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Is Xi Jinping Losing Power?

Since last year, many social media influencers outside China have been discussing whether Xi Jinping (习近平) is losing power, citing their insider sources from China. One exemplary claim is that Xi suffered a stroke and was incapacitated during the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress in July 2024. Others dismissed this as fake news. {1} Both narratives had been circulating online, and the sheer volume of such discussions may indicate actual political turbulence in Beijing.

The truth is hard to discern, as the CCP tightly controls information about internal power struggles. Below, Chinascope presents both sides of those arguments which seem to be based on factual evidence or sound logical reasoning. We leave it to our readers to make up their own minds. Those who argue that Xi is still in power primarily rest their arguments on Xi’s continued public appearances and his dominance in state media coverage. Therefore, this article primarily focuses on arguments from those who argue that he is losing power.

1. The “Losing Power” Theory

Supporters of this view believe Xi has lost control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to Zhang Youxia (张又侠), the first Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC, 中央军委). This shift may have started in July 2024, when rumors of Xi’s stroke first emerged, or in April 2024, when talk of Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan (彭丽媛) possibly joining the CMC suddenly ceased and Xi’s key ally Zhong Shaojun (钟绍军) was quietly removed from his pivotal role on the CMC.

In CCP politics, losing control of the military means losing everything; controlling the CMC equated to controlling China. Mao Zedong once said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” {2} Mao held the CMC chairmanship for nearly 40 years. Deng Xiaoping, during his term of CMC Chairman, purged two CCP General Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and ordered the Tiananmen Square crackdown.

Even if Zhang Youxia does now have command over the PLA, he is unlikely able to oust Xi on his own. As a career military general, Zhang lacks political stature and does not have the broad support base necessary to remove Xi from his position as General Secretary of the CCP. He needs backing from senior political figures.

Who are Zhang’s political allies? There are multiple theories, including “old leaders” (an unclearly defined group of former CCP leaders), the “Princeling faction,” and the Communist Youth League (CYL) faction led by former CCP leader Hu Jintao (胡锦涛). Names like Wen Jiabao (温家宝), Li Ruihuan (李瑞环), and Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红) have also been floated.

Possible successors to Xi being discussed include:

  • Wang Yang (汪洋): Former Politburo Standing Committee member, aligned with the CYL faction.
  • Hu Chunhua (胡春华): Originally groomed as Xi’s successor based on the CYL faction’s plan.
  • Li Qiang (李强): Current Premier, viewed as Xi loyalist.
  • Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥): Xi loyalist, Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Premier.
  • Chen Jining (陈吉宁): Shanghai Party Secretary, also in Xi’s camp.

One recent story suggests Wen Jiabao and Zhang Youxia are leading a transition plan. According to this theory, Xi may partially or fully step down at the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress, likely in August or September 2025, with Wang Yang serving as interim party leader and Hu Chunhua becoming Premier.

Some Chinese sources claim that Russian intelligence shares a similar assessment, citing the General SVR social media account, which alleges ties to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. {3} Some U.S. analysts and people with government backgrounds have also shared similar observations recently.

2. How CCP Power Transitions Work

Critics of the “losing power” theory argue that, if Xi had lost power, his removal would have been quickly and decisively announced, following a “Sudden Power Change” model. An example of one such abrupt transition was the 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four immediately after Mao’s death. As of yet, there has not been any official announcement regarding a change of power.

The “losing power” camp counters that there is another precedent in CCP history: the “Gradual Power Transition” model, exemplified by Deng Xiaoping’s slow removal of Hua Guofeng after 1976. Deng systematically eroded Hua’s power over several years before finally displacing him from key positions. {4} {5} {6}

According to this view, Zhang Youxia is likely to follow Deng’s model – controlling Xi’s environment and allowing a slow transfer of power. Zhang is confident that Xi is no longer able to fight back effectively, although he has made several failed attempts.

