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Chinese “Medical Ship” Touring Latin America Suspected to Have Military Objectives

A large Chinese vessel, the “Silk Road Ark,” is touring Latin America and the Caribbean under the banner of a “medical mission,” but its presence has sparked significant concern among local authorities and experts. In Brazil, officials reported that the crew provided medical services without proper authorization, and attempts by Brazilian regulators to inspect the ship were reportedly denied. Critics in host countries have questioned the lack of transparency surrounding the vessel’s activities, raising concerns that its mission may extend beyond purely humanitarian aid.

Observers suggest it may be linked to the Chinese navy rather than functioning solely as a civilian medical vessel. Features such as advanced communications systems, as well as the ship’s size and capabilities, fuel suspicions about possible intelligence-gathering or other dual-use purposes. As a result, some analysts interpret the voyage as part of a broader pattern of Chinese strategic and military projection carried out under the guise of soft-power diplomacy.

From a geopolitical standpoint, the ship’s tour takes place amid intensifying competition between China and the United States for influence in the Western Hemisphere. China’s expanding footprint in the region — including reported military activities near the Caribbean — contrasts with renewed U.S. efforts to strengthen partnerships and reaffirm strategic interests in Latin America.

Source: Epoch Times, February 3, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/3/n14689964.htm

Beijing Garrison Command Filled by Armed Police Officer Amid Leadership Shake-Up

The position of commander of the Beijing Garrison Command had been vacant for approximately ten months before recent public information indicated that Chen Yuan, formerly commander of the Shanghai Armed Police Contingent, has been appointed to the post. The Beijing Garrison Command is responsible for securing China’s top leadership as well as central Party and state institutions, and it reports directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Chen’s predecessor, Fu Wenhua, was reassigned as deputy commander of the People’s Armed Police in March last year. Fu was widely regarded as a former subordinate of CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, who fell from power in January. Analysts note that the extended vacancy and the timing of Chen’s appointment coincided with the period leading up to Zhang’s removal.

Commentators have described Chen’s appointment as unusual, given that he comes from the People’s Armed Police rather than the People’s Liberation Army. They argue that this may reflect an effort by Xi Jinping to distance key internal security positions from military networks associated with figures such as Zhang Youxia or Miao Hua.

{Editor’s Note: Unverified rumors had been widely circulating online that the death of former Premier Li Keqiang in Shanghai was out of Xi’s order; Chen Yuan and Shanghai Armed Police were allegedly involved in it.}

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 7, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202602070147.aspx

China’s Local Government Land Transfer Income Drops More Than 50 Percent From 2021 Peak

A February 2 report by Yicai, citing publicly released data from China’s Ministry of Finance, shows that revenue from local government transfers of state-owned land-use rights totaled 4.1 trillion yuan in 2025, representing a year-on-year decline of 14.7 percent. This marks the fourth consecutive year of double-digit declines in such revenue since 2022. Compared with the 2021 peak of 8.7 trillion yuan, local land transfer revenue in 2025 fell by approximately 4.6 trillion yuan, a decline of 52.3 percent.

Analyst suggests that shifts in real estate supply and demand, which have contributed to a sluggish property market and financial strain among developers, are the primary drivers of the continued downturn in land-based fiscal revenue. The prolonged adjustment in the real estate sector has significantly reduced local governments’ land transfer income, constraining fiscal resources and increasing debt repayment pressures. China’s current reliance on the “land finance” model is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), February 3, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202602030136.aspx

China Coast Guard Patrolled Diaoyu Islands for 357 Days in 2025

On January 30, Zhang Jianming, Director of the China Coast Guard, briefed the public on maritime rights protection and law-enforcement operations carried out over the five years since the implementation of the “China Coast Guard Law.” Zhang said that during this period, the China Coast Guard deployed vessels more than 550,000 times and aircraft over 6,000 times to conduct maritime rights-protection missions.

