Hot Topics – Page 12

Leadership: The CCP’s State Advisors

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a few political and ideological advisors. They are called the “state advisors.” The Epoch Times reported on four of them. All four came from Fudan University.

Wang Huning (王沪宁), a Standing Committee Member of the Politburo, is the top advisor to Xi Jinping. He also advised the previous two CCP top leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Thus he is called the “Three Dynasties State Advisor.”

Wang was affiliated with Fudan University for 17 years, from 1978 to 1995. First he was a graduate student then a professor, followed by department chair and dean of the School of Law. He is deeply connected to Fudan University and brought a few other Fudan scholars as “state advisors” to the CCP leadership.

Zhang Weiwei (张维为), Dean of the School of China Studies, Fudan University, was invited to lecture to the Standing Committee Members of the Politburo on May 31 on the topic of “Strengthening China’s International Communication Capabilities.” The details of Zhang’s talk were not available, but he said in an interview the next day that his diplomatic stand was that the CCP is right, but the world has a “malicious misinterpretation.”

Zhang’s advice to the Standing Committee Members was clear, “When it is time to punch, then punch; when it is time to mock then mock; and when it is the time to give out a loud shouting warning then give out a loud shouting warning.”

Zhang is known for talking down about the U.S. His infamous quotes include, “China has fully reached moderate prosperity for the entire nation, but the U.S. still has 40 million people living below the poverty line.” His book “China Is Fighting the Pandemic,” claimed the COVID-19 pandemic was a catalyst for the world to tilt rapidly to the East while sending the West tumbling.

Another advisor is Zheng Ruolin (郑若麟), Researcher at the School of China Studies of Fudan University. Zheng frequently writes for the Shanghai Wen Hui Bao, the newspaper owned by the Shanghai Party Committee.

Zheng published articles that stated, “It is far from enough just to rely on the diplomat wolf warriors to fight the public opinion war.” Instead, media and scholars should all participate in that war. He suggested that China’s media “should assume the role of the main force” in the war of public opinion against the West. The most important thing to do is to “repeat, repeat, repeat;” and “a lie repeated a thousand times will really become the ‘truth’!”

Zheng also suggested supporting the “international friends” who speak for the CCP. “Some examples are: to purchase copyrights of their books to publish them to the world; give them China’s book awards or news awards; invite them to visit China; and hire them as professors at our universities. …”

Another advisor is Shen Yi (沈逸), Associate Professor at the Department of International Politics, Fudan University. He is known for his outlandish statements on nationalism and is popular among the people with extreme nationalist views.

On May 1, the CCP Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC) published a picture titled, “China Lit Fire vs. India Lit Fire.” The picture showed on one side China’ launching a rocket and on the other side India’s burning the bodies of people who died due to the COVID-19 virus (India was at its peak of suffering from COVID at that time). Many people, including Huanqiu’s Chief Editor Hu Xijin, criticized the picture for lack of empathy. The PLAC then removed the picture. However, Shen praised the picture on the social media, calling it the normal response to India’s “sultry slutty style.” He even blamed Hu Xijin for not being tough on this point and for issuing a surrender.

Source: The Epoch Times, July 19, 2021
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/21/7/19/n13099514.htm

Hot Topics | | July 28, 2021 | Government/Politics

People’s Lives: Did Zhengzhou Reservoir Release Flood Water without Informing the Public?

Henan Province suffered much rainfall recently. On July 20, the streets of its capital city, Zhengzhou, were completely under water and cars were washed away.

The videos of people trapped in subway trains, which the city kept running during the flood, were widespread on social media. Around 6 p.m. on July 20, subway trains were stuck underground due to the water. Water started to flow into the cars through the doors and kept accumulating. Some reported water reached 1.6 meters high. Passengers stood on chairs to keep their heads above water and parents held their babies in the air. People started to call their families to leave their wills and account information. Quite a few people lost conscience as there was not enough air. Finally the rescuers arrived and many people were saved. The authorities announced 12 deaths. The people who survived the tragedy questioned this number.

