German Journalist Estimates Chinese Spy Network in Taiwan Could Number Up to 100,000
German journalist Jürgen Kremb released a research report in Taipei on Monday estimating that China has planted between 50,000 and 100,000 intelligence assets in Taiwan—far exceeding previous official and expert estimates. Kremb, who spent years reporting from Beijing for the Frankfurter Rundschau and Der Spiegel and authored a book on Wei Jingsheng, is currently a visiting scholar in Taiwan researching Chinese intelligence operations. His report, titled “War of Spies: How Chinese Intelligence Agencies Infiltrate Taiwan—With Implications for Europe,” was unveiled at Monday’s presentation.
While acknowledging the figure is difficult to verify, Kremb argued Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, which has estimated roughly 5,000 agents, has significantly undercounted the threat. His broader definition of “spies” includes deployed agents, local informants, and ordinary Taiwanese willing to provide intelligence under certain circumstances—comparable to Russia’s “throwaway agents.”
The report highlights Beijing’s use of economic dependency as a pressure tool, often through Taiwanese businesspeople, and notes a troubling rise in espionage cases within Taiwan’s military, frequently targeting information on U.S. weapons systems. Recruitment often begins innocuously via Telegram or LinkedIn before escalating through bribery or exploitation of personal vulnerabilities. Citing mainland sources, the report claims 180,000 Chinese personnel work on Taiwan-related intelligence across agencies including the United Front Work Department and Ministry of State Security.
Kremb also disclosed being surveilled by a suspected Chinese agent during a trip to Alishan last June. A woman with a northern Chinese accent, claiming to live in Denmark, aroused his suspicion; he later spotted her making a phone call, reminiscent of past interrogation experiences. He reported the incident to Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau, which confirmed her identity via surveillance footage—though she had already left Taiwan.
Source: Radio Free Asia, September 15, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhengzhi/2026/09/15/china-espionage-jurgenkremb/
People’s Daily: China’s Semiconductor Boom and Challenges
People’s Daily reports that China’s semiconductor industry is experiencing rapid growth. In July, integrated-circuit output by large industrial firms reached 53 billion chips, equivalent to about 1.7 billion chips per day. During the first seven months of 2026, integrated-circuit exports reached $216 billion, up 99.5 percent year-on-year and already exceeding the full-year 2025 total of $201.9 billion.
The article attributes the growth to strong global demand, China’s large domestic market, and its relatively complete semiconductor supply chain. China’s capacity for mature-process chips of 28nm and above now accounts for nearly 30 percent of global capacity.
The article also identifies four major challenges:
- Technology bottlenecks: High-end chips remain subject to foreign technology restrictions, while domestic production of key materials and semiconductor equipment remains insufficient, creating supply-chain vulnerabilities.
- Unbalanced industrial structure: Capacity growth is concentrated in memory chips and mature processes, with risks of overcapacity and duplication in some lower-end segments, while high-end chip capacity remains insufficient.
- Talent and ecosystem gaps: The industry faces shortages of chip architects, AI-chip specialists, and advanced-process integration experts. Coordination among industry, universities, research institutions, and end users remains underdeveloped.
- Growing international competition: Intensifying U.S. technology restrictions and restructuring of the global semiconductor industry create uncertainty over whether China can sustain its rapid export growth.
Source: People’s Daily, September 7, 2026
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0907/c1004-40793493.html
China’s Medical Procurement Favors Domestic Products; Foreign Manufacturers Lose Ground
A Chinese government procurement policy on domestic products took effect on January 1, providing preferential treatment to products manufactured in China. Under the policy, domestically produced products can receive a 20 percent price deduction during procurement evaluations when competing with imported products. The Ministry of Finance will establish, within five years, requirements for the proportion of domestically produced components and, for certain products, key components and production processes that must be met for a product to qualify as domestically produced.
In theory, foreign companies can qualify for the domestic-product preference if they manufacture in China and meet the requirements. How the policy will work in practice remains to be seen.
According to The Epoch Times, a source at a public hospital in Hubei said the hospital had received internal instructions to prioritize domestic medical-equipment suppliers and to verify product specifications, registration certificates, country of origin, and budgets during procurement. A source at a Beijing hospital said many Chinese medical-equipment manufacturers are struggling or have even gone bankrupt because of tight medical-insurance funds. As a result, hospitals have received government instructions to purchase domestic products, even though foreign medical equipment is generally considered to be of good quality and offers a wider range of products.
