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US-China Relations

China and the United States Accelerate Competing AI Alliances

Beijing moved earlier than the United States to establish a national strategy for artificial intelligence (AI) and shape global AI governance. China issued the “New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” in 2017, setting the goal of becoming the world’s leading AI innovation center by 2030 while calling for active participation in international AI governance and standards-setting. It subsequently launched the “World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC)” as a state-backed platform for AI diplomacy, introduced national AI ethics guidelines in 2021, and unveiled the “Global AI Governance Initiative” at the Belt and Road Forum in 2023.

On the U.S. side, the Trump administration’s first term emphasized maintaining American leadership in AI through deregulation, market-driven innovation, and limited government intervention. The “American AI Initiative,” launched in 2019, marked the first U.S. national AI strategy, while the United States also joined multilateral efforts such as the “Global Partnership on AI (GPAI).” Following President Trump’s return to office in 2025, the administration shifted its focus to winning the global AI race through deregulation, rapid infrastructure expansion, strategic competition with China, and reducing ideological constraints on AI development.

The Trump administration further strengthened cooperation with allied countries by launching the “Pax Silica Declaration” in December 2025 to establish a trusted AI and semiconductor supply chain independent of China. An initial group of seven countries—including Japan, South Korea, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Israel—signed the declaration, while Taiwan, the Netherlands, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and the OECD participated in various capacities. At a second summit in Washington in June 2026, the coalition expanded to 35 countries and economies, which jointly endorsed the “Joint Statement on AI Opportunity,” emphasizing trusted supply chains, pro-growth, light-touch regulation, and accelerated AI infrastructure development.

Twenty days later, on July 16, 2026, China established the “World AI Cooperation Organization” (WAICO) in Shanghai with 29 founding members. The emergence of these two blocs signals an increasingly polarized global AI landscape, with competing approaches to AI governance, supply chains, and technology standards. China’s coalition consists primarily of Russia, Belarus, Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and developing countries in the Global South. While Beijing promotes an alternative framework centered on open-source cooperation, data sovereignty, and equality, the bloc’s combined technological capabilities remain significantly weaker than those of the U.S.-led alliance.

Source: Epoch Times, July 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/25/n14817344.htm

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FARA Filings Renew Scrutiny of Chinese Influence Operations Targeting U.S. Media

Recently resurfaced filings under the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (FARA) have renewed scrutiny of China’s long-running influence operations targeting U.S. media organizations. The filings show that the Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), through U.S. public relations firm BLJ Worldwide (BLJ), sponsored trips to China and engagement programs involving journalists from dozens of major Western media outlets over more than a decade. The disclosures have gained renewed attention following investigative reporting by journalist Natalie Winters, who argues the records illustrate the scope and sophistication of Beijing’s overseas influence efforts.

According to the FARA filings, BLJ organized sponsored visits to China for 128 journalists from 48 media organizations beginning in 2009. Participants reportedly included journalists from CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, the Associated Press, and other leading news organizations. The filings describe the programs as providing prominent journalists with opportunities to gain a more positive understanding of China’s development and achievements through official meetings, site visits, and exchanges.

CUSEF, founded in 2008 by former Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, has long been identified by U.S. officials and congressional reports as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) broader united front influence network. Beyond media engagement, the organization has funded exchanges with universities, think tanks, and political organizations, including programs for historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). Critics contend that these activities are designed to cultivate long-term relationships with political, academic, and media elites capable of shaping public opinion and policy debates in ways favorable to Beijing.

The resurfaced FARA records have renewed attention to the CCP’s broader influence operations and the role of sponsored exchanges as a tool of public diplomacy. Critics argue that such programs form part of a wider strategy to shape Western media narratives and public discourse by cultivating relationships with influential journalists and opinion leaders over the long term.

Source: Aboluo, July 20, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0720/2410405.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Government/Politics US-China Relations

Trump Administration Plans Nearly $500 Million Initiative to Counter China’s Global Influence

The Trump administration has notified Congress of plans to invest $175.8 million to replace aging undersea telecommunications cables in the Caribbean and Central America as part of a broader effort to counter China’s influence over the region’s communications infrastructure. The initiative, titled “Countering CCP Control of Caribbean and Central America Undersea Cables Project,” would fund the installation of strategically selected submarine cable systems and support partnerships between regional governments and private-sector providers to deploy secure U.S. and other trusted alternatives.

The proposed funding would support cable projects serving El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Because of strained U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Washington does not plan to work directly with the Nicaraguan government. The project reflects broader U.S. concerns over China’s expanding strategic presence in the Western Hemisphere, including its investments in telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and other sectors.

According to State Department planning documents, the cable initiative is part of a broader proposal to invest nearly $500 million in more than 50 projects across the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia to counter Chinese influence. Proposed initiatives include strengthening cybersecurity, securing ports and critical mineral supply chains, countering China’s export of surveillance technologies, and reducing international support for Beijing’s space program. Other projects would establish regional security operations centers and bolster communications security, information resilience, and religious freedom, including efforts to counter Chinese influence over the selection of the next Dalai Lama.

Source: Epoch Times, July 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/28/n14818672.htm

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Report Warns of Sharp Decline in U.S. Students Studying in China

A 2026 report by the U.S.-China Education Trust (USCET) found that fewer than 2,000 American students are currently studying in China, down more than 80 percent from approximately 11,000 in 2019. The number peaked at around 15,000 during the 2011–2012 academic year before plunging during the COVID-19 pandemic, when China’s border restrictions reduced the U.S. student population to as few as 300–350.

The report says the sustained decline reflects more than the lingering effects of the pandemic. It attributes the downturn to deteriorating U.S.-China relations, intensifying strategic competition in areas such as defense and technology, China’s national security policies, exit bans, and growing concerns over personal safety. According to the Institute of International Education’s Open Doors data, the number of American students in China rebounded to about 1,749 in the 2023–2024 academic year but has remained below 2,000, far below pre-pandemic levels.

Former U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns warned that if the trend continues, the United States could face a serious shortage of China specialists over the next decade. He argued that a shrinking pool of Americans with firsthand knowledge of China’s language, culture, society, and political system would weaken the ability of the U.S. government, businesses, and academic institutions to understand China and formulate effective policies.

Source: Epoch Times, July 23, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/22/n14815062.htm

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations

Xi Jinping Calls for New Global AI Order to Challenge U.S. Leadership

At the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) in Shanghai, Xi Jinping called for a new global AI governance framework, positioning China as an alternative to the U.S.-led AI order. He described China’s open-source AI models as a global public good and argued that AI development and governance should be driven by international cooperation rather than dominated by any single country.

Xi criticized the “overextension of the national security concept” in AI governance, an apparent reference to U.S. technology restrictions on China. He announced that China will provide 5,000 AI training opportunities for developing countries over the next five years, expand AI cooperation with BRICS, ASEAN, Latin America, and Africa, and make its AI-powered weather forecasting and early warning system available to 30 countries.

Xi also highlighted the launch of the Chinese-initiated World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO), which reportedly has 29 member states. The initiative reflects Beijing’s broader effort to shape global AI governance, promote Chinese AI standards, and strengthen technological partnerships with the Global South as strategic competition with the United States intensifies.

Source: Deutscher Welle, July 17, 2026
https://www.dw.com/zh/习近平倡议中国建立全球ai新秩序-挑战美国主导地位/a-78007555

Briefings | | |   Information/Technology US-China Relations

PLA Daily: U.S. Pacific Command Name Change Reflects Strategic Refocus on the Western Pacific

People’s Daily republished a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily analysis examining the U.S. Department of Defense’s June 16 decision to restore the name U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), replacing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command designation adopted in 2018. The Pentagon stated that the command’s area of responsibility, mission, and organizational structure remain unchanged. However, The article argues that the renaming reflects a broader adjustment in U.S. strategic priorities rather than a purely symbolic change.

According to the analysis, Washington’s effort to make India a central pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy has fallen short of expectations, as New Delhi has maintained an independent foreign policy on issues including Ukraine, the Middle East, and international trade. At the same time, growing U.S. military commitments in Europe and the Middle East have placed increasing pressure on defense resources, prompting Washington to reduce its strategic emphasis on the Indian Ocean while encouraging regional allies to assume greater security responsibilities.

The article argues that the United States is increasingly concentrating military resources in the Western Pacific, which it identifies as the primary theater of great-power competition under the Trump administration’s national security strategy. It predicts expanded deployments of carrier strike groups and amphibious forces, accelerated modernization of U.S. aircraft based in Japan and South Korea, increased operations from Guam, and further development of distributed basing and unmanned capabilities. The analysis concludes that the U.S. will continue to strengthen its military posture in the Western Pacific, sustaining long-term strategic competition and increasing the risk of military confrontation in the region.

Source: People’s Daily, July 6, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0706/c1011-40754050.html

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People’s Daily Highlights Early Success of Xi’s “50,000 in Five Years” U.S. Youth Exchange Initiative

People’s Daily published a signed article by Chinese Ambassador to the United States Xie Feng highlighting the early success of Xi Jinping’s initiative to invite 50,000 young Americans to China for exchange and study. Originally announced by Xi at a welcome banquet in San Francisco in November 2023, the initiative has achieved its target two and a half years ahead of schedule, according to Xi’s recent reply letter to participants in the “Sailing for Blue: China–U.S. Youth Friendship Journey” program.

The article states that over the past two years, the program has brought American students from all 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C., to China. Participants have included university students from institutions such as Harvard University, high school groups, and youth taking part in activities ranging from pickleball cultural exchanges to choral performances. During their visits, they traveled across both coastal and inland China, including the Tibetan Plateau, Jiangnan water towns, smart factories, and rural villages, to gain what Beijing describes as a firsthand understanding of the “real China.”

Xie said China will continue to advance the initiative under Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, institutionalizing and expanding youth exchanges while broadening cooperation in education, science and technology, culture, and sports, to cultivate a new generation of Americans who can share “China’s story” and serve as ambassadors of China–U.S. friendship.

Source: People’s Daily, June 28, 2026
https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202606/28/content_30165341.html

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations