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A Road Map for the Development of Inner-Party Democracy

      
A Road Map for the Development of Inner-Party Democracy" [1]

"The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee raised the issue that the party is facing profoundly severe challenges. … It revealed the deep background and an inevitable trend of developing inner-party democracy under the new situation. One of the important tests the Party is facing is to achieve legitimacy in the transformation of governance, that is, the transformation from revolution legitimacy to governance legitimacy, and to achieve democratic governance under highly developed inner-party democracy. The Plenary Session … placed the development of inner-party democracy in a very prominent position, proposed strategic thinking and detailed requirements for inner-party democracy’s development, and laid a road map for further developing democracy within the party. This road map includes four elements: adhering to one principle, laying one foundation, following one path, and perfecting one system. Adhering to one principle means to adhere to the unity of inner-party democracy and centralization, or the principle of democratic centralism; [3] laying one foundation is to strengthen the building of grassroots democracy within the party and consolidate the cornerstone of democracy within the party; following one path is to follow the path of inner-party democracy leading people’s democracy, to achieve an effective connection and interaction between inner-party democracy and people’s democracy. Perfecting one system means to reform and perfect a series of specific systems of inner-party democracy and improve the institutionalization of democracy within the party. "

"Either from a theoretical or from a practical perspective, there are three forms of relationship between democracy and centralization: strong democracy, weak centralization; weak democracy, strong centralization; and the unity of democracy and centralization. A revolutionary party generally adopts the second form, namely, weak democracy and strong centralization. This is due to the need to ensure the victory of the revolution. It was also related to the limitations associated with the situation back then. When a revolutionary party turns into a governing party, especially governing in a market economy and in opening up conditions, it requires transformation from the second to the third form, that is, from weak democracy strong centralization to the unity of democracy and centralization. Democratic centralism is the third form, which is the combination of centralization based on democracy and democracy under centralized guidance. Developing inner-party democracy does not mean to abandon the centralization within the party, but to change the situation where there is not enough democracy but too much centralization." "Given the conditions of our country and the party, it is feasible and relatively beneficial to choose transformation from weak democracy, strong centralization to the unity of democracy and centralization, that is, maintaining centralization while developing inner-party democracy, or democratic centralism. Centralization within the party embodies a number of specific principles and systems, such as the party’s leadership, the party’s managing its cadres, and so on. Developing inner-party democracy is inseparable from the party’s leadership and promotion. Inner-party democracy can only be developed orderly and healthily under the leadership of the party. … Without the party’s leadership and promotion, inner-party democracy will be difficult to develop, may lead to a wrong path, or may even cause the party to split."

"The development of inner-party democracy is critical to political system reform and the stability of the nation’s reform and development policies. … A safer way is to effectively build grass-roots democracy from the grassroots level. A grassroots unit involves a small number of party members and is relatively simple to operate with relatively low risk. Thus it is a good testing ground to try inner-Party democracy. It will help us to learn democracy while practicing democracy, and practice democracy while learning democracy." "Whether we can develop a good grass-roots democracy within the party is directly related to the immediate interests of party members. Party members and the masses care the most about the development of grassroots democracy within the party. The development of grassroots democracy within the party will facilitate party members to be directly involved in the management and decision-making processes of party affairs at the grassroots level, and fully reflect the democratic rights of party members."

"The people’s democratic system is formed and developed under the party’s leadership. If we want to continue the development of the people’s democracy, we must have a breakthrough in inner-party democracy; otherwise the room for people’s democracy will be limited. From a procedural point of view, inner-party democracy in some respects is the front link for people’s democracy. For example, the candidates for government leaders must be nominated by the ruling party. Hence, at this point, the ruling party’s inner-party democracy has a decisive impact on the people’s democracy. More importantly, it is a strategic choice to have inner-party democracy lead the people’s democracy. In the democratic development process, if the people’s democracy is too far ahead, independent forces outside the ruling party could constitute a challenge to the ruling party’s governing position. This is what the ruling party does not want to see during its development of democracy." "The development of inner-party democracy could serve as a model for the people’s democracy, mainly in the following areas: how to protect democratic rights; how to build a competition mechanism; how to improve democratic procedures; and how to constrain and balance power. If we can implement the constraints and balances of power within the ruling party which is the core of state power, it will not be difficult at all to develop the people’s democracy."

