Defense/Military

The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress has removed Zhang Youxia from his position as vice chairman of the state Central Military Commission (CMC) and Liu Zhenli from his position as a CMC member. Both were also stripped of their National People’s Congress deputy positions. (See Chinascope briefing “China Formally Removes Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from Central Military Commission” (https://chinascope.org/archives/41186.))

The Epoch Times reported, citing sources familiar with the military, that the formal removals have triggered particularly strong reactions among retired military officers. One source said some retired officers were deeply dissatisfied, with some reportedly drinking at home while others refused to answer calls from their former units. Active-duty officers are reportedly more reluctant to express opposition openly because of tighter political controls, while retired officers have greater freedom to voice their views privately.

The report also claims that the military leadership anticipated resistance and took steps to prepare the PLA in advance. Before the NPC Standing Committee announced the removals, political commissars at grassroots units were reportedly instructed to organize study sessions on PLA Daily editorials that outlined the alleged crimes of Zhang and Liu.

Source: Epoch Times, September 3, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/9/2/n14841227.htm

The newly revised Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Mobilization has been officially promulgated and will take effect on October 1. Based on the law’s provisions, China National Radio highlights the following 10 key points:

1. Defining “national defense mobilization”

The revised law defines national defense mobilization as making adequate preparations and reserves during peacetime and rapidly shifting to a mobilization posture in times of crisis. This involves transforming the country’s human resources, materials, industrial capacity, and technological potential into national defense capabilities.

2. Establishing a “reserve personnel system”

The law distinguishes reserve personnel from reservists and establishes systems for the registration, retention, and mobilization of reserve personnel to support ongoing national defense and military reforms.

Notably, once a mobilization order is issued, designated personnel may not leave their registered place of residence without authorization. Those who are away must immediately return or remain where they are and stand by for mobilization and report for duty as required.

3. Expanding the scope of “national defense service”

The law provides that a broad segment of the population may be required to perform national defense service. Those subject to the obligation include:

• Male citizens aged 18–60
• Female citizens aged 18–55

The law also specifies exemptions. Those required to perform national defense service, particularly individuals who were previously unemployed, may receive certain subsidies.

4. Requisition and protection of civilian resources

If national defense mobilization is implemented and existing reserves are insufficient, the government may legally requisition civilian resources, including vehicles, facilities, and equipment.

However, the law establishes an exemption list covering personal and household necessities and residences, as well as essential goods and accommodations needed by childcare, elderly-care, child-welfare, and assistance institutions serving children, the elderly, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups.

Requisitioned property must be returned promptly after use, while modified property must be restored before being returned. Fair and reasonable compensation must be provided for damaged or destroyed property and direct economic losses. All requisitions must be registered and documented.

5. Special controls following national defense mobilization

Once national defense mobilization is implemented, authorities may impose controls in relevant areas over transportation, telecommunications and networks, energy, food, and other sectors, including restrictions on the movement of people and goods.

6. Mobilization in emerging fields

The revised law adds provisions promoting the application of advanced technologies in national defense mobilization and the development of mobilization capabilities in emerging fields. The move reflects the growing importance of emerging and new types of combat capabilities in modern warfare.

7. Greater opportunities for civilian companies to participate in military production

The law calls for a mobilization system covering military research and development, production, maintenance, and support. It also requires security assessments of military-industrial and supply chains and promotes the standardization, serialization, and modularization of military products, as well as the socialization of military maintenance and support.

These provisions could create greater opportunities for civilian enterprises to participate in military research, production, maintenance, and support.

8. Stricter legal responsibilities and enforcement

The law establishes penalties for refusing to fulfill mobilization obligations, evading mobilization, delaying requisitions, falsifying information, or obstructing mobilization efforts. It strengthens accountability and enforcement to safeguard national defense requirements.

9. Recognition and rewards for contributors

Organizations and individuals who make outstanding contributions to national defense mobilization will be eligible for commendations and rewards. The law emphasizes the honor of serving the country and seeks to enhance the dignity and social recognition of active-duty personnel, veterans, reservists, and militia members.

10. Improving supporting regulations and systems

Relevant military and civilian authorities will formulate or revise supporting policies and regulations based on the revised National Defense Mobilization Law and actual requirements.

Provincial governments will also develop and improve regulations and policies within their jurisdictions, with the goal of establishing a comprehensive and integrated legal and regulatory framework for national defense mobilization in the new era.

