Government/Politics - 9. page

Recently, exiled Chinese scholar Yuan Hongbing, a former law professor at Peking University, gave an exclusive interview in Taiwan, where he recounted his drinking encounters from the past with Xi Jinping. Yuan had previously detailed this experience in New Tang Dynasty TV (NTDTV) program Elite Forum on June 2013.

Xi Jinping served as the Vice Mayor of Xiamen City, Fujian Province from 1985 to 1988. During that time, he flew from Xiamen to Beijing about every two weeks – sometimes even weekly – to build political connections. He usually visited Hu Deping (eldest son of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Yaobang). Xi was a heavy drinker but Hu was not. So Hu introduced Xi to Yuan Hongbing, and from there the two developed a drinking companionship that lasted more than eight months.

Yuan said Xi had a peculiar trait: during the first half of a drinking session, Xi would say almost nothing – coming off as simple, reserved, and inexpressive. But once he’d drunk over half a bottle of Moutai (the best Chinese wine), he would open up and speak at length. Two politically related remarks left the deepest impression on Yuan.

First case: Yuan and many intellectuals held the view that China’s large population was a burden to its economic development. Xi disagreed and said, “Yuan Hongbing, you’re wrong. China’s population isn’t too big – it’s too small. China needs 4 billion people to manage the world. To realize global communism, we need people to govern.” Yuan reflected that this mindset was understandable, as Xi’s ideology was formed during the Cultural Revolution and deeply shaped by Mao Zedong’s ideas.

Second case: Xi, Yuan, and Bai Enpei (then CCP Party Secretary of the Yan’an Prefectural Committee in Shaanxi Province and later the Party Secretary of Yunnan Province and sentenced to death with reprieve under Xi’s anti-corruption campaign) once drank together while Bai was attending training at the Central Party School in Beijing. The topic of the Korean War’s Battle of Chosin Reservoir came up. Bai criticized China’s Ninth Corps’ commanders for sending 150,000 soldiers to a freezing battlefield without adequate winter gear, resulting in two-thirds of the unit being killed or severely frostbitten. Bai called it a crime and said Mao Zedong should be held accountable, and Song Shilun (the commanding general) should be harshly punished.

Xi Jinping suddenly erupted in anger. He rebuked Bai, saying the battle was “a tremendous strategic victory,” and that the sacrifice was necessary. Xi insisted that Song Shilun should not only be absolved but honored as a hero. The two argued heatedly and even came to blows – Bai Enpei sustained some injuries in the scuffle.

Yuan Hongbing concluded that this incident revealed something about Xi’s psychological makeup: in Xi’s mind, the loss of life – no matter how great – is secondary. What truly matters to him is the realization of a dictator’s idealized vision of political and military power.

Source: NTDTV, May 11, 2025
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2025/05/10/a103984479.html

China’s State Council Information Office released the whitepaper “China’s National Security in the New Era” on May 12. The whitepaper stressed the importance of security of  the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) ruling over the country and rejecting the Western’s universal values or “color revolution.” The following are some key excerpts from the whitepaper:

I. China Injects Certainty and Stability into a World of Turmoil

{The whitepaper assessed the external and internal threats}

External security pressures are increasing. Western anti-China forces are making every effort to contain, suppress, and restrain China, pursuing strategies of Westernization and division, and engaging in infiltration and sabotage. Extra-regional powers are increasingly interfering in China’s neighboring affairs, posing threats to the security of China’s border regions and periphery. Certain countries are crudely interfering in China’s internal affairs, stirring up trouble in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, and frequently provoking issues related to Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong. Some external forces are intent on playing the “Taiwan card,” while “Taiwan independence” forces stubbornly maintain a separatist stance and continue to provoke dangerously. Meanwhile, overseas separatist forces such as “Tibetan independence” and “East Turkestan independence” are also increasingly active.

Some key and core technologies remain under foreign control. The foundation for economic recovery and growth is not yet solid. Major natural disasters, production safety accidents, public health incidents, and serious criminal events still occasionally occur, impacting social security and stability. The safety of overseas institutions, projects, and personnel also faces real risks.

II. The Holistic National Security Concept Guides National Security in the New Era

The key to the holistic national security … emphasizes a broad security vision that covers numerous domains: political, military, territorial, economic, financial, cultural, social, technological, cyber, food, ecological, resource, nuclear, overseas interests, space, deep sea, polar regions, biology, artificial intelligence, and data security. It also evolves dynamically in line with social development.

{Two subsections stressed the CCP’s security.}

(3) Prioritizing Political Security

This is the lifeline of China’s national security in the new era. The core of political security is the security of the state regime and the political system. Most fundamentally, this means safeguarding the leadership and governing status of the Chinese Communist Party and upholding the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. Without political security, China would fall into disunity and chaos, and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation would be out of reach. The fundamental and long-term interests of the people could not be guaranteed. We must enhance political sensitivity and discernment, promptly eliminate various political risks, and prevent non-political risks from escalating into political ones.

(7) Strengthening the Party’s Absolute Leadership Over National Security Work

{Omitted}

III. Providing Strong Support for Steady and Long-Term Progress of Chinese-Style Modernization

{This section shows the CCP’s priorities in security.}

(1) Safeguarding the Party’s Governing Status and the Socialist System

We must prevent and resist infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and separatist activities by hostile forces. This includes resolutely guarding against foreign anti-China forces promoting Western-style democracy, freedom, human rights, and so-called “universal values” as a strategy to Westernize and divide China. We must closely monitor, strictly prevent, and harshly crack down on various infiltration and subversive activities, such as “color revolutions” and “street politics,” orchestrated by hostile forces. Nationwide national security education should be normalized to solidify the people’s defense line.

(2) Enhancing the People’s Sense of Gain, Happiness, and Security
(3) Ensuring High-Quality Development
(4) Safeguarding National Territorial Integrity and Maritime Rights
(5) Ensuring Security and Reliability in Emerging Fields

Source: Chinese Government website, May 12, 2025
https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202505/content_7023405.htm