Report Claims CCP Bot Network Exploits X Algorithm to Suppress Dissident Voices
On March 7, a Chinese blogger living in Canada described what he believes to be a coordinated online attack by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–linked “internet trolls” targeting his account on the social media platform X. According to the blogger, the tactic does not involve directly banning accounts but instead exploits weaknesses in the platform’s recommendation algorithm to restrict the reach of targeted users.
The blogger, who posts under the account name “Finding心归何处,” began operating the account in January 2026 and gradually gained followers by sharing personal experiences after leaving China and commenting on political issues. His follower count grew from about 2,800 on February 14 to 7,800 by March 7, with some posts reaching as many as 870,000 views. However, he soon noticed suspicious activity and described the alleged attack as unfolding in three stages. First, large numbers of bot accounts with no profile photos, posts, or followers suddenly followed him. Second, these accounts remained in his follower list for a period of time, potentially causing the platform’s algorithm to associate his account with a low-quality social network profile. Third, when his politically sensitive posts began gaining traction, the same accounts simultaneously unfollowed and blocked him, often during Beijing working hours.
The blogger argues that this coordinated activity manipulates the platform’s recommendation system. When many followers abruptly leave while a post is trending, the algorithm may interpret the content as offensive or misleading, triggering automated mechanisms that limit further distribution to new users. In addition, large numbers of blocks within a short period can reduce an account’s credibility score and may even place it in a search blacklist, making it difficult for others to locate the account. Because unfollowing and blocking are normal user actions, the tactic is difficult for platforms to classify as malicious behavior. A well-known political commentator also said he has observed similar tactics for years and believes CCP has studied platform algorithms to suppress anti-CCP voices while simultaneously amplifying pro-government narratives.
Source: Epoch Times, February 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/27/n14707579.htm
Massive Lunar New Year Promotions Boost Chinese AI Apps—But Most Users Quickly Leave
Major Chinese technology companies spent heavily to promote their artificial intelligence (AI) chat applications during the 2026 Lunar New Year holiday. Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance invested tens of billions of yuan (several billion US dollars) in marketing campaigns for their AI products—such as Tongyi Qianwen, Yuanbao, and Doubao. These promotions relied on incentives such as digital red-packet rewards and special holiday activities to attract users, temporarily driving large spikes in downloads and daily active users across multiple platforms.
However, user engagement declined sharply once the holiday promotions ended. Industry data suggests that more than 80 percent of users stopped using the apps after the incentives disappeared, leaving an estimated 30-day retention rate of only about 12–13 percent. Many users reportedly joined primarily to collect promotional rewards rather than to use the AI tools regularly, highlighting the difficulty of converting short-term promotional traffic into sustained engagement.
The trend suggests, as analysts argue, that the long-term success of AI products cannot rely on financial incentives alone. Instead, it depends on factors such as model capability, reliability, and integration within broader digital ecosystems.
Source: Epoch Times, February 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/27/n14707559.htm
Italy Expels Eight Chinese Nationals Over Surveillance of Dissidents
Italy recently expelled eight Chinese nationals accused of monitoring and intimidating Chinese dissidents living in the country, reigniting public debate over China’s use of overseas “police stations” to extend its repression networks across multiple countries.
The eight individuals were removed on March 5, following a lengthy investigation by Italy’s DIGOS unit and Turin prosecutors. Four left voluntarily, three were immediately deported, and one woman remains detained after applying for asylum. The primary target of their surveillance was a prominent online activist known as “Teacher Li” — whose account “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” regularly exposes human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party. Li stated that he and his team had faced years of transnational harassment and intimidation, and welcomed Italy’s action as a defense of democratic principles and the rule of law.
The case also drew attention to a separate cyberattack on Italy’s Interior Ministry in February, in which hackers attempted to access information on Chinese dissidents and Italian officials investigating Chinese organizations. A prior attack between 2024 and 2025 allegedly resulted in the theft of data on approximately 5,000 Italian police officers holding sensitive positions.
The phenomenon is not limited to Italy. In France, the rights group Safeguard Defenders previously identified at least four clandestine Chinese police stations in the greater Paris area, part of a global network of over 100 such outposts spanning 53 countries. French authorities confirmed the closure of nine such stations and issued expulsion orders against at least two individuals linked to their operation.
These stations, ostensibly offering administrative assistance to overseas Chinese communities, are widely reported to be used for pressuring dissidents and coercing individuals into returning to China.
Source: Radio France International, March 10, 2026
https://rfi.my/CVxq
Political Scientist: Activists Focus on “China After Xi,” but Should Focus on “China After the CCP”
New Century Net, an Chinese language media outside China, published an interview with political scientist Wu Guoguang discussing the prospects for political change in China after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wu argues that China’s political transformation does not necessarily need to follow the classic four-stage transition model proposed by Samuel P. Huntington, often referred to as “transplacement,” which involves regime liberalization, the rise of opposition forces, authoritarian retrenchment, and eventual negotiation between the regime and opposition. Instead, Wu suggests that social and political change in China could emerge even without deliberate political liberalization initiated by the ruling authorities.
Wu emphasizes that discussions about China’s future often focus on “China after Xi Jinping” rather than “China after the CCP.” He argues that this perspective reflects the preferences of some political elites who may hope for a return to a relatively moderate period such as the Jiang Zemin–Hu Jintao era. However, Wu argues that genuine democratization in China cannot emerge from within the CCP leadership but would require the end of the Party’s rule.
