Kazakhstan to Launch China’s SWIFT Alternative CIPS by November
Kazakhstan and China have finalized agreements to fully integrate their payment systems, with China’s alternative to SWIFT, known as CIPS, expected to launch in Kazakhstan this November. The announcement came from Binur Zhalenov, deputy head of Kazakhstan’s central bank, who is currently visiting Beijing.
Zhalenov said on Instagram that Kazakhstan and the People’s Bank of China have confirmed an agreement for comprehensive integration of the two countries’ payment systems. By the end of this year, the two countries plan to achieve interoperability between their QR code payment systems. Kazakhstan has reportedly become a core access point, or service center, for China’s CIPS network, which is set to launch in the country in November.
The two sides also plan to launch a pilot settlement program linking Kazakhstan’s digital tenge with China’s digital yuan, with implementation expected to begin in 2027.
SWIFT is an international secure financial messaging network used by banks worldwide to transmit financial information and process payments. CIPS, developed by the People’s Bank of China, is a cross-border payment system built to handle transactions in yuan and is widely viewed as an alternative to SWIFT, part of Beijing’s broader push to reduce reliance on Western-dominated financial infrastructure.
The report notes that Instagram is banned in Russia, where it has been designated as belonging to a platform owned by an organization classified as extremist.
Source: Sputnik News, July 30, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260730/1072573453.html
Japan Establishes National Intelligence Bureau, Advances Counterintelligence Reforms
Japan’s cabinet approved the establishment of a National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) on July 24, with the new agency set to begin operations on July 31. Upgraded from the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the NIB will serve as Japan’s central intelligence organization, employing approximately 730 personnel. Cabinet Intelligence Director Hara Kazuya has been appointed as its first director.
The government will also convene the inaugural meeting of the National Intelligence Council, chaired by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and comprising nine cabinet ministers. The council will oversee national security-related intelligence activities, coordinate responses to foreign espionage, and formulate Japan’s first National Intelligence Strategy, which will establish a framework for future intelligence operations.
The government also plans to establish an expert panel as early as this summer to prepare counterintelligence legislation for submission to the 2027 regular Diet session. Proposed measures include an Anti-Espionage Law and possible Foreign Agents Registration requirements for individuals lobbying in Japan on behalf of foreign governments.
According to the report, Tokyo is also considering additional measures to counter foreign disinformation campaigns and is exploring the creation of a dedicated foreign intelligence service responsible for overseas intelligence collection.
Source: Kyodo News, July 24, 2026
https://china.kyodonews.net/articles/-/13340
Science Investigation Raises Ethical Concerns Over Fatal Gene-Editing Trial in China
Science magazine and the watchdog Retraction Watch jointly published investigations on July 23 detailing the death of a six-year-old Chinese girl following an experimental gene-editing treatment. The reports have reignited concerns over research ethics, informed consent, and regulatory oversight in China’s rapidly advancing biotechnology sector.
According to the investigations, the girl became the world’s first known patient to receive an in vivo base-editing therapy targeting the brain. Researchers at Shanghai Xinhua Hospital injected trillions of viral vectors carrying a customized gene-editing system into her cerebrospinal fluid to treat a rare genetic disorder. Her family reportedly paid US$860,000 to help fund development of the experimental therapy. The child developed a fever and signs of kidney injury after treatment and died one week later. Hospital investigators concluded that the most likely cause of death was an immune reaction to the viral delivery vector.
The investigations further report that both the girl’s death and her family’s financial support for the research were omitted from a Nature paper published by the research team in February 2026. According to Science, seven international experts in gene therapy and bioethics questioned whether the parents had been fully informed of the treatment’s risks and whether the trial should have proceeded given its highly uncertain prospects. The reports also raise questions about the validity of the published animal data and whether Nature should correct or reconsider the paper.
