Impact on Xi Jinping If Russia Suffers Defeat in Ukraine
A Chinese article analyzes the potential impact on Beijing and Xi Jinping if Russia suffers defeat in the Ukraine war. It argues that such an outcome could significantly affect Xi’s governing environment, strategic legacy, and historical standing.
1. Pressure on Political Legitimacy and Narrative Framework
Russia’s weakening as a major strategic partner could undermine the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) official narratives emphasizing “historical confidence” and “confidence in the system.” Any abrupt adjustment in China’s Russia policy could create cognitive dissonance within both the Party and broader society, particularly among nationalist groups. Xi’s highly centralized governance model is closely tied to perceptions of strategic foresight and correct decision-making. A major failure by a close partner could therefore be viewed as a foreign policy misjudgment, weakening Xi’s authority within elite political circles.
2. Systemic Pressure on China’s Diplomatic Strategy
A Russian defeat could reshape China’s external environment. Without Russia serving as a northern strategic buffer and absorbing part of U.S. and Western strategic attention, more American resources could shift toward the Indo-Pacific region, increasing pressure on issues such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. China’s broader “anti-hegemony” alignment could weaken, reducing the effectiveness of organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
China’s Eurasian strategy could also face setbacks. Projects linked to the Belt and Road Initiative, including Arctic shipping routes and cross-border infrastructure projects, could stall or require renegotiation. On the Taiwan issue, weaker Russian support could reduce certain external variables, but it could also increase the likelihood of stronger Western intervention, raising strategic uncertainty for Beijing.
3. Domestic Economic and Governance Risks
External shocks could quickly transmit into China’s domestic economy. Reduced access to discounted Russian energy supplies could increase import costs and amplify commodity price volatility. Combined with existing problems in real estate, local government debt, and industrial supply chains, these pressures could narrow the policy space for initiatives such as “dual circulation” and “common prosperity.”
Broader financial instability could trigger capital outflows and weaken market confidence. Within the Party, more pragmatic factions could use the situation to criticize policies perceived as prioritizing “security” over economic development.
4. Extreme Scenario: Political Challenges to Xi Jinping
In a more severe scenario, a Russian defeat could trigger a chain reaction involving deterioration in China–Russia relations, intensified economic pressure, growing factional struggles within the Party, and greater international isolation. Under such conditions, Xi’s political position could face systemic challenges, including the possibility of being forced down. Historically, the collapse or weakening of major strategic allies has often accelerated the erosion of authority for highly centralized authoritarian leaders, especially when domestic structural tensions remain unresolved.
Source: CReaders.Net, May 22, 2026
https://news.creaders.net/china/2026/05/22/3006530.html
Al Jazeera Report: What Drives The China–Pakistan “Brotherhood” Relations
A report published by Al Jazeera challenges China’s long-promoted narrative of a uniquely close China–Pakistan relationship. It argues that ties between Beijing and Islamabad are not driven by ideology or emotional affinity as they claim, but rather shared geopolitical interests centered on countering India. The report states that the $62 billion China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), once promoted as a flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) effort, has instead exposed mounting debt burdens, economic imbalances, and security risks.
The report reviews two historical secret arrangements between the two countries. The first was Pakistan’s 1963 transfer of control over the disputed Shaksgam Valley to China shortly after the 1962 Sino–Indian war, as part of a strategic alignment against India. The second involved alleged secret nuclear cooperation beginning in the 1970s after India’s nuclear test, including Chinese assistance in nuclear technology and weapons-related development.
CPEC has failed to deliver the prosperity initially promised. China is now Pakistan’s largest bilateral creditor, holding roughly $29 billion in loans, accounting for about 22 percent of Pakistan’s external debt. Pakistan has become increasingly dependent on Chinese debt rollovers. The report also highlights a major trade imbalance: China exported $20.2 billion worth of goods to Pakistan in 2025, while Pakistan’s exports only $2.8 billion to China.
Chinese-led infrastructure projects, including development around Gwadar Port, have reportedly generated local resentment because surrounding communities were largely excluded from ownership and economic benefits. Some Chinese BRI projects have also reportedly been scaled back or abandoned due to concerns over Pakistan’s repayment capacity and deteriorating security conditions.
During the 2025 India–Pakistan military clash, Pakistan extensively used Chinese-made weapons systems, including J-10C fighter jets, HQ-9 air defense systems, and PL-15 missiles. However, China’s diplomatic influence in de-escalating the conflict proved limited, while the United States played the leading role in mediating a ceasefire.