"The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC central committee pointed out that (we should) uphold and perfect the party’s leadership system, perfect the party’s congress system and the party’s electoral system, and improve the mechanism of democratic decision-making within the party. The system plays a fundamental role. For inner-party democracy to really work, we must rely on a series of effective concrete systems: 1. Perfect the party’s congress and the committee system. In recent years we have … implemented the party congress tenure system, and emphasized the committee’s role in major personnel decisions, but there is still much room for improvement. We need innovation in the process of determining representatives and committee members, and also improving the quantity and quality of meetings. 2. Perfect the competitive election system within the party. Currently there is room for the party’s election system to improve, mainly in two areas. One is in candidate nominations, which has a significant impact on the election results. If the power of nomination rests in the hands of a few people, it is not beneficial for broadening the view for the election, and can easily lead to corruption. The second is whether to have the same number of candidates as there are positions, or to have more candidates, and if more, how much more. The meaning of an election is to choose from a number of candidates. If we offer the same number of candidates or a slightly larger number of candidates, compared to the positions to be elected, the election is not meaningful any more. 3. Improve the democratic decision-making mechanism within the party. Improving the decision-making mechanism is an extremely urgent requirement and task for developing democracy within the party. The main disadvantage of the current decision-making mechanism is that the power is too concentrated in a few hands, especially in the ‘number one’ hands. Sometimes it is only a "one-man decision." This has become a major cause for decision-making errors and corruption."

Promote Democracy within the Party in Our Study and Practice [2]

"On June 29, 2009, at the 14th group study meeting of the Central Politburo, Comrade Hu Jintao clearly pointed out that promoting inner-party democracy is a strategic task in the great new project to comprehensively promote the party’s development. … The Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee once again called on all party members and leading cadres to work hard at mastering and applying all new scientific ideas, new knowledge, and new experiences, and to treat the strategic task of building a learning-oriented Marxism Party as an urgent priority. Therefore, promoting democracy within the party in our study and practice and leading people to create a new situation in the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics have become the strategic tasks for our party’s development. As the governing party we must study democracy more comprehensively and more systematically, and practice democracy in a broader and deeper way."

"To promote inner-party democracy, we must seriously and systematically study the Marxist  theory of democracy. Marxism is the thinking and action guideline for the proletarian party. Marxism is not only revolutionary theory but also development theory." "To promote inner-party democracy, we must have a broad and open vision and objectively learn the outstanding civilization results from other countries in their development of democracy. The historical development of democracy is diverse. The democratic practice models in different countries are vastly different, too. Different countries and different nationalities choose their own model for democratic development based on their own historical and cultural traditions and specific national conditions. … Our country has a long, rich history of feudalism. It is lacking in democratic traditions and democratic culture. … [We] must have an open and inclusive attitude to selectively learn step by step from outstanding civilizations’ experiences in the development of a democratic political system." "To promote inner-party democracy, based on our current task, we must timely and comprehensively learn from the democratic experiences created and summarized in the nation’s reform process. … The creative practice of grassroots democracy within the party has crystallized the wisdom, hard work, responsibility, and vision of the grassroots party members and cadres." "To promote inner-party democracy … we must get rid of various erroneous arguments that occurred during the development of democracy, achieve a systematic connection, and promote systematic development and mechanism innovation under the framework of the law. We must encourage all party members and cadres to actively participate in the democratic process, exercise democratic skills, and develop democratic habits, to ensure the vitality and sustainability of inner-party democracy by institutional development."

