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Defense/Military

China Explores “Robotic Fortress” Concept for South China Sea Defense

Chinese coast guard researchers have proposed a forward-looking defense concept involving a coordinated network of aerial, surface, and underwater unmanned platforms—dubbed a “robotic fortress”—to be potentially deployed on South China Sea islands and reefs. The goal is to counter the growing threat posed by low-cost drone swarm attacks.

According to Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, the research was published in July in Command Control & Simulation, a journal overseen by China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The study was jointly conducted by researchers from the China Coast Guard Academy and Dalian Maritime University.

The paper argues that traditional human-centered defense systems struggle against low-cost, saturation-style drone swarm attacks, citing weaknesses in early warning efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and sustained combat capability. It points to Ukraine’s use of Magura V5 unmanned surface vessels against Russia as evidence that such asymmetric tactics can effectively target larger crewed warships.

To address detection blind spots caused by limited island terrain and narrow waterways, the researchers drew on the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd, proposing a closed-loop, multi-domain defense system integrating aerial drones, surface vessels, and underwater platforms anchored around islands as fixed nodes. AI-equipped platforms would reportedly retain some autonomous function even if communication links are disrupted.

Separately, satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters shows China has completed the first phase of construction on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, creating a 6-square-kilometer artificial island that analysts believe could become part of China’s largest military base in the region.

The proposal comes amid intensifying U.S.-China military competition in the South China Sea, as both sides seek strategic advantages ahead of any potential future conflict.

Source: Sputnik News, August 20, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260820/1072849620.html

Beijing Party Journal Analyzes Rise of “Chronic Warfare” Amid Ukraine, Iran Conflicts

Against the backdrop of prolonged and unresolved conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, Study Times, a publication affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Party School, published a commentary on the 3rd examining what it describes as a recurring historical form of conflict: “chronic warfare.” The term refers to long-lasting, low-intensity, attritional conflicts in which combatants pursue ambiguous strategic objectives rather than decisive victory.

The article examines this phenomenon across five dimensions. First, time: warfare has shifted from the pursuit of swift, decisive outcomes toward prolonged, back-and-forth struggles, as objectives have expanded beyond territorial conquest to include regime change and the reshaping of geopolitical structures. Second, space: battlefields have become increasingly boundless, with conflict extending from front lines into rear-area cities, energy infrastructure, and grain storage facilities. At the same time, cognitive and cyberspace domains have emerged as a “second battlefield” for narrative warfare, aimed at dividing enemy societies and eroding their willingness to fight.

Third, tactics: warfare increasingly relies on low-cost, high-frequency, and reversible strikes. The article points to the extensive use of inexpensive drones by both sides as an example, with such weapons enabling round-the-clock harassment of targets in the rear. Fourth, actors: the participants in warfare have become more diverse, dispersing responsibility and distributing the costs of conflict more broadly. In the article’s view, this dynamic further reinforces the prolonged, low-intensity, and difficult-to-resolve nature of such wars.

Fifth, outcomes tend toward asymmetry. Rather than producing clear victors, chronic wars typically end in what the article characterizes as “exhausted compromise” or temporary ceasefires, leaving no true winners—only survivors that have endured heavy casualties and economic losses.

The article further argues that chronic wars tend to end not through external defeat but through internal collapse. The decisive blow, it suggests, often comes from structural breakdown within one’s own side rather than from enemy fire.

Although the commentary does not explicitly name Ukraine or Iran, its framework closely parallels the dynamics of those ongoing conflicts.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 10, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608100076.aspx

China’s Space Launch Success Rate Declines Amid Surge in Launch Activity

China has conducted 56 orbital launches so far this year, with 52 successful and four failures, putting its success rate at 92.86 percent, according to Ming Pao, based on publicly available data. The success rate has declined for three consecutive years, from 97.1 percent in 2024 to 95.9 percent in 2025 and 92.86 percent so far this year, which translates to one failure every 34 launches in 2024 to every 25 launches in 2025 and every 14 launches this year.