The case has intensified scrutiny of research integrity and medical ethics in China. Although the hospital reportedly received an administrative penalty, no public disciplinary action has been announced against the lead researcher, renewing questions about accountability and oversight in China’s biomedical research system. Source: Epoch Times, July 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/25/n14817406.htm
China and the United States Accelerate Competing AI Alliances
Beijing moved earlier than the United States to establish a national strategy for artificial intelligence (AI) and shape global AI governance. China issued the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” in 2017, setting the goal of becoming the world’s leading AI innovation center by 2030 while calling for active participation in international AI governance and standards-setting. It subsequently launched the “World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC)” as a state-backed platform for AI diplomacy, introduced national AI ethics guidelines in 2021, and unveiled the “Global AI Governance Initiative” at the Belt and Road Forum in 2023.
On the U.S. side, the Trump administration’s first term emphasized maintaining American leadership in AI through deregulation, market-driven innovation, and limited government intervention. The “American AI Initiative,” launched in 2019, marked the first U.S. national AI strategy, while the United States also joined multilateral efforts such as the “Global Partnership on AI (GPAI).” Following President Trump’s return to office in 2025, the administration shifted its focus to winning the global AI race through deregulation, rapid infrastructure expansion, strategic competition with China, and reducing ideological constraints on AI development.
The Trump administration further strengthened cooperation with allied countries by launching the “Pax Silica Declaration” in December 2025 to establish a trusted AI and semiconductor supply chain independent of China. An initial group of seven countries—including Japan, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Israel—signed the declaration, while Taiwan, the Netherlands, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and the OECD participated in various capacities. At a second summit in Washington in June 2026, the coalition expanded to 35 countries and economies, which jointly endorsed the “Joint Statement on AI Opportunity,” emphasizing trusted supply chains, pro-growth, light-touch regulation, and accelerated AI infrastructure development.
Twenty days later, on July 16, 2026, China established the “World AI Cooperation Organization” (WAICO) in Shanghai with 29 founding members. The emergence of these two blocs signals an increasingly polarized global AI landscape, with competing approaches to AI governance, supply chains, and technology standards. China’s coalition consists primarily of Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and developing countries in the Global South. While Beijing promotes an alternative framework centered on open-source cooperation, data sovereignty, and equality, the bloc’s combined technological capabilities remain significantly weaker than those of the U.S.-led alliance.
Source: Epoch Times, July 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/25/n14817344.htm
China Imposes Personal Income Tax on Offshore Trusts
China’s Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration issued a regulation on July 24 clarifying the personal income tax treatment of offshore trusts. Under the new rules, Chinese tax residents must declare and pay personal income tax both when transferring assets into offshore trusts and on income generated during the trusts’ operation. The measure is designed to close a long-standing tax loophole and strengthen oversight of offshore wealth held by Chinese residents.
The regulation establishes tax obligations at each stage of an offshore trust’s lifecycle. At the establishment stage, transferring assets into an offshore trust will be treated as a taxable asset transfer, with taxable gains calculated as the asset’s market value minus its original cost and reasonable expenses. The resulting gains will be subject to a 20 percent personal income tax. During the trust’s operation, investment gains, interest, dividends, and other qualifying income will also be taxed annually at 20 percent, based on the nature of the income.
The regulation also introduces transitional arrangements for existing offshore trusts. Trusts established more than three years before the announcement will not be subject to taxes on the initial asset transfer, but income generated during the trust’s operation must still be declared regardless of when the trust was established. Taxpayers will be granted a three-month grace period to file returns without incurring late-payment penalties. The new rules underscore Beijing’s broader campaign to strengthen tax enforcement, curb offshore tax avoidance, and enhance oversight of cross-border assets held by Chinese residents.
Related reading: China Expands Tax Scrutiny of Offshore Trusts Held by Wealthy Individuals
Source: Xinhua, July 24, 2026
https://www.news.cn/20260724/bafc54eba6bc49f19c0e7192d5176315/c.html
Foreign Correspondents Say China’s Press Restrictions Expand to Economic Reporting
The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) released its “Media Freedoms Report 2025: The New Abnormal” on July 13, concluding that foreign journalists continue to face growing restrictions, intimidation, and uncertainty in China. Based on responses from 89 journalists, the report says restrictions on foreign media have become a “new normal” rather than isolated incidents.
