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Defense/Military

Taiwan Scholar: PLA’s Actual Combat Effectiveness May Lag Its Visible Military Strength

At a seminar hosted by the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University in Taiwan, National Defense University professor Ma Zhenkun assessed the “substance and appearance” of China’s military expansion. He said China’s People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) tangible capabilities have improved significantly since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, including a sharp increase in missiles, broader precision-strike capabilities, more survivable mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, and advances in second-strike capability.

However, Ma argued that extensive purges of senior PLA officers have weakened its command structure and operational effectiveness. Citing think-tank estimates, his research said roughly 28–30 senior generals and more than 40–50 lieutenant generals have been detained, expelled, or absent from important meetings since 2023. He also pointed to the absence of large-scale, centrally commanded joint exercises around Taiwan following the removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. As examples of possible operational weaknesses, Ma cited a PLA formation sent to the Western Pacific after a Japanese destroyer transited the Taiwan Strait that consisted of only two combat ships, lacked a supply vessel, returned after three days, and did not disclose its training objectives. He also cited a confrontation near Sandy Cay in the South China Sea in which two larger Chinese vessels reportedly failed to intercept a smaller Philippine vessel, which he said reflected weaknesses in tactical coordination and force deployment.

Ma concluded that while the PLA’s tangible military strength has grown and affects U.S. force planning in the First Island Chain, its “intangible” capabilities—including senior leadership, joint command, and combat effectiveness—have been weakened. His overall assessment was that the PLA’s actual military strength may currently be lower than its visible military capabilities.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), September 18, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202609180243.aspx

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Beijing Announces Party Decision on Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli Ahead of Expected CCP Fifth Plenum

Xinhua News Agency reported that on September 21, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo reviewed and approved the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) reports on the investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. It decided to expel the two senior military officials from the CCP, terminate their qualifications as delegates to the 20th Party Congress, and transfer their alleged criminal offenses to military procuratorial authorities for prosecution. The CMC had previously decided to expel them from military service.

A source described as an insider in the CCP’s military system told The Epoch Times that the decisions on how to handle their cases were originally expected to be announced at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee (October 26 – 29). However, according to the source, Xi Jinping recently called for the announcement to be brought forward ahead of his visit to the United States. The source said Xi intended to “settle the matter once and for all” and put a definitive end to the political characterization of Zhang and Liu.

Xinhua’s announcement described the offenses attributed to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli as follows: abandoning their original aspiration and mission; becoming alienated from and disloyal to the Party; losing their Party spirit and principles; and crossing red lines and bottom lines; seriously violating political discipline and political rules, forming cliques, and being disloyal and dishonest to the Party; seriously violating organizational discipline by using their positions to assist others in obtaining promotions and receiving large sums of money; seriously violating integrity discipline by improperly accepting gifts and cash; seriously violating work discipline by failing to fulfill their political responsibility for exercising comprehensive and strict Party governance; and seriously violating life discipline by failing to properly educate and supervise their relatives and staff.

However, the language used in the latest announcement differs notably from that of a PLA Daily editorial published on January 25, when the investigations into Zhang and Liu were first announced. The earlier editorial accused them of “seriously undermining the CMC chairman responsibility system” — which can be understood as “seriously undermining Xi Jinping’s authority in the military” — and of damaging the Party’s absolute leadership over the military. It also said their conduct had severely affected the political foundation, political environment, and combat effectiveness of the PLA.

Sources:
{1} Xinhua, September 21, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260921/ed84cef8e5ad411e9ebf80c5f43e375e/c.html
{2} People’s Daily, January 26, 2026
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0125/c1001-40652025.html
{3} The Epoch Times, September 22, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/22/n14854544.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Government/Politics

China’s State Security Minister Warns of Six AI Security Risks; Political and Ideological Security Ranked No. 1

Chen Yixin, head of China’s Ministry of State Security, published an article under his name warning that the rapid development and deployment of AI presents significant risks to China’s national security. Chen said AI is reshaping the global economy, power structure, innovation, and social governance, and argued that China must seize the opportunities while establishing safeguards against emerging threats.

Chen identified six major areas of concern:

  1. Systematic threat to China’s political and ideological security. As of June 2026, China had more than 500 million AI-product users, with daily token usage exceeding 140 trillion. Chen warned that hostile forces and others with ulterior motives could misuse generative AI technologies—including deepfake audio and video, AI-generated text and images, and automated online accounts—to cheaply and rapidly produce political rumors, spread harmful information, and incite social division, using “public opinion warfare” and “cognitive warfare” to directly threaten China’s political, institutional, and ideological security.
  2. AI-enabled cyberattacks that could automate vulnerability discovery and malicious software development.
  3. Increased risks of espionage, data theft, and personal-information leakage.
  4. Technology controls and closed ecosystems that could widen disparities in global AI development.
  5. Disruptions to social governance caused by algorithmic bias, data poisoning, and unclear accountability.
  6. Fundamental transformation of military warfare as AI becomes increasingly involved in intelligence analysis, decision-making, target identification, and battlefield operations.