"To practice democracy within the party, we must first break through the theory of democratic conditions and the fear of democracy. We must promote the practice of inner-party democracy without hesitation and be down to earth. … The essence of the democratic conditions theory is to postpone the practice of democracy into the unforeseeable future using the excuse of waiting for the conditions suitable for democracy to arrive. The essence of the fear of democracy is either people’s fear of losing their own privileges and special gains under democracy, or, due to their lack of understanding of democracy, taking it for granted that democracy will bring chaos and disorder." "To practice inner-party democracy, we must achieve a systematic connection among inner-party democracy, people’s democracy, and social democracy. … In the process of building China’s socialist democratic politics, the inner-party democracy is the core, the people’s democracy is the main project, while social democracy is the foundation. If there is no inner-party democracy, the development of democratic politics will lose its guidance and direction; if there is no people’s democracy, the development of democratic politics will lose its soul and the specifications for its system; if there is no social democracy, the development of democratic politics will lose its momentum and foundation. When implementing inner-party democracy leading people’s democracy, we must treat them as being linked overall and not overemphasize one and ignore the other. … The development of the inner-party democratic system, mechanisms, and procedures can help regulate the democratic practice and avoid disorder, confusion, impulsiveness, and blindness. The development of inner-party democracy must be under the rule of law, procedure-oriented, and normalized." "To practice democracy within the party, all party members and cadres must be encouraged to actively participate in the democratic process. … Party organizations at all levels must encourage party members to participate in a variety of democratic practices. Each individual member must show their enthusiasm, initiative and creativity. … When we learn while practicing and learn through practice, culture and structure, as well as attitudes and behavior continually interact with each other. The socialist democratic political culture will mature and improve together." "Only when we are prepared for danger in times of safety … and vigorously promote the development of inner-party democracy, will we be able to control the power of our voice in the global ideological competition … and ultimately promote the renaissance of the great course of building socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Endnotes:
[1] Study Times, October 26, 2009
http://www.studytimes.com.cn/WebPage/ny1.aspx?act=0&id=3006&bid=5
[2] Study Times, October 26, 2009
http://www.studytimes.com.cn/WebPage/ny1.aspx?act=1&id=3006&nid=10929&bid=5&page=1
[3] Democratic centralism is the name given to the principles of internal organization used by Leninist political parties. … The democratic aspect of this organizational method describes the freedom of members of the political party to discuss and debate matters of policy and direction, but once the decision of the party is made by majority vote, all members are expected to uphold that decision. This latter aspect represents the centralism.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_centralism

Australia Chinese Newspaper Group: China’s Broadcasting Mouthpiece in the U.S.

The radio station KGBC near Houston, Texas has become China’s official mouthpiece. Sina.com republished an article by the Australia Chinese Newspaper Group on April 29, reporting that the radio station has become the home base in the U.S. of China Radio International (CRI). KGBC, at AM1540, is based in Galveston, 50 miles from Houston. It has 67 years of history and had financial difficulties for years. Recently, a U.S. company made a very attractive offer and bought it. It then started broadcasting CRI’s programs around the clock. The previous owner was not aware of the purchasing company’s deal with CRI. KGBC’s loyal listeners found that they were listening to “Asian music and political forums,” instead of the traditional and hot music and talk shows that they enjoyed in the past.

Source: Sina.com, April 29, 2010
http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/chn/chnnews/ausdaily/20100429/00211400610.html

Central Comprehensive Management Office: Advancing Conflict Investigation and Mediation Work

The Central Comprehensive Management Office recently published the “Opinion on Implementing the Big Conflict Investigation and Mediation Work.” The opinion stressed that, to maintain social stability, it is important to further improve conflict and dispute investigation and mediation efforts throughout the country. Officials should work at the origin of the conflict and try to put it down at its earliest stage. The whole effort should be under the Party’s leadership. It should follow the principle of “whoever is in charge is responsible (for the issue).” It will be  implemented primarily at the county and town level for rural areas and district and street level for urban areas.

