Defense/Military

A discussion on the podcast ChinaTalk highlighted how Ukraine’s drone industry has expanded rapidly during the Russia–Ukraine War while gradually reducing reliance on Chinese imports. Ukrainian expert Cat Buchatskiy noted that at the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine had only about 3,000 drones, with 99 percent imported as complete systems from China. By 2026, Ukraine has shifted to domestically assembling nearly all unmanned systems, with annual production reaching up to 5 million first-person-view (FPV) drones, along with other categories such as reconnaissance systems and loitering munitions.

A key transition has been from importing finished drones to importing components. By 2025, 99 percent of imports from China consisted of parts rather than complete systems, although Ukraine still relies heavily on Chinese components. Export restrictions imposed by China beginning in 2023 accelerated Ukraine’s efforts to diversify suppliers and localize production. As a result, the share of Chinese components in Ukrainian drones reportedly fell to around 38 percent by 2025.

The discussion suggested that China is pursuing a dual-track approach in the conflict. While Beijing does not want Russia to lose, it also seeks to avoid a Ukrainian defeat, thereby maintaining Russia’s dependence on China and preventing the United States from fully shifting its strategic focus to Asia. Despite publicly emphasizing close ties with Moscow, Chinese suppliers continue to provide drone systems and components to both Russia and Ukraine.

A Ukrainian drone industry executive described how, during a visit to a drone factory in southern China, suppliers carefully managed schedules to prevent Ukrainian and Russian clients from encountering each other, sometimes using separate entrances or rooms. “When the Russian delegation’s cars left, the Ukrainian delegation’s cars arrived,” he said. Buchatskiy added that Ukrainian companies generally do not expect Chinese factories to cut off supplies, as strong demand and large orders create incentives to continue fulfilling Ukrainian needs.

Source: Epoch Times, April 16, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/4/16/n14742481.htm

The Zubr-class (known in China as Type 728, NATO reporting name: Pomornik-class) air-cushion landing craft is a large hovercraft designed by the Soviet Union in the late Cold War period, reflecting a focus on large-scale military transport. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine modified the design for export. In 2009, China signed a $315 million agreement with Ukraine to acquire four vessels—two built in Ukraine and two assembled in China from kits—along with the transfer of production technology. By 2017, Chinese defense firms had reportedly overcome key technical barriers and begun domestic production. In 2023, reports indicated that domestically built Zubr-class vessels had entered service with the PLA Navy’s Eastern Theater Command. China is believed to have produced at least five such vessels on its own and plans to further expand to 10–12 units, surpassing Russia (2 vessels) and Greece (4 vessels) to become the largest operator of this class.

The Zubr-class landing craft measures approximately 57 meters in length and has a full-load displacement of about 555 tons, making it the largest hovercraft in the world. Each vessel can carry up to 500 fully equipped troops, or three main battle tanks (MBTs), or ten light armored vehicles (AFVs) along with 230 troops. With a top speed exceeding 55 knots (about 102 km/h), it can rapidly deploy forces directly onto beaches that are inaccessible to conventional landing craft. Compared with traditional amphibious vessels, the Zubr-class is less vulnerable to certain types of naval mines and is capable of making multiple crossings of the Taiwan Strait within a single day, offering high mobility and strong assault capabilities.

This development suggests that China is continuing to expand its amphibious assault capabilities, with potential implications for future operations in areas such as the Taiwan Strait.

Source: Newtalk, March 30, 2026
https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2026-03-30/1027092

Sources close to China’s Foreign Ministry told The Epoch Times that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has repeatedly communicated with Iran, seeking assurances for the safety of Chinese commercial shipping. However, Iran’s response was limited, stating it could only guarantee the safety of “some” cargo bound for Iran, emphasizing that such protection would be partial. The source described this as a form of “selective security,” suggesting Iran may be using it as leverage to pressure China to ship more military supplies to Iran.

This situation was reflected in maritime activity on March 27, when two Chinese container shipsCSCL Indian Ocean and CSCL Arctic Ocean—attempted to pass through the Strait of Hormuz but ultimately turned back. (Update: The vessels successfully transited the strait on their second attempt on March 30.)

Another source indicated that Beijing had initially hoped to use its relationship with Iran to act as a mediator in the U.S.-Iran conflict and expand its influence in the “Global South.” However, this effort has faced challenges, including Russia’s competing influence in Iran. According to the report, China and Russia have differing interests, while Tehran has its own—prioritize tangible military support over diplomatic engagement. This dynamic has placed Beijing in a difficult position between maintaining ties with Iran and avoiding broader confrontation with the United States and its allies.

Source: Epoch Times, March 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/3/26/n14727332.htm