China is intensifying efforts to address food security concerns. Following recent discussions at the Central Economic Work Conference and the “San Nong” (agriculture, rural areas, farmers) work conference, Xi Jinping stressed that the local party and government organs share “joint responsibility for food security.”

China has officially claimed that its supply of staple foods exceeds 100 percent self-sufficiency and is “absolute secure.” However, “staple foods” typically refer to only rice and wheat. China still imports significant amounts of other essential grains including corn, sorghum, and legumes. A report from the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has warned of a potential grain gap of 130 million tons by the end of the “14th Five-Year Plan” period (2021-2025), with a cereal gap of about 25 million tons. A report from the China Macroeconomic Forum last year indicated that “more than one-third of all food [consumed in China] is now reliant on imports.” China’s food self-sufficiency rate has declined over the past 20 years, dropping from 93.6 percent in 2000 to the current rate of 65.8 percent. The rate for soybeans was 62.4 percent in 2000 and has since fallen to 16.6 percent.

China’s network of food imports is dependent on a few countries, primarily the United States. Beijing no doubt sees this as a geopolitical risk. To diversify imports, China seeks to “enhance cooperation” with over 140 countries.

China’s second strategic worry is the vulnerability of the sea-based food transportation routes on which it relies. As of 2023, the majority of food imported to China traveled through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Malacca (which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea). Transport through the Suez Canal is currently disrupted by Houthi military activity in the Red Sea, forcing ships bound for China to travel a much longer route circumnavigating Africa. A sea blockade at the Strait of Malacca would cause further delays or disruption to China’s food import network.

Source: Voice of America, December 26, 2023
https://www.voachinese.com/a/7412613.html

A posting on social platform X discussed why the record high of 28 trillion yuan (US$4 trillion) currency that China issued in 2023 didn’t lead to the expect result of boosting economy:

The excess currency, primarily intended to circulate through loans, encountered a lack of demand. Individuals and businesses refrained from borrowing, causing the money to passively flow back, resulting in passive deleveraging. Traditionally, a significant portion of loans flowed into real estate which would drive up development and consumption. But this time the reduced demand (and the dismal projected return) for property purchases and land acquisitions led to idle funds in commercial banks. Consequently, most of the 28 trillion yuan were returned to China’s central bank. The government became the primary borrower, with local governments issuing new city investment bonds to replace old bonds approaching maturity. The total amount of investment bonds issued by city governments in China now exceeds 65 trillion yuan.

Source: Twitter, @TheXiangYang

2023年诞生了人类历史上单一经济体印货币最多的国家—中国。28万亿，相当于多印了一个德国。既然超发了这么多的货币，股市没有涨，楼市没有涨，就连物价也没有明显的上涨。那超发了这些货币都到哪里去了？其实别管放多少钱的水，它不会直接平均到每个人。而是通过银行发放贷款，企业拿到贷款之后扩大业…

— Xiang Yang 向阳 (@TheXiangYang) December 21, 2023