Wu identifies three key challenges facing democratic change in China. First, democratic forces must clearly articulate demands for systemic democratization rather than focusing solely on leadership changes. Second, opposition movements need stronger organizational capacity, although Wu suggests they should move beyond traditional Leninist-style hierarchical structures and explore new forms of organization suited to the internet era. Third, meaningful political transformation ultimately depends on broad public support. According to Wu, widespread social grievances in China reflect deeper demands for rights and representation, which could form the foundation for democratic aspirations.
Overall, Wu concludes that China’s future political transformation could involve a complex interaction between reformist pressures and more revolutionary forces. Whether such change becomes possible, he argues, will depend on the ability of democratic forces to develop clear political goals, build effective organizational structures, and mobilize broad public support.
Source: New Century Net
https://2newcenturynet.blogspot.com/2026/03/blog-post_40.html
Some Chinese Regions Use Lottery Funds to Support Medical Insurance System, but Sustainability Is Uncertain
An article from The Epoch Times reports that China’s medical insurance fund is facing increasing financial pressure, prompting some local governments to use lottery revenues to help fill gaps in the healthcare insurance system. However, analysts caution that lottery income is unlikely to provide a stable or sustainable source of funding.
The report notes that China’s basic medical insurance fund recorded revenue of about 3.48 trillion yuan (US$ 500 billion) in 2024, while expenditures reached about 2.97 trillion yuan (US$ 430 billion), with spending rising faster than income. Interviewees cited in the article attribute the growing financial strain to rising demand for healthcare services, more frequent hospital visits, increased treatment for chronic diseases, and possible over-treatment in some hospitals. In some cities, including Beijing and Tianjin, medical insurance funds have reportedly experienced deficits or required fiscal subsidies to maintain operations.
According to the article, some regions have begun transferring a larger share of public welfare funds from sports and welfare lotteries into social security programs to support healthcare spending. One source said the proportion allocated to such purposes has reportedly increased from around 10 percent to about 20 percent. Analysts warn that this approach may not be sustainable, as lottery sales have slowed in recent years, making the revenue stream uncertain. At the same time, China’s rapidly aging population—now exceeding 200 million people aged 65 or older—is expected to place increasing long-term pressure on the country’s healthcare insurance system.
Source: Epoch Times, March 4, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/3/4/n14711019.htm
China’s Military Issues New Reserve Personnel ID Cards
Starting March 1, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began issuing a new unified identity document — the “PLA Reserve Personnel Certificate” — following approval from the Central Military Commission.
According to China Central Television’s military channel, the new certificate serves as an official form of identification for reserve personnel. Each card carries a unique, system-generated identity number and is issued to reserve officers, sergeants, and soldiers who are serving in the PLA under the country’s Reserve Personnel Law.
Zhang Yaokui, a professor at the PLA’s National Defense University Joint Operations College, explained that the new certificate formally recognizes the status of reserve personnel by both the Chinese government and military. It provides unified proof of enrollment in reserve forces and replaces the previously issued “PLA Reserve Officers Certificate,” which has now been officially abolished.
Zhang noted the certificate serves practical purposes in both peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, it facilitates participation in military training, readiness duties, and non-combat military operations. In wartime, it enables the swift mobilization and deployment of reserve personnel. It also helps reserve members access relevant welfare benefits, compensation, and preferential treatment as provided by law.
Zhang further emphasized that PLA reserve personnel hold a dual identity — they are both civilians and soldiers. In ordinary times, they work across various sectors of society as regular citizens. However, when called upon, they are required to put on their uniforms and fulfill their military obligations.
The rollout of this new credential is seen by analysts as a meaningful step in streamlining the mobilization process and strengthening the institutional framework governing China’s reserve forces.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 3, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202603030108.aspx
Chinese Military Expert: Why the Fujian Aircraft Carrier Leapt Directly to Electromagnetic Catapults
Among the aircraft carriers currently in service worldwide, no conventionally powered vessel has been equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system. Why, then, did China’s Fujian bypass steam catapults and move straight to electromagnetic launch technology?
According to military expert Zhang Junshe, the breakthrough lies in the innovative application of a medium-voltage direct current (MVDC) integrated power system combined with advanced energy storage technology.
Adoption of a Medium-Voltage DC System
The Fujian is equipped with a highly efficient medium-voltage DC integrated electric power system. This system can directly power the electromagnetic catapult tracks, eliminating the need for mechanical energy conversion. As a result, the overall structure is simplified and the failure rate is significantly reduced.
Supercapacitors Overcome the Pulsed Power Challenge
Conventional carriers have long been questioned about whether they could meet the instantaneous high energy demands required by electromagnetic catapults. The Fujian addresses this challenge through the innovative use of supercapacitor energy storage technology. With extremely short charging times, the system can independently handle pulsed power loads, preventing strain or disruption to the ship’s main propulsion power system.
Source: CCTV, February 21, 2026
https://military.cctv.com/2026/02/21/ARTIRWfUdYlwFVZuRQPpgtmI260221.shtml
Over Half of Japanese Believe A Tough Stance Should be Taken on China’s Maritime Behavior
Singapore’s primary Chinese language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao recently reported that, Japan’s Foreign Ministry just released the results of a domestic opinion poll on diplomacy. Regarding the question of whether respondents believed the security environment in East Asia was becoming increasingly severe, 79.3 percent of respondents agreed.
Regarding the aspects that Japan should prioritize in its diplomacy with China, the most popular answer among respondents, at 52.9 percent, was “taking a tough stance against violations of territorial waters.” The survey results reflect the Japanese public’s vigilance regarding the activities of Chinese coast guard vessels around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).
This survey was conducted by telephone from February 10 to 18, targeting 1,000 people aged 18 and over throughout Japan.
Source: Lianhe Zaobao, March 8, 2026
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20260308-8698254