Chen proposed seven measures to strengthen AI governance:

  1. Maintain Party leadership.
  2. Improve cross-government coordination.
  3. Strengthen risk monitoring and early-warning systems.
  4. Increase research into core AI technologies and computing chips.
  5. Improve legal safeguards.
  6. Expand public education on AI security risks.
  7. Deepen international cooperation.

Source: People’s Forum, September 14, 2026
https://www.rmlt.com.cn/2026/0914/755773.shtml

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Information/Technology

Xinhua: China Coast Guard Conducts Routine Patrols East of Taiwan

China Coast Guard spokesperson Jiang Lue said that on September 3, the Putuoshan ship formation conducted a routine law-enforcement patrol in waters east of China’s Taiwan Island. Since August, the formation has intensified patrols and maritime control in the area to safeguard normal navigation and operational order and protect the lawful rights, interests, lives, and property of Chinese citizens, including Taiwan residents.

The China Coast Guard said it will continue to strengthen law-enforcement patrols in waters under China’s jurisdiction and firmly safeguard China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.

Source: Xinhua, September 3, 2026
https://www.news.cn/20260903/7b7a76a884d44f6d8b89e3aa81d074c8/c.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Retired Military Officers Reportedly Unhappy over Removal of Zhang Youxia

The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress has removed Zhang Youxia from his position as vice chairman of the state Central Military Commission (CMC) and Liu Zhenli from his position as a CMC member. Both were also stripped of their National People’s Congress deputy positions. (See Chinascope briefing “China Formally Removes Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from Central Military Commission” (https://chinascope.org/archives/41186.))

The Epoch Times reported, citing sources familiar with the military, that the formal removals have triggered particularly strong reactions among retired military officers. One source said some retired officers were deeply dissatisfied, with some reportedly drinking at home while others refused to answer calls from their former units. Active-duty officers are reportedly more reluctant to express opposition openly because of tighter political controls, while retired officers have greater freedom to voice their views privately.

The report also claims that the military leadership anticipated resistance and took steps to prepare the PLA in advance. Before the NPC Standing Committee announced the removals, political commissars at grassroots units were reportedly instructed to organize study sessions on PLA Daily editorials that outlined the alleged crimes of Zhang and Liu.

Source: Epoch Times, September 3, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/2/n14841227.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

Taiwan’s Xiaohongshu Restrictions Highlight Growing Security Concerns

In December 2025, Taiwan announced a one-year restriction on the use of Xiaohongshu, a popular Chinese social media app, citing a surge in scams targeting Taiwanese users and the platform’s alleged lack of cooperation with law enforcement investigations. According to Taiwan authorities, the platform’s failure to provide necessary data has made it difficult for police to investigate fraud cases.

Taiwanese authorities reported that during the eight months following the restriction, Xiaohongshu-related fraud cases fell from 525 to 145, while reported financial losses declined from approximately NT$98.9 million (US$3.12 million) to NT$33.88 million (US$1.07 million).

The issue, however, extends beyond fraud. Xiaohongshu is one of China’s most popular social media platforms, particularly among young people, and has gained a growing following in Taiwan. Users share content about food, travel, shopping, and everyday life, making the platform an unusual channel for people-to-people interaction across the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, Taiwan has become increasingly concerned about the potential risks posed by Chinese social media platforms, including data security, information manipulation, and political influence.

Source: Radio Free Asia, September 4, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhengzhi/2026/09/04/xiaohongshu-taiwan-ban-data-controversy/

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Economy/Resources

Secret 2017 Xinjiang Police Manual Reveals Extensive “Return Prevention” System to Control People

A confidential 2017 police document obtained by The Epoch Times reportedly reveals a multilayered system within Xinjiang’s public security apparatus for restricting overseas travel and monitoring people returning from abroad. The document, titled “2017 Work Manual for ‘Preventing Return’ by Public Security Agencies Directly Under Ili Prefecture,” describes a system in which Xinjiang police authorities established 35 categories of people subject to overseas travel restrictions, while Ili’s local authorities added another 17 categories of priority targets.

The restrictions reportedly covered a broad range of groups, including key security targets, people associated with alleged threats to national security, Christians and Catholics, individuals designated as members or associates of the “three forces”—Beijing’s term for terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—as well as relatives of people who had sought political asylum overseas and individuals who frequently communicated with people abroad using foreign or domestic messaging applications. The document also identifies relatives of people killed, executed, or punished for alleged security-related offenses as additional targets.

