Beijing Party Journal Analyzes Rise of “Chronic Warfare” Amid Ukraine, Iran Conflicts
Against the backdrop of prolonged and unresolved conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, Study Times, a publication affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School, published a commentary on the 3rd examining what it describes as a recurring historical form of conflict: “chronic warfare.” The term refers to long-lasting, low-intensity, attritional conflicts in which combatants pursue ambiguous strategic objectives rather than decisive victory.
The article examines this phenomenon across five dimensions. First, time: warfare has shifted from the pursuit of swift, decisive outcomes toward prolonged, back-and-forth struggles, as objectives have expanded beyond territorial conquest to include regime change and the reshaping of geopolitical structures. Second, space: battlefields have become increasingly boundless, with conflict extending from front lines into rear-area cities, energy infrastructure, and grain storage facilities. At the same time, cognitive and cyberspace domains have emerged as a “second battlefield” for narrative warfare, aimed at dividing enemy societies and eroding their willingness to fight.
Third, tactics: warfare increasingly relies on low-cost, high-frequency, and reversible strikes. The article points to the extensive use of inexpensive drones by both sides as an example, with such weapons enabling round-the-clock harassment of targets in the rear. Fourth, actors: the participants in warfare have become more diverse, dispersing responsibility and distributing the costs of conflict more broadly. In the article’s view, this dynamic further reinforces the prolonged, low-intensity, and difficult-to-resolve nature of such wars.
Fifth, outcomes tend toward asymmetry. Rather than producing clear victors, chronic wars typically end in what the article characterizes as “exhausted compromise” or temporary ceasefires, leaving no true winners—only survivors that have endured heavy casualties and economic losses.
The article further argues that chronic wars tend to end not through external defeat but through internal collapse. The decisive blow, it suggests, often comes from structural breakdown within one’s own side rather than from enemy fire.
Although the commentary does not explicitly name Ukraine or Iran, its framework closely parallels the dynamics of those ongoing conflicts.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 10, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608100076.aspx
China’s Space Launch Success Rate Declines Amid Surge in Launch Activity
China has conducted 56 orbital launches so far this year, with 52 successful and four failures, putting its success rate at 92.86 percent, according to Ming Pao, based on publicly available data. The success rate has declined for three consecutive years, from 97.1 percent in 2024 to 95.9 percent in 2025 and 92.86 percent so far this year, which translates to one failure every 34 launches in 2024 to every 25 launches in 2025 and every 14 launches this year.
The latest failure involved the recent Long March-7A, following unsuccessful launches of the Long March-3B, Ceres-2, and Zhuque-3 earlier this year. The failures come as China enters a period of unusually intensive launch activity. Chinese media estimates that the country conducted 44–48 launches during the first half of 2026, the highest number for the first half of any year, with commercial launches accounting for more than 60 percent.
The surge reflects China’s push to build a large-scale low-Earth-orbit satellite infrastructure, including satellite internet constellations such as Qianfan. The rapid expansion of commercial space activity and satellite deployments is increasing pressure on launch providers to maintain a high launch cadence. The declining success rate suggests that the acceleration of China’s space-launch industry may also be accompanied by greater operational and technical risks as launch frequency increases.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 12, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608120044.aspx
China Expands Cross-Border Cash Management Access for Multinational Companies
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) will expand a pilot program for centralized cross-border cash management by multinational companies nationwide under a new notice taking effect on September 14, 2026. The policy covers both Chinese companies operating overseas and foreign multinationals operating in China, allowing them to more efficiently pool, allocate, and manage domestic and overseas funds.
The new rules are designed to facilitate cross-border fund management, particularly for small and mid-sized multinational companies. Companies will be allowed to consolidate members’ external debt and overseas lending quotas, determine their own fund-pooling ratios, and manage both RMB and foreign-currency funds through a single account. Companies registered in free-trade zones will face lower eligibility thresholds.
According to analyst Pang Ming, allowing multinational companies to centrally manage domestic and overseas RMB and foreign-currency funds can reduce liquidity-management costs. Importantly, using RMB will give companies greater flexibility in managing cross-border funds, highlighting China’s push to expand the international use of its currency.
