US-China Relations - 9. page

In June 2009, Greenland’s Self-Government Act took effect, transferring most governing powers from Denmark to the Greenlandic government—excluding foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy—and granting Greenland the right to declare independence at any time. Economic independence, however, remains a prerequisite. Nearly 60 percent of Greenland’s revenue still comes from an annual Danish subsidy of about 3.5 billion kroner (US$ 346,000), frozen at the time of autonomy, forcing the territory to shoulder increasing fiscal responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Beijing’s involvement in Greenland gradually emerged. Today, Greenland has the highest level of Chinese investment as a share of GDP in the Arctic region. In 2016, Chinese rare-earth firm Shenghe Resources became the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine, and in 2018 it signed a memorandum of understanding to lead the processing and sale of materials extracted from the site.

Prior to 2013, China kept a deliberately low profile in the Arctic, avoiding open discussion of polar resources. This approach shifted after Xi Jinping took power. In April 2013, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development highlighted research into Arctic shipping routes and the normalization of polar expeditions. In June 2014, the People’s Liberation Army’s “Strategic Assessment 2013” identified Arctic shipping and resource development as having major strategic value and described access to Arctic resources as an “important strategic interest.”

In January 2018, China released its first “Arctic Policy White Paper,” declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” and formally introducing the “Polar Silk Road,” which added a northern maritime corridor to the Belt and Road Initiative. The route encompasses the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and a future Central Arctic route. The Northeast Passage, largely controlled by Russia, reduces shipping time from Shanghai to Hamburg to about 18 days, compared with roughly 35 days via the Suez Canal, while the Northwest Passage through Canada shortens routes by about 20 percent compared with the Panama Canal.

The Polar Silk Road is widely regarded as a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely commercial project, with significant implications for the global balance of power. Analysts argue that China aims to expand its Arctic influence in coordination with Russia, potentially laying the groundwork for a parallel global system and enabling the future deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to counter the United States.

In operational terms, China COSCO began using Arctic routes in 2013 and, over the following eight years, conducted 56 voyages with 26 vessels, including 14 trips in 2021 alone. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels transited the Bering Sea near Alaska, drawing U.S. attention. In 2017, China’s “Xuelong” icebreaker completed its first passage through the Northwest Passage.

China’s Arctic ambitions have also raised security concerns. In 2016, a Hong Kong–based company proposed purchasing a decommissioned Danish naval base, and in 2018 a Chinese state-owned enterprise bid to expand and modernize Greenland’s airports; both proposals were ultimately blocked by Copenhagen. In 2020, Chinese scholars openly argued that Greenland should serve as a strategic hub for the Polar Silk Road.

In October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Arctic Ocean waters for the first time, operating farther north than previously recorded and signaling an expansion into areas traditionally viewed as within the U.S. strategic sphere.

China frames its Arctic policy around four principles—“understanding, protecting, utilizing, and participating in the governance of the Arctic”—while asserting its “near-Arctic” status and seeking greater influence within Arctic institutions.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/14/n14676123.htm