinion guidance, and emergency response. Government press offices and social-media platforms should proactively explain policies, respond to public concerns, build credibility, and serve as rapid official-information channels when controversies emerge.
- Respond quickly with both “emotion and facts”: Officials should establish clear criteria for when and how to respond to emerging controversies. Initial responses should address both the underlying incident and public emotions through empathy, reassurance, apologies when appropriate, and transparent updates. Qin warns that defensive messaging or attempts to shift responsibility can intensify negative sentiment and trigger secondary controversies.
- Strengthen information management and preparedness: Government communications should provide both factual information and confidence-building messages, including clear explanations of an incident’s causes, investigation, response, and follow-up. Qin also calls for regular training, simulation exercises, and reviews of past cases to develop practical response plans and improve interdepartmental coordination.
- Overall framework: Qin proposes a comprehensive system of “good governance of people’s livelihoods → information release → public-opinion guidance → public-opinion response,” making public-opinion management a routine component of governance rather than a response limited to exceptional crises.
Source: Study Times, September 18, 2026
https://www.studytimes.cn/llsd/202609/t20260917_91732.html
Chinese Universities Tighten Spending Amid Growing Budget Pressure
Several Chinese universities are urging staff to “practice strict economy and live through tight times” as shrinking budgets increase financial pressure. Beijing Forestry University recently issued measures restricting spending on travel, meetings, training, official receptions, and overtime meals, while Anhui Jianzhu University prohibited reimbursement for tobacco, alcohol, and high-end dishes at research-related meals. Shanxi Finance and Economics Vocational College also tightened rules on official receptions, travel, meetings, and promotional materials.
The financial pressure is reflected in declining budgets at several universities. In 2025, Renmin University’s total budget revenue was RMB 9.17 billion (US$1.37 billion), down RMB 816 million (US$121 million) from the previous year, while Yunnan University and Fuzhou University saw declines of RMB 801 million and RMB 677 million, respectively. Other universities, including the University of Science and Technology of China and Minzu University of China, also reported reduced government funding. Meanwhile, Chinese social media has seen increasing reports of salary and performance-pay cuts among university faculty, including reduced research bonuses, canceled overtime-teaching subsidies, and cases in which poor performance reportedly resulted in salary deductions.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 15, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609150331.aspx
China’s Education “Involution” Drives Extreme Early Learning and Student Distress
China’s intense educational competition is increasingly affecting elementary and middle school students. A recent internet term, “prefabricated children” (预制娃), describes students who learn course material well ahead of the school curriculum, turning classroom instruction largely into review. Guangzhou Experimental Middle School principal Zhang Xianlong criticized the practice, saying excessive academic pressure has contributed to high levels of depression, anxiety, and school aversion among students. A 2025 survey cited in the report found that 11 percent of Chinese primary and secondary students were in poor psychological condition and in need of professional intervention.
The pressure has persisted despite China’s 2021 “Double Reduction” policy, which was intended to reduce academic and extracurricular tutoring burdens. Parents interviewed in Beijing said the policy has failed to ease the pressure, with exam difficulty reportedly increasing since its implementation and driving families toward intensive advance preparation and underground tutoring. Some parents reported severe test anxiety and depression among their children, including cases in which students took leave from school because of academic difficulties.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 20, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609200045.aspx
Another Incident of Beijing-Organized Supporters Clashed with Protesters During Xi’s Visit to the U.S.
Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States drew demonstrations by at least 39 anti-CCP groups. Chinese authorities reportedly organized large numbers of supporters—one source estimated nearly 1,000—to welcome Xi. Supporters and protesters clashed outside Joint Base Andrews during Xi’s arrival (see Chinascope briefing).
Another altercation occurred around 3:30 p.m. on September 24 outside the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency headquarters on Constitution Avenue in Washington, D.C., where Falun Gong practitioners were peacefully demonstrating. A woman identified as Li Huahong confronted practitioner Xin Qin, who was photographing the demonstration. Xin said Li repeatedly pressured him to move back before grabbing and pulling him down, after which several people accompanying Li allegedly struck, scratched, and bit him. Xin said he did not fight back and called police. A police officer reportedly witnessed the incident and intervened, handcuffing Li, who was later taken away by ambulance.
According to the report, Li had previously attacked Falun Gong practitioners in New York and had been arrested several times. She was convicted of assault in 2013.
Also, an earlier incident occurred on September 22 outside the Chinese Consulate in Toronto, Canada, where a Chinese-Canadian man allegedly damaged Falun Gong protesters’ display boards and banners, issued threats, and injured a practitioner who tried to protect a banner. Police reportedly arrived, documented the incident, and said the case could proceed to legal action.
Sources:
{1} NTDTV, September 25, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/25/a104136302.html
{2} NTDTV, September 26, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/09/26/a104136553.html
Taiwan Scholar: PLA’s Actual Combat Effectiveness May Lag Its Visible Military Strength
At a seminar hosted by the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, National Defense University professor Ma Zhenkun assessed the “substance and appearance” of China’s military expansion. He said China’s People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) tangible capabilities have improved significantly since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, including a sharp increase in missiles, broader precision-strike capabilities, more survivable mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, and advances in second-strike capability.
However, Ma argued that extensive purges of senior PLA officers have weakened its command structure and operational effectiveness. Citing think-tank estimates, his research said roughly 28–30 senior generals and more than 40–50 lieutenant generals have been detained, expelled, or absent from important meetings since 2023. He also pointed to the absence of large-scale, centrally commanded joint exercises around Taiwan following the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. As examples of possible operational weaknesses, Ma cited a PLA formation sent to the Western Pacific after a Japanese destroyer transited the Taiwan Strait that consisted of only two combat ships, lacked a supply vessel, returned after three days, and did not disclose its training objectives. He also cited a confrontation near Sandy Cay in the South China Sea in which two larger Chinese vessels reportedly failed to intercept a smaller Philippine vessel, which he said reflected weaknesses in tactical coordination and force deployment.
Ma concluded that while the PLA’s tangible military strength has grown and affects U.S. force planning in the First Island Chain, its “intangible” capabilities—including senior leadership, joint command, and combat effectiveness—have been weakened. His overall assessment was that the PLA’s actual military strength may currently be lower than its visible military capabilities.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 18, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609180243.aspx