3. Power Shifts in the Military

The “losing power” camp points to two high-profile military diplomacy events in 2024:

  • In August, during his visit to China, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan requested and met directly with Zhang Youxia to discuss Russia, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. {7} Such a meeting would typically be held with Xi if he were still in charge.
  • In October, Zhang received near-head-of-state treatment during his visit to Vietnam, where he was welcomed with red carpet and full military honors and met separately with Vietnam’s top leaders, including Communist Party General Secretary, President, and Prime Minister. {8}

CMC Reshuffling

The current CMC, China’s highest military body, was formed with seven members at the 20th Party Congress in 2022:

  • Chairman: Xi Jinping
  • Vice Chairman: Zhang Youxia
  • Vice Chairman: He Weidong (何卫东)
  • Defense Minister: Li Shangfu (李尚福) – removed in October 2023
  • Chief of Staff: Liu Zhenli (刘振立)
  • Political Work Director: Miao Hua (苗华) – removed in November 2024
  • Disciplinary Commission Secretary: Zhang Shengmin (张升民)

He Weidong is believed to be the third member who has been purged – he disappeared in March 2025, and there is still no official announcement on his status or whereabouts. U.S. intelligence reportedly also concluded that this disappearance was part of an internal political shakeup. {9}

Both Miao Hua and He Weidong were known as Xi’s confidants. They both came from the 31st Group Army, which is widely regarded as belonging to Xi’s power base due to its long-term stationing in Fujian Province, where Xi served from 1985 to 2002. {10} {11}

The remaining two CMC members now lean toward Zhang Youxia’s camp:

  • Liu Zhenli and Zhang both fought in the Sino-Vietnamese War.
  • Zhang Shengmin shares regional ties with Zhang (both are from Shanxi Province). {12}

With these alliances, Zhang may now have control of three out of the four remaining CMC votes.

If Xi is still in control, he could refill those CMC vacancies to reverse the balance of power. These vacancies have existed for an abnormally long period of time, suggesting that Zhang may have dominance over the CMC and may choose to leave the seats empty intentionally.

Director of the General Office of the CMC

Xi had installed Zhong Shaojun (钟绍军), a close aide from the time when Xiwas the Party Secretary in Zhejiang and then later in Shanghai, as the Director of the General Office of CMC. Xi also promoted Zhong to the rank of lieutenant general, even though Zhong had no prior military experience. In that position, Zhong served as Xi’s trusted political overseer of the CMC and the PLA. In April 2024, however, Zhong was unexpectedly removed from this core post and reassigned as Political Commissar of the National Defense University, effectively sidelining him. Some analysts view this as Xi’s first major setback in an ongoing power struggle.

There was a report in July that Zhou Hongxu (周洪许) had been appointed as the Director of the General Office of the CMC. {13} Prior to this assignment, Zhou had been the leader of the Central Guard Bureau ( 中央警卫局) since July 2021. {14} The Central Guard Bureau is a critical function in the CCP power structure, as it is responsible for the security of top CCP officials as well as state and PLA leaders.

Zhou reportedly has close ties with Zhang Youxia. Both served in the 14th Group Army, where Zhang was a Division Commander and Zhou an Artillery Regiment Commander. {15} Zhang is said to have recommended Zhou’s appointments.

Control over Military Personnel

The Political Work Department, which manages PLA promotions, has been gutted:

  • Its former head, Miao Hua, was removed.
  • Executive Deputy Director He Hongjun (何宏军) reportedly died by suicide while under investigation in May 2025. He has Xi’s trust – Xi promoted him to the rank of General and held an exclusive ceremony for him in July 2023. {16}

The CMC’s disciplinary organ, led by Zhang Shengmin, remains intact, giving Zhang Youxia control over military personnel oversight.

Additional Signs

  • Wang Renhua (王仁华), a Xi loyalist and head of the PLA Political and Legal Affairs Commission, went missing in May 2025 while Xi was abroad. {17}
  • Miao Hua and his three assistants allegedly implicated over 1,300 military officials during detention. {18} The investigators must have pushed and enounced Miao to do so since reporting and provided evidence against 1,300 people is not a trivial effort. It is more likely that Xi’s rivals, rather than Xi himself, are interested in such an extensive list, as it could be used to pressure those officials into submission.

4. Power Shifts in the Party and Civilian Sectors

Personnel Management

In the CCP’s structure, the Central Organization Department handles promotions, while the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) oversees purges.

In April 2024, an unprecedented job swap took place: Shi Taifeng (石泰峰), then head of the CCP United Front Work Department, replaced Li Ganjie (李干杰) as Minister of the CCP Central Organization Department; and Li took Shi’s position. {19}

Shi’s background is politically sensitive. A classmate of former Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) at Tsinghua University, Shi spent nearly 20 years at the Central Party School and served as Vice President under Hu Jintao, Zeng Qinghong, and Xi Jinping. In March 2016, when Hu Jintao (retired) visited Shi’s hometown in Taizhou City, Jiangsu Province, Shi, then governor of Jiangsu, made a special visit to meet Hu and his wife.