The report concludes that despite the economic difficulties surrounding CPEC, Beijing is unlikely to allow Pakistan to collapse because of its continuing strategic value as a counterweight to India.
Source: Renminbao, May 23, 2026
https://renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2026/5/23/95288b.html
Franco-Chinese Battery Plant Breaks Ground in Dunkirk, with Chinese Partner Holding 51 Percent Stake
A joint venture between French nuclear energy company Orano and Chinese battery materials firm Xiamen Tungsten New Energy Technology (XTC) has officially launched, with French Economy Minister Roland Lescure attending the groundbreaking ceremony on May 29. Lescure called the facility “a critical link in battery technology research and innovation,” and said the partnership would demonstrate that France, Europe, and China “can work together in a mutually beneficial way — not through destructive competition, but through cooperation.”
The plant, operating under the name Neomat CAM, is located in Dunkirk in northern France and targets the European electric vehicle market, with an annual production capacity equivalent to 500,000 EVs. It is expected to begin operations by the end of 2028.
Ownership stakes have shifted since earlier reporting. A July 2025 account indicated XTC held a 49 percent stake after contributing €103 million (US$ 112 million); however, more recent AFP reporting shows Orano now holds 49 percent while XTC has taken a 51 percent majority controlling interest.
Total project investment stands at €500 million (US$ 545 million), with roughly one quarter funded through France’s green industry tax credit program (C3IV). The project also includes a dedicated research and development center in Dunkirk, set to open alongside the factory. During construction, the site is expected to employ nearly 400 workers, with 400 permanent jobs to follow upon launch — 90% of which will be filled locally, according to Orano.
The Dunkirk site sits at the heart of France’s so-called “Battery Valley,” where all of the country’s major battery manufacturers are based in the Hauts-de-France region, including ACC, AESC, Verkor, and ProLogium. If market conditions allow, Neomat CAM aims to double its capacity to 80,000 tons annually by 2035 — enough for one million vehicles and roughly 10% of the European market.
Source: Radio France International, May 29, 2026
https://rfi.my/CkKH
Oriental Daily: China’s FDI Plunged 56.7 Percent Month-over-Month in April
Oriental Daily News, Hong Kong’s number one newspaper in circulation since 1976, recently reported that, the actual use of foreign direct investment (FDI) in mainland China in the first four months of this year recorded a significant slowdown in the inflow of foreign capital into the mainland.
China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that foreign direct investment (FDI) in the first four months of the year amounted to RMB 287.69 billion (around US$42.5 billion), a 10.3 percent decrease compared to the same period last year. Also, actual single-month FDI in April alone was RMB 38.09 billion (around US$5.6 billion), a sharp drop of 26.1 percent year-over-year, and a major decrease of 56.7 percent month-over-month.
By industry sector, FDI in the manufacturing sector totaled 78.88 billion yuan (around US$11.7 billion) from January to April, while FDI in the service sector totaled 204.15 billion yuan (around US$30.2 billion). FDI in manufacturing and services declined by 6.2 percent and 11.7 percent year-over-year, respectively.
In the meantime, according to data released by the People’s Bank of China (Central Bank), after 12 consecutive months of reducing its holdings of bonds in China’s interbank market, foreign investors’ total holdings of interbank market bonds amounted to RMB 3.12 trillion yuan (around US$461 billion) as of the end of April, the lowest level since November 2020.
Source: Oriental Daily, May 24, 2026
https://hk.on.cc/hk/bkn/cnt/news/20260524/bkn-20260524104539657-0524_00822_001_cn.html
China Sidesteps Question on Storing Iran’s Enriched Uranium as Ceasefire Nears
A ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran appears close to finalization, with Iran reportedly seeking to transfer its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to China for safekeeping. China’s Foreign Ministry, however, declined to directly address the request, saying only that Beijing remains willing to play a “constructive role” in reaching a political and diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir, who has been mediating between Washington and Tehran, met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing on May 25. Munir briefed Wang on the latest developments, stating that “an agreement is close to being reached,” and expressed hope that China would take a more active role. Wang praised Pakistan’s mediation efforts, calling Islamabad a trusted and capable intermediary, and offered the hopeful remark that “peace, though difficult, will ultimately come.”
Al Arabiya reported late on May 25, citing informed sources, that Iran is seeking Chinese guarantees before finalizing any deal to end the war, and has specifically requested that its highly enriched uranium be transferred to China. The sources also indicated that Munir was likely to travel to Doha, Qatar, to continue mediation efforts.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, speaking at a routine press briefing on May 26, said China has maintained close communication with all relevant parties, including Iran, since the outbreak of hostilities, and has been actively working toward a ceasefire and peace.
