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Government/Politics

China Passes Ethnic Unity Law, Raising Minority Rights Concerns

On March 12, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress. The legislation calls for greater integration among ethnic groups through policies related to education, housing, population mobility, community life, culture, tourism, and economic development. The law states that its goal is to strengthen national unity under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and foster a shared national identity among China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities, as part of efforts to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Critics argue that the measure could further erode the identities of non-Han ethnic groups and potentially allow authorities to label those who question such “unity” as separatists subject to legal punishment.

The law stipulates that Mandarin will be the primary language used in schools as well as in government and official affairs. In public settings where Mandarin and minority languages are used together, the law requires that the national common language be given prominence in terms of placement and order. In practice, the legislation establishes at the national level that minority languages cannot serve as the primary language of instruction. In regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, authorities have already significantly reduced opportunities for students to receive education in their native languages, despite strong opposition and protests from students, teachers, and parents.

The law also prohibits interference with freedom of marriage on the grounds of ethnic identity, customs, or religious beliefs, with the stated aim of encouraging interethnic marriage. It further calls for the development of “inter-embedded community environments.” Some scholars warn that this policy could lead to the dispersal of ethnic minority communities, as it appears designed to encourage Han Chinese and other ethnic groups to move into each other’s neighborhoods.

The legislation also requires religious organizations, religious schools, and places of worship to “adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion.” Ethnic affairs are incorporated into China’s broader social governance framework, with provisions covering anti-separatism measures, border security, risk prevention, and social stability. The law also states that foreign organizations and individuals who engage in activities that undermine ethnic unity or incite ethnic division may face legal consequences.

Source: Deutsche Welle, March 12, 2026
https://www.dw.com/zh/中国人大通过民族团结进步促进法-引发少数民族人权担忧/a-76331516

Report Claims CCP Bot Network Exploits X Algorithm to Suppress Dissident Voices

On March 7, a Chinese blogger living in Canada described what he believes to be a coordinated online attack by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–linked “internet trolls” targeting his account on the social media platform X. According to the blogger, the tactic does not involve directly banning accounts but instead exploits weaknesses in the platform’s recommendation algorithm to restrict the reach of targeted users.

The blogger, who posts under the account name “Finding心归何处,” began operating the account in January 2026 and gradually gained followers by sharing personal experiences after leaving China and commenting on political issues. His follower count grew from about 2,800 on February 14 to 7,800 by March 7, with some posts reaching as many as 870,000 views. However, he soon noticed suspicious activity and described the alleged attack as unfolding in three stages. First, large numbers of bot accounts with no profile photos, posts, or followers suddenly followed him. Second, these accounts remained in his follower list for a period of time, potentially causing the platform’s algorithm to associate his account with a low-quality social network profile. Third, when his politically sensitive posts began gaining traction, the same accounts simultaneously unfollowed and blocked him, often during Beijing working hours.

The blogger argues that this coordinated activity manipulates the platform’s recommendation system. When many followers abruptly leave while a post is trending, the algorithm may interpret the content as offensive or misleading, triggering automated mechanisms that limit further distribution to new users. In addition, large numbers of blocks within a short period can reduce an account’s credibility score and may even place it in a search blacklist, making it difficult for others to locate the account. Because unfollowing and blocking are normal user actions, the tactic is difficult for platforms to classify as malicious behavior. A well-known political commentator also said he has observed similar tactics for years and believes CCP has studied platform algorithms to suppress anti-CCP voices while simultaneously amplifying pro-government narratives.

Source: Epoch Times, February 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/27/n14707579.htm

Political Scientist: Activists Focus on “China After Xi,” but Should Focus on “China After the CCP”

New Century Net, an Chinese language media outside China, published an interview with political scientist Wu Guoguang discussing the prospects for political change in China after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wu argues that China’s political transformation does not necessarily need to follow the classic four-stage transition model proposed by Samuel P. Huntington, often referred to as “transplacement,” which involves regime liberalization, the rise of opposition forces, authoritarian retrenchment, and eventual negotiation between the regime and opposition. Instead, Wu suggests that social and political change in China could emerge even without deliberate political liberalization initiated by the ruling authorities.

