Controversies Follow South Korea’s 2026 Local Elections: Allegations of Chinese Involvement in Policing
South Korea held its ninth nationwide local elections and parliamentary by-elections on June 3, 2026. However, voting was disrupted at multiple polling stations after ballot shortages were reported in Seoul and other regions. According to reports, 67 polling stations required emergency ballot deliveries, while voting was temporarily suspended at 22 locations. Some voters reportedly waited for hours without being able to cast their ballots.
The election was followed by a series of allegations circulating online. Videos and social media posts purportedly showed election workers opening ballot boxes and inserting additional ballots, ballots being discarded without being counted, and police removing evidence related to election complaints. Protests subsequently broke out in several areas, leading to confrontations between demonstrators and police.
Separately, online speculation emerged over the identities of some police officers deployed at protest sites. Some social media users claimed that certain officers displayed unusual name tags or appearances and suggested that individuals of Chinese nationality may have participated in security operations.
The claims gained further attention after a Facebook user identified as “James Jseng” alleged the existence of “Foreign Self-Governance Patrol Teams,” community volunteer groups that cooperate with local police. According to the post, these groups were first established in Seoul in 2009 and later expanded nationwide, with ethnic Korean Chinese residents from China making 80 percent of the team, but t he official publicity materials rarely feature Chinese members.
Additional online videos claimed that a name displayed on an officer’s name tag could not be found in police personnel records when citizens inquired with authorities.
However, South Korea’s National Police Agency issued a statement on June 8 stating that all personnel involved in election-related security operations were South Korean police officers and denying allegations that foreign nationals had served in policing roles.
Sources:
1. Secret China, June 8, 2026
https://www.secretchina.com/news/gb/2026/06/08/1100203.html
2. Yahoo (Taiwan), June 9, 2026
https://tw.news.yahoo.com/韓國選票短缺抗議現場真有中國公安-韓媒事實查核給答案了-162541757.html
KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun Unable to Meet U.S. National Security Council Officials During Washington Visit
During Kuomintang (KMT) Chair Cheng Li-wun’s visit to Washington, D.C., local media reported that a planned meeting with U.S. National Security Council (NSC) officials was first downgraded and later canceled without a public explanation. According to the reports, Cheng’s delegation had initially been expected to meet NSC officials at the White House on June 10. The meeting was later moved to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) headquarters in Washington and downgraded to a lower-level NSC representative before being canceled altogether.
Washington observers suggested the cancellations may have been linked to Cheng’s recent remarks criticizing U.S.-Taiwan arms sales and describing First Island Chain security cooperation as a “Cold War mentality.” Some analysts argued that such comments raised concerns among U.S. officials because they echoed narratives frequently promoted by Beijing. The KMT has also questioned the proposed NT$1.25 trillion (US$40 billion) special defense budget and raised allegations of corruptions in U.S. proposed arms sales.
The reported cancellations drew attention because, under past practice, visiting Taiwanese political leaders have often met with senior NSC officials and AIT representatives during trips to Washington.
Source: Liberty Times (Taiwan), June 11, 2026
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/5468674
Reports Highlight Oversupply of Delivery Riders and Ride-Hailing Drivers in China
Chinese media outlets, including Phoenix News and East Finance, reported that China’s delivery sector is facing a growing oversupply of workers. Industry estimates suggest that nearly 20 million people are now working as delivery riders nationwide, while only about 4 million experienced riders are needed for the current average of 110 million daily orders.
The oversupply has contributed to falling incomes. In Shanghai, some riders reportedly saw monthly earnings decline from around 15,000 yuan (US$2,100) to 12,000 yuan (US$1,700), while average daily orders fell by roughly 20. In Beijing, daily deliveries dropped from 35 orders in 2020 to 20 today, even as working hours increased. Delivery fees have also fallen sharply, with some short-distance orders paying less than 2 yuan.
Similar pressures are emerging in the ride-hailing sector. On May 31, Shenzhen transportation authorities warned that the city’s ride-hailing market had become saturated, with drivers averaging only about 13 trips per day. Authorities advised prospective drivers to carefully consider the risks before entering the industry. One Shenzhen ride-hailing driver said in a video that after deducting vehicle rental costs and traffic fines, he earned only about 5,000 yuan (US$700) per month despite working up to 16 hours a day.
Reports noted that growing numbers of unemployed and downwardly mobile middle-class workers have entered the delivery and ride-hailing sectors as traditional employment opportunities become harder to find.
Source: Epoch Times, June 1, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/6/1/n14779387.htm
The Eighth China–U.S. Sister Cities Conference Held in San Francisco
The Eighth China–U.S. Sister Cities Conference was held in San Francisco on June 5 under the theme “Working Together to Promote High-Quality Development of China–U.S. Cities.”
People’s Daily described the event as an important bilateral dialogue following the recent meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping in Beijing. The conference brought together more than 150 representatives from 15 Chinese provincial-level regions and 12 cities, as well as 160 representatives from 21 U.S. states and 36 cities.
Participants exchanged views on green development and urban governance, culture and tourism, and education and youth engagement. During the conference, Chinese and U.S. cities signed five cooperation agreements and showcased 31 collaborative projects covering sister-city partnerships, cultural and tourism exchanges, and youth programs.