Source: Xinhua, April 26, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-04/26/c_1257307.htm

36,000 College Graduates to Serve as Village Officials in 2010

On Aprl 29, the Central Propaganda Department issued the “Notice on Quotas of College Graduates for Village Official Positions for 2010.” The notice increased the target number of college graduates who will serve as village officials to 200,000 for the period from 2008 to 2012, with 36,000 in 2010. So far there are 159,000 college graduates working in villages, with 24% holding party or village official titles. The order also asks local authorities to keep these college graduates there after their term is over.

[Ed: In 2008, to solve the unemployment problem for college graduates and strengthen control in rural areas, the Central Propaganda Department started sending college graduates to serve as village officials. Their salaries are subsidized by the central government and their terms at the village are two or three years.]

Source: Xinhua, April 29, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-04/29/c_1264253.htm

Minister of Culture: Culture Industry Growing Rapidly, Lacking Leading Enterprises

Cai Wu, China’s Minister of Culture, recently delivered a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on the development of the culture industry. He admitted that there are several fronts where the industry is facing challenges: (1) the culture industry is does not have a large enough scale and the development level is not high; (2) the industry lacks leading enterprises and well-known brands; (3) the culture trade deficit remains high; (4) blind investments do exist. He believes that, to improve the situation, increased government investment and support from the financial industry are necessary.

Source: Renmin, April 29, 2010
http://culture.people.com.cn/GB/87423/11482720.html

Xinhua Authorized to Announce the State Secrets Law

On April 29, The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets. This law has six articles and fifty three clauses. State secrets are divided into three classes of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential, with an expiration time of no more than thirty years, twenty years, and ten years, respectively. The law will take effect starting October 1, 2010.

(Chinascope Notes: Many believe there is a high probability that government officials will use this law to restrict human rights.)

Source: Xinhua, April 29, 2010
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-04/29/c_1264598.htm

Xiong Guangkai: Chinese Military Should Have ‘Grand Security Vision’

China News Agency recently reported that Xiong Guangkai, former General and Army Deputy Chief of the General Staff, commented on China’s security situation. Xiong believes the overall positive security status remains unchanged, but the nation still faces many risks that require the army to remain alert. The “Grand Security Vision” is needed.

Xiong summarized three areas of “traditional risks”: (1) regional wars happen frequently; (2) international military competition intensifies around a core of new age military reforms; (3) nuclear proliferation and control are very much alive. However the Grand Security Vision includes six non-traditional risks: (1) the international financial crisis changes the development model; (2) anti-terrorism needs more attention; (3) information security stands out as a crucial risk; (4) energy safety is becoming a challenge; (5) food supply reliability is increasingly problematic; (6) climate change and public health issues are on the rise.

Source: China News Agency, April 29, 2010
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2010/04-29/2253225.shtml

Retrospect and Prospects for the Security of China’s Periphery

In 2009, China’s periphery was generally stable. The situation has been “mitigated in the east, and is urgent in the west, harmonious in the north, and worrisome in the south.” On the east side, regarding the Sino-US and the Sino-Japan relationship, a situation quite rare in many years is that the parties get along very well, alleviating a lot of the pressure on security. Since President Obama took office, the U.S. government has been seeking to develop a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. The Sino-U.S. military dialogue, once halted due to the Bush administration’s arms sales to Taiwan, has resumed, improving the bilateral trust between high-level military leaders. [2] As Japan’s new Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has been actively promoting Asian diplomacy, the Sino-Japan relation has significantly improved. During Hatoyama’s visit to China, he promised to stick to the “Murayama Statement” in spirit on historical issues, bridge differences, build a reliable relationship, and promote a mutually beneficial strategic bond.

On the East China Sea issue, although there has been an overall improvement in the Sino-Japan relationship, disputes over maritime rights remain. Japan has stepped up the use of military force in monitoring the Diaoyu Islands (a.k.a. the Senkaku Islands), and has sought to expand its marine strategic domain. Japan is to construct harbor facilities on Chongniao Island (a.k.a. the Okinotorishima) in an effort to show “territorial sovereignty.”

