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Record Competition in China’s 2026 Civil Service Exam — 74 Applicants Per Position

Amid a slowing economy, many Chinese citizens are turning to government positions in search of security and reliable income. Civil service jobs, long regarded as a stable and prestigious career path, are now more fiercely pursued than ever.

The public written exam for the 2026 national civil service recruitment, covering central government agencies and directly affiliated institutions, was held on November 30 in 250 cities across 31 provinces. A total of 2.831 million people sat for the exam, competing for just 38,100 openings — an average of 74 candidates for every position.

Over the past several years, civil service recruitment numbers had grown steadily, increasing from 14,500 positions in 2019 to 39,700 in 2025. This year, however, marks the first contraction in years, with openings reduced by about 1,600 positions. In contrast, the number of applicants reached a historic high, intensifying competition to an unprecedented level.

One of the most competitive postings was the “First-Level Police Chief and Below (XIII)” position at the Ruili Repatriation Center under the National Immigration Administration. With 6,470 applicants vying for a single slot, it stood out as one of the most sought-after posts in the exam.

Sources:
1. People’s Daily, November 30, 2025
http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1130/c1008-40614425.html
2. Epoch Times, November 30, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/11/30/n14645884.htm

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics Social Stability

Epoch Times Exclusive: CCP Ministry of State Security’s 10th Bureau and Its Global Operations

The Epoch Times published an exclusive report, based on research by intelligence expert Feng Zheng, on the Chinese Ministry of State Security’s (MSS’s) 10th Bureau, which is responsible for overseas counterintelligence and suppression. The bureau primarily monitors Chinese communities abroad, exiled dissidents, and other perceived foreign threats. In recent years, multiple countries have uncovered large-scale CCP operations targeting overseas Chinese, including surveillance, transnational pressure campaigns, and attempts to influence elections – all linked to this bureau.

The 10th Bureau is part of China’s broader overseas intelligence network, estimated to include around 40,000 operatives embedded in global Chinese communities. Its duties encompass counterespionage, political security, and intelligence collection. Operatives often operate under official covers (diplomats, journalists, academics) or non-official covers (businesspeople, travelers), and leverage resources from other MSS bureaus to carry out surveillance and covert operations. While not primarily focused on economic or technological espionage, the bureau may still collect such intelligence through overseas Chinese channels.

The bureau operates alongside the CCP United Front Work Department, which applies soft influence strategies, such as cultural programs and community networks. By contrast, the 10th Bureau conducts covert monitoring, harassment, and, when necessary, direct suppression of overseas critics. It has been linked to high-profile incidents, including the Wang Shujun case in New York, attempts to disrupt dissident campaigns, and the theft of sensitive technology.

Feng emphasizes that the bureau’s reach extends to extreme actions, including cross-border kidnappings, pressuring dissidents’ relatives in China, and cyberattacks on protest organizers abroad. Intelligence gathered by the 10th Bureau can even shape China’s foreign policy: reports on dissident activity may lead Beijing to apply diplomatic pressure or offer economic incentives to host countries to curb dissent, illustrating the bureau’s central role in both intelligence operations and strategic decision-making.

Sources:
1. Epoch Times, November 14, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/11/13/n14635481.htm
2. Epoch Times, November 19, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/11/18/n14638233.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

People’s Daily: Overseas Chinese Voice Support for China’s “15th Five-Year Plan”

The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party approved the proposals for the “15th Five-Year Plan,” setting out China’s development goals for the next five years. Overseas Chinese praised the achievements of the “14th Five-Year Plan” and voiced their readiness to continue contributing to China’s high-quality development by leveraging their global connections in technology, cross-border services, and cultural exchange.

Guo Xinjing, Vice Chairman of Cuba’s Hung Mun Minzhi Party, said overseas Chinese can help connect research institutions, companies, and universities, fostering technological collaboration and talent exchange.

Gao Wei, President of the Kenya Council for the Promotion of China’s Peaceful Reunification, noted that overseas Chinese are well-versed in local markets and regulations. “We can use our resources to organize international exhibitions, showcase China’s innovations, and promote cooperation between Chinese and foreign enterprises,” he said.

Dong Gang, head of the Huaxing Art Troupe in Cape Town, emphasized the role of overseas Chinese communities in preserving cultural heritage. His troupe performs dragon-and-lion dances during Chinese New Year and plans to offer youth training classes to pass on the traditions and strengthen community bonds.

Wang Peizhong, President of the Chinese Association in Egypt, said overseas Chinese should actively share Chinese culture through Hanfu (traditional Chinese attire) showcases, tea-art gatherings, and intangible heritage workshops. “We will use social media platforms to produce Arabic-language cultural content that resonates with local audiences, helping more people understand a trustworthy, appealing, and respected China,” he said.

