Retired Military Officers Reportedly Unhappy over Removal of Zhang Youxia
The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress has removed Zhang Youxia from his position as vice chairman of the state Central Military Commission (CMC) and Liu Zhenli from his position as a CMC member. Both were also stripped of their National People’s Congress deputy positions. (See Chinascope briefing “China Formally Removes Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from Central Military Commission” (https://chinascope.org/archives/41186.))
The Epoch Times reported, citing sources familiar with the military, that the formal removals have triggered particularly strong reactions among retired military officers. One source said some retired officers were deeply dissatisfied, with some reportedly drinking at home while others refused to answer calls from their former units. Active-duty officers are reportedly more reluctant to express opposition openly because of tighter political controls, while retired officers have greater freedom to voice their views privately.
The report also claims that the military leadership anticipated resistance and took steps to prepare the PLA in advance. Before the NPC Standing Committee announced the removals, political commissars at grassroots units were reportedly instructed to organize study sessions on PLA Daily editorials that outlined the alleged crimes of Zhang and Liu.
Source: Epoch Times, September 3, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/2/n14841227.htm
Phoenix Commentary: China-Russia Visa-Free Travel May Become Permanent
Phoenix published a commentary on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to make China-Russia visa-free travel permanent.
On August 31, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Putin told Xi Jinping that if Beijing considered it feasible and beneficial, the two sides were willing to work toward making visa-free travel permanent. China did not immediately accept or reject the proposal. On September 1, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said mutual visa-free travel “fully reflects” the two countries’ “high level of strategic mutual trust” and would further facilitate people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. The wording suggests that Beijing is receptive to the proposal, although it stopped short of formally agreeing.
The two countries currently have a mutual visa-free arrangement in place through December 31, 2027. The policy has already boosted cross-border travel. In the first half of 2026, about 380,600 Chinese citizens traveled to Russia, up 19.7 percent year-on-year, while 396,000 Russians visited China, up 62.4 percent. Russia has become China’s second-largest source of foreign tourists. The development also reflects China’s broader visa strategy: by 2026, Beijing had extended unilateral visa-free access to 50 countries and established full mutual visa exemption with 29 countries. Unlike many of these arrangements, the China-Russia agreement is based on reciprocity, giving it added political significance.
The proposal also has significant economic and geopolitical implications. China-Russia trade reached $227.9 billion in 2025 and about $134.2 billion in the first half of 2026. As cooperation expands into technology, artificial intelligence, and digital innovation, easier cross-border travel could facilitate deeper business and professional ties. At the same time, with the Ukraine war entering its fifth year and Western sanctions continuing to constrain Russia, Moscow’s economic “pivot to the East” has increased its dependence on China.
Beijing’s response suggests that the proposal is under consideration. A future Xi-Putin meeting could produce a further extension of the current arrangement—or eventually eliminate its expiration date altogether.
Source: Phoenix, September 3, 2026
https://h5.ifeng.com/c/vivo/v002TCf5YDudeUiMHbLlVhXcWjGH0–d2QUXNs-_H3MuUmncw__
Taiwan’s Xiaohongshu Restrictions Highlight Growing Security Concerns
In December 2025, Taiwan announced a one-year restriction on the use of Xiaohongshu, a popular Chinese social media app, citing a surge in scams targeting Taiwanese users and the platform’s alleged lack of cooperation with law enforcement investigations. According to Taiwan authorities, the platform’s failure to provide necessary data has made it difficult for police to investigate fraud cases.
Taiwanese authorities reported that during the eight months following the restriction, Xiaohongshu-related fraud cases fell from 525 to 145, while reported financial losses declined from approximately NT$98.9 million (US$3.12 million) to NT$33.88 million (US$1.07 million).
The issue, however, extends beyond fraud. Xiaohongshu is one of China’s most popular social media platforms, particularly among young people, and has gained a growing following in Taiwan. Users share content about food, travel, shopping, and everyday life, making the platform an unusual channel for people-to-people interaction across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, Taiwan has become increasingly concerned about the potential risks posed by Chinese social media platforms, including data security, information manipulation, and political influence.
Source: Radio Free Asia, September 4, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhengzhi/2026/09/04/xiaohongshu-taiwan-ban-data-controversy/
China’s Government Debt Tops 480 Trillion Yuan, Debt Ratio Hits 73.2 Percent at End of 2025
China’s Ministry of Finance reported that national government debt reached RMB 102.5 trillion (approximately US$15.27 trillion) by the end of 2025, pushing the overall debt ratio to 73.2 percent.
The figures were disclosed through “China Finance,” a WeChat account run by the finance ministry, which published a report delivered by Vice Finance Minister Lin Zechang to the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress on August 31. The report, titled “State Council Report on Government Debt Management for 2025,” detailed the country’s debt position covering both statutory and implicit debt.
Based on China’s preliminary 2025 GDP figure of RMB 140.2 trillion (approximately US$20.89 trillion), the statutory government debt ratio—measuring legally recognized government debt against GDP—stood at 68.5 percent. When local governments’ outstanding implicit debt is included, the ratio rises to 73.2 percent.
Statutory government debt, primarily bonds issued by central and provincial-level governments, totaled RMB 96 trillion (approximately US$14.30 trillion) as of year-end 2025. This included RMB 41.2 trillion (approximately US$6.14 trillion) in central government bonds and RMB 54.8 trillion (approximately US$8.16 trillion) in local government statutory debt.
Local governments’ outstanding implicit debt, after multiple rounds of auditing and debt swaps, stood at RMB 6.5 trillion (approximately US$968.5 billion) by the end of 2025. Beijing has continued efforts in recent years to resolve local debt risks, making the prevention of unauthorized new implicit debt a key priority in debt management.
The report stated that authorities will continue strengthening monitoring and oversight of government debt going forward, imposing strict accountability for violations such as newly created implicit debt, enhancing “penetrating” oversight of special bond projects, and firmly prohibiting misreporting of spending progress.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 3, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609030200.aspx
China Tightens Exit Controls on Officials, State Employees, Students
China will implement new exit-management regulations at all border checkpoints starting September 15, imposing stricter controls on residents leaving the country. According to sources cited by Radio Free Asia, the rules introduce a “whoever approves bears responsibility” system: civil servants, state enterprise and public institution staff—including university faculty, doctors, listed company executives—and university students must obtain approval before traveling abroad. If an approved traveler overstays or fails to return, the official who signed off faces accountability.
A source in China’s financial sector described a hierarchical approval chain, with department heads needing approval from bureau chiefs, and so on up the chain. Financial institution and public hospital department heads are reportedly limited to one overseas trip per year.
An insider said the new rules formalize restrictions that had already existed internally, adding fresh limits on financial, research, and student travel—responding to concerns about tech talent and data outflows affecting China’s AI development.
Reports describe university students being blocked from planned trips: one video showed a student stopped at Nanning airport after a scanner flagged her; she said her visa was cancelled and her phone, chat records, and bank statements were searched, and that her entire university of roughly 60,000 students had been restricted from leaving China due to another student’s overstay in Spain.
Separately, Chinese nationals working or living abroad—including in Singapore and the U.S.—reported being contacted by local police demanding passports, employment proof, photos, and real-time location sharing. A Hubei lawyer suggested the crackdown may relate to declining birth rates and concerns over talent and asset flight.
Source: Radio Free Asia, September 3, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shehui/2026/09/03/china-entry-and-exit-management-regulations-capital-fleeing-technology-and-talent-outflow-strict-approval-processing/
Taiwan Officials: China’s Interference, Not Absent Leaders, Is Real Threat to Pacific Unity
Taiwanese diplomatic officials pushed back on interpretations that the recent 55th Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) summit in Palau revealed cracks in Pacific unity due to some leaders skipping the event, arguing this framing oversimplifies the situation. They said the more significant concern is China’s ongoing efforts to inject geopolitical rivalry into the region, disrupting Pacific nations’ ability to jointly address shared issues.
Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung led a delegation to Palau for PIF-related events. While 13 members were represented by heads of state or government, Fiji, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, and Samoa sent ministerial-level representatives—a pattern officials noted also occurred at the previous forum, making it not unprecedented.
Officials emphasized that Taiwan has participated in PIF mechanisms since 1993 as a “Development Partner,” respecting the “Pacific Way” principles of mutual respect, consensus, and solidarity, while contributing to initiatives like the Pacific Resilience Facility and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. By contrast, they said, China’s recent actions have raised regional concerns over security and political autonomy.
Regarding China’s intercontinental missile test in the Pacific this past July, officials noted that Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. said forum leaders called for countries conducting such tests to ensure transparency with at least 24 hours’ advance notice—a proposal Nauru objected to. Officials said this incident better illustrates the real challenge to Pacific unity: nations with close ties to Beijing declining to support common positions on security matters.
