{Editor’s Note: An analysis published by CReaders.net argues that Xi Jinping should not be dismissed as an inept leader who rose to power merely by appearing harmless or politically unthreatening. While his record on economic management and modern governance remains highly contested, the article contends that Xi has demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) internal power dynamics. It argues that his defining strength lies not in governing a modern state, but in identifying political risks, consolidating authority, and reshaping the Party-state around security, centralized control, and organizational discipline.
The following is a translation of the article. {1}}
I. The “Pretending to Be Foolish” Explanation Is Inadequate
A common narrative in overseas Chinese-language discourse portrays Xi Jinping as an unremarkable, poorly educated politician who rose to power by acting simple-minded and nonthreatening. This interpretation, however, is overly simplistic.
A leader who merely knew how to conceal his ambitions could not have spent more than a decade systematically reshaping the CCP’s power structure while weakening the Communist Youth League faction, the Jiang Zemin network, regional power centers, technocratic elites, the political-legal apparatus, the military, and major capital platforms. Nor could a truly mediocre politician have reimposed a security-first governing philosophy across the Party-state after the political crises involving Ling Jihua, Bo Xilai, and Zhou Yongkang.
The greatest misunderstanding among outside observers is not that Xi is authoritarian, but that he is politically incompetent. In reality, he has demonstrated a keen understanding of the CCP’s internal logic of power. That said, mastering Party politics is fundamentally different from governing a modern state. Controlling the Party is not the same as governing society, just as tightening the screws of a machine is not the same as repairing it.
Many argue that Xi emerged because Party elders viewed him as honest, modest, and easy to control—a compromise candidate acceptable to competing factions. While this explanation contains some truth, it accounts only for why Xi was selected, not for how he subsequently transformed the CCP’s political structure.
Nor were Party elders easily deceived. They had survived decades of ideological campaigns, factional struggles, and elite power contests. Even if Xi’s low-profile demeanor reassured them, they were unlikely to have ignored the political risks altogether.
Within his first year in office, Xi simultaneously launched the Eight-Point Regulations (八项规定), the sweeping anti-corruption campaign, the final prosecution of Bo Xilai, the reform agenda of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, and the Central National Security Commission. These initiatives reflected not political inexperience but the actions of a seasoned political operator rapidly constructing a new power structure. His ability to remain patient and politically restrained for years before assuming office was itself an important political skill.
II. Xi Inherited a Party Already Under Strain
When Xi assumed power, the CCP was already confronting serious internal vulnerabilities.
The Ling Jihua scandal implicated not only a senior official but also the Party’s General Office, the secretary system, and the Communist Youth League network. The Bo Xilai affair involved far more than the downfall of a provincial leader; it centered on a charismatic political figure who had cultivated an independent power base through the “Chongqing Model,” mass mobilization, propaganda campaigns, and extensive local patronage. The Zhou Yongkang investigation was even broader, exposing entrenched interests within the political-legal system, the petroleum sector, and China’s domestic security apparatus.
Taken together, these cases revealed deep structural weaknesses within the CCP: an overgrown General Office system, increasingly powerful regional leaders, an autonomous political-legal apparatus, entrenched interest groups in strategic industries, and dense patronage networks linking Party officials, local governments, security agencies, and business elites. These were not isolated corruption scandals; they reflected growing concern within the Party that centralized control was weakening.
From this perspective, the CCP required more than a compliant successor. It needed a leader capable of reasserting organizational discipline, curbing the diffusion of power, and rebuilding centralized authority. Many of Xi’s actions after taking office can be understood in that context.
III. Xi Is Not a Modern Statesman but a Master of Party-State Power
It is important to distinguish between two fundamentally different forms of political capability.
The first is the ability to govern a modern state: revitalizing the economy, maintaining public trust, upgrading industries, stabilizing public finances, creating opportunities for younger generations, and helping local governments overcome mounting debt. Judged by these standards, Xi Jinping’s record remains highly contested.