The latest failure involved the recent Long March-7A, following unsuccessful launches of the Long March-3B, Ceres-2, and Zhuque-3 earlier this year. The failures come as China enters a period of unusually intensive launch activity. Chinese media estimates that the country conducted 44–48 launches during the first half of 2026, the highest number for the first half of any year, with commercial launches accounting for more than 60 percent.

The surge reflects China’s push to build a large-scale low-Earth-orbit satellite infrastructure, including satellite internet constellations such as Qianfan. The rapid expansion of commercial space activity and satellite deployments is increasing pressure on launch providers to maintain a high launch cadence. The declining success rate suggests that the acceleration of China’s space-launch industry may also be accompanied by greater operational and technical risks as launch frequency increases.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 12, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608120044.aspx

Chinese Intelligence-Linked Official Buys Building 200 Meters From White House, Raising Security Alarm

A report by The Daily Caller on August 13 raised concerns over Chinese espionage activities in the United States after Philip Qiu, whom the report describes as a former senior Chinese intelligence official, purchased a nine-story historic building less than 200 meters from the White House. Qiu and his family foundation reportedly paid $8.4 million for the Securities Building on July 21. Former CIA operations officer Bryan D. Wright warned that the property could potentially be used as an intelligence base to monitor communications and digital activity around sensitive government facilities.

According to The Daily Caller, Qiu’s background includes military training and work within China’s public security and United Front systems. University records reportedly described him as having received special-forces training, while Chinese government records show that he later worked in organizations affiliated with the United Front system, including the Shanghai branch of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese and the Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Development Foundation. In 2023 and 2024, he reportedly helped organize visits for Hong Kong students to Shanghai’s special police forces.

Qiu also founded the Chinese American Museum in Washington, D.C., located about 700 meters from the White House. Although the museum says it has never received funding from, or been controlled or influenced by, any foreign government, The Daily Caller found that Chinese government entities had co-organized at least eight events with the museum, four of which received support from religious organizations controlled by the CCP’s United Front system.

Wright, China expert Gordon Chang, and national-security advocate Michael Lucci urged the U.S. government to investigate the property and consider measures to prevent individuals with alleged ties to Chinese intelligence and security agencies from acquiring strategically sensitive real estate near key government facilities.

Source: Liberty Times (Taiwan), August 15, 2026
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/5540464

Taiwan’s Han Kuang 42 Exercises Expand Focus on Gray-Zone Threats and Whole-of-Society Defense

Taiwan launched its 42nd Han Kuang live-fire military exercise on August 5, a 10-day drill involving more than 20,000 active-duty and reserve personnel. The exercise is designed to test Taiwan’s ability to respond to Chinese gray-zone harassment and a potential transition from peacetime coercion to full-scale conflict. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry is focusing on five areas: whole-of-society defense, counter-blockade and escort operations, medical response, reserve mobilization, and drone-based attack and kill chains.

Military analysts highlighted several unprecedented features. Taiwan is testing drone swarms and integrated attack-and-kill chains, coordinating the navy and coast guard to counter a potential Chinese maritime blockade, and conducting large-scale civilian medical resilience drills. The exercise also includes the mobilization of more than 5,000 reservists, reportedly the largest such mobilization in Han Kuang history.

Another major focus is communications resilience. Taiwan is conducting mobile internet throttling exercises in 14 cities and counties to simulate wartime communications disruptions and test backup systems. During the drills, mobile internet is temporarily slowed rather than shut down, while voice calls and text messaging remain available.

The expanded scope reflects Taiwan’s effort to prepare for a conflict that could begin below the threshold of war. The military is increasingly integrating the coast guard, civilian agencies, medical institutions, telecommunications providers, and reservists into defense planning. The exercises suggest that Taiwan is preparing not only to repel a direct invasion but also to withstand blockade, gray-zone coercion, cyber disruption, and prolonged conflict while maintaining essential civilian functions.

Source: Epoch Times, August 7, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/7/n14825270.htm

PLA Commentary Accuses Japan of Moving Toward Nuclearization, Warns Hiroshima’s Tragedy Could Happen Again

On August 10, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published an article through its Junzhengping (“Military Politics Commentary”) account criticizing Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her remarks on Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles during ceremonies marking the 81st anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The article highlighted Takaichi’s statement that Japan is “currently adhering to” the principles, arguing that the wording leaves open whether Tokyo intends to continue observing them. It warned that “What happened yesterday in Hiroshima and Nagasaki may not be impossible tomorrow in Japan.”

Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles—not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons—have served as a cornerstone of Japan’s nuclear policy since their adoption by the Diet in 1971. Japanese media noted that Takaichi’s wording differed from that traditionally used by previous prime ministers, who have explicitly affirmed Japan’s continued commitment to the principles.

The PLA commentary portrays Takaichi’s wording as evidence that Japan’s conservative government may be moving away from its postwar anti-nuclear policy. It concludes: “If the Japanese government insists on playing with fire over nuclear issues, the heavy hammer of history will eventually fall again. What happened yesterday in Hiroshima and Nagasaki may not be impossible tomorrow in Japan.”

Source: QQ, August 10, 2026
https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260810A05ADE00?id=20260810A05ADE00&path=a&app=news&suid=&redirect_pc=1

China’s Joint Drill With Indonesia East of Taiwan Signals Push Toward Second Island Chain, Experts Say

China announced that its navy will conduct a maritime passage exercise with the Indonesian Navy in waters east of Taiwan in mid-August, involving communications and at-sea replenishment drills. Chinese state media described it as the first exercise between the Chinese and a foreign navy in waters east of Taiwan. The move comes as Chinese naval and coast guard activities increasingly extend beyond the First Island Chain, with Beijing seeking to expand its operational presence into the Philippine Sea or east of Taiwan, and toward the Second Island Chain.

The location and replenishment component have drawn particular attention. Military analysts cited by The Epoch Times argue that sustained operations beyond the First Island Chain require reliable long-range logistics, while at-sea replenishment could enable Chinese naval forces to remain deployed farther from the mainland for longer periods. The exercise could therefore contribute to Beijing’s efforts to develop the logistical capabilities needed for a more persistent military presence between the First and Second Island Chains.

The exercise also has a diplomatic dimension. To counter U.S. efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, and other regional states, China has expanded maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, seeking to present itself as a regional security partner.

However, Indonesia has emphasized that its warship is conducting a routine “passing exercise” rather than a combat exercise, noting that similar naval passage drills are common with other countries. This qualification suggests that Jakarta may be seeking to maintain military ties with China without signaling alignment with Beijing’s broader strategic objectives.

Source: Epoch Times, August 12, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/12/n14828298.htm

South Korea Arrests Two Chinese Nationals for Alleged Espionage Near Military Bases

South Korean police said on August 11 that they had arrested two Chinese nationals for allegedly engaging in activities benefiting an enemy near South Korean and U.S. military facilities. One suspect, a Chinese man in his 60s, allegedly used a software-defined radio (SDR), antenna, and laptop from a hotel less than one kilometer from Gunsan Air Base in April to intercept communications between fighter aircraft and air traffic control. Police said he had repeatedly entered South Korea on a tourist visa since January 2024, including during joint U.S.-South Korean air exercises, and are investigating whether the intercepted intelligence was passed to Chinese authorities.

The second suspect, a 45-year-old ethnic Korean Chinese national, allegedly operated a military goods store near the main gate of U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys as a cover while recruiting a South Korean employee to obtain military information. From November 2021 to May 2026, he allegedly acquired materials related to U.S.-South Korean exercises, including the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, as well as personnel information, command assignments, and photographs from military ceremonies. Police also accused him of observing and photographing weapons movements inside the base.

Both suspects are reportedly former military personnel. South Korean authorities are conducting digital forensics on their electronic devices and investigating whether military intelligence was transferred to Chinese authorities.

Source: Yonhap News Agency, August 11, 2026
https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20260811002000881