Li Ganjie is a close ally of Xi, recommended by Chen Xi (陈希), another Xi associate.

The swap was not equal: Shi retained his Vice Chairmanship of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – a title that the Minister of the United Front Work Department always holds but Li did not inherit this time – indicating Shi’s power expanded while Li’s diminished.

Additionally, Shi was reported to be serving as the Deputy Head of the Central Leading Group for Disciplinary Inspection Work, a powerful function of the CCDI. {20} This job swap signals that Xi may have lost control over personnel management decisions.

 Other Appointments with Implications for Xi

Some recent civilian appointments appear to fall outside Xi’s traditional power base:

  • Qin Yunbiao (秦运彪) was appointed Director of the Beijing Public Security Bureau in 2024. His long-term career in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (AR) suggests his limited ties to Xi. His experience in Baise city, Guangxi, which was tied to Deng Xiaoping’s legacy of organizing a military rebel there in 1929, may align him more with Deng’s followers. {21}
  • Liu Guiping (刘桂平) became Deputy Party Secretary of Tianjin in May 2024, reportedly promoted directly by the CCP Central Organization Department, bypassing local party chief Chen Miner (陈敏尔), Xi’s associate. Liu’s career in the financial sector may indicate that he is connected to Wang Qishan, a strong ally of Xi during Xi’s first term but being dumped by Xi afterward. {22}
  • Liu Fei (刘非) was appointed Party Secretary of Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang province, a major political base for Xi. This may be an erosion into Xi’s core power base, since Liu’s career mainly spanned Jilin, Hunan, and Yunnan provinces, with little direct link to Xi’s core circle. {23}

Political Events

  • On July 15, 2024, the first day of the 3rd Plenary Session of the CCP’s 20th Party Congress, Xinhua News Agency released a special feature titled “Reformer Xi Jinping.” Many media outlets highlighted this Xinhua feature in their coverage, noting that it was the first time the official media had referred to Xi Jinping as a “reformer (改革家),” likening him to Deng Xiaoping who is known as the chief architect of China’s “reform and opening-up.” However, this near 10,000-word Xinhua article was removed on the next day without any explanation. {24}
  • Xi Jinping built a memorial hall for his father Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) in his father’s hometown Fuping County, Shaanxi Province. The hall was originally named “Xi Zhongxun Memorial Hall,” but its name was changed to “Guanzhong Revolution Memorial Hall” when it was opened (Guanzhong in Chinese means Central Shaanxi, where Xi’s father conducted his earlier revolutionary work). The memorial is clearly for Xi’s father: the exhibitions were about his  belongings or his works, and the opening date for the memorial was May 24, 2025, the 23rd anniversary of elder Xi’s death. People took the removal of the name of Xi’s father as another sign that Xi’s power is getting weaker. {25}

5. Which Groups Are Challenging Xi?

Military

There is broad consensus among the “losing power” camp that Zhang Youxia now dominates the military.

Political Factions

There are differing accounts regarding political and civilian opposition to Xi:

  • CYL Faction: This group, which flourished due to Deng Xiaoping’s pushing for younger leadership, was nearly eliminated by Xi at the 20th Party Congress. Xi humiliated its figurehead Hu Jintao by forcing him to leave the Congress’ closing session and sidelined key players like Li Keqiang (李克强), Wang Yang, and Hu Chunhua. Li Keqiang’s sudden death in 2024 fueled speculation about Xi’s role.

There are suggestions that the CYL faction is regaining influence, which could be evidenced by a recent event that Hu Jintao’s son, Hu Haifeng (胡海峰), made a high-profile appearance at a financial forum in Shanghai, which he does not have much business to do. {26}

  • Princeling Faction: Comprised of children of communist revolutionaries, this group is divided into:
    • The right wing, led by Hu Deping (胡德平) and Liu Yuan (刘源), who are more open to political reform.
    • The left wing, which leans toward Maoist ideology.