The report said some foreign medical-equipment companies have reduced or withdrawn their operations in China in recent years. A representative of a U.S. medical-equipment company in Guangdong said the company’s workforce in China had fallen from more than 150 employees at its peak to just three, all working remotely without an office.
Source: Epoch Times, September 8, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/8/n14844701.htm
Chinese Embassy Reportedly Mobilizing Xi Welcome in Washington; DOJ Reminds Public of Foreign-Agent Registration
Chinese-language social media posts and WeChat screenshots circulating among overseas Chinese communities reportedly show organized efforts to mobilize Chinese Americans to Washington, D.C., for activities welcoming Xi Jinping during his expected visit to the United States from September 23 to 25.
One organizer, identified as “Sister Xia” and registered on WeChat in Alhambra, California, said she had recruited many participants. She said the Chinese Embassy and business associations were providing funding. Other circulating recruitment messages reportedly offered free airfare or bus transportation, lodging, meals, and an $80 participation payment, with one message seeking participants under age 70 for a “flag-waving welcome” event.
These organized welcome groups can create the appearance of a “mass welcome.” They may also serve a “counteraction” function: when the Chinese leader’s motorcade passes by, participants may use large numbers of red flags, human walls, and loudspeakers to obscure protesters’ signs and chants, ensuring that the leader “does not see” opposing voices. Many netizens have questioned whether participants in such activities are effectively “paid actors,” and characterized the activities as part of Beijing’s overseas propaganda and United Front efforts.
Participants in such activities could potentially be subject to foreign-agent registration requirements if they act in the United States at the direction or control of a Chinese government entity or other foreign principal.
On September 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice published a press release titled “Liability for Unregistered Foreign Agents” to remind the public that federal laws require individuals “to register as foreign agents when they act in the United States at the direction or control of a foreign government or foreign principal.” It explains, “If a person acts as an agent of any foreign power to carry out any public activity, including (but not limited to) public demonstrations designed to further the propaganda or other goals of the foreign power, he or she must register with or notify the appropriate federal authorities. Failure to do so may result in significant civil or criminal sanctions, up to and including a maximum of five years in prison.”
Sources:
{1} Epoch Times, September 8, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/8/n14844612.htm
{2} Epoch Times, September 18, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/18/n14851493.htm
{3} US DOJ website, September 16, 2026
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/liability-unregistered-foreign-agents
Beijing Announces Party Decision on Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli Ahead of Expected CCP Fifth Plenum
Xinhua News Agency reported that on September 21, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo reviewed and approved the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) reports on the investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. It decided to expel the two senior military officials from the CCP, terminate their qualifications as delegates to the 20th Party Congress, and transfer their alleged criminal offenses to military procuratorial authorities for prosecution. The CMC had previously decided to expel them from military service.
A source described as an insider in the CCP’s military system told The Epoch Times that the decisions on how to handle their cases were originally expected to be announced at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee (October 26 – 29). However, according to the source, Xi Jinping recently called for the announcement to be brought forward ahead of his visit to the United States. The source said Xi intended to “settle the matter once and for all” and put a definitive end to the political characterization of Zhang and Liu.
Xinhua’s announcement described the offenses attributed to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as follows: abandoning their original aspiration and mission; becoming alienated from and disloyal to the Party; losing their Party spirit and principles; and crossing red lines and bottom lines; seriously violating political discipline and political rules, forming cliques, and being disloyal and dishonest to the Party; seriously violating organizational discipline by using their positions to assist others in obtaining promotions and receiving large sums of money; seriously violating integrity discipline by improperly accepting gifts and cash; seriously violating work discipline by failing to fulfill their political responsibility for exercising comprehensive and strict Party governance; and seriously violating life discipline by failing to properly educate and supervise their relatives and staff.
However, the language used in the latest announcement differs notably from that of a PLA Daily editorial published on January 25, when the investigations into Zhang and Liu were first announced. The earlier editorial accused them of “seriously undermining the CMC chairman responsibility system” — which can be understood as “seriously undermining Xi Jinping’s authority in the military” — and of damaging the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. It also said their conduct had severely affected the political foundation, political environment, and combat effectiveness of the PLA.
Sources:
{1} Xinhua, September 21, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260921/ed84cef8e5ad411e9ebf80c5f43e375e/c.html
{2} People’s Daily, January 26, 2026
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0125/c1001-40652025.html
{3} The Epoch Times, September 22, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/22/n14854544.htm
Xi Jinping’s U.S. Visit: A Display of Political Power Ahead of the 21st Party Congress
Xi Jinping is expected to visit the United States from September 23 to 25 and meet with President Trump on September 24, roughly one year before the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chinese political observers say Beijing hopes the summit will help stabilize economic and business expectations, while Xi could use the high-profile diplomatic engagement to demonstrate his control over foreign policy and upcoming personnel arrangements within the Party.