A bigger controversy was that people questioned whether the disaster was caused by the authorities’ releasing flood water from the reservoir near Zhengzhou without first informing the public.

An article listing several suspicious points was widely spread over the Internet. China Digital Times saved a copy in case the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deleted the article. The following is a summary of the highlights:

1. When were people saved?

A number of the Zhengzhou and the Henan Provincial news media declared victory in early evening. Zhengzhou News Radio said at 7:23 p.m. that all passengers were saved. The Huanqiu website quoted Zhengzhou News at 8:02 p.m. stating people were saved. Henan Province Daxiang News reported victory at 9:17 p.m.

However, an online video showed that a passenger said it was past 8 p.m. and rescuers had not arrived yet. A microblog posting at 11:25 p.m. said that his family members were trapped in the subway No. 5 line and had not been rescued yet, but that posting was removed very quickly. Another microblog posted at 3:09 a.m. on July 21 said people at the Guangnan Road Station of subway No. 5 line had been trapped from 6 p.m. till then and still were waiting to be rescued.

Xinhua News Agency also reported at 0:54 a.m. on July 21 that the rescue was still ongoing and the number of casualties was unknown.

2. How substantial was the amount of rain?

The Zhengzhou authorities blamed the weather for the disaster. The Zhengzhou official weather microblog said, “Zhengzhou had rain of 201.9 mm (millimeters) in one hour (4 p.m. to 5 p.m. on July 20), and 552.5 mm in one day (8 p.m. on July 19 to 8 p.m. on July 20).”

However, the National Weather Bureau had a top article discussing the Henan heavy rainfall, “Hehan Province has had heavy rainfall since July 17. Zhengzhou’s average rainfall (from July 17 to 20) was 357 mm. In one day (from 5 p.m. July 19 to 5 p.m. July 20), the average rainfall in Henan Province was 73.1 mm and that in Zhengzhou was 286.5 mm. … The biggest rainfall occurred in Zhengzhou’s Jiangang site, which was 584.0 mm.”

It seems that the Zhengzhou officials exaggerated the rainfall dramatically. It took the biggest rainfall in one location and made it the city average.

3. Did the government release water from the reservoir near Zhengzhou?

Around 10 p.m. on July 20, messages started to spread among social media in China that the water broke the main gate of the Changzhou Reservoir and the authorities bombed the sub-gates to release floodwater.

The Henan Public Security Bureau sent a microblog message at 11:06 p.m. immediately to declare this was a rumor.

However, The Beijing News published an article at 0:48 a.m. on July 21, stating, “The Changzhuang Reservoir opened the gates to release flood-water around 4 p.m. on July 20.” It quoted the source as being from the CCTV Military channel.

National Business Daily reported at 10:53 p.m. on July 20, “According to CCTV news, … The water at the Changzhuang Reservoir reached 127.87 meters at 10:57 a.m. on July 20, which was 0.38 meters above the “alerting” water level. Following the Henan Provincial and Zhengzhou Municipal Flood Control Command’s order, the reservoir started releasing flood-water at 3 cubic meters per second.”

Baidu Encyclopedia said that the Changzhuang Reservoir was 2 km (around 1.2 mile) away from Zhengzhou’s Xihuan Road. The Reservoir dam was 36.74 meters above the center of Zhengzhou city and 52.74 meters above the Zhengdong New District, of Zhengzhou.

All these media, including CCTV said that the Changzhuang Reservoir released water. The timeline seemed to be a good match: The reservoir released water around 4 p.m. and subway trains in Zhengzhou were taken over by flood-water around 6 p.m.

The article questioned whether the authorities were trying to cover up their releasing flood water without notifying the public, which caused a huge disaster for the people.

