Government/Politics - 3. page

A recent report reveals that since April 2025, researchers have identified a large-scale phishing and digital impersonation campaign targeting overseas Uyghur, Tibetan, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong activists, as well as journalists covering related issues. Two primary threat groups were identified: GLITTER CARP, which conducts broad and persistent phishing operations—even targeting individuals loosely connected to its main targets—and SEQUIN CARP, which focuses specifically on journalists reporting on China’s transnational repression, including those involved in the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) project “China Targets.”

The attackers’ primary objective is to steal login credentials—particularly for Google and Microsoft 365 accounts—by redirecting victims to highly convincing fake login pages via links sent through email or messaging apps such as Signal and Line. Researchers also found evidence of coordinated operations using multiple phishing toolkits, suggesting collaboration among groups with varying technical capabilities. The campaign includes impersonation of legitimate media domains, such as fake versions of The Epoch Times, and relies on a large infrastructure of IP addresses and domains, indicating broader—and potentially ongoing—operations beyond those identified.

The report argues that these activities form part of a long-standing pattern of China-linked digital transnational repression, targeting overseas dissidents through hacking, spyware, and online intimidation. It highlights the growing role of private Chinese companies in this ecosystem, describing a “public-private” model in which contractors develop and sell cyber tools—such as spyware and phishing kits—to state agencies. Leaked documents from a sanctioned firm suggest the emergence of a commercialized market for cyber operations, with relatively low costs for data theft and system access.

The report further warns that the outsourcing and industrialization of such activities reduce operational costs, expand their scale, and complicate attribution and accountability. Beyond their technical impact, these campaigns generate a broader “chilling effect,” fostering fear, self-censorship, and distrust among targeted communities.

For example, following the publication of the ICIJ’s “China Targets” investigation in April 2025, journalists involved in the project were themselves targeted by phishing and impersonation campaigns—highlighting how scrutiny and reporting on these issues can trigger retaliatory cyber operations.

Source: Epoch Times, April 29, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/4/29/n14752403.htm

An anonymous online post, purportedly written by a former temporary informant in Huanggang City, Hubei Province, claims involvement in surveillance operations targeting individuals who were allegedly later subjected to organ harvesting. The author states they were tasked with tracking individuals and reporting their movements to authorities.

In one case, the informant describes following a young woman who was subsequently detained and taken—not to a standard detention facility—but to a heavily guarded psychiatric hospital. The post alleges that procedures there included registration, sedation, and transfer.

The author further claims to have accessed an internal system tracking people with categories such as “(organ) match rate,” “freshness,” and “priority,” and alleges that the woman’s liver was marked as a high-quality match. According to the account, a surgery was later recorded as having been completed successfully.

The post expresses remorse, with the author describing themselves as complicit, and calls on international organizations and the public to investigate what is alleged to be systemic abuse carried out under the guise of law enforcement and medical procedures.

Source: Creaders.net
https://blog.creaders.net/u/8994/202604/548122.html

A report by German news outlet Der Spiegel states that a former Chinese police officer from Xinjiang, identified as Zhang Yabo, defected during a tour in Germany in 2025 and has since publicly described alleged abuses against Uyghurs. He reportedly fled with a laptop containing documents he claims provide evidence of repression and later contacted the World Uyghur Congress in Munich.

Zhang said he worked for about nine years as a prison guard and police officer in Xinjiang, where he described a system combining detention camps, surveillance, and political control targeting Uyghurs. He alleged that detainees were frequently subjected to beatings and other forms of mistreatment during interrogations, with some deaths occurring in custody and limited access to medical care.

According to his account, authorities also carried out extensive monitoring in local communities, collecting personal data on residents—including religious activities, contacts, and behavior—and reporting regularly to higher-level security agencies. He claimed that individuals could be detained arbitrarily based on broad or vague criteria, and that officials were under pressure to identify and report suspects.

Zhang also described broader social control measures, including incentives for interethnic marriages and the classification of certain individuals, such as unmarried or disobedient people, as “mentally ill” for monitoring purposes.

Source: Epoch Times, April 17, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/4/17/n14743438.htm