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Australian Labor Party Rejects Chinese Demand to Expel Taiwan Representatives

Australia’s public broadcaster ABC reported that representatives from Taiwan’s office in Australia attended the governing Australian Labor Party’s national conference as observers. Chinese diplomats reportedly objected to their presence and asked Labor National Secretary Paul Erickson to remove the Taiwanese representatives. Erickson rejected the request, stating that the delegation had the right to attend as observers. Chinese diplomats subsequently walked out of the conference, a move that several diplomats and Labor delegates interpreted as a protest.

Mark Harrison, a China specialist at the University of Tasmania, said the Labor Party, as a political party rather than a government institution, is not bound by Australia’s One China policy. Given the close and complementary trade relationship between Australia and Taiwan, it was entirely appropriate to invite Taiwan to observe the conference.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 24, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202607240048.aspx

Revolving Door Between China’s State Security and Foreign Affairs Systems

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed Li Qian, a former vice minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) team stationed at the ministry. Analysts say the appointment reflects Beijing’s growing emphasis on political security within the diplomatic corps.

The appointment follows a series of high-profile personnel exchanges between China’s foreign affairs and state security systems. Former Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong resurfaced this year as Executive Deputy Director of the Office of the Central National Security Commission, while Liu Haixing moved from the Foreign Ministry to the national security apparatus before returning to head the CCP’s International Department. Analysts view these appointments as evidence of increasingly close institutional ties between China’s diplomatic and state security systems.

The personnel shifts have renewed scrutiny of the intelligence role of Chinese diplomats abroad. Critics point to the 2023 expulsion of Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei from Canada over allegations of intimidating a lawmaker, while former U.S. diplomat John J. Tkacik Jr. has argued that former Foreign Minister Qin Gang may have conducted intelligence work under diplomatic cover. Some commentators also contend that China’s foreign-language universities have long served as recruitment channels for the Ministry of State Security, further blurring the line between diplomacy and intelligence.

Source: Epoch Times, July 10, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/10/n14806905.htm

Report Claims “Restoration Party” Is Expanding Anti-CCP Activities

Yuan Hongbing, a Chinese legal scholar living in Australia, citing sources inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), claimed that an internal Ministry of Public Security document circulated after July 1 acknowledged widespread inaction and declining morale among officials responsible for China’s domestic stability maintenance system. According to Yuan, “lying flat,” bureaucratic inertia, and passive non-compliance have become increasingly common among local public security and grassroots officials.

The sources attributed the trend primarily to mounting fiscal pressures on local governments. Budget shortfalls have resulted in delayed or reduced salaries and bonuses for police officers, while grassroots officials—including neighborhood committees, township governments, and village Party branches—have also experienced prolonged delays in wage and subsidy payments. Yuan argued that these financial constraints have weakened the effectiveness of the CCP’s stability maintenance apparatus, particularly at the county and township levels.

Yuan also claimed that the same internal document identified an anti-CCP organization known as the “Restoration Party” (复国党), which reportedly advocates overthrowing Xi Jinping’s rule and replacing the current political system with a “Republic of China 2.0” framework. According to the report, the group has adopted a decentralized, cell-based organizational structure to expand its activities inside China.

Yuan further claimed that the Restoration Party has carried out operations in the Beijing–Tianjin region to seize what it describes as illicit wealth held by CCP officials, with the stated goals of assisting the public and financing anti-CCP resistance activities. According to Yuan, the group has conducted more than 100 successful operations and has also organized anti-CCP graffiti campaigns in multiple regions across China. He argued that declining enforcement by local stability maintenance authorities has created unprecedented opportunities for domestic resistance movements. The authenticity of the Ministry of Public Security document and Yuan’s claims could not be independently verified.

Source: NTDTV, July 15, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/07/15/a104115463.html

Chinese Courts Rule Against Pension Suspensions in Two Falun Gong Cases

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has persecuted Falun Gong practitioners since launching its nationwide campaign against the spiritual group in July 1999. In addition to imprisonment and other forms of physical and legal persecution, authorities have also imposed financial penalties, including dismissals from employment and suspension of pensions. Although China’s laws protect citizens’ pension rights, Minghui.org has documented numerous cases in which Falun Gong practitioners have had their pensions suspended or been ordered to repay previously received benefits after serving prison sentences.

However, two recent court rulings have challenged this CCP’s longstanding practice.

One case involved Jia Fengxian, a 62-year-old retired government employee in Zhuozhou, Hebei Province. She was sentenced to seven months in prison in 2019 for distributing information about Falun Gong. In February 2026, the Zhuozhou Social Insurance Service Center suspended her pension and demanded repayment of approximately RMB 480,000 (US$71,000) in pension benefits, citing an internal government document. The agency also filed a civil lawsuit against her. On June 25, the court dismissed the case, ruling that the Zhuozhou Social Insurance Service Center and Jia Fengxian were not equal civil parties, making the agency’s civil lawsuit legally improper.

A second case involved Cui Zhongxin, 89, and his wife Qi Guoxin, 84, both retired employees of the Liaohe Oilfield system in Liaoning Province. After serving prison sentences related to their Falun Gong practice, the couple’s pensions were suspended in 2020. After years of unsuccessful petitions and legal challenges, the Liaoning Provincial High Court ruled on March 2 that the pension suspension was unlawful, ordered the authorities to restore the couple’s pension benefits and repay the withheld funds, and overturned the earlier lower-court rulings.

Source: Epoch Times, July 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/14/n14809468.htm

CCP Hosts International Media Tour Promoting Long March Legacy and Development Model

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) recently organized an international media tour to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the Party’s founding and the 90th anniversary of the Red Army’s Long March. Invited by the CCP International Department, representatives from political party-affiliated and mainstream media organizations in 21 countries visited Jiangxi, Guizhou, and Ningxia to retrace the Long March route while learning about the CCP’s governance philosophy and China’s development achievements.

During the tour, participants visited key Long March historical sites as well as manufacturing, technology, and agricultural enterprises that Chinese authorities showcased as examples of modernization in former revolutionary base areas. Stops included intelligent manufacturing facilities in Jiangxi, the National Big Data (Guizhou) Comprehensive Pilot Zone, and automated agricultural processing plants in Ningxia.

The delegation also attended the July 9 international symposium, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the World,” held in Yinchuan, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. The event brought together more than 120 foreign political party leaders, diplomats, scholars, and media representatives from over 50 countries. Chinese organizers presented both the symposium and the media tour as platforms to promote the CCP’s governance model while portraying the Long March as a source of resilience and inspiration with global relevance.

Source: Xinhua, July 9, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260709/e49e3b0b8a964198bbd34e714be7430b/c.html

Report: North Korea Seeks Chinese Investment While Tightening Controls on Chinese Influence

Daily NK, a South Korean news outlet specializing in North Korean affairs, reported that Pyongyang has adopted a dual-track policy toward China, expanding economic cooperation while tightening ideological controls to prevent the spread of Chinese cultural influence. Citing a source in Kangwon Province, the report says the directive was issued by the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Committee in late June following Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea.

The directive reportedly instructs officials to separate political and security issues from economic cooperation, encourage Chinese investment, facilitate customs clearance for bilateral trade, and boost foreign currency earnings during the second half of the year. Cadres were told to adopt a pragmatic approach that reassures Chinese investors while avoiding political disputes that could undermine economic cooperation.

At the same time, Pyongyang reportedly ordered security agencies to intensify efforts to block Chinese cultural and ideological influence. The directive emphasized that while North Korea can “make money and buy on credit, it must not be influenced ideologically.” Authorities were instructed to crack down on rumors that Xi’s visit had led to greater tolerance for watching unauthorized Chinese films and television programs.

The policy reflects North Korea’s effort to maximize economic benefits while balancing its relationships with China, Russia, and the United States. As Beijing seeks to preserve its influence on the Korean Peninsula amid expanding North Korea-Russia cooperation, Pyongyang is reportedly attempting to leverage competition among the major powers for economic gain while preventing China’s reform experience and capitalist culture from weakening domestic ideological control.

Source: Daily NK, July 14, 2026
https://www.dailynk.com/chinese/可以赚钱和赊账,但思想不能受影响,拿出对/

Papua New Guinea to Close Taiwan Representative Office; U.S. Expressed “Deep Concern”

Papua New Guinea (PNG) Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko confirmed on July 16 that the government will close Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby, a move welcomed by Beijing and strongly protested by Taipei.

PNG maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) for only 17 days in 1999 before reestablishing diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although the two sides have not maintained official diplomatic relations since then, they continued to operate representative offices that functioned as de facto embassies. PNG closed its trade office in Taipei in 2023, citing economic reasons, while Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby remained open until the latest decision.

The U.S. State Department said it was “deeply concerned” by the move, describing it as “yet another example of Beijing’s intimidation campaign against Taiwan and its supporters around the world.”

Strategically located along key sea lanes and near international submarine cable routes connecting the United States and Australia, Papua New Guinea has become an important arena for geopolitical competition. Over the past decade, the PRC has invested billions of dollars in Pacific island nations, expanding its diplomatic and economic influence across the region.

Source: Deutsche Well, July 18, 2026
https://www.dw.com/zh/巴新关闭台北办事处-美国北京恫吓的又一例证/a-78018695

CCDI Publicizes Cases of Local Government Fiscal Data Falsification

China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) Office publicly disclosed three cases involving serious misconduct by local officials in pursuit of political performance, highlighting fiscal data falsification, hidden local government debt, and the misuse of central government funds.

According to the CCDI, the city of Nanning in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region artificially inflated fiscal revenue by RMB 2.83 billion (US$395 million) within a single year through circular financing arrangements and repeated land transactions. In one case, the same parcel of land was reportedly transferred 18 times to inflate government revenue. The report also cited Xiaoshan District in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, for concealing local government debt through financing vehicles while falsely reporting that all hidden debt had been eliminated and related risks fully resolved. In Jiuquan, Gansu Province, authorities were accused of diverting ultra-long-term special treasury bond funds intended for public welfare projects to urban landscaping and city beautification initiatives.

The cases suggest that some local governments continue to rely on accounting maneuvers, off-budget financing, and fiscal data falsification to meet economic and political performance targets amid a challenging economic environment.

Source: Net Ease, June 29, 2026
https://www.163.com/dy/article/L0HTE9IR0512E5AP.html