Source: China Digital Times, July 20, 2021

【404文库】七使2020 | 郑州洪灾，水库溃坝：我们要真相，不要糊涂账

Hot Topics | | July 23, 2021 | Social Stability

Leadership: Central Security Bureau’s Leadership Change

Recently, Xi Jinping appointed Zhou Hongxu (周洪许) as the Director of the Central Security Bureau (中央警卫局). Coming from the position of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Army, Zhou is the first Central Security Bureau’s head appointed from outside instead of being promoted from within.

Cheng Xiaonong, an expert on China issues, wrote a lengthy article to explain the importance of the Central Security Bureau to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) top leader and how appointment of the bureau’s director works.

The Central Security Bureau is best known for its role in the political coup in 1976 after Mao Zedong died. At that time, Marshall Ye Jianying, Prime Minister Hua Guofeng, and Security Chief Wang Dongxing joined forces and ordered the guards of the Central Security Bureau to arrest the “Gang of Four,” including Mao’s wife Jiang Qing. This coupe ended the disastrous Cultural Revolution in China, and thus was praised as a heroic action.

Cheng explained the inside operation of the CCP system. There is only one ultimate TOP LEADER of the CCP system, who may or may not hold the highest official title. For example, then paramount leader Deng Xiaoping let his subordinates Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang hold the highest CCP’s position – General Secretary of the CCP.

The TOP LEADER secures his power via effectively monitoring/controlling other officials.

He uses three key units of the CCP General Office (中央办公厅) to carry out the control: the Confidential Bureau (机要局), the Health Services Bureau (保健局), and the Central Security Bureau (警卫局).

The Confidential Bureau serves confidential documents and manages the confidential phone systems. Ministers and officials above the ministerial level, have a four-digit-number confidential phone, which is called the “red phone” due to its red case. There is also a “39” phone system, since those phones have their numbers start with “39” and then five digits afterward. The “39” phones are installed at Zhongnanhai, the Great Hall of the People, the Diaoyutai Hotel, and the Yuquanshan Guest House. The Confidential Bureau monitors both the red phones and the 39 phones.

The Health Service Bureau provides personal health care to the few top CCP officials, including health checkups, daily medication, and treatment plans in case of illness. This bureau directly reports to the TOP LEADER and many times only the TOP LEADER knows the real health problem of the other officials. For example, Mao Zedong knew that his Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had cancer but didn’t tell Zhou; Mao also decided not to conduct a cancer treatment operation for Zhou.

The Central Security Bureau is responsible for the safety of the TOP LEADER. The unit also assigns personal security guards to other high-ranking officials.

Though staff members from these three units are assigned to serve individual officials, they report back to their own bureau, so their true loyalty stays within the bureau but not with the official they are serving. They are the eyes and ears of the TOP LEADER to monitor other officials’ actions.

Therefore, the head of the Central Security Bureau is very important to the TOP LEADER. When a new top leader takes power from the incumbent, he will naturally want to replace the director, but he may wait for a few years before doing it. One reason is that if he does it immediately, it shows he does not trust the incumbent leader and creates tension. The other reason is that he may need time to find someone that he can truly trust.

From 1978 to 1994, Deng Xiaoping used Yang Dezhong (杨德中) as the Director of the Central Security Bureau. Deng also took the three key units out of the CCP General Office and put them under the Central Military Commission, which he directly controlled. There are three top leadership titles in China, Deng had the title of Chairman of Central Military Commission and gave the other two, CCP General Secretary and President of China, to others.

Jiang Zemin inherited all the powers after Deng passed away. Jiang held all three big titles and moved the three units back under the CCP General Office. From 1994 to 2007Jiang installed his loyalist You Xigui (由喜贵) as the head of Central Security Bureau.

The next leader, Hu Jintao, took the top office in 2002, though Jiang still had the real power. It took Hu five years, that is, not until 2007, was he able to replace Jiang’s man You Xigui by his own person Cao Qing (曹清).

