{Editor’s Notes: On September 3, China held a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan during World War II. As Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi Jinping reviewed the troops and parade formations.
The event attracted considerable attention from analysts for several reasons: (1) internal CCP power struggles are ongoing; (2) China’s diplomatic ties with key countries such as Russia, North Korea, and India are evolving; and (3) the new weapons systems showcased during the parade.
The following sections summarize key discussions and analyses.}
1. Xi’s Health {1}
Xi Jinping delivered a speech before reviewing the troops. China Central Television’s (CCTV’s) live broadcast showed him looking listless, with a lack of energy in his delivery. His complexion appeared unusually dark, his left hand noticeably swollen, and his head trembled involuntarily several times – moments that the broadcast quickly cut away from. Observers noted that Xi looked markedly different from his usual appearance.
2. Xi’s Conversation on Living to 150 Years via Organ Transplant {2} {3} {4}
When Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin walked together to the Tiananmen rostrum, a hot mic caught their discussion on organ transplants. Putin’s translator translated Putin’s remarks in Chinese: “Biotechnology is continuously developing… Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and (you can) even achieve immortality.”
Xi replied, “Some predict that in this century humans may live to 150 years old.”
The exchange went viral despite censorship in China. Searches for “150” on Chinese social media platform WeChat surged nearly 96.5-fold from the previous day, reaching 3,368,513 searches. U.S. Congressman Chris Smith cited the incident to push for Senate approval of the Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2025.
After the clip spread globally, CCTV pressured international media such as AP and Reuters to remove a four-minute video and revoked their broadcast license; Reuters withdrew the video on September 5.
3. Politics
Attendance of Elder CCP Leaders {5}
CCTV footage showed the retired top CCP officials (of full national rank) attending, including Li Ruihuan (李瑞環), Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), Jia Qinglin (賈慶林), Zhang Dejiang (張德江), Yu Zhengsheng (俞正聲), Li Zhanshu (栗戰書), Wang Yang (汪洋), Li Lanqing (李嵐清), Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅), Wu Guanzheng (吳官正), Li Changchun (李長春), He Guoqiang (賀國強), Liu Yunshan (劉雲山), Wang Qishan (王岐山), and Zhang Gaoli (張高麗).
Absent were Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基), Song Ping (宋平), and Luo Gan (羅幹).
View #1: Xi is Still in Control {6}
Some analysts argue that Xi used the parade to project stability and authority amid speculation about his weakening grip on power. By orchestrating a large-scale event, Xi sought to dispel rumors, consolidate the Party, and reaffirm his leadership.
View #2: Signs of Xi’s Declining Power
Several irregularities fueled speculation that Xi’s authority is eroding:
- Zhang Youxia (张又侠)’s Seating: Zhang, a Politburo member and CMC vice chairman (sub-national rank), was seated in the front row reserved for national-level leaders, next to Zhang Gaoli and Wang Qishan, at the far-left seat. Since CCP is very strict on protocol, this suggests that Zhang had been elevated to quasi-national rank. {7}
- Hu Chunhua (胡春华)’s Airtime: CCTV cameras lingered on Hu Chunhua for six seconds – unusually long for someone of his rank – sparking speculation he and Wang Yang could be positioned as future successors to Xi. {8}
- Parade Commander’s Rank: Traditionally led by the Central Theater commander, this parade was commanded instead by Lieutenant General Han Shengyan, Air Force Commander of the Central Theater Command. The Central Theater commander, Wang Qiang, did not appear. Han is a protégé of Zhang Youxia. Reports suggest senior generals refused to serve under Xi during the parade, leaving only a lieutenant general and lower-ranking officers to lead. {9} {10}
- 82nd Group Army in Beijing: After the parade, the 82nd Group Army, loyal to Zhang, refused to return to its garrison, citing the need to “protect the Party Central Committee.” Military regulations forbid a field army from staying in the capital without joint approval of the CMC chairman and vice chairmen – rules that appear to have been bypassed. {11}
4. Foreign Diplomacy
Putin–Kim Jong Un Meeting {12}
Report described a tense battle of wills between the two sides’ aides. In the meeting room, a North Korean official attempted to set the room temperature to 23°C, while a Russian official insisted it be lowered to 20°C. The two reportedly struggled over the air conditioning control, with the North Korean official refusing to yield. The two struggled to pry each other’s fingers off the control panel. A video shows the North Korean official eventually left, while the Russian official remained to guard the control panel.