Source: People’s Daily, November 11, 2025
https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202511/11/content_30114060.html

Briefings | | |   Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

Hong Kong Woman Jailed for One Year Over Promotional Videos for Overseas Group

A 19-year-old Hong Kong woman has been sentenced to one year in prison after pleading guilty to sedition charges for producing promotional videos for the overseas-based “Hong Kong Parliament” group. Lan Fei was convicted under Hong Kong’s national security legislation for committing acts with seditious intent.

The judge stated that the two videos received over 910,000 views and were widely circulated. The court determined that the organization seeks to spread what it characterized as anti-China sentiment globally. Lan’s acknowledgment that the “Hong Kong Parliament” operates as an overseas political body was cited as evidence of international elements in the case, leading to an additional two-month sentence enhancement for the final 12-month term.

Lan is the former girlfriend of Lam Chin-kan, an overseas Hong Kong resident wanted by authorities for involvement with the “Hong Kong Parliament.” The defense argued that Lam, being older and more mature, had influenced and manipulated Lan. The judge accepted this as a mitigating factor.

Hong Kong’s National Security Department said Lan filmed promotional videos between March and May and used social media to encourage participation in voting activities, which authorities claim were intended to subvert the Beijing central government and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government.

Lan was overseas during the alleged offense but was arrested upon returning to Hong Kong. The “Hong Kong Parliament” was established in 2022 by overseas Hong Kong residents including Yuen Kung-yi and Ho Leung-mok. The organization’s stated purpose is to “conduct a global election among Hong Kong people to select representatives who would advocate for them internationally.”

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), November 14, 2025
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202511140098.aspx

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

China’s Vanishing Power Brokers: The Hidden Purge Within the Communist Party’s Upper Ranks

Since April, He Weidong has vanished from public view. Once serving as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, he was the second-highest commander of one of the world’s largest armed forces. His absence from Politburo meetings and other key events went unmentioned by state-controlled media, while online speculation was swiftly censored. For Chinese citizens, such disappearances have become routine—official explanations often arrive months later, if at all.

Confirmation finally came at the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, where the Party announced that He had been expelled for “serious duty-related violations involving exceptionally large sums of money, of an extremely grave nature, and with profoundly negative impact.” Eight other senior military officers now face identical accusations.

The official statement, heavy on slogans and light on detail, reaffirmed the Party’s “unwavering determination to carry the anti-corruption struggle through to the end.” He’s position will be taken by Zhang Shengmin, previously in charge of anti-corruption investigations within the military. Similar patterns have emerged across government ministries: top officials disappear, and their posts remain vacant for months. Liu Jianxuan, the former head of the International Liaison Department, vanished in July and was only officially replaced in September.

After nearly thirteen years of Xi Jinping’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign, the purges show no sign of slowing. What began as a drive against loyalists of previous leaders has now turned inward, ensnaring Xi’s own appointees. According to Yang Zi, a scholar at Nanyang Technological University, even the mere suspicion of disloyalty can trigger a downfall in such a highly centralized system.

Many analysts interpret these purges as calculated displays of Xi’s enduring power—moves that allow him to continually reshape the political and military elite to his liking. And while speculation occasionally arises about possible succession plans, Yang argues that any such transition remains highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Source: Deutsche Welle, October 25, 2025
https://p.dw.com/p/52ZUP

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics

China Announces Downfall of Nine Senior Generals, Including CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong

On the afternoon of October 17, Senior Colonel Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, issued the following statements:

“With the approval of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission and Supervisory Commission have opened formal investigations into nine senior military officials:

  • Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong
  • CMC member and former Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua
  • Former Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department He Hongjun
  • Former Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center Wang Xiubin
  • Former Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Lin Xiangyang
  • Former Political Commissar of the Army Qin Shutang
  • Former Political Commissar of the Navy Yuan Huazhi
  • Former Commander of the Rocket Force Wang Houbin
  • Former Commander of the People’s Armed Police Wang Chunning”

“Investigations revealed that all nine officials had seriously violated Party discipline and were suspected of committing major duty-related crimes involving extremely large sums of money. Their actions were particularly egregious with profoundly negative impact. Consequently, the CCP Central Committee decided to expel all nine from the Party and transfer their cases to the military procuratorate for legal prosecution.

“Of the nine, eight – He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, Wang Xiubin, Lin Xiangyang, Qin Shutang, Yuan Huazhi, and Wang Chunning – were Central Committee members, and their expulsions will be formally ratified at the next full Central Committee meeting. The CMC had earlier decided to strip all nine of their military ranks.”