The second is the ability to wield power within a Leninist Party-state. This requires identifying potential political threats, recognizing institutions that could develop independent authority, preventing rival factions from gaining influence, and using organizational tools to reinforce central control. It also involves employing anti-corruption campaigns to restructure bureaucratic networks, applying a security-first framework to the economy and society, and ensuring that the military, the political-legal apparatus, the propaganda system, the financial sector, state-owned enterprises, and major internet platforms remain firmly subordinate to the Party leadership.
Xi may not excel at governing a modern economy, but he has repeatedly demonstrated exceptional skill in consolidating political authority. Many observers judge him primarily by China’s governance outcomes, overlooking that his overriding objective has never been administrative efficiency but political control. He may struggle with the complexities of managing an increasingly open and sophisticated society, yet he has proved remarkably adept at navigating the internal mechanics of CCP power.
IV. Xi Understands What the CCP Fears Most
Xi Jinping’s greatest political strength lies not in his understanding of economics or the spontaneous dynamics of modern society, but in his understanding of what the CCP fears most.
At its core, the CCP fears losing control. It fears a military that no longer follows Party commands, a political-legal system that evolves into an autonomous power center, regional leaders who cultivate independent political influence, technology and financial platforms capable of mobilizing society, and media or internet ecosystems beyond Party supervision. It is equally wary of universities, lawyers, religious organizations, NGOs, and civic groups developing into independent social networks. Above all, it fears a gradual erosion of Party authority by the state bureaucracy, the market, or civil society.
This perspective underpins Xi’s governing philosophy. Any institution or sector that shows signs of drifting beyond Party oversight is treated as a potential security concern. The military, the political-legal apparatus, propaganda, finance, state-owned enterprises, internet platforms, private education, private capital, local governments, Party discipline, and social organizations have all been subjected to successive rounds of rectification and tighter supervision.
This approach may not offer too much help with economic growth. It does, however, reflect a coherent political logic: Xi interprets virtually every potential source of institutional autonomy as a matter of political security. Where technocrats see economic efficiency, he sees political stability. Where reformers see social vitality, he sees organizational risk. Where entrepreneurs see innovation, he sees the possibility of weakened Party control. This security-first worldview has become the defining characteristic of Xi’s leadership.
V. Anti-Corruption as a Tool for Organizational Restructuring
Under Xi Jinping, the anti-corruption campaign has served purposes far beyond punishing official misconduct. It has become one of the Party’s most effective instruments for organizational restructuring.
Through anti-corruption investigations, entrenched patronage networks can be dismantled, bureaucratic loyalties reshaped, and previously decentralized power structures brought back under central authority. While many observers view the campaign primarily as a political purge, from the perspective of the Party-state it functions as a comprehensive effort to reestablish organizational discipline and reaffirm who ultimately exercises authority.
This helps explain why officials in the Xi era fear not only corruption investigations but also the possibility that past decisions, signatures, projects, relationships, or even public statements may later be reinterpreted as political liabilities.
As anti-corruption has evolved into a permanent high-pressure campaign, it has fundamentally changed bureaucratic behavior. Officials have become more cautious, more reluctant to assume responsibility, and increasingly focused on demonstrating political loyalty while protecting themselves through procedural compliance. They are less willing to speak candidly or take policy risks.
These changes undoubtedly strengthen organizational discipline and reinforce centralized control. At the same time, they also weaken administrative effectiveness. When avoiding mistakes becomes the overriding priority, officials become increasingly unwilling to make difficult decisions or exercise initiative. The result is a bureaucracy that may be more obedient but also less capable of effective governance.
VI. Xi Resolved the Question of “Who Decides,” but Not “How to Govern”
Xi Jinping has unquestionably resolved one of the CCP’s longstanding political questions: who holds ultimate authority.