Wu emphasizes that discussions about China’s future often focus on “China after Xi Jinping” rather than “China after the CCP.” He argues that this perspective reflects the preferences of some political elites who may hope for a return to a relatively moderate period such as the Jiang Zemin–Hu Jintao era. However, Wu argues that genuine democratization in China cannot emerge from within the CCP leadership but would require the end of the Party’s rule.

Wu identifies three key challenges facing democratic change in China. First, democratic forces must clearly articulate demands for systemic democratization rather than focusing solely on leadership changes. Second, opposition movements need stronger organizational capacity, although Wu suggests they should move beyond traditional Leninist-style hierarchical structures and explore new forms of organization suited to the internet era. Third, meaningful political transformation ultimately depends on broad public support. According to Wu, widespread social grievances in China reflect deeper demands for rights and representation, which could form the foundation for democratic aspirations.

Overall, Wu concludes that China’s future political transformation could involve a complex interaction between reformist pressures and more revolutionary forces. Whether such change becomes possible, he argues, will depend on the ability of democratic forces to develop clear political goals, build effective organizational structures, and mobilize broad public support.

Source: New Century Net
https://2newcenturynet.blogspot.com/2026/03/blog-post_40.html

CNA: Xinhua News Agency Released a New List of Prohibited Terms, Emphasizing Taiwan Is a Province of China

Xinhua News Agency recently released a new batch of prohibited terms, covering five major
categories: social life, legal matters, ethnic and religious issues, matters involving territorial
sovereignty and Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan, and international relations.

In the category concerning territory, sovereignty, and Hong Kong–Macau–Taiwan, there are 13
prohibited expressions. Xinhua states that “Hong Kong and Macau are Special Administrative
Regions of China, and Taiwan is a province of China. In all written texts, maps, and charts,
special care must be taken not to refer to them as ‘countries.’” This is especially important
when listing multiple countries and regions together, where the phrase “countries and regions”
must not be omitted.

For the names of Taiwan’s governmental institutions, quotation marks should be used when
they cannot be avoided, such as Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan,” “Executive Yuan,” “Control Yuan,”
and “Election Commission.” Terms such as “central,” “national,” or “Chinese Taipei” must not
appear; if they must be used, they should be placed in quotation marks, such as Taiwan
“Central Bank,” Taiwan “Premier,” or “Legislator.” Institutions like Taiwan “Tsinghua University”
and the Taiwan “National Palace Museum” should also be placed in quotation marks.
“It is strictly forbidden to refer to the leader of the Taiwan region as the ‘President (Vice
President) of the Republic of China,’ even with quotation marks.”

Other prohibited expressions include: Taiwan’s socalled “laws” should be described as “relevant
regulations of the Taiwan region.” In matters involving crossStrait legal affairs, terms from
international law such as “document authentication,” “judicial assistance,” or “extradition”
must not be used.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait and Hong Kong must not be collectively referred to as “the
two sides of the Strait and the three regions.” The phrase “Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan
tourists traveling to China” should be expressed as “Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan tourists
traveling to the mainland.” “Taiwan” corresponds to “the mainland (or the motherland’s
mainland),” and “Hong Kong and Macau” correspond to “the mainland,” and these concepts
must not be confused.

Additional prohibited expressions include placing Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau alongside China
as parallel entities, such as “China–Hong Kong” or “China–Taiwan.” Instead, one should use
expressions like “the mainland and Taiwan” or “Fujian and Taiwan.”

Source: CNA, February 27, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202602270111.aspx

Panama President Rejects Chinese Pressure After Court Cancels Port Concessions

Panama’s Supreme Court ruled last week that contracts granting CK Hutchison Holdings, through its subsidiary Panama Ports Company, the right to operate two Panamanian ports were unconstitutional and therefore void. The court determined that the agreements conferred exclusive privileges and tax exemptions in violation of Panama’s constitution.

On February 3, Chinese authorities warned that Panama would pay a “heavy price” for the ruling, with China’s State Council Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office denouncing the decision as “absurd.”

Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino responded on February 5, stating that Panama is a sovereign nation and would not accept threats from any country.

The timeline for implementing the court’s ruling remains unclear. Mulino said port operations would continue in coordination with Panama Ports Company until the decision takes effect. Once the concession is formally terminated, a local subsidiary of Denmark’s A.P. Moller–Maersk will assume interim management of the ports until a new concession is tendered and awarded.

