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China Offers integrated RMB and foreign-currency cash Pool for multinational corporations

Recently, the People’s Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange issued a notice expanding the integrated RMB and foreign-currency cash pooling scheme for multinational corporations from select pilot regions to nationwide implementation.

Previously, RMB and foreign-currency cash pools were regulated under separate systems, creating currency barriers and redundant accounts. Multinational companies often had to file complex applications and wait days—or even longer—to convert funds between RMB and foreign currencies.

Under the new policy, Chinese subsidiaries can independently manage cross-border funds within quotas approved by the People’s Bank of China, significantly easing domestic fund allocation constraints. This reform allows China operations to play a more active role in regional and cross-border treasury management, risk control, and strategic capital allocation, shifting them from a traditional “cost center” to an emerging decision-making hub.

Source: People’s Daily, January 29, 2026
https://world.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0129/c1002-40654876.html

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources

Flying Cars Poised to Reshape Transportation as Commercial Use Nears, Chinese Report Says

China’s “Flying Car Development Report 2.0” report, released on January 19 by Tsinghua University’s School of Vehicle and Mobility, says the emergence of flying cars signals a major shift in the country’s low-altitude economy—from incremental tool innovation to a fundamental reshaping of the transportation ecosystem.

The report projects a surge in commercial deployment between 2025 and 2030, following a dual-track trajectory of specialized and mass-market applications. Initial adoption is expected in professional fields such as emergency rescue, law enforcement, and highway inspection. Consumer applications are set to roll out more gradually, beginning with tourism, followed by short-distance airport–city shuttles and intercity travel within urban clusters, while routine urban commuting remains a longer-term objective.

Technologically, the report highlights several bottlenecks to large-scale adoption, including payload range, airworthiness and safety certification, autonomous flight control, and propulsion systems. Advanced autonomy—especially for operations in dense urban airspace—is identified as a globally recognized requirement. While propulsion development is trending toward a mix of electric, hybrid, and hydrogen systems, the report notes that lightweight hybrid technologies capable of meeting emergency safety standards still require significant breakthroughs.

Source: Xinhua, January 21, 2026
https://www.news.cn/tech/20260120/233fdd2f80974d15b2db33035c01414e/c.html.

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics

Xinhua: “China Speed” Lights Up the Global AI Development Map

Xinhua News Agency publishes an article, claiming China’s rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have captured widespread attention, showcasing a fast-paced innovation drive across the economy. In China’s draft 15th Five-Year Plan, the term “intelligent” appears 16 times, underscoring AI’s central role in industrial development, cultural advancement, public services, and social governance. AI is increasingly positioned as a key engine of China’s competitiveness on the global technological frontier.

On the technology front, China is racing to secure strategic advantages. Domestic AI and semiconductor companies have moved swiftly into capital markets, with large-model developers such as Zhipu and MiniMax listing in Hong Kong, alongside GPU manufacturers including Moore Threads and Biren Technology. These firms emphasize self-reliant innovation, strong performance, and cost efficiency, seeking to build a complete domestic ecosystem spanning foundation models and high-end chips.

More significantly, China’s AI development is shifting from research toward large-scale application. The country is entering the “second half” of AI growth, focusing on real-world deployment rather than model training alone. The government’s “Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the “AI+” Action Plan” further clarifies this roadmap: by 2030, AI is expected to comprehensively empower high-quality development, with adoption rates of next-generation intelligent terminals, AI agents, and related applications exceeding 90 percent.

AI is already transforming healthcare, scientific research, manufacturing, and daily life in China. Examples include Alibaba’s AI-based cancer screening tools; the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Panshi AI-assisted research platform; and the world’s first “island-style” lean intelligent manufacturing factory by Huawei and SAIC-GM-Wuling. By the end of 2025, China had established more than 35,000 basic-level smart factories, over 7,000 advanced-level facilities, and more than 230 excellence-level factories. Humanoid robots have also achieved a critical breakthrough, moving from laboratory research to production lines. AI agents are capable of handling real-world tasks—such as ordering food or booking travel—are bringing AI from conversation into practical action.