Source: Xinhua, August 14, 2026
http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/20260814/eb77884237ab4485936477b5c5d6ef8d/c.html
Chinese Intelligence-Linked Official Buys Building 200 Meters From White House, Raising Security Alarm
A report by The Daily Caller on August 13 raised concerns over Chinese espionage activities in the United States after Philip Qiu, whom the report describes as a former senior Chinese intelligence official, purchased a nine-story historic building less than 200 meters from the White House. Qiu and his family foundation reportedly paid $8.4 million for the Securities Building on July 21. Former CIA operations officer Bryan D. Wright warned that the property could potentially be used as an intelligence base to monitor communications and digital activity around sensitive government facilities.
According to The Daily Caller, Qiu’s background includes military training and work within China’s public security and United Front systems. University records reportedly described him as having received special-forces training, while Chinese government records show that he later worked in organizations affiliated with the United Front system, including the Shanghai branch of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Development Foundation. In 2023 and 2024, he reportedly helped organize visits for Hong Kong students to Shanghai’s special police forces.
Qiu also founded the Chinese American Museum in Washington, D.C., located about 700 meters from the White House. Although the museum says it has never received funding from, or been controlled or influenced by, any foreign government, The Daily Caller found that Chinese government entities had co-organized at least eight events with the museum, four of which received support from religious organizations controlled by the CCP’s United Front system.
Wright, China expert Gordon Chang, and national-security advocate Michael Lucci urged the U.S. government to investigate the property and consider measures to prevent individuals with alleged ties to Chinese intelligence and security agencies from acquiring strategically sensitive real estate near key government facilities.
Source: Liberty Times (Taiwan), August 15, 2026
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5540464
China’s Water Crisis Exposes Growing Risks to Food Security and Governance
Japanese media have warned that China’s worsening water shortage could become a major constraint on the Xi Jinping government, particularly because its political, industrial, and agricultural centers are heavily concentrated in the water-scarce north. Commentator Tsukasa Shirakawa argues in his book “What Is Xi Jinping Really Afraid Of?” that Beijing, the Communist Party leadership, PLA headquarters, and major industrial clusters all face growing water-security risks. China’s decision to prioritize water infrastructure as one of its “six major networks,” alongside the power grid, computing, communications, underground pipelines, and logistics, also highlights the strategic importance of the issue.
The imbalance is particularly severe: regions south of the Yangtze River account for about 81 percent of China’s water resources but only 36.5 percent of its land, while northern and northwestern regions hold about 19 percent of the water resources across 63.5 percent of the land. The North China Plain, one of the country’s major agricultural regions, relies heavily on groundwater for irrigation, while Beijing, Tianjin, and other major cities increasingly depend on the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. The project has already transferred more than 89.2 billion cubic meters of water through its eastern and central routes, while its more challenging western route remains undeveloped.
Water scarcity also raises questions about China’s claims of food self-sufficiency. Although Beijing says its three major staple grains—rice, wheat, and corn—have a self-sufficiency rate of about 98 percent, China remains heavily dependent on imports of soybeans, barley, sorghum, and edible oils. An analysis by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations estimated that China’s overall food self-sufficiency fell from 93.6 percent in 2000 to 65.8 percent in 2020. The combination of declining water availability, groundwater depletion, and agricultural expansion in water-stressed northern regions could therefore pose growing challenges to China’s food security, economic development, and long-term governance.
Source: Liberty Times (Taiwan), August 1, 2026
https://ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/5525236
China’s Grid Worker System Draws Scrutiny After Chongqing Landslide Death
A landslide in Pengshui County, Chongqing, on July 17 killed a grid worker named Gong Baodong, drawing public attention to China’s grassroots governance system known as grid management. Chinese state media describe the system as an industrialized approach to precision governance, dividing the country into roughly 4 million grids overseen by about 4.5 million grid workers.
The model originated in Beijing’s Dongcheng District in 2004, when officials divided the district into 1,652 grid units, each covering roughly 10,000 square meters, and assigned a supervisor to patrol the area and report problems using handheld devices. Reported issue-detection rates rose from about 30 percent to more than 90 percent, while response times fell from roughly one week to less than a day. The system received central government backing after the 2013 Third Plenum called for strengthening grassroots service platforms through grid-based management, leading to nationwide expansion by 2020.
In urban areas, grids typically cover 300–500 households, or about 800–1,000 people, while rural grids generally follow natural village boundaries. Each grid is assigned a unique code linked to administrative divisions and associated with detailed records on residents, businesses, safety risks, and other local conditions.