Xi’s visit comes as attention focuses on whether he will continue as CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, potentially entering a fourth term. Beijing has not announced any such arrangements or publicly discussed a potential successor.
A Chinese political scholar said official-media coverage of a Xi-Trump meeting at the White House could reinforce Xi’s image as the leader directing China’s major-power diplomacy. A military affairs scholar said Xi’s overseas visit, amid continuing changes in the PLA leadership, could serve as a domestic display of his political influence and control over the military command system.
Chinese state media have already established a favorable narrative around Xi’s summit diplomacy. People’s Daily described head-of-state diplomacy in May as the “compass” and “rudder” of China-U.S. relations, saying Xi and Trump had helped “calibrate the trajectory” of bilateral ties at a critical moment. Beijing has also promoted the concept of building a “constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.”
Source: Radio Free Asia, September 9, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhengzhi/waijiao/2026/09/09/china-xi-jinpings-visit-to-the-us-trump-21st-national-congress-of-the-cpc/
Academic Warns Beijing Seeks to Monopolize Chinese-Language Interpretation in AI Era
A Taiwanese scholar has warned that artificial intelligence could hand Beijing control over how the Chinese language is interpreted worldwide. Speaking at a seminar on resistance in Taipei on Saturday, Hung Tzu-wei, a research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies, said China is deliberately trying to monopolize global Chinese-language interpretive authority by supplying vast quantities of simplified-Chinese data. He argued this amounts to a form of cognitive warfare that produces a new kind of “epistemic injustice.”
Hung said Taiwan’s government should scrap its policy of privileging Mandarin, which he said has no legal basis according to a Control Yuan report, and that replacing “Huayu” with Taiwanese-language writing is the future trend. He noted that Taiwan initially did not speak Mandarin and that martial-law-era ethnic framing produced flawed language revitalization policy. Although Taiwan has its own language models, he argued that datasets nobody uses have no future. He pointed to Ukraine, where the share of Ukrainian speakers rose after the Russian invasion.
Hung also distinguished between China’s short-term interference, which typically targets elections and draws a stronger government response, and long-term cultural infiltration, which could shape children’s future ideologies.
Other speakers addressed the ethics of resistance. Philosopher Wu Feng-wei, citing Kant, argued that citizens of an invaded country have a duty to resist, provided there are shared principles of justice, an immediate external threat, and a population that shares in the community’s benefits. Historian Chen Chun-kai stressed vigilance against online troll armies and disinformation.
Hung added that a recent Academia Sinica survey found that people who value democracy are not necessarily willing to defend Taiwan, whereas those with stronger Taiwanese identity are more willing to resist China.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 19, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202609190230.aspx
Chinese Universities Told to Tighten Belts as Budgets Shrink, With Scenic-Spot Meetings Banned
Universities across China are curbing spending after cuts to their budgets. Several have issued notices urging staff to practice thrift and “live tight lives,” according to mainland outlets The Paper and Sina.
Peking University published its implementation measures on the 11th, reportedly barring units from using public funds for tourism disguised as training. The rules prohibit holding meetings at 21 named scenic areas, including Badaling–Ming Tombs, the Chengde Mountain Resort’s outer temples, Mount Wutai, Taihu Lake, Putuo Mountain, Huangshan, Jiuhua Mountain, Guilin’s Li River, Sanya’s tropical coastline and Jiuzhaigou–Huanglong.
Anhui Jianzhu University issued its own rules in August. Reimbursement of research-related meals now requires a registration form, invoice, menu and corporate card record. Cigarettes, alcohol, expensive dishes and playing cards, which are unrelated to research, cannot be claimed.
Beijing Forestry University said on the 9th that money should be spent “where it should be spent.” Staff are asked to buy lower-priced airfares first, keep the number and duration of research and business trips to a minimum, and avoid travel over statutory holidays.
Shanxi University of Finance and Trade Vocational and Technical College held a meeting the same day on budget controls. It vowed to curb frequent budget adjustments, put special government funds first in payments, and end spending for its own sake. Hosting colleagues from within the same city is barred. Travel costs above the standard will not be reimbursed. Meetings may not offer tea-break fruit, and display boards may not use costly production methods. The college also told relevant departments to handle students’ fee-related concerns properly and explain the policy to them.
Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 17, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609170103.aspx