Analysts have been pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department has used subnational exchange programs, including sister-city and sister-province relationships, to expand political influence and cultivate local networks within the United States.
Source: People’s Daily, June 8, 2026
https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202606/08/content_30161744.html
China Hosts BRICS Industrial Forum, Promotes Manufacturing and AI Cooperation
Xinhua News Agency reported that the 2026 BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution Forum was held in Xiamen, Fujian Province, on May 27–28. Beijing used the event to showcase the country’s industrial capabilities, claiming that the combined value of China’s intelligent manufacturing equipment, industrial software, and related solutions industries has surpassed 4.5 trillion yuan (US$630 billion).
China established the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution Innovation Center in Xiamen in 2020. Since then, the platform has facilitated 138 cooperation projects with total investment exceeding 62 billion yuan (US$8.6 billion).
The forum highlighted growing industrial and technology cooperation among BRICS countries. Indonesia promoted its “Making Indonesia 4.0” strategy focused on smart manufacturing, digital transformation, and green industry, while Chinese battery giant CATL showcased its nearly US$6 billion battery supply-chain project in Indonesia. Brazil’s Trade and Investment Promotion Agency became the first foreign government institution to establish a presence at Xiamen’s BRICS Overseas Expansion Service Center, creating a channel for Chinese companies seeking opportunities in Brazil.
Officials from Durban, South Africa, presented a five-year artificial intelligence strategy covering public services, infrastructure, tourism, and security, while Ethiopia promoted investment opportunities in its 29 industrial parks, many of which were built by Chinese companies.
Source: Xinhua, May 29, 2026
https://www.news.cn/world/20260529/7988a32bdb924b0090c846c319cb67db/c.html
PLA Expands Use of Civilian Resources for Logistics Support
People’s Daily reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is accelerating the integration of civilian resources into its logistics system, shifting away from a traditionally self-sufficient support model toward one that relies more heavily on government coordination, private-sector participation, and market-based services.
Under the reform effort, a growing range of civilian entities now support military logistics. Local supply chains are being used to deliver fresh food to remote military outposts, while uniforms and personal equipment are increasingly distributed through commercial logistics networks. Many military bases have also introduced civilian property-management services, and remote facilities are gradually being connected to municipal water, electricity, gas, and heating systems.
The PLA has also expanded cooperation with local hospitals, allowing service members and their families to access nearby public healthcare facilities. In addition, dedicated transportation channels for military personnel have been established at airports, railway stations, bus terminals, and ports nationwide. Chinese authorities said pilot programs involving commercial logistics, fuel supply, new-energy applications, and diversified transportation support are being rolled out across the military.
Source: People’s Daily, June 4, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0604/c1011-40733909.html
China’s State Media Reporter in Czech Republic Charged with Espionage-Related Offense
Yang Yiming, the Prague correspondent for Chinese state-run newspaper Guangming Daily, is set to stand trial after being detained for four months in the Czech Republic. Czech prosecutors accused Yang of working for Chinese intelligence services and charged him with “conducting unauthorized activities for a foreign power,” marking the first prosecution under the country’s espionage-related legislation. If convicted, he could face up to five years in prison.
According to Czech authorities, Yang allegedly monitored and collected intelligence on political and academic figures in the Czech Republic, including pro-Taiwan politicians such as Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil and former Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Markéta Pekarová Adamová. Investigators said he sought to gather compromising information on these individuals on behalf of Chinese intelligence agencies.
Yang had reportedly operated in the Czech Republic for years under the identity of a journalist and had interviewed numerous Czech and Slovak political figures. Czech authorities had repeatedly renewed his press credentials and residency permits before the investigation was launched.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 3, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202606030328.aspx
Why Is Beijing Using Coast Guard Patrols Instead of Warships Near Taiwan?
On May 28, 2026, Japan and the Philippines announced the start of negotiations over the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and continental shelves in waters east and southeast of Taiwan. On June 1, China’s Coast Guard announced that the Daishan vessel (2502) task group had conducted “law enforcement patrols” east of Taiwan, describing the operation as a response to the Japan–Philippines maritime negotiations.
Sources cited by The Epoch Times said the patrols were aimed less at military deterrence and more at increasing political and psychological pressure on Taiwan. One source close to the Chinese military claimed Beijing recognizes that such operations are unlikely to intimidate Taiwan’s government directly and is instead seeking to influence Taiwanese public opinion ahead of the 2028 presidential election.
Observers noted that China has increasingly relied on coast guard vessels, maritime surveillance ships, and so-called “law enforcement patrols” rather than traditional naval deployments around Taiwan. One scholar cited economic pressure as a major reason for the shift, arguing that coast guard operations are far less costly than military deployments while still allowing Beijing to create the perception of “encirclement” around Taiwan.
Analysts also said the strategy enables Beijing to frame its activities as administrative law enforcement or maritime management rather than overt military escalation. China hopes the regular presence of coast guard vessels will gradually normalize Beijing’s claims over waters currently regarded as part of international freedom of navigation zones.
Source: Epoch Times, June 4, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/6/3/n14781055.htm