FARA Filings Renew Scrutiny of Chinese Influence Operations Targeting U.S. Media
Recently resurfaced filings under the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (FARA) have renewed scrutiny of China’s long-running influence operations targeting U.S. media organizations. The filings show that the Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), through U.S. public relations firm BLJ Worldwide (BLJ), sponsored trips to China and engagement programs involving journalists from dozens of major Western media outlets over more than a decade. The disclosures have gained renewed attention following investigative reporting by journalist Natalie Winters, who argues the records illustrate the scope and sophistication of Beijing’s overseas influence efforts.
According to the FARA filings, BLJ organized sponsored visits to China for 128 journalists from 48 media organizations beginning in 2009. Participants reportedly included journalists from CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, the Associated Press, and other leading news organizations. The filings describe the programs as providing prominent journalists with opportunities to gain a more positive understanding of China’s development and achievements through official meetings, site visits, and exchanges.
CUSEF, founded in 2008 by former Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, has long been identified by U.S. officials and congressional reports as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) broader united front influence network. Beyond media engagement, the organization has funded exchanges with universities, think tanks, and political organizations, including programs for historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). Critics contend that these activities are designed to cultivate long-term relationships with political, academic, and media elites capable of shaping public opinion and policy debates in ways favorable to Beijing.
The resurfaced FARA records have renewed attention to the CCP’s broader influence operations and the role of sponsored exchanges as a tool of public diplomacy. Critics argue that such programs form part of a wider strategy to shape Western media narratives and public discourse by cultivating relationships with influential journalists and opinion leaders over the long term.
Source: Aboluo, July 20, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0720/2410405.html
Russia Abandons Support for Korean Peninsula Denuclearization, Leaving Beijing in an Awkward Position
Russia has announced a major shift in its policy toward North Korea’s nuclear program. At a July 22 press conference following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that, in light of what he described as increasingly “aggressive” military activities around North Korea, Moscow no longer supports calls for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The statement marks a sharp departure from the 2005 “Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks,” in which China, the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea jointly affirmed that the goal of the negotiations was the peaceful and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Lavrov’s remarks came just days after North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin. Putin conveyed his “warmest greetings” to Kim Jong Un and praised North Korean troops for their contributions to Russia’s military operations abroad. The visit came amid reports that Moscow is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops to support its war in Ukraine. The growing military partnership follows the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, under which both sides pledged to provide military and other assistance if either enters a state of war.
Mosco argued that the surrounding situation made it for North Korea to defend itself without nuclear capability, citing expanding U.S.-South Korea military exercises, Japan’s debate over revising its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” and the collapse of the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control framework following the expiration of the “New START Treaty.”
Russia’s policy reversal further erodes the long-standing international consensus on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. South Korea has also adopted a more pragmatic approach, emphasizing efforts to contain further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal rather than insisting on complete denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue. Against this backdrop, China faces an increasingly difficult dilemma: abandoning its longstanding support for denuclearization would undermine two decades of diplomatic policy and its commitment to the global nonproliferation regime, while maintaining that position risks leaving Beijing increasingly isolated as regional realities continue to evolve.
Source: CReaders.net, July 27, 2026
https://news.creaders.net/world/2026/07/27/3029916.html
Trump Administration Plans Nearly $500 Million Initiative to Counter China’s Global Influence
The Trump administration has notified Congress of plans to invest $175.8 million to replace aging undersea telecommunications cables in the Caribbean and Central America as part of a broader effort to counter China’s influence over the region’s communications infrastructure. The initiative, titled “Countering CCP Control of Caribbean and Central America Undersea Cables Project,” would fund the installation of strategically selected submarine cable systems and support partnerships between regional governments and private-sector providers to deploy secure U.S. and other trusted alternatives.
The proposed funding would support cable projects serving El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Because of strained U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Washington does not plan to work directly with the Nicaraguan government. The project reflects broader U.S. concerns over China’s expanding strategic presence in the Western Hemisphere, including its investments in telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and other sectors.
According to State Department planning documents, the cable initiative is part of a broader proposal to invest nearly $500 million in more than 50 projects across the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia to counter Chinese influence. Proposed initiatives include strengthening cybersecurity, securing ports and critical mineral supply chains, countering China’s export of surveillance technologies, and reducing international support for Beijing’s space program. Other projects would establish regional security operations centers and bolster communications security, information resilience, and religious freedom, including efforts to counter Chinese influence over the selection of the next Dalai Lama.
Source: Epoch Times, July 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/28/n14818672.htm
Changchun Officials Warn of “Unprecedented” Economic Challenges
Authorities in Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province, have acknowledged that the city is facing “unprecedented difficulties and challenges” in economic development. On July 22, CCP Secretary Zhang Enhui chaired a meeting to review the city’s first-half economic performance and discuss priorities for the remainder of the year.
The meeting stated that Changchun’s economy is confronting unprecedented difficulties and challenges. Officials were urged to remain clear-headed, calmly assess the situation, and accurately assess current economic conditions. They were instructed to recognize both the severity and complexity of the broader macroeconomic environment and the more direct and serious challenges the city is facing; acknowledge both their efforts (to improve) and the still existing shortcomings; and recognize both the progress in regional coordination and the widening disparities among different districts and sectors.
Analysts view the unusually candid assessment as a rare public acknowledgment by a local government of the severity of its economic problems, in contrast to Beijing’s longstanding narrative that China’s economy remains stable and continues to improve.
The economic development at China’s northeast has been declining for decades. Once considered one of the few economic bright spots in the region, Changchun has also experienced a sharp slowdown, with GDP falling 9.9 percent year over year in the first half of 2022.
Source: Lianhe Zaobao, July 24, 2026
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20260724-9412767
State Media Profiles Raise Questions About PLA Rocket Force Personnel Skillsets
As part of celebrations marking the Chinese Communist Party’s 105th anniversary, state media profiled several “Outstanding Communist Party Members,” including He Xianda, a serviceman in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. A July 13 Xinhua article portrays He’s rise from military cook to model missile operator as an example of exceptional dedication. At the same time, the account offers unusual insights into the Rocket Force’s personnel practices and training standards.
According to the report, He enlisted in 1997 as a cook in a missile brigade. In six months, he self-studied and ranked among the top three in a brigade-wide missile theory examination. He was then reassigned as a missile-loading operator and, within five months, reportedly became the brigade’s top operator. In 2000, he qualified as the brigade’s first enlisted “No. 1 operator”—the missile launch position previously reserved for highly educated officers. His story of a cook becoming the top operator is an inspiration story, but it suggests many servicemen in the Rocket Force may not have strong education background.
The article notes that the “No. 1 operator” is an instable position since the educated officers were often promoted to higher positions after some time. The military had to fill the vacancies with enlisted personnel who had limited technical backgrounds and relatively short training periods.
The profile also recounts an incident in which onboard equipment reported an abnormal voltage reading shortly before a missile launch. Instead of aborting the mission, He crawled beneath the launcher, manually inspected the system by touch, concluded the circuit was functioning normally, and authorized the launch to proceed. State media praised his judgment, claiming “his hands were more reliable than the instruments.” The episode, however, suggests that field units may rely heavily on operator experience when equipment warnings are considered unreliable or diagnostic capabilities are limited.
A separate Xinhua article published on June 30 profiled Fang Yongzheng, a missile launch operator in the PLA’s “First Dongfeng Brigade.” According to the report, Fang compiled operational procedures, technical manuals, and troubleshooting guides that were adopted across the brigade. The article also states that, despite 26 years of service, he has never participated in an actual missile launch. This suggests that key training materials is missing and the military has to rely on documents developed by personnel whose expertise was derived primarily from training rather than operational experience.
Taken together, the two showcase exemplary Rocket Force servicemen inadvertently suggest persistent shortages of technically qualified personnel, extensive reliance on accelerated on-the-job training, and continued dependence on experienced individuals to compensate for gaps in technical expertise and organizational capacity.
Sources:
1. Xinhua, July 13, 2026
https://www.news.cn/20260713/959650c9a06b414d91cdb56746c54da1/c.html
2. Xinhua, June 30, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260630/46cce79284e74942a780dc8af0fca9a4/c.html
3. Epoch Times, July 19, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/18/n14812116.htm
Chinese Universities Scale Back Foreign Language Programs Amid AI and Employment Pressures
Chinese universities are increasingly merging or eliminating foreign language departments as Artificial Intelligence (AI) transforms language education and employment prospects deteriorate. Recently, Guilin University of Information Technology dissolved its School of Foreign Trade and Foreign Languages, transferring language instruction to a newly established School of General Education while merging its faculty into the Business School. According to Chinese media, at least 10 universities have restructured foreign language departments since 2025, with several also suspending enrollment in language majors.
Analysts attribute the trend to rapid advances in AI-powered translation, which have diminished demand for traditional language skills, as well as a weakening job market for language graduates. Employment data show that foreign language majors have below-average job placement rates and salaries, while English has been identified as an oversupplied major in several provinces.
Rather than abandoning foreign language education, many universities are integrating language training with disciplines such as business, communications, and international studies to cultivate graduates with broader, interdisciplinary skill sets that are better aligned with evolving labor market demands.
Source: Epoch Times, May 31, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/5/31/n14778725.htm
CCP Moves to Expand Party Building Among Gig Workers and New Economic Groups
The Chinese Communist Party is intensifying grassroots governance efforts, recently issuing a directive to strengthen Party building within new economic organizations—including online platforms—and “new employment groups” such as ride-hailing drivers and food delivery couriers. As these flexible forms of employment become increasingly common, authorities aim to achieve full Party organizational coverage at the grassroots level.
Since establishing the Central Social Work Department in 2023, the CCP has continued pushing Party-led grassroots governance. This included 2024 guidance on strengthening community worker teams, and this year’s “Opinions on Advancing the Professional Social Work Workforce,” alongside measures on registering public petition visits that took effect July 1.
While the Party has long required Party branches within enterprises, the high mobility of gig workers like delivery couriers and ride-hailing drivers has made traditional grassroots Party structures difficult to apply—prompting the new policy focus.
State news agency Xinhua reported that the CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly issued “Opinions on Strengthening Social Work in the New Era,” describing social work as vital to the Party’s long-term governance and national stability. The document calls for comprehensive Party leadership over social work, adherence to a people-centered approach, and development of the “Fengqiao Experience” model for the new era, with emphasis on Party building in new economic organizations, social organizations, and employment groups.
Specific measures include improving Party building quality in private enterprises, targeting internet platform companies, exploring approaches for tech innovation firms, and extending efforts to small businesses and individual vendors. The document also calls for strengthening Party building in social organizations and foundations, improving algorithmic governance of online platforms, and building social security systems suited to new employment patterns. Additionally, it emphasizes reforming grassroots political institutions and resolving public grievances at their source, before conflicts escalate.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 23, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202607230334.aspx
PLA Daily: Europe Faces Long Road to Defense Industrial Autonomy
People’s Daily republished an article from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily arguing that Europe continues to face formidable obstacles to achieving defense industrial autonomy despite years of increased spending and ambitious policy initiatives. Citing the collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program after nearly a decade of disputes, the article argues that deep political and structural divisions continue to hinder Europe’s efforts to build an independent defense industry.
The article identifies four major challenges: poorly coordinated defense spending, limited industrial capacity, technological dependence on the United States, and conflicting national interests. It notes that although European defense spending has risen sharply since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, a large share of procurement has gone to non-European suppliers, particularly U.S. defense contractors. It also argues that European defense manufacturers continue to face production bottlenecks, underinvestment in research and development, and fragmented procurement practices that limit economies of scale.
According to the article, these challenges stem from deeper structural constraints, including member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty over defense policy, Europe’s longstanding reliance on the NATO security framework, and a fragmented defense market. It concludes that political divisions—rather than industrial capacity alone—will remain the principal obstacle to Europe’s pursuit of strategic and defense industrial autonomy.
Source: People’s Daily, July 13, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0713/c1011-40759395.html