Source: Xinhua, January 20, 2026
https://www.news.cn/tech/20260120/f059fd8d33ba4800bfac9b345bae4505/c.html

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Information/Technology

Beijing Unveils 2026–2028 Action Plan to “Accelerate Industrial Internet Platform Development”

China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has released an Action Plan for Promoting High-Quality Development of Industrial Internet Platforms (2026–2028), outlining 13 measures to “strengthen industrial internet platforms as critical infrastructure for advancing new industrialization and modern productive forces. China currently has more than 340 influential industrial internet platforms and over 100 million connected industrial devices.” Below are some key excerpts from a People’s Daily article on the topic.

The plan centers on four strategic priorities. First, it calls for cultivating and strengthening platforms through differentiated development, establishing a tiered ecosystem of foundational, growth-oriented, leading, and ecosystem platforms. Second, it emphasizes deeper data integration and intelligent applications by improving data collection, aggregation, and utilization, while reinforcing intellectual property protection. Third, it seeks to scale platform applications by expanding use in high-value industrial scenarios and encouraging new business models and service formats. Fourth, it aims to build a stronger support ecosystem through open-source collaboration, expanded international engagement, and closer cooperation between platform providers and manufacturing enterprises.

The ministry also stresses the need for stronger policy coordination, localized implementation, and enhanced support mechanisms. Particular emphasis is placed on ensuring fair participation by private companies and small and medium-sized enterprises, with the goal of accelerating the real-economy impact of industrial internet technologies.

Source: People’s Daily, January 14, 2026
https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/pc/content/202601/14/content_30132247.html

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources

China Submits Record 203,000 Satellite Applications to ITU

According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), between December 25 and 31, 2025, China formally submitted applications for frequency and orbital resources for an additional 203,000 satellites, covering 14 constellations, including low- and medium-Earth orbit satellites. This represents China’s largest coordinated international satellite frequency and orbit filing to date.

The Radio Spectrum Development and Technology Innovation Institute (the “Radio Innovation Institute”) submitted applications for the CTC-1 and CTC-2 constellations, each requesting 96,714 satellites—a combined total of 193,428 satellites, accounting for over 95 percent of China’s submissions. Other applicants include China SatNet, China Mobile, and Yuanxin Satellite.

This large-scale filing is expected to stimulate the entire satellite industry chain—including manufacturing, launch, and operations—and drive China’s aerospace sector toward both large-scale growth and breakthroughs in core capabilities.

Source: People’s Daily, January 12, 2026
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0112/c1004-40643364.html

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Information/Technology

China Faces Sharp Early-2026 Slump in New Energy Battery Demand

Cui Dongshu, Secretary-General of the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA), said that domestic demand for new-energy lithium batteries is likely to fall sharply at the beginning of 2026 compared with the fourth quarter of 2025. In response, battery manufacturers are expected to cut output and take extended production breaks to adjust to the seasonal and policy-driven downturn.

He cited several key factors behind the expected decline:

  1. Policy impact on passenger vehicles: Adjustments to the vehicle purchase tax for new-energy passenger cars are expected to reduce sales by at least 30 percent quarter-on-quarter from the fourth quarter of 2025.
  2. Post-subsidy slump in commercial vehicles: New-energy commercial vehicles are likely to see a steep quarter-on-quarter drop after year-end rushes to secure subsidies and tax exemptions.
  3. Limited export spillover: While exports of new-energy passenger vehicles may remain relatively strong in early 2026, they are unlikely to significantly boost battery demand for independent battery suppliers.
  4. Weak U.S. energy storage pull: Demand from the U.S. energy storage market offers little support for China’s battery exports. Battery shipments to the U.S. fell sharply in 2025, and AI-driven storage demand in the U.S. provides minimal upside for Chinese producers.
  5. Pressure from low domestic storage prices: Domestic energy storage tender prices have dropped well below 300 yuan per kilowatt-hour, dampening incentives for price increases. At the same time, vehicle batteries cannot offset losses incurred in the energy storage sector.

Together, these factors point to a challenging start to 2026 for China’s new-energy battery industry.