As part of the “return prevention” campaign, Ili authorities reportedly established eight broad categories of people and nine additional categories of priority targets. These included people involved in terrorism-related activities overseas and their relatives, people who had illegally left China, individuals whose whereabouts were unknown, people who had lived abroad for extended periods and suddenly returned home, individuals who had changed their identities after going overseas, and people who had renounced Chinese citizenship.

According to the document, people on these lists could face intensive monitoring and investigation upon returning to China. Authorities could reportedly flag them at border checkpoints, interrogate them, and inspect their electronic devices and communications. If they passed through border controls without being questioned, an integrated surveillance system could alert local police and community personnel, who were instructed to make face-to-face contact within a specified period and conduct follow-up monitoring for at least 90 days. The reported system illustrates how Xinjiang authorities combined travel restrictions, border screening, digital surveillance, and grassroots monitoring to prevent targeted individuals from returning to the region and scrutinize their overseas contacts, finances, and political and religious activities.

Source: Epoch Times, August 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/25/n14836601.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Government/Politics

China National Radio: 10 Key Points of the Newly Revised National Defense Mobilization Law

The newly revised Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Mobilization has been officially promulgated and will take effect on October 1. Based on the law’s provisions, China National Radio highlights the following 10 key points:

1. Defining “national defense mobilization”

The revised law defines national defense mobilization as making adequate preparations and reserves during peacetime and rapidly shifting to a mobilization posture in times of crisis. This involves transforming the country’s human resources, materials, industrial capacity, and technological potential into national defense capabilities.

2. Establishing a “reserve personnel system”

The law distinguishes reserve personnel from reservists and establishes systems for the registration, retention, and mobilization of reserve personnel to support ongoing national defense and military reforms.

Notably, once a mobilization order is issued, designated personnel may not leave their registered place of residence without authorization. Those who are away must immediately return or remain where they are and stand by for mobilization and report for duty as required.

3. Expanding the scope of “national defense service”

The law provides that a broad segment of the population may be required to perform national defense service. Those subject to the obligation include:

  • Male citizens aged 18–60
  • Female citizens aged 18–55

The law also specifies exemptions. Those required to perform national defense service, particularly individuals who were previously unemployed, may receive certain subsidies.

4. Requisition and protection of civilian resources

If national defense mobilization is implemented and existing reserves are insufficient, the government may legally requisition civilian resources, including vehicles, facilities, and equipment.

However, the law establishes an exemption list covering personal and household necessities and residences, as well as essential goods and accommodations needed by childcare, elderly-care, child-welfare, and assistance institutions serving children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups.

Requisitioned property must be returned promptly after use, while modified property must be restored before being returned. Fair and reasonable compensation must be provided for damaged or destroyed property and direct economic losses. All requisitions must be registered and documented.

5. Special controls following national defense mobilization

Once national defense mobilization is implemented, authorities may impose controls in relevant areas over transportation, telecommunications and networks, energy, food, and other sectors, including restrictions on the movement of people and goods.

6. Mobilization in emerging fields

The revised law adds provisions promoting the application of advanced technologies in national defense mobilization and the development of mobilization capabilities in emerging fields. The move reflects the growing importance of emerging and new types of combat capabilities in modern warfare.

7. Greater opportunities for civilian companies to participate in military production

The law calls for a mobilization system covering military research and development, production, maintenance, and support. It also requires security assessments of military-industrial and supply chains and promotes the standardization, serialization, and modularization of military products, as well as the socialization of military maintenance and support.

These provisions could create greater opportunities for civilian enterprises to participate in military research, production, maintenance, and support.

8. Stricter legal responsibilities and enforcement

The law establishes penalties for refusing to fulfill mobilization obligations, evading mobilization, delaying requisitions, falsifying information, or obstructing mobilization efforts. It strengthens accountability and enforcement to safeguard national defense requirements.

9. Recognition and rewards for contributors

Organizations and individuals who make outstanding contributions to national defense mobilization will be eligible for commendations and rewards. The law emphasizes the honor of serving the country and seeks to enhance the dignity and social recognition of active-duty personnel, veterans, reservists, and militia members.

10. Improving supporting regulations and systems

Relevant military and civilian authorities will formulate or revise supporting policies and regulations based on the revised National Defense Mobilization Law and actual requirements.

Provincial governments will also develop and improve regulations and policies within their jurisdictions, with the goal of establishing a comprehensive and integrated legal and regulatory framework for national defense mobilization in the new era.

Source: China National Radio, August 30, 2026
https://military.cnr.cn/jq/20260830/t20260830_527798615.shtml

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military