Xi-Kim Jong Un Meeting {13}
South Korean media outlet Hankyoreh reported:
“According to North Korea’s media outlet Rodong Sinmun, the two sides ‘candidly exchanged views on enhancing high-level contacts and strategic communication and mutually informed each other of their respective autonomous policy positions in foreign relations.’ They also discussed strengthening strategic coordination in international and regional affairs to safeguard common interests.”
“Neither Rodong Sinmun nor Xinhua explicitly mentioned nuclear issues such as denuclearization. The reference to ‘mutually informing each other of their respective autonomous policy positions in foreign relations’ has been interpreted as Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping clarifying their (different) stances on nuclear matters.”
“No written agreements were issued following the meeting. Since 2018, Kim and Xi have met six times but have yet to sign a joint document. This suggests that the two sides have not reached a strategic consensus that could be formalized into mutually binding commitments, or may deliberately avoid making such commitments in writing.”
India’s position {14}
Prime Minister Modi skipped the September 3 parade despite attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin days earlier. He also missed a BRICS virtual meeting on September 8, but engaged positively with U.S. President Trump afterward.
India Today commented, “India’s challenge extends beyond optics. It must navigate a rising China, a cautious Tokyo, and scrutiny from Washington.”
“Modi’s carefully choreographed visit to Tianjin avoided alienating Beijing or Tokyo, sending nuanced messages. On one hand, engagements with Xi and Putin confirmed that India remains in dialogue with key global power brokers. On the other, skipping the parade signaled that New Delhi is not yet choosing sides amid the growing alignment of China, Russia, and North Korea.”
5. Weapons Systems Showcased {15}
Chinese military experts highlighted the following to Huanqiu Times:
- New “King of Land Combat” Debuts: The land combat formation featured the first public appearance of China’s 99B tank, 100 tank, and 100 support vehicle, collectively dubbed the “King of Land Combat.” These vehicles feature futuristic designs, multiple electro-optical sensors, remote weapon stations, and active defense systems. The 100 support vehicle carries a vehicle-mounted rotary-wing drone for reconnaissance, enhancing battlefield situational awareness and counter-ambush capabilities. The 100 tank prioritizes sensor-driven precision strikes rather than large-caliber firepower, and the support vehicle coordinates closely with the tank for combined operations.
- Amphibious and Airborne Forces: The amphibious assault formation displayed three types of 8×8 wheeled amphibious armored vehicles, capable of mounting various calibers of cannons and troop configurations. These vehicles enhance China’s near-shore island-seizing capabilities by integrating with the navy and air force for sea and air dominance. Airborne forces featured new armored vehicles deployable via Y-20 transport aircraft, allowing paratroopers to transition into mechanized units immediately upon landing.
- Long-Range Rocket Artillery: Two variants of the 191 long-range box rocket launchers were displayed, demonstrating precision strike capability over long distances. The system’s modularity allows it to deliver missile-like effects at rocket costs, enhancing the PLA’s long-range precision firepower.
- Naval Innovations and Laser Weapons: The naval formation highlighted four anti-air weapon systems – HQ-9C, HQ-16C, HQ-10A, and a new shipborne laser weapon –providing layered, integrated air defense. The laser weapon can intercept incoming missiles and UAVs at low cost while damaging optical sensors, changing naval warfare dynamics. The anti-ship missile formation featured multiple “YJ” series missiles, including hypersonic variants, demonstrating versatility and advanced offensive capabilities. Submarine-launched and surface unmanned systems, including torpedoes and mine-laying units, debuted with autonomous reconnaissance and strike functions.
- Air Power and Carrier-Based Aircraft: The air formation included new and upgraded fighters such as the J-20S and J-20A, carrier-based J-35, and electronic warfare variants of the J-15. The J-20S, with an additional pilot, enhances command capabilities, while the J-35 marks China’s entry into fifth-generation carrier aviation. AEW&C and electronic warfare aircraft complement these fighters, boosting carrier strike group effectiveness. Anti-submarine patrol, electronic reconnaissance, and H-6 bombers were also showcased, highlighting multi-domain operational capabilities.
- Unmanned Combat Systems: The parade featured extensive unmanned systems across land, sea, and air, including ground combat robots, unmanned surface vessels, submarines, drones, loyal-wingman UAVs, and carrier-based unmanned helicopters. Land-based unmanned systems support reconnaissance, fire support, and assault while reducing personnel risk. Maritime unmanned systems integrate reconnaissance, strike, and mining capabilities. Airborne UAVs provide sensor and strike support, enabling manned-unmanned team operations. Anti-drone systems using lasers and high-power microwaves were also showcased.
