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US-China Relations

Texas Bans the Use of Products of Multiple Chinese Companies

Chinese international trade news site CHW recently reported that Texas Governor Greg Abbott just issued a new executive order requiring all state employees to refrain from installing or using hardware, software, and artificial intelligence technology from certain Chinese companies on any state-owned equipment and networks. This decision aims to protect the data privacy and cybersecurity of Texas residents and prevent the risk of foreign governments, particularly the Chinese government, gaining access to sensitive information.

According to the officially released list of prohibited technologies, the companies and products included in the restrictions cover multiple sectors, including e-commerce platforms, communication equipment, artificial intelligence, energy, and drones. The specific list of companies includes well-known e-commerce platforms such as Alibaba and Temu, as well as fashion e-commerce platform Shein, network equipment manufacturer TP-Link, battery manufacturer CATL, and Chinese AI companies such as iFlyTek. In addition, the governor’s office also included drone manufacturer Autel and AI and visual recognition companies in the ban.

In his statement, Governor Abbott emphasized that with the increasing global cyber threats, it is crucial to prevent “hostile actors” from using technological products to infiltrate Texas government systems or devices. He believes that certain foreign technologies could be used to collect, manipulate, or misuse the data of Texas citizens.

Source: CHW, January 27, 2026
https://www.chwe.cn/article/GjivTWtRwus

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations

FBI Relaunches Hard-Line Anti-CCP Counter-Espionage Effort, Arrests Up 40 Percent

The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has reinstated a hard-line counter-espionage initiative targeting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reversing the suspension of the program under the previous U.S. administration. FBI Director Kash Patel said countering the CCP has become a top bureau priority, with strategies being recalibrated to address evolving national security threats.

According to Patel, arrests of individuals suspected of spying for China have risen by approximately 40 percent in the first year since the initiative was relaunched, underscoring a more aggressive enforcement posture and renewed focus on countering Chinese intelligence activities.

Source: Epoch Times, February 7, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/7/n14693327.htm

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations

Chinese Officials Notified Chinese Companies to Start Preparation of H200 Orders

Singapore’s primary Chinese language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao recently reported that, Chinese officials have notified China’s largest tech companies, including Alibaba, that they can prepare to order Nvidia’s H200 AI chips. This move suggests that China is close to approving the import of this key component needed for artificial intelligence.

Chinese regulators have recently given, in principle, approval for Alibaba, Tencent Holdings, and ByteDance to proceed to the next stage of procurement preparations. Sources familiar with the matter said the companies can now discuss specific details, such as the required purchase quantities. China will also encourage these companies to purchase a certain number of domestically produced AI chips as a condition for obtaining approval. The Chinese government appears to be prioritizing the needs of major Chinese hyperscale cloud service providers such as Alibaba and Tencent.

This is a major victory for Nvidia. CEO Jensen Huang has stated that the AI chip sector alone could generate US$50 billion in revenue over the next few years.

Representatives for Nvidia declined to comment, while China’s Ministry of Commerce did not respond to a request for comment. Representatives for Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance also did not respond to requests for comment.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, January 24, 2026
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20260124-8155995

Briefings | | |   Information/Technology US-China Relations

Former U.S. Defense Official Analyzes U.S. Indo-Pacific Military Deployment

Hu Zhendong, a former U.S. Department of Defense official, spoke at a forum hosted by Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research on January 15, offering an analysis of the current posture and future direction of U.S. military deployment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Hu said U.S. national security strategy prioritizes maintaining military overmatch in the Western Pacific as a cornerstone for deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait and preserving regional stability. He noted that President Trump’s approach continues to emphasize “peace through strength,” with substantial U.S. forces deployed across key locations including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. Alaska, in particular, hosts robust fifth-generation air power capable of supporting operations across the Pacific theater.

To sustain naval operations, major U.S. bases on the West Coast house submarine forces and an active aircraft carrier strike group, while additional carrier strike capabilities and expeditionary sea bases are deployed throughout the Pacific. The U.S. military presence also extends to Singapore, Saipan, Palau, Midway Island, Wake Island, and Australia—locations relatively close to Taiwan—forming a first-island-chain security network supported by logistics hubs and mutual defense arrangements.

Hu noted that joint military exercises with partner nations have expanded significantly in both scale and frequency. He cited the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which in 2024 involved 29 countries, approximately 25,000 personnel, 40 ships, and more than 150 aircraft, and is expected to grow further in 2026.

He also outlined several key U.S. military modernization efforts, including:

  • Upgrading Pacific submarine forces with Virginia-class submarines;
  • Deploying advanced F-35 fighter aircraft while retiring older platforms at bases in Japan and South Korea;
  • Expanding amphibious and expeditionary sea base capabilities to support helicopters and unmanned systems.

In addition, Hu said the United States is refining arrangements to increase the flexibility of forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, enabling them to respond rapidly across the broader Indo-Pacific rather than being confined to a narrow regional role.

Overall, Hu argued, these developments demonstrate that the United States is reinforcing its strategic military posture throughout the Indo-Pacific to deter aggression and strengthen collective security partnerships, continuing to rely on military strength as the foundation for regional peace and stability.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/15/n14676384.htm/amp

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend US-China Relations

DW Chinese: Beijing Orders Domestic Chinese Companies Stop Using U.S. and Israeli Cybersecurity Software

Deutsche Welle Chinese Edition recently reported that, Chinese authorities notified domestic companies to stop using cybersecurity software from more than a dozen American and Israeli companies, citing national security concerns.

The software vendors named include Broadcom, Palo Alto Networks, and Fortinet, as well as Check Point Software Technologies, an Israeli company. Chinese authorities are concerned that the cybersecurity software offered by these vendors may collect confidential information and transfer it overseas.

Over the years, these companies have established a considerable business base in China. Broadcom has six offices in China, Fortinet has three offices in mainland China and one in Hong Kong, Palo Alto Networks has five offices in China, one of which is in Macau, and Check Point’s website lists its service addresses in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

It was uncertain how many Chinese companies received the notification. China’s internet regulators, the Cyberspace Administration of China and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, did not respond to requests for comment. The four companies mentioned also did not respond to inquiries.

Some U.S. and Israeli companies facing bans have repeatedly accused China of hacking attacks before, but China has denied these allegations. For instance, last month, Check Point released a report claiming a Chinese-linked hacking operation targeted a “European government agency.” Last September, Palo Alto Networks released a report accusing Chinese hackers of attacking diplomats around the world.

Source: DW Chinese, January 14, 2026
https://tinyurl.com/4nxvp36k

Briefings | | |   Geo-Strategic Trend Information/Technology US-China Relations

Xinhua: 2025, a “Wild Year” Under the New U.S. Government

A Xinhua analysis describes 2025 as a turbulent and unpredictable year under the new U.S. administration, portraying its governing style as “wild” and marked by unilateral decision-making. The commentary argues that Washington pursued an aggressive agenda at home and abroad, including strict immigration enforcement, contentious trade policies, and military actions involving countries such as Iran and Venezuela, while repeatedly asserting freedom from international legal constraints. It quotes a Chinese scholar for characterizing this approach as “bulldozer-style governance,” saying it has intensified social divisions, weakened institutional trust, and reignited debate over presidential authority and federal power.

On the domestic front, the article claims the administration implemented sweeping administrative changes, including large-scale federal job cuts and sharp budget reductions for agencies such as the Department of Education and the Environmental Protection Agency. It also highlights a record 43-day federal government shutdown triggered by budget disputes, arguing that these developments deepened political polarization and eroded public confidence in governance.

Internationally, the commentary criticizes what it describes as U.S. unilateralism, including withdrawals from international treaties and organizations and a reshaping of global alliances and trade relations. It argues that Washington has pressured allies to shoulder greater defense burdens, relied on tariffs and coercive trade practices that disrupt global supply chains, and framed foreign policy around ideological dominance. According to the article, these actions have increased global instability and weakened confidence in U.S. leadership, standing in contrast to principles of multilateral cooperation.

Source: Xinhua, January 17, 2026
https://www.news.cn/world/20260117/f9af53da5a194c64884793497ace5bfe/c.html

Briefings | | |   US-China Relations

CIA Releases New Video Outlining Secure Contact Methods for Chinese Sources

On January 15, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a video on social media platform X providing step-by-step instructions for securely contacting the agency. The video states that the CIA “wants to know the truth about China” and is seeking individuals who have such information and are willing to share it.