All nine were full generals personally promoted by Xi Jinping and had advanced rapidly under his leadership. Several, including He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Lin Xiangyang, had previously served in the 31st Group Army, Xi’s former power base in Fujian.

The purge of these Xi-aligned generals from both the Party and the military has sparked speculation among rival factions and Party elders, who may question Xi’s personnel decisions and his ability to control the armed forces. At the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the CCP 20th Party Congress, the vacant Central Committee seats are expected to be filled, offering observers a chance to assess whether Xi’s military authority remains secure or has been weakened.

Sources:
1. Ministry of Defense website, October 17, 2025
http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16416031.html
2. Epoch Times, October 17, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/10/17/n14618290.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Government/Politics

Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s Visit to North Korea Sparks Criticism Over “Humiliating” Reception by Kim Jong-un

Chinese Premier Li Qiang’s visit to North Korea from October 9 to 11 has ignited heated debate online, with many observers accusing him of displaying a “loss of national dignity.” His meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was widely described as a “humiliating encounter.”

During the talks, Li sat on one side of a long conference table accompanied by his delegation, while Kim sat alone on the opposite side with only an interpreter. The arrangement, reminiscent of a supreme leader receiving subordinates’ reports, sharply contrasted with Kim’s previous meetings with Russian and Vietnamese visitors, where both sides were seated with their full teams. Commentators also noted that Li appeared nervous and deferential in front of Kim.

A video clip circulating online purportedly shows Li bidding farewell to Kim. In the footage, Kim kept his hands in his pockets and repeatedly turned away to speak with aides, offering only a brief nod at the end. Kim maintained a stern expression throughout, while Li stood with his arms at his sides, seemingly waiting for instructions. As his motorcade departed, Li waved repeatedly from his car, but Kim responded with just a single wave before turning away.

The footage drew widespread ridicule on Chinese social media. Some netizens wrote, “He’s still a national premier – how could he appear so submissive before a dictator? This is the most humiliating moment for a Chinese premier since the founding of the PRC.” Others mocked, “A great-power premier acting like a servant before a beggar boss.”

Some commentators, however, suggested that Li’s behavior was deliberate. They argued that Chinese diplomatic interactions are typically choreographed in advance, and Li must have known about the one-sided setup beforehand. His compliance reflected a calculated act of self-preservation. As Kim had recently reviewed troops alongside Xi Jinping and Putin, the hierarchy was clear: Xi and Kim were the masters, while Li was merely the servant – even when he was abroad. Sitting as an equal beside Kim would instead get Li Qiang into big trouble.

Sources:
1. Epoch Times, October 13, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/25/10/13/n14614984.htm
2. Epoch Times, October 15, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/25/10/15/n14616527.htm
3. Pincong
https://pincong.rocks/article/88792

Briefings | | |   @CS Government/Politics

People’s Daily Publishes 8-Part Series on “China’s Economy Under Xi Jinping’s Thought on Economic Development”

From September 30 to October 7, People’s Daily published a series of eight consecutive articles on China’s economic development. The articles were authored under the pen name “Zhong Cai Wen (钟才文),” a homophone for the abbreviation of “Article by the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission” (中央财经委员会文章).

On October 9, People’s Daily published a follow-up article outlining the significance of the series: to help readers “understand the economic situation and guide economic work.” It said the series explain China’s long-term stable growth, highlight opportunities for the world, and convey a message of confidence, stability, and development.

The eight articles cover the following topics:

  1. China’s Economic Transformation
  2. Internal Logic of Stability
  3. Current Economic Situation
  4. Opportunities in Economic Upgrading
  5. High-Quality Development Certainty
  6. Inclusive Global Development Model
  7. Open and Win-Win Economy
  8. Trust and Cooperation with China

Critics, however, question the “wonderful” portrayal of China’s economy, arguing that citizens’ and businesses’ lived experiences tell a different story. They suggest the articles may mask or twist facts. For example, the series highlights high-quality, low-cost goods and services, which in reality benefit consumers, but also reflect intense competition and worsening conditions for service providers. Similarly, while emerging sectors like artificial intelligence show rapid wage growth, these high-tech sectors constitute only a small portion of the overall economy, meaning their gains cannot offset the struggles of larger, traditional industries such as real estate that face declining employment and wages.

Sources:
1. People’s Daily, October 9, 2025
http://finance.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1009/c70846-40578339.html
2. Epoch Times, October 9, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/10/8/n14612200.htm

Briefings | | |   Economy/Resources Government/Politics