Mao did not respond directly to whether China would accept Iran’s enriched uranium. She reiterated China’s consistent position of supporting peaceful resolution through dialogue and negotiation.
The U.S.-Iran ceasefire reached in early April is set to be extended by 60 days, during which both sides are expected to hold negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. President Donald Trump, however, posted on May 25 that Iran’s enriched uranium must be handed over to the United States for destruction — or destroyed on-site or at another acceptable location.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), May 26, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202605260231.aspx
China’s Military Purge Continues as Xi Jinping Issues New Rules for Senior Officers
Following one of the most sweeping purges of China’s military leadership in recent history, the Central Military Commission (CMC), chaired by Xi Jinping, has issued 26 new measures to tighten oversight and ideological control over senior officers.
State media reported Wednesday that the new regulations aim to enforce strict discipline through “iron rules” governing the education, management, and supervision of high-ranking military officials. The rules emphasize strengthening Communist Party collective leadership, improving political screening during officer selection, and deepening “ideological rectification” campaigns.
The announcement comes amid Xi’s second wave of military purges, which has effectively decimated China’s top brass. On May 7, former Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu were both sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve. Among the seven CMC members, only two remain active, while Zhang Youxia — once considered Xi’s closest confidant and the CMC’s First Vice Chairman — is currently under investigation.
The scale of the purge has raised serious questions internationally about the combat readiness of the People’s Liberation Army, particularly since nearly all of the fallen generals were personally vetted and promoted by Xi himself.
State media did not release the full text of the new measures, but CCTV reported they will set clear guidelines on Party oversight of senior officers, personnel selection, and political education. A recurring theme is ensuring strict adherence to the principle that “the Party commands the gun” — not the reverse.
The charges against Zhang Youxia are illustrative: a PLA Daily editorial accused him of five serious failures, nearly all centered on insufficient absolute loyalty and obedience to Xi. Analysts note that the continued purges and the new regulations both point to a fundamental and unresolved trust problem between Xi and his own military leadership.
Source: Radio France International, May 28, 2026
https://rfi.my/CjvS
China Attempted to Host CPTPP Event Without Approval; Some Members Boycotted
Japan’s Jiji Press reported that during the recent APEC Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province, China organized an event related to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) without prior approval from the organization, prompting dissatisfaction among several member countries.
The event, held on May 22 under the framework of a dialogue linked to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), included participants from Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries. However, some CPTPP members reportedly criticized China for organizing the event without following CPTPP procedures, arguing that it violated the pact’s consensus-based operating principles. Several member countries chose not to attend as a sign of protest.
The CPTPP currently has 12 members, including Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, in addition to several Asian countries. China is not a member. Beijing applied to join the CPTPP in 2021 but has not yet entered formal accession negotiations. Observers cited in the report suggested the incident could negatively affect China’s efforts to join the trade pact.
Source: NTDTV, May 23, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/05/23/a104099303.html
How Foreign Influencers Became China’s Most Effective PR Tool
A recent Le Monde report examines how China is leveraging foreign social media influencers to reshape its global image, with the southwestern megacity of Chongqing at the center of this highly organized effort.
Influencers flock to Chongqing for its visually striking backdrops — dangling from the 56th floor of a skyscraper for dramatic effect, or marveling at a monorail that passes directly through an apartment building. Their videos, filled with exclamations like “China is full of wonders,” flood TikTok and Instagram, reaching a generation that consumes information through short-form content rather than traditional media. For Gen Z audiences, Chongqing’s vertical cityscape and neon-lit nights offer a futuristic novelty that New York simply can no longer provide.
The timing works in China’s favor. America’s global image has taken hits from Capitol Hill riot footage, immigration enforcement controversies, and its stance on Gaza, eroding the moral authority Washington once claimed. Meanwhile, imagery of China’s massive bridges, train stations, and airports is gradually displacing older narratives around Wuhan’s wet market, Uyghur detentions, and Hong Kong crackdowns. A Prague-based China analyst notes that Western governments’ failure to prevent the situation in Gaza has weakened criticism of China while amplifying admiration for its development achievements.
A Politico survey of six European countries found that in four of them — Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Germany — the U.S. is now seen as a greater threat than China. A Pew Research poll meanwhile shows 27% of Americans now hold a favorable view of China, nearly double the figure from 2023.
Le Monde traces this influence campaign back to 2018, when Xi Jinping called for stronger international communication capacity. That same year, the first government-backed “International Communication Center” was established — in Chongqing.
Source: Radio France International, May 24, 2026
https://rfi.my/CjHb