- Air and Missile Defense: China displayed six types of integrated, multi-layer air and missile defense systems, including HQ-11, HQ-20, HQ-22A, HQ-9C, HQ-19, and HQ-29. These systems provide far-, mid-, and short-range interception and multi-layered missile defense, forming a robust protective shield and demonstrating strategic deterrence.
- Cruise Missile Strategic Strike: Cruise missile formations displayed the CJ-20A, YJ-18C, and CJ-1000, capable of precise long-range strikes against high-value targets. These systems enable “surgical” strikes from air, sea, or land platforms, including underground or hardened targets. Hypersonic missile formations featured YJ-21, DF-17, and DF-26D, designed for rapid, precise, and penetrative strikes across regional ranges, targeting critical areas such as the so-called “first island chain.”
- Strategic Nuclear Forces: China showcased its triad of strategic nuclear forces – land-, sea-, and air-based – demonstrating integrated deterrence. Air-based systems included the JL-1 long-range missile on bombers such as the H-6 bomber series –the H-6N, H-6K, and H-6J; sea-based forces featured the JL-3 SLBM on submarines, now reaching intercontinental range; land-based forces included DF-61, DF-31, and DF-5C ICBMs, covering global targets. These systems enhance survivability, flexibility, and second-strike capability, ensuring China’s strategic nuclear deterrence is credible and comprehensive.
- Global Coverage and Flexibility: The DF-5C liquid-fueled ICBM provides global strike reach, allowing flexible launch sites within China and diverse trajectories to bypass current missile defense systems. Combined with other triad components, China now possesses a fully integrated, multi-domain nuclear deterrent capable of credible retaliation against potential threats worldwide.
Endnotes:
{1} Epoch Times, “September 3rd Military Parade: Multiple Unusual Aspects,” September 6, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/25/9/5/n14588586.htm.
{2} Congressman Chris Smith’s website, “After hot mic exposes Xi Jinping-Vladimir Putin forced organ transplantation conversation to extend the lives of communist party leaders, Rep. Smith calls on Senate to immediately approve his House-passed Stop Forced Organ Harvesting Act of 2025,” September 3, 2025.
https://chrissmith.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=414959&utm_source=chatgpt.com.
{3} Epoch Times, “Xi and Putin Chat About Organ Transplants for Life Extension; WeChat Daily Search Volume Surpasses 3.36 Million,” September 5, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/9/5/n14588192.htm.
{4} Radio France International, “Reuters Takes Down Video of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Discussing Organ Transplants and Immortality,” September 6, 2025.
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20250906-路透社下架习近平和普京谈器官移植可以长生不老视频.
{5} Epoch Times, “September 3rd Military Parade: Multiple Unusual Aspects,” September 6, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/25/9/5/n14588586.htm.
{6} World Forum, ““September 3rd Military Parade: China’s ‘New Militarism’ Arena,” September 3, 2025.
https://m.wforum.com/news/china/2025/09/03/521790.html.
{7} Epoch Times, “The Power Codes Behind the Parade and Anomalies in Military-Industrial Stocks,” September 6, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/9/5/n14588571.htm.
{8} Ibid.
{9} Ibid.
{10} Epoch Times, “Has the Topic of “Nationalizing the Military” Quietly Been Unlocked?” September 13, 2025.
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/9/12/n14593398.htm.
{11} Ibid.
{12} The Chosun Daily, “North Korean, Russian officials clash over aircon temperature before summit,” September 4, 2025.
https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/09/04/ZGJIVKEMB5HOJLHPO7LY4MKIRU/.
{13} Hankyoreh, “Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping both emphasized that, regardless of the situation, they will continue to advance the relations between the two countries.” September 5, 2025.
https://china.hani.co.kr/arti/northkorea/15865.html.
{14} India Today, “Why the SCO summit could not bring Modi, China, and Russia together,” September 1, 2025.
https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/why-the-sco-summit-could-not-bring-modi-china-and-russia-together-2780364-2025-09-01.
{15} Huanqiu Times, “[Huanqiu Times Analysis] September 3rd Military Parade: New Generation of Weapons and Equipment Unveiled,” September 6, 2025.
https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/4OBDqYjokSw.