Source: Stock Times, December 28, 2026
https://stcn.com/article/detail/3561185.html China Faces Sharp Early-2026 Slump in New Energy Battery Demand

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources

China’s Expanding Arctic Strategy: From Greenland Autonomy to the “Polar Silk Road”

In June 2009, Greenland’s Self-Government Act took effect, transferring most governing powers from Denmark to the Greenlandic government—excluding foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy—and granting Greenland the right to declare independence at any time. Economic independence, however, remains a prerequisite. Nearly 60 percent of Greenland’s revenue still comes from an annual Danish subsidy of about 3.5 billion kroner (US$ 346,000), frozen at the time of autonomy, forcing the territory to shoulder increasing fiscal responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Beijing’s involvement in Greenland gradually emerged. Today, Greenland has the highest level of Chinese investment as a share of GDP in the Arctic region. In 2016, Chinese rare-earth firm Shenghe Resources became the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine, and in 2018 it signed a memorandum of understanding to lead the processing and sale of materials extracted from the site.

Prior to 2013, China kept a deliberately low profile in the Arctic, avoiding open discussion of polar resources. This approach shifted after Xi Jinping took power. In April 2013, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development highlighted research into Arctic shipping routes and the normalization of polar expeditions. In June 2014, the People’s Liberation Army’s “Strategic Assessment 2013” identified Arctic shipping and resource development as having major strategic value and described access to Arctic resources as an “important strategic interest.”

In January 2018, China released its first “Arctic Policy White Paper,” declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” and formally introducing the “Polar Silk Road,” which added a northern maritime corridor to the Belt and Road Initiative. The route encompasses the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and a future Central Arctic route. The Northeast Passage, largely controlled by Russia, reduces shipping time from Shanghai to Hamburg to about 18 days, compared with roughly 35 days via the Suez Canal, while the Northwest Passage through Canada shortens routes by about 20 percent compared with the Panama Canal.

The Polar Silk Road is widely regarded as a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely commercial project, with significant implications for the global balance of power. Analysts argue that China aims to expand its Arctic influence in coordination with Russia, potentially laying the groundwork for a parallel global system and enabling the future deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to counter the United States.

In operational terms, China COSCO began using Arctic routes in 2013 and, over the following eight years, conducted 56 voyages with 26 vessels, including 14 trips in 2021 alone. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels transited the Bering Sea near Alaska, drawing U.S. attention. In 2017, China’s “Xuelong” icebreaker completed its first passage through the Northwest Passage.

China’s Arctic ambitions have also raised security concerns. In 2016, a Hong Kong–based company proposed purchasing a decommissioned Danish naval base, and in 2018 a Chinese state-owned enterprise bid to expand and modernize Greenland’s airports; both proposals were ultimately blocked by Copenhagen. In 2020, Chinese scholars openly argued that Greenland should serve as a strategic hub for the Polar Silk Road.

In October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Arctic Ocean waters for the first time, operating farther north than previously recorded and signaling an expansion into areas traditionally viewed as within the U.S. strategic sphere.

China frames its Arctic policy around four principles—“understanding, protecting, utilizing, and participating in the governance of the Arctic”—while asserting its “near-Arctic” status and seeking greater influence within Arctic institutions.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/14/n14676123.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Economy/Resources Geo-Strategic Trend US-China Relations

Russian Media Warn Door-Lock Failures Could Turn Chinese Cars into “Mobile Coffins” in Winter

Russian media report growing complaints about door-lock malfunctions in Chinese-made vehicles, particularly during extreme cold. Drivers say the driver-side door can freeze shut, in some cases forcing them to attempt escape through a window—an option that becomes risky in freezing conditions and may damage window-lift mechanisms.

According to Russian outlet Lenta Dnya, the issue is commonly caused by condensation seeping into the electric door-lock actuator. When temperatures drop, the moisture freezes, causing the lock to seize and preventing the door from being opened even manually. Videos circulating online show drivers unable to unlock or open doors from either inside or outside the vehicle, even after lowering the window.

Automotive expert Vadim Kabanov told The Post that harsh Russian winters could turn some Chinese vehicles into “mobile coffins,” posing serious safety hazards. He added that Chinese cars generally perform worse in winter conditions than Korean, Japanese, and German models, and claimed that owners often need to replace key components every three years, with frequent issues including transmission failures.

Source: Epoch Times, January 13, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/12/n14674773.htm

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources