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China Submits Record 203,000 Satellite Applications to ITU

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), between December 25 and 31, 2025, China formally submitted applications for frequency and orbital resources for an additional 203,000 satellites, covering 14 constellations, including low- and medium-Earth orbit satellites. This represents China’s largest coordinated international satellite frequency and orbit filing to date.

The Radio Spectrum Development and Technology Innovation Institute (the “Radio Innovation Institute”) submitted applications for the CTC-1 and CTC-2 constellations, each requesting 96,714 satellites—a combined total of 193,428 satellites, accounting for over 95 percent of China’s submissions. Other applicants include China SatNet, China Mobile, and Yuanxin Satellite.

This large-scale filing is expected to stimulate the entire satellite industry chain—including manufacturing, launch, and operations—and drive China’s aerospace sector toward both large-scale growth and breakthroughs in core capabilities.

Source: People’s Daily, January 12, 2026
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0112/c1004-40643364.html

China Faces Sharp Early-2026 Slump in New Energy Battery Demand

Cui Dongshu, Secretary-General of the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), said that domestic demand for new-energy lithium batteries is likely to fall sharply at the beginning of 2026 compared with the fourth quarter of 2025. In response, battery manufacturers are expected to cut output and take extended production breaks to adjust to the seasonal and policy-driven downturn.

He cited several key factors behind the expected decline:

  1. Policy impact on passenger vehicles: Adjustments to the vehicle purchase tax for new-energy passenger cars are expected to reduce sales by at least 30 percent quarter-on-quarter from the fourth quarter of 2025.
  2. Post-subsidy slump in commercial vehicles: New-energy commercial vehicles are likely to see a steep quarter-on-quarter drop after year-end rushes to secure subsidies and tax exemptions.
  3. Limited export spillover: While exports of new-energy passenger vehicles may remain relatively strong in early 2026, they are unlikely to significantly boost battery demand for independent battery suppliers.
  4. Weak U.S. energy storage pull: Demand from the U.S. energy storage market offers little support for China’s battery exports. Battery shipments to the U.S. fell sharply in 2025, and AI-driven storage demand in the U.S. provides minimal upside for Chinese producers.
  5. Pressure from low domestic storage prices: Domestic energy storage tender prices have dropped well below 300 yuan per kilowatt-hour, dampening incentives for price increases. At the same time, vehicle batteries cannot offset losses incurred in the energy storage sector.

Together, these factors point to a challenging start to 2026 for China’s new-energy battery industry.

Source: Stock Times, December 28, 2026
https://stcn.com/article/detail/3561185.html China Faces Sharp Early-2026 Slump in New Energy Battery Demand

China’s Expanding Arctic Strategy: From Greenland Autonomy to the “Polar Silk Road”

In June 2009, Greenland’s Self-Government Act took effect, transferring most governing powers from Denmark to the Greenlandic government—excluding foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy—and granting Greenland the right to declare independence at any time. Economic independence, however, remains a prerequisite. Nearly 60 percent of Greenland’s revenue still comes from an annual Danish subsidy of about 3.5 billion kroner (US$ 346,000), frozen at the time of autonomy, forcing the territory to shoulder increasing fiscal responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Beijing’s involvement in Greenland gradually emerged. Today, Greenland has the highest level of Chinese investment as a share of GDP in the Arctic region. In 2016, Chinese rare-earth firm Shenghe Resources became the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine, and in 2018 it signed a memorandum of understanding to lead the processing and sale of materials extracted from the site.

Prior to 2013, China kept a deliberately low profile in the Arctic, avoiding open discussion of polar resources. This approach shifted after Xi Jinping took power. In April 2013, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development highlighted research into Arctic shipping routes and the normalization of polar expeditions. In June 2014, the People’s Liberation Army’s “Strategic Assessment 2013” identified Arctic shipping and resource development as having major strategic value and described access to Arctic resources as an “important strategic interest.”

In January 2018, China released its first “Arctic Policy White Paper,” declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” and formally introducing the “Polar Silk Road,” which added a northern maritime corridor to the Belt and Road Initiative. The route encompasses the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and a future Central Arctic route. The Northeast Passage, largely controlled by Russia, reduces shipping time from Shanghai to Hamburg to about 18 days, compared with roughly 35 days via the Suez Canal, while the Northwest Passage through Canada shortens routes by about 20 percent compared with the Panama Canal.

The Polar Silk Road is widely regarded as a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely commercial project, with significant implications for the global balance of power. Analysts argue that China aims to expand its Arctic influence in coordination with Russia, potentially laying the groundwork for a parallel global system and enabling the future deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to counter the United States.

In operational terms, China COSCO began using Arctic routes in 2013 and, over the following eight years, conducted 56 voyages with 26 vessels, including 14 trips in 2021 alone. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels transited the Bering Sea near Alaska, drawing U.S. attention. In 2017, China’s “Xuelong” icebreaker completed its first passage through the Northwest Passage.

China’s Arctic ambitions have also raised security concerns. In 2016, a Hong Kong–based company proposed purchasing a decommissioned Danish naval base, and in 2018 a Chinese state-owned enterprise bid to expand and modernize Greenland’s airports; both proposals were ultimately blocked by Copenhagen. In 2020, Chinese scholars openly argued that Greenland should serve as a strategic hub for the Polar Silk Road.

In October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Arctic Ocean waters for the first time, operating farther north than previously recorded and signaling an expansion into areas traditionally viewed as within the U.S. strategic sphere.

China frames its Arctic policy around four principles—“understanding, protecting, utilizing, and participating in the governance of the Arctic”—while asserting its “near-Arctic” status and seeking greater influence within Arctic institutions.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/14/n14676123.htm

Russian Media Warn Door-Lock Failures Could Turn Chinese Cars into “Mobile Coffins” in Winter

Russian media report growing complaints about door-lock malfunctions in Chinese-made vehicles, particularly during extreme cold. Drivers say the driver-side door can freeze shut, in some cases forcing them to attempt escape through a window—an option that becomes risky in freezing conditions and may damage window-lift mechanisms.

According to Russian outlet Lenta Dnya, the issue is commonly caused by condensation seeping into the electric door-lock actuator. When temperatures drop, the moisture freezes, causing the lock to seize and preventing the door from being opened even manually. Videos circulating online show drivers unable to unlock or open doors from either inside or outside the vehicle, even after lowering the window.

Automotive expert Vadim Kabanov told The Post that harsh Russian winters could turn some Chinese vehicles into “mobile coffins,” posing serious safety hazards. He added that Chinese cars generally perform worse in winter conditions than Korean, Japanese, and German models, and claimed that owners often need to replace key components every three years, with frequent issues including transmission failures.

Source: Epoch Times, January 13, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/12/n14674773.htm

Analysts Warn 2026 Could Trigger Seven Simultaneous Systemic Crises in China

In late December 2025, a group of economists and data analysts specializing in China’s structural macroeconomic risks concluded—based on a cross-sector quantitative indicator framework—that 2026 may become a critical window in which seven major crises could erupt simultaneously.

The warning signs span seven key indicator clusters:

  • Worsening pension contribution and payout gaps;
  • Collapsing local government fiscal self-sufficiency alongside shrinking land-sale revenues and mounting hidden-debt pressure;
  • Synchronized reversals in new-home sales, second-hand listings, and inventory digestion in major cities;
  • Rising stress in small and mid-sized banks reflected in non-performing loans, interbank funding strain, and delayed wealth-management redemptions;
  • Prolonged contraction in industrial profits, output growth, and employment indicators;
  • Accelerating demographic decline marked by falling births, a shrinking working-age population, and slowing preschool enrollment; and
  • A broad downturn in external demand signaled by weakening export orders, slowing shipments to major markets, reduced coastal electricity consumption, and declining container throughput.

Historically, these seven core indicator groups have rarely deteriorated together within a 12–18 month period. By the second half of 2025, however, most had already breached critical warning thresholds and were worsening in tandem—raising the risk of an unusually dangerous system-wide “resonance of disappointment” across China’s fiscal, financial, demographic, and economic foundations.