Before Xi came to power, the Party was characterized by competing factions, powerful regional leaders, bureaucratic interests, an increasingly autonomous political-legal apparatus, a military with greater institutional independence, influential technology and financial firms, and complex patronage networks linking technocrats, local officials, and business elites. Over the past decade, Xi has systematically brought these forces back under tighter central control, transforming the CCP into a more centralized, disciplined, and security-oriented Party-state.
Resolving the question of “who decides,” however, is fundamentally different from resolving the question of “how to govern.”
China continues to face slowing economic growth, mounting local government debt, youth unemployment, a prolonged property downturn, declining private-sector confidence, population aging, and growing fiscal pressures on healthcare and social welfare. These challenges cannot be solved simply by concentrating on political authority.
Indeed, excessive centralization may make effective governance more difficult. Lower-level officials become less willing to report problems candidly, middle-ranking cadres become increasingly risk-averse, and local governments lose the incentive to experiment with policy innovation. Xi has largely resolved the Party’s internal organizational challenges, but many of the country’s broader governance problems remain unresolved.
VII. Tightening the Party Is Not the Same as Repairing It
Under Xi’s leadership, the CCP has become markedly more disciplined. Party discipline has been strengthened, propaganda more tightly coordinated, security measures expanded, internet regulation intensified, capital more closely supervised, local governments subjected to greater oversight, and bureaucratic discipline significantly reinforced. By almost every organizational measure, the Party-state has become more centralized and more tightly controlled.
Yet tightening a system is not the same as repairing it.
If an institution’s underlying structures have deteriorated, if external conditions have fundamentally changed, or if its governing model no longer matches the demands of the times, simply tightening organizational discipline will not necessarily improve performance. In some cases, it may even reduce the system’s capacity to adapt.
As power becomes increasingly concentrated at the top, the entire political system becomes more dependent on the judgment of a single top leadership. The greater that dependence, the more difficult it becomes to identify mistakes and correct them. Xi has unquestionably tightened the Party-state, but tighter control alone does not resolve its underlying structural challenges. This is one of the defining contradictions of the Xi era.
VIII. Neither Underestimate Xi Nor Overestimate Him
Public assessments of Xi Jinping often fall into one of two extremes.
The first portrays him as an incompetent politician who rose to power merely by appearing harmless or politically unambitious. This view underestimates his sophisticated understanding of the CCP’s internal power structure and his ability to reshape it.
The second assumes that because Xi has successfully consolidated political authority, he must also be an effective national leader. This overestimates his governing ability.
A more balanced assessment is that Xi is not an accomplished statesman in the modern sense, but an exceptionally capable Party politician. He possesses a deep understanding of how authority operates within a Leninist political system and has consistently sought to place the Party above both the state and society.
The key distinction is that mastery of political power does not necessarily translate into effective governance. Understanding organizational control is not the same as understanding economics. Maintaining political security does not automatically produce social vitality. Suppressing risks does not eliminate them. Making officials obedient does not make them more capable, making capital compliant does not restore business confidence, and creating social stability does not necessarily inspire public optimism.
IX. The Real Xi Jinping: A Reshaper of the Party-State Machine
The real Xi Jinping is a reshaper of the Party-state machine.
Under his leadership, the CCP has evolved from a development-oriented governing model toward one centered on political security. Economic growth has increasingly taken a back seat to security considerations. Local initiative has yielded to centralized control. Technocratic governance has been subordinated to political loyalty. Areas of autonomy once tolerated in markets and civil society have gradually been brought back within the Party’s organizational framework.
This represents the defining transformation of the Xi era.
Xi’s direction has been clear and consistent. The question is whether that direction can solve the challenges confronting China today. The central issue is not who exercises ultimate authority within the Party, but rather how China can restore economic dynamism, bureaucratic accountability, institutional adaptability, and public confidence amid slowing growth, demographic decline, digital transformation, and weakening social trust.
And they cannot be solved through a security-first approach.
Endnotes:
{1} CReaders.net, “Stop Underestimating Xi Jinping,” May 25, 2026.
https://news.creaders.net/china/2026/05/25/3007437.html.