Source: China National Radio, August 30, 2026
https://military.cnr.cn/jq/20260830/t20260830_527798615.shtml

China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee on August 28 formally removed Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member, from their positions on the state CMC. This marked the first formal removal at the state-institution level since the two were announced in January to be under investigation for alleged “serious violations of discipline and law.”

Zhang, formerly a member of the Politburo and the CMC’s first-ranked Vice Chairman, was widely regarded as the second-most powerful figure in China’s military hierarchy after Xi Jinping. Liu also served as Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department, overseeing PLA operational planning and joint operations. Chinese authorities have not disclosed specific allegations, evidence, financial details, or potential legal consequences in either case.

Xinhua also reported that Zhong Shaojun, regarded as a close military aide to Xi Jinping, was stripped of his National People’s Congress membership. Zhong served as Xi’s personal secretary during Xi’s tenure in Zhejiang, Shanghai, and later at the central government, despite having no significant military background. Xi appointed him Director of the CMC General Office in 2013. Zhong left that position in 2024 and became Political Commissar of the National Defense University before being removed from that post in October 2025.

Source: VOA, August 29, 2026
https://www.voachinese.com/a/china-formally-removes-zhang-youxia-and-liu-zhenli-from-state-central-military-commission-posts-20260828/8191566.html

Chinese coast guard researchers have proposed a forward-looking defense concept involving a coordinated network of aerial, surface, and underwater unmanned platforms—dubbed a “robotic fortress”—to be potentially deployed on South China Sea islands and reefs. The goal is to counter the growing threat posed by low-cost drone swarm attacks.

According to Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, the research was published in July in Command Control & Simulation, a journal overseen by China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The study was jointly conducted by researchers from the China Coast Guard Academy and Dalian Maritime University.

The paper argues that traditional human-centered defense systems struggle against low-cost, saturation-style drone swarm attacks, citing weaknesses in early warning efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and sustained combat capability. It points to Ukraine’s use of Magura V5 unmanned surface vessels against Russia as evidence that such asymmetric tactics can effectively target larger crewed warships.

To address detection blind spots caused by limited island terrain and narrow waterways, the researchers drew on the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, proposing a closed-loop, multi-domain defense system integrating aerial drones, surface vessels, and underwater platforms anchored around islands as fixed nodes. AI-equipped platforms would reportedly retain some autonomous function even if communication links are disrupted.

Separately, satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters shows China has completed the first phase of construction on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, creating a 6-square-kilometer artificial island that analysts believe could become part of China’s largest military base in the region.

The proposal comes amid intensifying U.S.-China military competition in the South China Sea, as both sides seek strategic advantages ahead of any potential future conflict.

Source: Sputnik News, August 20, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260820/1072849620.html

Against the backdrop of prolonged and unresolved conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, Study Times, a publication affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School, published a commentary on the 3rd examining what it describes as a recurring historical form of conflict: “chronic warfare.” The term refers to long-lasting, low-intensity, attritional conflicts in which combatants pursue ambiguous strategic objectives rather than decisive victory.

The article examines this phenomenon across five dimensions. First, time: warfare has shifted from the pursuit of swift, decisive outcomes toward prolonged, back-and-forth struggles, as objectives have expanded beyond territorial conquest to include regime change and the reshaping of geopolitical structures. Second, space: battlefields have become increasingly boundless, with conflict extending from front lines into rear-area cities, energy infrastructure, and grain storage facilities. At the same time, cognitive and cyberspace domains have emerged as a “second battlefield” for narrative warfare, aimed at dividing enemy societies and eroding their willingness to fight.

Third, tactics: warfare increasingly relies on low-cost, high-frequency, and reversible strikes. The article points to the extensive use of inexpensive drones by both sides as an example, with such weapons enabling round-the-clock harassment of targets in the rear. Fourth, actors: the participants in warfare have become more diverse, dispersing responsibility and distributing the costs of conflict more broadly. In the article’s view, this dynamic further reinforces the prolonged, low-intensity, and difficult-to-resolve nature of such wars.

Fifth, outcomes tend toward asymmetry. Rather than producing clear victors, chronic wars typically end in what the article characterizes as “exhausted compromise” or temporary ceasefires, leaving no true winners—only survivors that have endured heavy casualties and economic losses.

The article further argues that chronic wars tend to end not through external defeat but through internal collapse. The decisive blow, it suggests, often comes from structural breakdown within one’s own side rather than from enemy fire.

Although the commentary does not explicitly name Ukraine or Iran, its framework closely parallels the dynamics of those ongoing conflicts.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 10, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608100076.aspx