The report finds that the scope of politically sensitive topics has expanded beyond Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and criticism of China’s leadership to include the economy and technology. Forty-seven percent of respondents said new sensitive subjects emerged over the past year, including youth unemployment, demographic decline, economic conditions, the property crisis, U.S.-China trade tensions, rare earths, and emerging technologies. Overall, 94 percent said China’s reporting environment rarely or generally failed to meet international standards for press freedom.
The report also highlights mounting operational challenges. Sixty-four percent of respondents reported being obstructed by police or other officials while reporting, while 29 percent waited more than a year to obtain journalist visas. In addition, 79 percent believed their WeChat communications were monitored, and 40 percent said their Chinese colleagues had experienced government pressure or intimidation, underscoring the Chinese authorities’ expanding use of surveillance and administrative measures to restrict foreign media reporting.
Source: Epoch Times, July 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/15/n14809847.htm
FARA Filings Renew Scrutiny of Chinese Influence Operations Targeting U.S. Media
Recently resurfaced filings under the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (FARA) have renewed scrutiny of China’s long-running influence operations targeting U.S. media organizations. The filings show that the Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), through U.S. public relations firm BLJ Worldwide (BLJ), sponsored trips to China and engagement programs involving journalists from dozens of major Western media outlets over more than a decade. The disclosures have gained renewed attention following investigative reporting by journalist Natalie Winters, who argues the records illustrate the scope and sophistication of Beijing’s overseas influence efforts.
According to the FARA filings, BLJ organized sponsored visits to China for 128 journalists from 48 media organizations beginning in 2009. Participants reportedly included journalists from CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, the Associated Press, and other leading news organizations. The filings describe the programs as providing prominent journalists with opportunities to gain a more positive understanding of China’s development and achievements through official meetings, site visits, and exchanges.
CUSEF, founded in 2008 by former Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, has long been identified by U.S. officials and congressional reports as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) broader united front influence network. Beyond media engagement, the organization has funded exchanges with universities, think tanks, and political organizations, including programs for historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). Critics contend that these activities are designed to cultivate long-term relationships with political, academic, and media elites capable of shaping public opinion and policy debates in ways favorable to Beijing.
The resurfaced FARA records have renewed attention to the CCP’s broader influence operations and the role of sponsored exchanges as a tool of public diplomacy. Critics argue that such programs form part of a wider strategy to shape Western media narratives and public discourse by cultivating relationships with influential journalists and opinion leaders over the long term.
Source: Aboluo, July 20, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0720/2410405.html
Russia Abandons Support for Korean Peninsula Denuclearization, Leaving Beijing in an Awkward Position
Russia has announced a major shift in its policy toward North Korea’s nuclear program. At a July 22 press conference following the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Manila, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that, in light of what he described as increasingly “aggressive” military activities around North Korea, Moscow no longer supports calls for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The statement marks a sharp departure from the 2005 “Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks,” in which China, the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea jointly affirmed that the goal of the negotiations was the peaceful and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Lavrov’s remarks came just days after North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui visited Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin. Putin conveyed his “warmest greetings” to Kim Jong Un and praised North Korean troops for their contributions to Russia’s military operations abroad. The visit came amid reports that Moscow is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops to support its war in Ukraine. The growing military partnership follows the “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, under which both sides pledged to provide military and other assistance if either enters a state of war.
Mosco argued that the surrounding situation made it for North Korea to defend itself without nuclear capability, citing expanding U.S.-South Korea military exercises, Japan’s debate over revising its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” and the collapse of the U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control framework following the expiration of the “New START Treaty.”
Russia’s policy reversal further erodes the long-standing international consensus on Korean Peninsula denuclearization. South Korea has also adopted a more pragmatic approach, emphasizing efforts to contain further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal rather than insisting on complete denuclearization as a precondition for dialogue. Against this backdrop, China faces an increasingly difficult dilemma: abandoning its longstanding support for denuclearization would undermine two decades of diplomatic policy and its commitment to the global nonproliferation regime, while maintaining that position risks leaving Beijing increasingly isolated as regional realities continue to evolve.
Source: CReaders.net, July 27, 2026
https://news.creaders.net/world/2026/07/27/3029916.html