According to Zhang, the Coast Guard organized 134 patrols in the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands (also known as “Senkaku Islands” which both China and Japan claims sovereignty over), with patrol days around the islands reaching 357 in 2025. In addition, the Coast Guard has carried out regular rights-protection patrols in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and Yellow Sea, conducted law-enforcement patrols in waters surrounding Taiwan and its affiliated islands, and enforced control and management in the territorial waters and surrounding areas of Huangyan Island.

Zhang said the China Coast Guard has continuously refined its operational strategies to effectively respond to infringement activities by external parties. He added that the force has achieved new breakthroughs in integrated sea-and-air patrols around the Diaoyu Islands, shaped a new approach to maritime rights protection, and established a new framework for managing and controlling the Taiwan Strait in accordance with the one-China principle and the law.

Source: People’s Daily, January 30, 2026
http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0130/c1008-40656339.html

PLA Daily Commentary Casts Zhang Youxia as a Political Enemy and Calls on the Military to Pledge Loyalty to Xi Jinping

Following Beijing’s announcement on January 24 of the downfall of Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, the Chinese military remained notably silent in publicly expressing support for the decision.

On January 31, PLA Daily published a commentary on the case. While framed on the surface as an anti-corruption article, the piece was laden with strong political messaging. Below are excerpts from People’s Daily, which republished the commentary, along with key interpretations.

The article characterizes the cases of Zhang and Liu not merely as corruption cases, but as political cases, signaling that they are viewed as antagonistic enemies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), rather than as participants in a non-antagonistic internal disciplinary violation, which corruption cases typically represent. It states:

“This decision to place Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli under case filing, review, and investigation is … a resolute struggle to eliminate major political hidden dangers.”
“They will ultimately be forever nailed to the pillar of shame in history.”

Editor’s Note: “Nailed to the pillar of shame in history” (钉在历史的耻辱柱上) is a particularly severe CCP expression, typically reserved for figures deemed politically hostile or fundamentally opposed to the Party.

The commentary also signals a broader purge of individuals connected to Zhang and Liu:

“Resolutely investigating and punishing Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is of great significance for pushing the people’s armed forces to eradicate the root causes of spreading toxins and to achieve renewal and rebirth.”

Editor’s Note: “Spreading toxins” (流毒) is a CCP term commonly used to describe the lingering influence of a disgraced leader and the networks or factions associated with them.

The article further warns military personnel:

“As for those who show no sense of awe and test the law with their own actions, whoever is involved will be investigated, and however deep the entanglements run will be thoroughly unearthed. Party members and cadres in the military, especially leading cadres, must always harbor a sense of awe, abandon any illusion of luck, and not act without restraint or fail to know when to stop. They must keep firmly in mind the principle that ‘hands must not reach out—once you do, you will surely be caught,’ take the lead in observing discipline and the law, and exercise strict self-discipline.”

The commentary concludes by placing strong emphasis on ideological and political loyalty to Xi Jinping:

“The entire military must adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as its guide, thoroughly implement Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military, fully carry out the political strategy for building the military in the new era, uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the people’s armed forces, deeply grasp the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes,’ strengthen the ‘Four Consciousnesses,’ bolster the ‘Four Confidences,’ and achieve the ‘Two Upholds,’ implement the responsibility system of the CMC Chairman, and resolutely obey Chairman Xi’s command, be responsible to Chairman Xi, and reassure Chairman Xi.”

Source: People’s Daily, January 31, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0131/c1011-40656924.html

Unusual Silence in PLA Follows Arrest of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli

As of January 29, more than five days have passed since Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were brought down, the Chinese military as a whole has issued no public statement of support yet. By contrast, when former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong fell from power in 2014 and 2015, the military swiftly declared its “support for the central leadership’s decision” the following day.

Multiple sources close to the Chinese military say that officers and soldiers privately questioned whether detaining Zhang and Liu without publicly releasing evidence amounted to a political purge. This has seriously shaken confidence within the ranks in top-level decision-making and sparked strong discontent among personnel across several theater commands.