At the same time, the security in the north continues to get better. The Sino-Russia relationship is deepening, with military cooperation as an important part of the bilateral strategic partnership. The “Peace Mission of 2009” joint anti-terrorist military exercise once again demonstrated the determination of the two countries to face new threats and challenges. The stable development has boosted the security partnership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and has consolidated the stability of China’s northern border.

In 2009, new initiatives in regional cooperation emerged in Northeast Asia. The second China-Japan-S Korea Beijing summit issued the “China, Japan, and South Korea’s Joint Declaration on the Tenth Anniversary of Cooperation” and “China, Japan, and South Korea’s Joint Declaration on Sustainable Development,” setting up priorities for future trilateral cooperation. In the past, leaders of the three countries met only at the ASEAN 10+3 meeting. The newly initiated separate meeting reflects the emphasis of the three countries on Northeast Asian cooperation.

However, the security situation on China’s west is very urgent, and there are major worries in the south. The security situation in Afghanistan has become a major threat to the western frontier. With the war zone spreading into Pakistan, the borderline of the two countries has become the battlefield between the U.S. military with its allies and the Taliban/al-Qaeda group. The reverse development in Afghanistan’s security situation caused the religious extremists and international terrorist forces in Pakistan to surge. Terrorist activities are going rampant; they even heavily damaged the Pakistan army headquarters. The continued turmoil in Pakistan has led to tensions between Pakistan and India.
 
In 2009, the security situation on the south border deteriorated. India continued to create a tense atmosphere by sending additional troops to the disputed border, deploying high-tech equipment, and accelerating the migration of population to the region. Disregarding China’s strong opposition, India allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the Tawang region in an attempt to “contain China with Tibet.” In addition, in 2009, the Sino-Burmese border was not quiet. Myanmar government forces moved to the north, reorganized the minority armed forces, and raided the Bold region. This caused many refugees to move into Yunnan Province.

In 2009, the number of disputes on the South China Sea between China and its maritime neighbors in Southeast Asia significantly increased. With the approaching deadline for the countries to ratify UNCLOS (The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), and to submit to the “Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” regarding the “Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf,” some countries are taking advantage of this time and re-delimiting the ocean boarders to compete with China for the ownership of the islands and the maritime space. China’s sovereignty over its maritime territory and the security of its maritime rights are facing major challenges.

The Philippine Congress passed the “Ocean Baseline Act,” which claimed the Huangyan Island and some of the reefs of the Nansha Islands (a.k.a. Spratly Islands), which are part of China. Vietnam submitted the case of “Delimitation of the Outer Continental Shelf,” claiming sovereignty over China’s Xisha Islands (a.k.a. the Paracel Islands) and Nansha Islands (a.k.a. the Spratly Islands). Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted proposals in order to take over and divide up the Nansha Islands. Malaysia’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister Badawi personally went to the Swallow Reef and Ardasier Reef of Nansha Island to declare sovereignty.

Factors complicating maritime security are increasing. The U.S. has strengthened its strategic investment in the western Pacific Ocean by deploying a large quantity of advanced naval and air forces into the region. Specifically, it deployed 12 F-22 Raptors to the Kadena Air Base, upgraded Okinawa into a level-1 combat base, expanded Alpha and Bravo piers, and deployed a new style Ohio class SSGN (nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine).

At the same time, the U.S. made more moves around the South China Sea. It held joint military exercises with the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. In the year of 2009, the U.S. seemed to be more willing to step from behind the curtain to the front on disputes regarding rights on the South China Sea. It was involved in two “right of passage” incidents including the USNS Impeccable Incident and USS John McCain Incident.

India has also intensified its attention and penetration in the region. Its naval fleet held a joint naval exercise with Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea on a cruise in the South China Sea. In addition, some countries around the South China Sea invited the oil companies of the U.S., Japan, the U.K., Italy, France, Russia, and other countries to join the event, in an attempt to internationalize the South China Sea issue. The involvement of the nations outside the region has further complicated the disputes over the South China Sea.