Grid workers typically perform five core functions: collecting information, mediating disputes, assisting vulnerable groups, conducting security patrols, and promoting government policies. The workforce includes full-time employees such as Gong, community cadres, retired Communist Party members, and volunteers.
The system also faces a number of challenges. Grid workers can carry heavy workloads while receiving uneven compensation, ranging from roughly 4,000–5,000 yuan (about $556–$694) per month in wealthier regions to 2,000–3,000 yuan (about $278–$417) elsewhere. Contract-based employment can limit opportunities for career advancement, while bureaucratic pressure to document activities often results in extensive photography and paperwork.
The system’s emphasis on detailed data collection has also raised concerns about privacy and the handling of residents’ personal information. How to balance the government’s goal of fine-grained grassroots management with individual privacy protections remains an unresolved issue.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 8, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608080063.aspx
Canadian CSIS Warns Richmond Officials of Potential Chinese Interference in Municipal Election
Canada’s Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reportedly held a closed-door briefing in July for Richmond, British Columbia, Mayor Malcolm Brodie and city councilors, warning that the municipal election scheduled for October 17 could face Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interference, including influence operations targeting the city’s Chinese Canadian community. According to The Bureau, the briefing was led by a senior CSIS regional official and relied primarily on previously public information, including cases discussed by the Hogue Commission on foreign interference.
CSIS reportedly warned that individuals with ties to the CCP could approach Richmond candidates during the campaign in an effort to influence the electoral process and undermine its integrity. While CSIS declined to confirm or deny the specific briefing, a spokesperson said recent amendments to the CSIS Act allow the agency to share information about national security threats with organizations beyond the federal government, including local governments, academia, businesses, and community groups.
The warning follows previous reports of Chinese interference in British Columbia elections. Former Vancouver Mayor Kennedy Stewart and Port Coquitlam Mayor Brad West have said they received similar warnings from CSIS. A 2024 investigation by the Commissioner of Canada Elections also found evidence of foreign interference targeting the Chinese Canadian community during the 2021 federal election. The investigation found that former Conservative candidate Kenny Chiu became a target after supporting Uyghur human rights, Hong Kong democracy, and a foreign-agent registry, with Chinese consular officials and community organizations allegedly portraying him negatively to Chinese Canadian voters.
Source: Epoch Times, August 2, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/2/n14822025.htm
Passport Controls in China Reportedly Expanding Beyond Officials to Ordinary Residents
A discussion on X about Chinese workers in various sectors reportedly being required to surrender their passports drew more than 100,000 views on August 9. Images circulating online listed 13 categories of workers allegedly affected, including employees of research institutes, civil servants, public institutions, large state-owned enterprises, and financial-sector firms, as well as university and school teachers and senior hospital staff.
Reported cases include subway maintenance workers who have been required to surrender their passports since last year and employees of state-invested companies who must obtain prior approval before attending exhibitions in Hong Kong.
A Lanzhou resident said grid workers—community-level administrators responsible for managing residential areas—had inquired about passport safekeeping in some housing compounds, although the practice was not uniform across all communities. A Gansu-based internet user claimed that some neighborhood committees were requiring residents to hand their passports to grid workers, suggesting that the practice may extend beyond state employees to ordinary residents.
A Chengdu taxi driver recalled that Tibetan residents in Sichuan’s Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture had their passports confiscated years ago regardless of their employment or official status, with similar measures reportedly applied to Uyghurs.
A Chongqing resident said he had been barred from obtaining a passport after being classified as a security threat because of alleged links to the pro-democracy movement. Another commenter said a friend’s hospital had expanded passport collection requirements to include temporary workers.
On August 7, China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection reiterated rules requiring registered officials to have their personal travel documents held by their work units. An independent scholar said police told him directly in 2023 that he was prohibited from leaving the country despite holding a valid passport.
Sources suggested that local officials often interpret central government intentions broadly and impose stricter controls without formal written directives. This can result in inconsistent and poorly documented enforcement across regions, with passport restrictions reportedly extending in some cases beyond government officials and state employees to ordinary residents.
Source: Radio Free Asia, August 12, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shehui/2026/08/12/china-entryexit-passport-revocation-exit-restriction/