Officials added that Taiwan does not ask Pacific nations to choose sides, while China uses military activity and political influence to obstruct consensus. Lin reiterated Taiwan’s commitment to working with PIF to keep the Pacific “an ocean of peace, not an arena of confrontation.”
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 5, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202609050103.aspx
China’s Gains and Costs from the Ukraine War and U.S.-Iran Conflict
Since the Ukraine crisis began in 2022, along with intensifying U.S.-Iran tensions and disruptions to Red Sea shipping, global geopolitical and economic structures have undergone major realignment. Beijing has maintained a “non-direct involvement” strategy, avoiding direct participation while benefiting from the disruptions. In the short term, China has gained advantages in energy, market share, renminbi internationalization, and strategic relief. However, China is likely to face significant long-term costs from Western sanctions, declining trust in Chinese companies, and worsening security conditions in East Asia.
China’s main benefits include:
- Energy: China has become Russia’s largest energy customer after Europe reduced its imports of Russian energy. Discounted Russian oil and gas have provided China with lower-cost energy while creating opportunities for Chinese companies.
- Market Share in Russia: Chinese firms have expanded rapidly in Russia as Western companies withdrew. China-Russia trade increased from about $100 billion before the war to more than $240 billion, while Chinese automakers now hold more than 60 percent of Russia’s auto market and Chinese smartphones account for more than 70 percent.
- Renminbi Settlement: The war has accelerated yuan-based trade settlement. More than 90 percent of China-Russia trade is now reportedly settled directly in yuan and rubles, compared with less than 2 percent before the war.
- Strategic Relief: Conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have consumed substantial Western military resources, potentially easing immediate U.S. and NATO pressure on China in the Indo-Pacific.
China also faces significant costs:
- Western Secondary Sanctions: U.S. and Western sanctions are increasingly targeting third-country companies supplying Russia and Iran with dual-use technologies and other materials. Hundreds of Chinese and Hong Kong entities have been placed on U.S. sanctions or export-control lists, while the threat of secondary sanctions has prompted major Chinese banks to tighten or suspend some Russia- and Iran-related transactions.
- Loss of Western Trust and Accelerating “De-risking” from China: Beijing’s support for Russia has accelerated European efforts to de-risk from China, potentially threatening access to China’s much larger Western markets. Chinese investments and infrastructure projects in the Middle East also face greater risks from conflict, including disruptions to construction, logistics, energy projects, and exports.
- Worsening Northeast Asian Security Environment: The deteriorating security environment is a long-term concern. The growing military partnership between Russia and North Korea has strengthened Pyongyang’s position and could reduce Beijing’s influence over North Korea. Meanwhile, closer U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation and deeper bloc-based confrontation could leave China facing a more militarized and polarized neighborhood.
Source: Epoch Times, August 20, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/20/n14833109.htm
40-Year Mortgage Policy Awaits Rollout as China’s Big Six Banks See Mortgage Balances Drop Over 500 Billion Yuan
China’s central bank and financial regulators unveiled a package of new property rules on August 28, with the headline change extending the maximum term for individual home loans from 30 to 40 years. According to Yicai, most banks have yet to formally implement the policy, though a few—including China Construction Bank—have begun accepting applications under the new 40-year limit for existing mortgage customers, pending detailed implementing rules.
Newly released bank interim reports show mortgage balances at China’s six largest state-owned banks fell by more than 500 billion yuan (roughly $74 billion) in the first half of the year, to about 24.63 trillion yuan (about $3.66 trillion). CCB remains the largest mortgage lender despite its balance dropping below 6 trillion yuan.
Analysts say lengthening loan terms could cut average monthly payments by around 15%, boosting home-buying demand and easing default risk for borrowers facing temporary income strain. For example, on a 3 million yuan (about $446,000) commercial loan at a 3.05% rate, extending the term from 30 to 40 years would lower the monthly payment from 12,729 yuan (about $1,894) to 10,826 yuan (about $1,611), saving roughly 1,903 yuan (about $283) a month—though total interest paid would rise.
The new rules also introduce loan-extension provisions for borrowers in temporary difficulty and raise the debt-to-income cap from 55% to 60%. Nationally, outstanding individual mortgage balances stood at 36.29 trillion yuan (about $5.4 trillion) at mid-year, continuing 13 consecutive quarters of year-on-year decline, even as the broader property market shows signs of recovery.
Source: Yicai.com, August 31, 2026
https://www.yicai.com/news/103341450.html