The Supreme Court’s decision has been widely interpreted as a political victory for U.S. President Donald Trump, who has sought to limit Chinese influence over the strategically vital Panama Canal.

Source: Epoch Times, February 6, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/5/n14692117.htm

Flying Cars Poised to Reshape Transportation as Commercial Use Nears, Chinese Report Says

China’s “Flying Car Development Report 2.0” report, released on January 19 by Tsinghua University’s School of Vehicle and Mobility, says the emergence of flying cars signals a major shift in the country’s low-altitude economy—from incremental tool innovation to a fundamental reshaping of the transportation ecosystem.

The report projects a surge in commercial deployment between 2025 and 2030, following a dual-track trajectory of specialized and mass-market applications. Initial adoption is expected in professional fields such as emergency rescue, law enforcement, and highway inspection. Consumer applications are set to roll out more gradually, beginning with tourism, followed by short-distance airport–city shuttles and intercity travel within urban clusters, while routine urban commuting remains a longer-term objective.

Technologically, the report highlights several bottlenecks to large-scale adoption, including payload range, airworthiness and safety certification, autonomous flight control, and propulsion systems. Advanced autonomy—especially for operations in dense urban airspace—is identified as a globally recognized requirement. While propulsion development is trending toward a mix of electric, hybrid, and hydrogen systems, the report notes that lightweight hybrid technologies capable of meeting emergency safety standards still require significant breakthroughs.

Source: Xinhua, January 21, 2026
https://www.news.cn/tech/20260120/233fdd2f80974d15b2db33035c01414e/c.html.

The Overseas Residence Status of Xi Jinping’s Family

According to an in-depth investigation by Bloomberg published in 2012, along with subsequent reporting, the overseas residency status of members of Xi Jinping’s family can be summarized as follows:

  • Qi Qiaoqiao (elder sister) and Deng Jiagui (brother-in-law): Both have been confirmed to hold Canadian permanent resident status. Qi Qiaoqiao and her daughter, Zhang Yannan, also possess Hong Kong permanent resident identity cards.
  • Xi An’an (second elder sister) and Wu Long (brother-in-law): The couple have long resided in Australia and have been identified by multiple media outlets as Australian permanent residents or citizens.
  • Xi Yuanping (younger brother): Xi Yuanping has publicly acknowledged living in Australia for work and family reasons. Verified information indicates that he holds Australian permanent residency as well as a Hong Kong permanent resident identity card.
  • Ke Lingling (former wife): Following their divorce, Ke Lingling emigrated to and settled in the United Kingdom.

At present, there is no public evidence that Xi Jinping himself holds significant overseas assets. Reported family wealth appears to be concentrated primarily in the hands of his elder sister Qi Qiaoqiao and brother-in-law Deng Jiagui. Although the family is said to have reduced certain assets after 2012 to mitigate political risk, their overseas residency statuses, offshore holdings, and extensive business ties continue to draw scrutiny and stand in stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s carefully cultivated image of personal probity and anti-corruption.

Source: Aboluo, January 24, 2026
https://hk.aboluowang.com/2026/0124/2338995.html

Peru’s President Faces Scandal Over Undisclosed Meetings With Chinese Businessman

Peru’s President José Jeri has been embroiled in a new political scandal after it emerged that he held private, undisclosed meetings with a Chinese businessman during an unofficial trip.

The controversy stems from Jeri’s failure to include meetings with businessman Yang Zhihua on the official presidential agenda, a breach of customary transparency that has fueled concerns over possible corruption. Local media report that Jeri met Yang on December 26 and again on January 6. Yang owns retail businesses in Peru and holds a concession for an energy project; one of his companies was later ordered shut by Lima authorities for selling illegal goods. Jeri publicly apologized for the December meeting, saying it took place at a Chinese restaurant to coordinate events marking Peru–China friendship, and denied receiving any improper requests.

The revelations have triggered a preliminary investigation by prosecutors. Opposition lawmakers have announced plans to pursue impeachment or a censure motion, though analysts say Jeri’s removal is unlikely. Despite his approval rating falling to 44 percent in January, it remains relatively strong, and many legislators—focused on reelection ahead of April elections—are expected to favor political stability over removing the president.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), January 21, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202601210021.aspx