Both wings reportedly agree Xi should step down soon. At a recent closed-door meeting, Kong Dan (孔丹), a left-wing leader, accused Xi of two major betrayals: {27}

  • Breaking the old guard’s agreement that power should be shared among princeling families. Xi keeps the political power for himself and blocks others from economic gains.
  • Abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s “keeping a low profile” strategy in favor of the aggressive “East is rising, West is declining” approach, which jeopardized princeling families’ vast overseas assets (reportedly valued at $20 trillion).
  • Jiang Zemin Faction: Now led by Zeng Qinghong after Jiang’s death in 2022, this group’s current strength is debated. Some argue they’ve gained ground, while others point to signs of their downfall:
    • Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒), Jiang Zemin’s son, was demoted from President of ShanghaiTech University to the Dean of its Administrative Committee in 2024. {28}
    • In June 2025, Fei Dongbin (费东斌), nephew-in-law of Jiang’s wife Wang Yeping, was placed under disciplinary investigation. {29} {30}

6. Recent Developments – Conflicting Signals

The “losing power” camp noted Xi’s disappearance from public view for 14 consecutive days from May 21 to June 3. During this period, he attended no public events, and news reports covered only a few minor activities, such as sending congratulatory letters or signing awards. Notably, People’s Daily, the CCP’s main mouthpiece, did not feature Xi-related news on its front page on June 2 and 3 – an unusual break from the norm. {31}

Two subsequent events appeared to suggest that Xi was still firmly in control, however:

On June 4, Xi hosted a meeting and banquet for Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who was visiting China from June 2 to 4. According to a June 9 report by the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BelTA), Belarusian First Deputy Prime Minister Snopkov revealed that Xi’s wife, Peng Liyuan, and their daughter, Xi Mingze (习明泽), also attended the dinner. Xi reportedly told Lukashenko “For the first time in history, my daughter will dine with a foreign leader in this manner.”

Some argue that Xi’s daughter attending such a politically-symbolic event indicates that Xi is still in control. If Xi were merely a figurehead, he and his wife might have conceivably been asked to host such an event as a show, but there would be little reason to include Xi’s daughter in the event.

BelTA later deleted its report regarding Lukashenko’s meeting with Xi, adding to the mystery. {32}

The second event bolstering the argument that “Xi is still in power” occurred on June 5, when Xi held a phone call with U.S. President Trump regarding trade negotiations. Trump later described the call as “very positive” and stated that both leaders had invited each other for state visits: “I will be going there with the First Lady at a certain point, and he will be coming here, hopefully with the First Lady of China.”

While this exchange seemed to indicate that Xi remains in power, the CCP-controlled media conspicuously omitted the part about Xi being invited to the U.S., mentioning only that Trump planned to visit China. {33} The “losing power” camp interpreted this as a sign that the new powerholders may not allow Xi to go to the U.S.

There were three events on July 7. The first was the BRICS Summit held in Rio de Janeiro on July 6 – 7. Xi declined to attend, citing a scheduling conflict. Instead, he sent Premier Li Qiang to represent China.

The second was a high-profile WWII commemoration hosted in Beijing. Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi attended the event, along with other top level officials, including Zhang Youxia, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, CCP Central Propaganda Department Director Li Shulei, Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong, and CMC member Liu Zhenli, etc.

Xi, however, visited the remote city of Yangquan in Shanxi Province to lay a wreath at the Hundred Regiments Battle Memorial, accompanied by only a small group of officials including Vice Premier He Lifeng.

Observers wondered whether Xi‘s attending the least-significant event was out of his own choice or out of no choice. {34}