When Xi Jinping took over in 2012, Xi kept Cao to show his respect and trust to Hu. After more than two years, Xi was ready to replace Cao. He disclosed the information to the New York Times and the BBC that the Central Security Bureau used his “air force one” to smuggle ivory from Africa, and then used that excuse to move Cao out. Xi promoted Wang Shaojun (王少军) to the Director position from 2015 to 2019.

In 2018, Xi appointed Chen Denglv (陈登铝) as the Deputy Director and Political Commissar of the Central Security Bureau. Chen was an outsider appointee, coming from the position of the Political Commissar of the 91st Division of the 31st Group Army in Zhangzhou, Fujian Province. Xi worked in Fujian from 1985 to 2002 and the 31^st Group Army is considered Xi’s loyalist army. Chen ran the Central Security Bureau from his Deputy Director position after Director Wang left. The director position was vacant from 2019 until the recent appointment of Zhou Hongxu.

Xi’s appointing outsiders as both the Director and Deputy Director of the Central Security Bureau had two risks: One, the bureau’s internal officials might see little hope for promotion. Two, the bureau’s current staff might worry whether Xi would get more outsiders to replace them. These do not help Xi to control the Central Security Bureau so that he can monitor other officials.

Despite these risks, Xi still chose outsiders rather than an internal promotion. This indicates that the officials of the Central Security Bureau might have been involved in CCP in-fighting, that CCP in-fighting is active, and that Xi is worried about the Central Security Bureau’s loyalty to him.

Source: Epoch Times, July 17, 2021
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/21/7/17/n13095911.htm

Hot Topics | | July 22, 2021 | Government/Politics

U.S.-China Relations: CCP’s Advice to the Biden Administration (Chinese Media’s Editorial on the Biden-Xi Talk)

After Joe Biden called Xi Jinping on Chinese New Year’s Eve (February 11, 2021), and they spoke for 2 hours, several of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) primary media published commentaries discussing the CCP’s advice to the Biden administration.

1. Xinhua:

The talk showed three positive signals. The first positive signal was the Chinese New Year’s greeting to each other.

The second positive signal was the willingness to communicate. China and the United States should re-establish a number of dialogue mechanisms to understand each other’s policy intentions accurately and to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.

The third positive signal was the identification with the spirit of cooperation.

The Xinhua article also stated, “The Sino-U.S. relationship is at a critical juncture at this moment. The diplomacy by the head of state will have an irreplaceable guiding role (on this issue).”

2. People’s Daily:

(We) must point out, China wants to develop a cooperative relationship with the U.S. but this cooperation must be a cooperation based on principles. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang related issues are China’s internal affair. They are related to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The U.S. should respect China’s core interests and act with caution.

How to deal with differences is a subject that both China and the U.S. must answer well. … China and the U.S. should re-establish all kinds of dialogue mechanisms to understand each other’s policy intentions accurately and to avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations.

3. Huanqiu (Global Times):

The U.S. briefing also said that Biden started with his New Year wishes to the Chinese people, which was widely seen as Biden’s gesture to show respect to President Xi Jinping and China. He seemed to use that goodwill to balance some tough messages the new U.S. administration has been sending to China and how the public opinion has been interpreting them lately.

Choosing the conversation time at the Chinese New Year’s Eve and starting with a Chinese New Year’s greeting between the two heads of state reaffirmed Biden’s basic attitude of wanting to compete with China with the bottom line of not to turn competition into conflicts.

The Sino-U.S. relation has become more and more complex. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) announced on February 10 that it would establish a China Working Group to coordinate each of the DOD’s components of China policy and actions. This is an unprecedented mechanism arrangement. It should impact the overall U.S. – China policy. There is a trend of more conflict between China and the U.S. Some U.S. elites have the attitude of “the tougher toward China the better,” but if that keeps developing, the U.S. will face inevitable strategic risk. Therefore, controlling Sino-U.S. differences is a key issue that the Biden administration has no choice but to discuss seriously with China.