Military insiders further disclosed that a number of directives issued by the CMC have encountered widespread resistance at the grassroots level, leaving orders effectively unenforced. Among rank-and-file troops, some have even been heard referring to Xi Jinping as “Baozi,” a nickname commonly used by the public to mock him.

{Editor’s Note: Senior officials may fear that a large-scale purge of officers with close ties to Zhang and Liu is inevitable. As a result, even those who publicly express support may not avoid being targeted themselves.}

Source: NTDTV, January 30, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/01/29/a104061477.html

Population Decline: Chinese People “Mysteriously Disappearing”

The article highlights China’s ongoing population decline, reporting that official data show the country’s population fell by 3.39 million in 2025, with just 7.92 million births — the lowest since modern record-keeping and comparable to levels seen during the Qing dynasty. China has now experienced four consecutive years in which annual deaths exceeded births. The sharp decline in births is attributed to economic pressures, high living costs, expensive housing and education, workplace challenges, and insufficient social safety nets, all of which discourage young people from marrying or having children.

The commentary also examines the wider consequences of this demographic downturn, warning that the erosion of China’s “demographic dividend” could negatively impact economic growth, domestic consumption, the housing market, and public finances. It questions the accuracy of official population figures, citing alternative estimates suggesting China’s actual population may be well below the government’s reported 1.4489 billion — potentially under 1 billion — based on leaked data, cremation statistics, and independent demographic analyses. The article frames the population decline as part of a deeper crisis that could profoundly affect China’s long-term prospects.

Source: Epoch Times, January 21, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/20/n14680260.htm

Beijing Rehearses “Maritime Militia” Strategy Against Taiwan

China has increasingly employed fishing vessels as part of its so-called “maritime militia” strategy, using civilian boats to assert control at sea while creating legal and moral dilemmas for its opponents. In January 2026, Beijing assembled roughly 1,400 Chinese fishing vessels into a floating maritime barrier stretching about 320 kilometers—widely interpreted as a rehearsal for a potential blockade of Taiwan. Similar operations in the past have reportedly involved more than 2,000 vessels arranged in formations exceeding 400 kilometers in length.

Independent media commentator Wen Zhao outlined three tactics of this maritime militia strategy.

Version 1.0:
Chinese fishing boats deliberately crossed other countries’ maritime “red lines,” provoking responses from foreign maritime law-enforcement agencies. When vessels were detained or crews arrested, China’s coast guard intervened under the pretext of defending fishermen’s rights, leading to standoffs, ramming incidents, and water-cannon exchanges. In some cases, naval forces were drawn in, creating a three-layered escalation model—fishing boats, coast guard, then navy. This approach has been used since 2012 in areas such as Scarborough Shoal against the Philippines and tends to be effective against countries with weaker maritime enforcement capabilities.

Version 2.0:
Against stronger maritime enforcers such as Japan, Chinese fishing vessels shifted from symbolic legal presence to active provocation. These boats deliberately cut across or collide with foreign coast guard patrol vessels, especially when Chinese maritime law-enforcement ships are nearby. According to Japanese police, the fishing boats often make sudden turns to block enforcement vessels, and if collisions occur, Chinese operators film and selectively edit footage to support its propaganda narratives against the foreign “bully.”

Version 3.0:
This method involves massing large numbers of fishing vessels into coordinated formations to support a blockade of Taiwan or to obstruct U.S. and Japanese military intervention. These slow-moving, densely packed formations exploit a legal gray zone, as military forces cannot lawfully attack civilian vessels. U.S. think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have analyzed such scenarios and suggested countermeasures such as declaring military zone to prevent vessels from coming in, waiting for them to weaken due to fuel constraints, disrupting inter-vessel communications through electronic warfare, transiting the area before formations fully coalesce, or taking a detour route to bypass the formations.

Source: Gan Jing World, January 19, 2026
https://www.ganjingworld.com/video/1i8p0lkkjje6G3cHANsOJdBWk1n51c?playlist_id=1galt8gs0ti1LGq7DHJ5BZQ1q00p