In 2009, forming a regional integration was gaining momentum. At the 15th ASEAN Summit, the 12th ASEAN 10+1 and 10+3 Summits, and the Fourth East Asia Summit, the focus was on the financial crisis and climate security, with a number of results achieved. ASEAN 10+3 leaders agreed to establish an East Asian foreign exchange reserve so as to safeguard regional financial market stability. What is particularly worth mentioning is that the leaders of the countries also agreed to promote the East Asian Community (EAC). In addition, the U.S., showing great interest in participating in the regional integration, signed the “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” with ASEAN countries.

In 2009, the cooperation among the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in promoting regional economic development and safeguarding regional security and stability continued to progress. Leaders signed the “Yekaterinburg Declaration” and agreed to actively promote cooperation in new industries, facilitate trade and investment, explore the potential in observer countries and dialogue partners, and expand areas of cooperation. In addition, member states also signed the “Convention on Counterterrorism,” further consolidating the legal basis for cooperation in combating terrorism.

As each state has its own motivation for promoting regional cooperation, the interests interlock with conflicts. The U.S. was highly worried about the idea of the East Asian Community (EAC) proposed by Japan, claiming it would exacerbate the “grouping” of the world economies, with an “adverse effect on the Sino-US strategic balance.” The U.S. wishes to break the EAC with the U.S. style of cooperation by strengthening its control across the Pacific region and coordination in the region. The U.S. said it would follow the ASEAN +3 model, where China, Japan, and South Korea joined with ASEAN to establish a free trade area, and establish a 10 +1 version with ASEAN. The U.S. also put forward the “USA – Mekong Basin cooperation” to compete with China’s “Lancang – Mekong sub-regional cooperation.” Japan’s high-profile launch of the EAC idea was for a relationship with U.S. on an equal footing and accelerating the process of “breaking away from the U.S. and joining Asia.” Its launch of the mechanism of the “Japan – Mekong Ministerial Conference,” and the holding of the “Japan – Mekong Summit” were for developing a geo-political advantage comparable to China. Australia’s strategic view resembles that of the U.S. It has its own idea of integration, hoping to establish an “Asia-Pacific community” that includes the U. S. so as to weaken Japan’s EAC. The ASEAN countries are both looking forward to and on alert for the EAC, fearing that the dominance of regional cooperation might drift. ASEAN sought to pull big powers outside the region into the East Asia cooperation network, so that major powers would contain each other. They constructed the “ASEAN – Russia Summit,” and also timely launched the “U.S. – ASEAN Summit.”

However, the disharmony factors on China’s periphery will remain for a long time. There is a long way to go to achieve perimeter security. The North Korea nuclear issue, which caused tension in the region, is difficult to improve within a short period of time. The security issues in the post-North Korean-nuclear-crisis need to be prepared for. Obama’s plan of sending more troops to Afghanistan will anger the extremist forces in Afghanistan. It has become increasingly evident that Afghanistan is becoming a second Iraq. Obama’s new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy continues to drag Pakistan into the quagmire of the U.S.’s war on terrorism. The situation in South Asia will still be volatile. The United States’ interest in Myanmar suddenly increased. Giving up hope of changing the regime, it has instead attempted to utilize the current regime to put in a new strategic wedge in Southeast Asia. In the South China Sea, although the situation has some degree of control, the effects of the involvement of countries outside the region should not be underestimated. China is in the situation of one versus many, and also in the situation of big versus small. This can easily lead to international misunderstandings. Variables in perimeter security have increased, and therefore the task of strengthening mutual trust and nurturing agreement on security can still be arduous.

Endnotes:
[1] Global Times, December 31, 2009
http://mil.huanqiu.com/china/2009-12/676250.html
[2] This article was written prior to U.S. President Obama’s announcement on January 29, 2010, of an arms sale package to Taiwan worth about $6.4 billion.