1. Excerpt in Chinese:

积极信号之一是互致新春祝福。

积极信号之二是保持沟通意愿。中美双方应该重新建立各种对话机制，准确了解彼此的政策意图，避免误解误判。

积极信号之三是认同合作精神。

当前，中美关系正处于重要关口，元首外交具有不可替代的引领作用。

Source: Xinhua, February 11, 2021
http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2021-02/11/c_1127094070.htm

2. Excerpt in Chinese:

需要指出的是，中方致力于同美方发展合作关系，但这种合作，必然是有原则的合作。台湾、涉港、涉疆等问题是中国内政，事关中国主权和领土完整，美方应该尊重中国的核心利益，慎重行事。

如何处理分歧，是中美双方必须回答好的一个课题。为了维护两国民众福祉与世界和平稳定，双方都有必要在有不同看法的问题上，做到相互尊重、平等相待，以建设性方式妥善管控和处理。中美双方应该重新建立各种对话机制，准确了解彼此的政策意图，避免误解误判。在这方面，双方曾经积累了大量经验。美国前财长雅克布·卢近日在公开活动中回忆了亲身参与中美战略与经济对话的经历，强调双方要通过对话协商，在有共同目标的领域找到合作方式，在有意见分歧的领域找到改变和进步的路径。此次中美两国元首通话中，拜登总统也表示，美方愿同中方本着相互尊重的精神，开展坦诚和建设性对话，增进相互理解，避免误解误判。应该说，这样的思路如果能够落到实处，将有助于中美关系尽快回归正轨。

事实早已证明，正确的政治决断，是保证中美关系不脱离正确航向的基本前提。多考虑合作，不蓄意对抗，才是两国之福。

Source: People’s Daily, February 14, 2021
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2021/0214/c64387-32029422.html

3. Excerpt in Chinese:

美方的通报也说，拜登一上来就向中国人民表达了他的新年祝福，这被广泛看成拜登向习近平主席和中国表达尊重的姿态。他似乎想用这一善意平衡美国新政府近来传递出的一些对华强硬信息以及舆论对那些信息的解读。

这次两国领导人的通话选在除夕，以两位元首相互拜年开始，再次验证了拜登希望同中国竞争、但给竞争设下不演变成冲突的底线这一基本态度。

中美关系复杂化的趋势越来越明显。美国国防部10日宣告成立中国工作组，要协调国防部各部门的对华政策和行动，这是美国军方前所未有的机制性安排，应该也会对美国的整体对华政策制定产生影响。中美摩擦点呈增多趋势，美国部分精英中存在“对华越强硬越好”的情绪，而那样发展下去显然意味着美国难以承受的战略风险，因而管控中美分歧将是拜登政府不得不认真与中方共同探讨的关键事项。

Source: Huanqiu, February 11, 2021
https://m.huanqiu.com/article/41t9jigLliO

Hot Topics | | February 28, 2021 | US-China Relations

Pandemic: People in Shanghai Do not Trust China-Made Vaccine

China has started providing COVID-19 vaccine to doctors, nurses, and people in essential industries. However, several official documents from Shanghai, which the Epoch Times obtained, show that people in Shanghai do not want to take the China-made vaccine.

Jing’an District is a main district in Shanghai, with a population of 1.06 million. It has 9 tertiary hospitals (usually these are the comprehensive and general hospitals in the city and have over 500 beds), 9 secondary hospitals (usually with 100 to 500 beds), and 15 society health service centers.

A report by the Jing’an District Health Committee on January 8, 2021, stated it had “surveyed 113,000 people in the district and 24,000 expressed interest in taking the vaccine.” That means 21.2 percent of the people were willing to take the vaccine, while 78.8 percent people were not.

Two other reports by the Jing’an District Health Committee showed that healthcare providers have a low interest in the Chinese vaccine. The Cishuixian Women and Children’s Hospital surveyed 135 people, but only 33 people were willing to take the shot. In Huadong Hospital, 616 out of 1,261 surveyed people were interested. In the Shanghai Dermatology Hospital, 124 out of 735 surveyed people were interested.

Government employees were not interested either. Only 25 people from the 155 people surveyed in the Shanghai Municipal Health Insurance Management Center were open to taking the vaccine.

Ten delivery companies surveyed 1,196 people, with a total of 12 people showing interest. One taxi company has 2 people out of 101 surveyed who showed interest and another taxi company had only 1 out of 30 surveyed who showed interest.

The district has 42 senior centers and 1 rescue station in the district. A total of 1,317 people in these institutes were surveyed. While 35 institutes reported zero interest, the other 8 institutes had 48 people who showed interest.

Excerpt in Chinese:

新一轮新冠病毒（COVID-19，中共病毒）疫情正在上海扩散，中共已对医生、护士、工勤人员等部分重点人群开展疫苗接种。

大纪元日前获得了中共上海市政府的部分防疫文件，文件披露上海市民普遍抗拒接种新冠病毒疫苗，包括医护人员在内的重点人群多数不愿接种。

上海市静安区卫生健康委员会在2021年1月8日提交的《2020年度静安区疾病预防控制工作汇报》中透露：1. “辖区排摸11.3万人，有意愿接种的2.4万人”；愿意接种新冠疫苗的比例仅为21.2%，不足四分之一；换言之，四分之三的上海静安区市民是不愿意接种新冠疫苗的。

静安区是上海市的主要城区之一，依据静安区卫健委工作汇报文件，静安区常住人口105.77万，户籍91.41万；户籍60岁以上人口占比39.06%；辖区内的医疗资源丰富，有三级医院9家，二级医院9家，社区卫生服务中心15家，公卫专业机构5家。

上海静安区卫健委的内部文件披露出，重点人群接种新冠病毒疫苗的意愿非常低。

以医疗卫生系统为例。根据静安区卫健委今年1月填报的《上海市新型冠状病毒疫苗接种摸底登记汇总表》，上海三级医院慈水仙妇儿医院排摸总人数135人，其中意愿接种人数只有33人，排摸对象属于重点人群中的医疗卫生人员。

根据静安区卫健委去年底填报的静安三级医疗机构《疫苗摸底登记汇总表》数据，意愿接种比例最高的上海市华东医院排摸1,261人，意愿接种616人，占比也未过半；而上海市皮肤病医院排摸735人，意愿接种124人，占比还不到五分之一。

即便是中共的公务员系统，对于新冠疫苗也是相当地抗拒。例如上海市政府的上海市医疗保险事业管理中心排摸155人，愿意接种的只有25人，占比不到六分之一。

而上海静安区卫健委的疫苗摸底文件表明，作为重点人群的物流和运输系统，很多人都不愿接种。静安区内的10家快递公司总共排摸了1,196人，意愿接种疫苗的只有12人，平均一家快递公司只有一人有意愿接种。

静安区卫健委今年1月7日-15日填报的物流行业《疫苗接种摸底汇总表》显示，上海大众运行物流股份有限公司排摸92人，愿意接种的只有30人；上海夜城出租汽车服务有限公司排摸101人，愿意接种的只有2人；上海中山汽车出租公司排摸30人，愿意接种的只有1人。上海芷新（集团）有限公司（含客运总站、芷新客运）排摸300人，意愿接种人数合计53人。

静安区福利和养老机构的《疫苗接种摸底汇总表》显示，在辖区内42家养老院和1家救助站中，有35家机构是零意愿接种、即一个愿意接种疫苗的人都没有；静安区43家养老（含救助）机构排摸总共1,317人，愿意接种的只有48人。

Hot Topics - 12. page

Leadership: The CCP’s State Advisors

Leadership: Central Security Bureau’s Leadership Change

U.S.-China Relations: CCP’s Advice to the Biden Administration (Chinese Media’s Editorial on the Biden-Xi Talk)

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