Source: 51 News, December 30, 2025
https://info.51.ca/articles/1500070?wyacs=info-article-list

Xinhua: China’s Digital Currency Enters a New Phase: From Digital Cash to Deposit-Based Money

China’s central bank announced that a new framework for the digital yuan (e-CNY) will take effect on January 1, 2026, marking a major transition from a digital cash model to a deposit-based digital currency. Chinese state-run media outlet Xinhua reported that the move represents a significant upgrade of the e-CNY from “version 1.0” to “version 2.0.” Key points from the Xinhua report are translated below.

Under the new system, digital yuan balances held in commercial bank wallets will be treated as account-based bank liabilities, similar to traditional deposits rather than cash. Banks will be required to pay interest on verified digital yuan wallet balances in accordance with deposit interest rate guidelines, manage these balances within their asset-liability frameworks, and provide deposit insurance protection equivalent to that of conventional bank deposits. Non-bank payment institutions participating in the system will be required to maintain 100 percent reserve backing for their digital yuan holdings.

The updated framework also brings digital yuan balances into China’s reserve requirement system, clarifying the rights and responsibilities of operating institutions and strengthening regulatory oversight.

As of the end of November 2025, the digital yuan had processed 3.48 billion transactions with a total value of 16.7 trillion yuan. A total of 230 million personal wallets and 18.84 million institutional wallets had been opened. In cross-border applications, the multilateral central bank digital currency bridge handled 4,047 transactions worth approximately 387.2 billion yuan, with the digital yuan accounting for more than 95 percent of total transaction value.

Source: Xinhua, December 29, 2025
https://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/20251229/b4769a74c4874897935a9bbd7ee2359f/c.html

China Continued Increasing Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves in December 2025

China’s foreign exchange reserves reached US$3.3579 trillion at the end of December 2025, an increase of US$11.5 billion, or 0.34 percent, from November, according to data released by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Over the same period, China’s gold reserves rose by 30,000 ounces to 74.15 million ounces, marking the central bank’s 14th consecutive month of gold purchases.

Analysts quoted by Chinese state-run media outlet People’s Daily wrote that “the current level of foreign exchange reserves remains adequately ample and is expected to stay broadly stable.”

The analysis noted that China’s gold holdings remain relatively low. As of the end of November 2025, gold accounted for about 9.5 percent of China’s official international reserves—mainly composed of foreign exchange and gold—well below the global average of around 15 percent. From the perspective of optimizing the reserve structure, continued increases in gold holdings are seen as necessary. Gold is also widely accepted worldwide as a final means of payment, and “further purchases by the central bank could help strengthen confidence in China’s sovereign currency and support the advancement of renminbi internationalization.”

Source: People’s Daily, January 8, 2026
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0108/c1004-40641245.html

IKEA China to Close Seven Stores Starting in February

Well-known new Chinese news site The Paper recently reported that IKEA China plans to make “strategic adjustments” to its store distributions.

On January 7, IKEA China issued a statement indicating that, after a comprehensive review and evaluation of existing customer touchpoints, IKEA China has decided to cease operations of seven physical retail stores, including the IKEA Baoshan Store in Shanghai, IKEA Panyu Store in Guangzhou, IKEA Zhongbei Store in Tianjin, IKEA Nantong Store, IKEA Xuzhou Store, IKEA Ningbo Store, and IKEA Harbin Store, effective February 2, 2026. “Local customers in these major cities can still shop through other IKEA stores in their cities (Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tianjin), the IKEA official website, the IKEA app, or the IKEA WeChat mini-program.”

IKEA China explained that the retail industry is undergoing an “unprecedented transformation” due to “global economic uncertainty, the wave of digitization, and profound changes in consumer behavior.” IKEA continues to evaluate and optimize its business portfolio, channel distribution, and operational structure globally to better meet customer needs. Specific measures include maximizing the efficiency of every square meter of commercial space through transformation, closure, or addition of business units.
IKEA began its sourcing operations in China in the 1960s and opened its first IKEA store in 1998. Since then, IKEA has gradually built a complete value chain in China, encompassing product development, sourcing, production, logistics, retail stores, and digital innovation.

Source: The Paper, January 7, 2026
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_32333259