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CCP Establishes New Central Leading Group to Strengthen Social Governance

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a new Central Leading Group for Social Governance (中共中央社会治理工作领导小组), headed by Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi, to improve cross-departmental coordination, strengthen social governance, and maintain social stability. The group is believed to have been established around the time of the Central Social Work Conference in November 2025, although its existence was publicly disclosed only later by local authorities.

The CCP established the Central Social Work Department in 2023 to oversee social work and grassroots Party-building. Since then, it has strengthened Party-building and management of the 84 million “new employment groups,” including delivery workers, couriers, and ride-hailing drivers. It has also tightened regulation of national industry associations and chambers of commerce.

Cai Qi is believed to head the Central Leading Group for Social Governance, with Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Chen Wenqing, and Mu Hong serving as deputy heads. Local disclosures subsequently confirmed the group’s establishment. In April, authorities in Henan’s Sheqi County stated that the group’s office was located within the Central Social Work Department, while in August, officials in Zhejiang’s Chun’an County referred to directives from a meeting of the central group.

In July, the CCP Central Committee and the State Council issued guidelines on strengthening social work in the new era, calling for stronger Party influence in emerging sectors, greater Party-building efforts within internet-platform companies, and new approaches to Party-building in technology companies. The guidelines also called for improved petition and complaint-handling mechanisms and for social conflicts to be resolved at the grassroots level before they escalate.

Source: Mingpao, September 8, 2026
https://news.mingpao.com/pns/中國/article/20260908/s00013/1788800364595/中國透視-中央社會治理小組-橫空殺出-蔡奇掛帥-文-劉實

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

China Steps Up Xi Jinping Ideology in School Textbooks

Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang called for strengthening the Communist Party’s oversight of textbook development, saying schools must “firmly grasp the correct political direction and value orientation,” according to state broadcaster Xinhua. Ding made the remarks at a national textbook conference in Beijing on September 8.

Ding said China should deepen its grasp of education’s “political, people-oriented, and strategic attributes” and accelerate building a textbook system with “Chinese characteristics.” He called for using “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” to shape students’ values, and for stricter management of textbook editing, review, and selection.

Separately, the Party mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a front-page article the previous day describing textbooks as a matter of “state authority” supporting China’s push to become an “education powerhouse.” According to the article, unified textbooks for morals and rule of law, Chinese language, and history now cover all school levels nationwide, with a revision process begun in 2022 completed this fall. A student reader based on Xi’s ideology has been used nationwide since 2021, purportedly fostering student “identification with and confidence in” Communist Party rule.

The article noted a new section, “the CCP as the mainstay of the war of resistance,” was added to a history-textbook chapter on the victory over Japan. It also said a university-level textbook on “socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics,” incorporating Xi’s policy concepts, has been piloted at more than 40 universities since spring 2025. China’s education ministry reportedly aims to complete a self-directed textbook system covering 29 academic disciplines by 2030, alongside a separate biology-textbook initiative involving over 50 academicians.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 8, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609080336.aspx

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

Secret 2017 Xinjiang Police Manual Reveals Extensive “Return Prevention” System to Control People

A confidential 2017 police document obtained by The Epoch Times reportedly reveals a multilayered system within Xinjiang’s public security apparatus for restricting overseas travel and monitoring people returning from abroad. The document, titled “2017 Work Manual for ‘Preventing Return’ by Public Security Agencies Directly Under Ili Prefecture,” describes a system in which Xinjiang police authorities established 35 categories of people subject to overseas travel restrictions, while Ili’s local authorities added another 17 categories of priority targets.

The restrictions reportedly covered a broad range of groups, including key security targets, people associated with alleged threats to national security, Christians and Catholics, individuals designated as members or associates of the “three forces”—Beijing’s term for terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—as well as relatives of people who had sought political asylum overseas and individuals who frequently communicated with people abroad using foreign or domestic messaging applications. The document also identifies relatives of people killed, executed, or punished for alleged security-related offenses as additional targets.

As part of the “return prevention” campaign, Ili authorities reportedly established eight broad categories of people and nine additional categories of priority targets. These included people involved in terrorism-related activities overseas and their relatives, people who had illegally left China, individuals whose whereabouts were unknown, people who had lived abroad for extended periods and suddenly returned home, individuals who had changed their identities after going overseas, and people who had renounced Chinese citizenship.

According to the document, people on these lists could face intensive monitoring and investigation upon returning to China. Authorities could reportedly flag them at border checkpoints, interrogate them, and inspect their electronic devices and communications. If they passed through border controls without being questioned, an integrated surveillance system could alert local police and community personnel, who were instructed to make face-to-face contact within a specified period and conduct follow-up monitoring for at least 90 days. The reported system illustrates how Xinjiang authorities combined travel restrictions, border screening, digital surveillance, and grassroots monitoring to prevent targeted individuals from returning to the region and scrutinize their overseas contacts, finances, and political and religious activities.

Source: Epoch Times, August 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/25/n14836601.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Government/Politics

Landslide Disaster Reveals Divergent Information Control Between China and Nepal

A glacier collapse in Nepal’s Himalayas on August 26 triggered a debris flow that swept through the Jilong border crossing in China’s Tibet region. As of September 1, Nepalese and Chinese authorities reported a combined 955 dead and 4,471 missing across both sides, though China had not updated its own casualty figures (16 dead, 546 missing) since August 29.

Chinese authorities have punished internet users for sharing unofficial casualty estimates, labeling posts—such as claims of “over 1,000 dead”—as rumors. Two official notices gave inconsistent accounts of the punishments, describing them alternately as “administrative penalties” and “education and punishment,” without clarifying the discrepancy or releasing formal penalty documents. WeChat groups have also restricted sharing of disaster footage, with one 499-member group reportedly acting after its administrator was taken to a police station.