The video outlines nine practical measures aimed at protecting anonymity and personal safety. These include purchasing communication devices with cash or gift cards to avoid identity disclosure, using public Wi-Fi locations for anonymous access, downloading web browsers and VPN software from U.S. or other Western providers, creating new email accounts, and contacting the CIA via the dark web. The agency also advises that, if circumstances permit, individuals should consider leaving the country before carrying out the first step.

This is not the CIA’s first outreach effort of this kind. In May 2025, the agency released two Chinese-language videos titled “Why I Contacted the CIA: To Take Control of My Fate” and “Why I Contacted the CIA: For a Better Life.” The short films portrayed fictional scenarios in which Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials, concerned about their own and their families’ futures, ultimately chose to cooperate with the CIA.

CIA Director John Ratcliffe said in a statement that he believes such videos can penetrate China’s internet censorship and reach relevant audiences inside mainland China. A U.S. official added that the agency would not continue producing the videos if they were ineffective, underscoring that in the broader strategic competition between the United States and China, the CCP remains the CIA’s top intelligence priority.

Source: Epoch Times, January 16, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/16/n14677269.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS US-China Relations

China’s Expanding Arctic Strategy: From Greenland Autonomy to the “Polar Silk Road”

In June 2009, Greenland’s Self-Government Act took effect, transferring most governing powers from Denmark to the Greenlandic government—excluding foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy—and granting Greenland the right to declare independence at any time. Economic independence, however, remains a prerequisite. Nearly 60 percent of Greenland’s revenue still comes from an annual Danish subsidy of about 3.5 billion kroner (US$ 346,000), frozen at the time of autonomy, forcing the territory to shoulder increasing fiscal responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Beijing’s involvement in Greenland gradually emerged. Today, Greenland has the highest level of Chinese investment as a share of GDP in the Arctic region. In 2016, Chinese rare-earth firm Shenghe Resources became the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine, and in 2018 it signed a memorandum of understanding to lead the processing and sale of materials extracted from the site.

Prior to 2013, China kept a deliberately low profile in the Arctic, avoiding open discussion of polar resources. This approach shifted after Xi Jinping took power. In April 2013, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development highlighted research into Arctic shipping routes and the normalization of polar expeditions. In June 2014, the People’s Liberation Army’s “Strategic Assessment 2013” identified Arctic shipping and resource development as having major strategic value and described access to Arctic resources as an “important strategic interest.”

In January 2018, China released its first “Arctic Policy White Paper,” declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” and formally introducing the “Polar Silk Road,” which added a northern maritime corridor to the Belt and Road Initiative. The route encompasses the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and a future Central Arctic route. The Northeast Passage, largely controlled by Russia, reduces shipping time from Shanghai to Hamburg to about 18 days, compared with roughly 35 days via the Suez Canal, while the Northwest Passage through Canada shortens routes by about 20 percent compared with the Panama Canal.

The Polar Silk Road is widely regarded as a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely commercial project, with significant implications for the global balance of power. Analysts argue that China aims to expand its Arctic influence in coordination with Russia, potentially laying the groundwork for a parallel global system and enabling the future deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to counter the United States.

In operational terms, China COSCO began using Arctic routes in 2013 and, over the following eight years, conducted 56 voyages with 26 vessels, including 14 trips in 2021 alone. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels transited the Bering Sea near Alaska, drawing U.S. attention. In 2017, China’s “Xuelong” icebreaker completed its first passage through the Northwest Passage.

China’s Arctic ambitions have also raised security concerns. In 2016, a Hong Kong–based company proposed purchasing a decommissioned Danish naval base, and in 2018 a Chinese state-owned enterprise bid to expand and modernize Greenland’s airports; both proposals were ultimately blocked by Copenhagen. In 2020, Chinese scholars openly argued that Greenland should serve as a strategic hub for the Polar Silk Road.

In October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Arctic Ocean waters for the first time, operating farther north than previously recorded and signaling an expansion into areas traditionally viewed as within the U.S. strategic sphere.

China frames its Arctic policy around four principles—“understanding, protecting, utilizing, and participating in the governance of the Arctic”—while asserting its “near-Arctic” status and seeking greater influence within Arctic institutions.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/14/n14676123.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Economy/Resources Geo-Strategic Trend US-China Relations