Endnotes:
{1} Radio Free Asia, “About the CCP 3rd Plenary Session of the 20th Party Congress,” July 19, 2024.
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/yehuazhongnanhai/gx-ccp-xi-jinping-07192024160848.html.
{2} Radio Free Asia, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” June 2, 2021.
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/duomeiti/jishitie/jj-06022021110054.html.
{3} Sound of Hope, “Secret Meeting Reveals Wang Yang as Successor? Russian Intelligence Exposes Shocking Inside Story! Has the CCP Quietly Launched a Power Transition?” June 14, 2025.
https://www.soundofhope.org/post/890937.
{4} Baidu Baike, “华国锋.”
https://baike.baidu.com/item/华国锋.
{5} Baidu Baike, “邓小平.”
https://baike.baidu.com/item/邓小平.
{6} RealHistory.org, “Hua Guofeng (Part 2): How Did Deng Xiaoping Use Political Maneuvering to Bring Down Hua Guofeng?” July 11, 2024.
https://realhist.org/2024/07/hua_guofeng_part_2_deng_xiaoping_overthrow/.
{7} Reuters, “Sullivan meets Xi as wide-ranging China-US talks near end in Beijing,” August 29, 2024.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/us-chinese-officials-wrap-up-talks-beijing-taiwan-fentanyl-2024-08-29/.
{8} Epoch Times, “Zhang Youxia’s Visit to Vietnam Shows Anomalies – Analysis: CCP Signals Xi’s Loss of Power,” October 28, 2024.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/10/28/n14358971.htm.
{9} Washington Times, “Senior Chinese general disappears in latest high-level political purge,” March 25, 2025.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/mar/25/senior-chinese-gen-weidong-disappears-latest-high-level-political/.
{10} Baidu Baike, “Miao Hua.”
https://baike.baidu.com/item/苗华/10721413.
{11} Wikipedia, “He Weidong.”
https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-hans/何卫东.
{12} Epoch Times, “CCP Military Discipline Commission Secretary Zhang Shengmin Replaces Miao Hua at Meeting,” May 19, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/5/19/n14512725.htm.
{13} Sound of Hope, “Zhou Hongxu Took the Most Pivotal Position in the PLA,” July 4, 2025.
https://www.soundofhope.org/post/893475.
{14} Secret China, “Director of the Central Guard Bureau Is Involved in Two Murder Cases,” December 16, 2023.
https://www.secretchina.com/news/gb/2023/12/16/1051503.html.
{15} Epoch Times, “Four Reasons for Zhang Youxia to Join Forces with the Retired Leaders to Push out Xi Jinping,” October 11, 2024.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/24/10/10/n14348260.htm.
{16} Radio France International, “Rumor Had that A PLA General Committed Suicide,” May 19, 2025.
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20250519-中国军方高层人事有变动-一上将惊传羁押中自缢身亡.
{17} Epoch Times, “General Wang Renhua Might Be Taken Down,” May 9, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/5/9/n14503928.htm.
{18} China News, “Miao Hua Implicated 1,300 Officers, including He Weidong,” March 31, 2025
https://news.creaders.net/china/2025/03/31/2850991.html.
{19} Chinascope, “Rare Job Swap in CCP Leadership: Shi Taifeng and Li Ganjie Exchange Roles Amid Internal Power Struggle,” April 6, 2025.
https://chinascope.org/archives/37139.
{20} Sina, “The Fifth Round of Central Disciplinary Inspection Groups Started Moving into Work Sites,” April 16, 2025.
https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2025-04-16/doc-inetimqy7049838.shtml.
{21} Baidu Baike, “Qing Yunbiao.”
https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%A7%A6%E8%BF%90%E5%BD%AA/16477971.
{22} China News, “Something Happened in Zhongnanhai,” May 27, 2025.
https://news.creaders.net/china/2025/05/27/2873645.html.
{23} China News, “Something Happened in Zhongnanhai,” May 27, 2025.
https://news.creaders.net/china/2025/05/27/2873645.html.
{24} Chinascope, “Xinhua Removes Article Praising Xi Jinping as a Reformer Amid Speculation and Rumors,” July 18, 2024.
https://chinascope.org/archives/35507.
{25} Epoch Times, “Shaanxi Guanzhong Memorial Hall Changed Name,” May 28, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/5/28/n14519583.htm.
{26} Chinascope, “Unusual Appearance of Hu Jintao’s Son at Financial Event Sparks Political Speculation,” June 25, 2025.
https://chinascope.org/archives/38029.
{27} Epoch Times, “Princelings Outlined Xi’s Two Major Crimes,” June 17, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/6/17/n14533092.htm.
{28} Chinascope, “Jiang Zemin’s Son Jiang Mianheng Demoted at ShanghaiTech University,” June 5, 2024.
https://chinascope.org/archives/35349.
{29} CCTV, “Fei Dongbin Under Investigation,” June 12, 2025.
https://news.cctv.com/2025/06/12/ARTICBUxuimu7Cy3llEsoat0250612.shtml.
{30} Aboluo, “Wang Yeping’s Nephew-in-Law Is Under Investigation,” June 21, 2025.
https://www.aboluowang.com/2025/0621/2236373.html.
{31} Chinascope, “Xi Jinping’s Unusual Public Absence Fuels Speculation of Internal Power Struggles,” June 3, 2025.
https://chinascope.org/archives/37839.
{32} Epoch Times, “BelTA Suddenly Deletes Report of Xi Mingze Attending Banquet – Reason Unknown,” June 16, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/6/16/n14531990.htm.
{33} BBC, “Trump confirms China trip after ‘very good’ call with Xi,” June 5, 2025
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0qg23gqllwo.
{34} Secret China, “Cai Qi and Zhang Youxia Took a High Profile Stance Than Xi Jinping,” July 10, 2025.
https://www.kanzhongguo.eu/node/71062.

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