Observers note a stark contrast in coverage: Nepalese and international media focused on survivors and victims’ families, while Chinese state media emphasized rescue personnel, equipment, and emergency response efforts. Roads near the disaster site have been closed to non-emergency vehicles.

Separately, Jiangsu province’s civil affairs department shut down 12 unregistered civil organizations on August 31, including seven emergency rescue groups. A Beijing-based scholar suggested the timing—close to the Tibet disaster—raises questions, though no direct evidence links the two events. He noted authorities have historically discouraged independent rescue groups from operating in disaster zones, viewing organizations outside state control with suspicion regardless of public support.

Source: Radio Free Asia, September 1, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shehui/2026/09/01/china-tibet-mudslide-information-blockade-banning-of-civilian-rescue-teams/

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

Xi Jinping’s Apparent Health Issues Draw Attention During Kyrgyzstan Visit

Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping arrived in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 30 to attend the 2026 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and make a state visit to the country.

Footage circulating outside Chinese state media has prompted speculation about Xi’s physical condition. Videos appear to show Xi tightly holding his wife Peng Liyuan’s hand as he descended from the aircraft, with Peng seemingly providing support. Other footage reportedly shows Xi coughing repeatedly during the welcoming ceremony, while security personnel quickly intervened when a photographer attempted to approach him. Some observers said the footage showed Xi appearing unsteady or physically strained, although the videos do not establish what, if any, medical condition he may have.

Xi’s health nevertheless attracts unusual attention because the health of China’s top leadership is highly opaque. Any persistent physical changes observed during high-profile overseas appearances can therefore generate speculation, particularly when official media provide limited information about the leader’s health.

Source: NTDTV, September 1, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/08/31/a104128805.html

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

Japan’s Pro-China Lawmakers Visit China to Improve Bilateral Ties, but Beijing Lectures Them Instead

A bipartisan group of Japanese lawmakers recently visited Beijing in an effort to restore political exchanges amid deteriorating Japan-China relations. The delegation included Shinichi Isa of the Centrist Reform Alliance, Gaku Hashimoto of the Liberal Democratic Party, and lawmakers from Komeito. Many of the delegates are considered relatively China-friendly and maintain some distance from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government.

But Beijing offered no apparent concessions. Instead, Lu Kang, a deputy head of the Chinese Communist Party’s International Department, told the delegation that Beijing had no intention of changing its current Japan policy unless Takaichi reverses her November parliamentary remarks that “a Taiwan contingency is a contingency for Japan.” The message was clear: Beijing is prepared to improve bilateral relations, but expects Japan to make concessions first.

Japanese commentator Akio Yaita criticized the lawmakers’ visit as a diplomatic miscalculation, arguing that Beijing used the meeting to pressure Tokyo rather than offer substantive concessions on issues such as export controls. He said Japan needs dialogue with China, but such engagement should be based on mutual respect. If Beijing believes Japan is eager to improve relations, he warned, it may demand a high price and repeatedly humiliate Japan.

Source: Liberty Times (Taiwan). August 29, 2026
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/5556051

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

China’s Local Government Revenue from Land Sales Falls 30.8 Percent

China’s Ministry of Finance reported that national government fund budget revenue fell 21.2 percent year on year in the first seven months of 2026, reflecting continued weakness in local government finances. While central government fund revenue increased 6.8 percent, local government revenue fell 24.8 percent, with revenue from state-owned land-use rights declining 30.8 percent.

Tax revenue, often viewed as an indicator of economic activity, increased 6.7 percent during the same period. Domestic VAT revenue rose 6.1 percent and corporate income tax increased 7.2 percent, while personal income tax grew 14.9 percent. However, domestic consumption tax declined 2.2 percent, and deed tax revenue fell 14.5 percent, pointing to continued weakness in the property market.

Revenue from state-owned land-use rights has declined for four consecutive years since 2022, as the prolonged property downturn has sharply reduced demand for land and weakened land prices. Local governments have historically relied heavily on land sales to finance public spending.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 22, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608220043.aspx

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics

China Expands Supply Cooperatives’ Role in Agriculture and Rural Economy

China has released the National Supply and Marketing Cooperatives’ 15th Five-Year Plan, outlining 18 key tasks aimed at strengthening food security and supporting rural revitalization. By 2030, the plan calls for the construction or renovation of about 100 national strategic agricultural-input reserve facilities and 1,000 county-level agricultural-input distribution centers.

The plan would further expand the role of the supply-and-marketing cooperative system in agricultural machinery services, farmland management, agricultural processing, warehousing and distribution, and other agricultural services. The system currently has about 37,000 grassroots cooperatives and 856,000 business and service outlets nationwide. In some regions, cooperatives have also been incorporated into high-standard farmland management, county-level commercial networks, and emergency supply systems, while affiliated companies participate directly in procurement, wholesale, retail, logistics, and asset management.

Supply and marketing cooperatives were once a central part of China’s rural planned economy, controlling much of the distribution of fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, daily necessities, and agricultural products. Their influence declined after market reforms opened rural commerce to private businesses, but the system has been expanding again in recent years.

Critics warn that the expansion could increase state control over rural distribution and squeeze out private businesses, leaving farmers and consumers with fewer private alternatives and increasing their dependence on state-controlled distribution networks.

Source: Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhengzhi/2026/08/04/china-supply-and-marketing-cooperatives-great-canteens-planned-economy/

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics