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PLA Develops Online Militia Platform to Strengthen Party Control

A People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily article reported that the People’s Armed Forces Department of Chancheng District in Foshan, Guangdong Province, has developed a “Smart Party-Building Platform” to strengthen political education and organizational management of China’s militia. The platform integrates ideological study, Party organization management, administrative services, and logistical support into a unified digital system, using technologies such as big data and cloud computing to move political education and routine management online.

According to the report, militia commanders can monitor participation in ideological training and Party activities through a centralized dashboard. The platform also offers short Party lessons, recorded courses, online assessments, meeting notifications, and digital archives of Party branch activities. PLA officials said the system is designed to shift militia members from passive participation to more proactive political study while improving the effectiveness of ideological education.

The platform also addresses the challenge of managing a large and geographically dispersed militia force. It enables online processing of administrative requests, automatically archives organizational activities, and provides paperless, traceable, and standardized management.

Source: People’s Daily, July 30, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0730/c1011-40770792.html

CCP Announces Fifth Plenum in October, Fueling Speculation Over Military Purge

At its July 30 meeting, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo decided to convene the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in October. The plenum’s principal agenda will be to study “major issues concerning the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party.”

Some analysts believe the renewed emphasis on strict Party governance is intended to help Xi Jinping consolidate control ahead of the 21st Party Congress, where he is widely expected to seek another term as CCP General Secretary. They speculate that the leadership may seek to conclude ongoing investigations involving former Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and CMC Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli, both reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations and being disrespectful to Xi Jinping. Observers argue that prolonged uncertainty surrounding these cases could undermine military morale and that the Fifth Plenum would provide a politically appropriate occasion to announce their outcomes.

The Politburo justified its focus on “strict Party governance” by stating that “profound changes” in both domestic and international conditions have created new challenges for Party building. It stressed that the entire Party must recognize the importance of strict self-governance from the perspective of safeguarding the CCP’s long-term ruling position. Analysts view this language as underscoring Beijing’s priority of preserving Party control and political stability as preparations for the next Party Congress accelerate.

Source: Radio France International, July 31, 2026
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/中国/20260730-五中全会的主要议程为何是-全面从严治党

Xinhua Analysis: Is the “Donro Doctrine” Pushing Latin America to the Right? Not So Simple

Xinhua News Agency published an analysis arguing that Latin America’s recent shift to the right does not necessarily indicate that the “Donro Doctrine” is fundamentally reshaping the region’s political landscape. Rather, it contends that the trend is a temporary swing based on a combination of domestic political dynamics and external factors.

According to the article, the region’s rightward trend continued in the first half of 2026, with conservative candidates winning presidential elections in Costa Rica, Colombia, and Peru, following right-of-center victories in Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras in 2025.

The analysis attributes the shift primarily to domestic economic and security challenges. Sluggish economic growth, deteriorating public security, and voter dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbent left-leaning governments have prompted many voters to support conservative candidates. It also contends that U.S. President Donald Trump’s renewed “Donro Doctrine” (唐罗主义) toward Latin America has reinforced the trend by openly backing right-leaning candidates and exerting political pressure during regional elections.

However, the analysis argues that the recent electoral outcomes do not signal a fundamental ideological realignment or a permanent shift to the right. Instead, they reflect Latin America’s long-standing political “pendulum effect,” in which power alternates between left- and right-leaning parties. The narrow victories of conservative candidates in countries such as Peru and Colombia suggest that election outcomes are driven more by government performance and campaign strategy than by a decisive ideological shift.

Source: Xinhua, July 15, 2026
https://www.news.cn/world/20260715/d608c3fad33c43ac859fdaefbc03bb65/c.html

Foreign Correspondents Say China’s Press Restrictions Expand to Economic Reporting

The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China (FCCC) released its “Media Freedoms Report 2025: The New Abnormal” on July 13, concluding that foreign journalists continue to face growing restrictions, intimidation, and uncertainty in China. Based on responses from 89 journalists, the report says restrictions on foreign media have become a “new normal” rather than isolated incidents.

The report finds that the scope of politically sensitive topics has expanded beyond Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and criticism of China’s leadership to include the economy and technology. Forty-seven percent of respondents said new sensitive subjects emerged over the past year, including youth unemployment, demographic decline, economic conditions, the property crisis, U.S.-China trade tensions, rare earths, and emerging technologies. Overall, 94 percent said China’s reporting environment rarely or generally failed to meet international standards for press freedom.

The report also highlights mounting operational challenges. Sixty-four percent of respondents reported being obstructed by police or other officials while reporting, while 29 percent waited more than a year to obtain journalist visas. In addition, 79 percent believed their WeChat communications were monitored, and 40 percent said their Chinese colleagues had experienced government pressure or intimidation, underscoring the Chinese authorities’ expanding use of surveillance and administrative measures to restrict foreign media reporting.

Source: Epoch Times, July 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/15/n14809847.htm

FARA Filings Renew Scrutiny of Chinese Influence Operations Targeting U.S. Media

Recently resurfaced filings under the U.S. Department of Justice’s “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (FARA) have renewed scrutiny of China’s long-running influence operations targeting U.S. media organizations. The filings show that the Hong Kong-based China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), through U.S. public relations firm BLJ Worldwide (BLJ), sponsored trips to China and engagement programs involving journalists from dozens of major Western media outlets over more than a decade. The disclosures have gained renewed attention following investigative reporting by journalist Natalie Winters, who argues the records illustrate the scope and sophistication of Beijing’s overseas influence efforts.

According to the FARA filings, BLJ organized sponsored visits to China for 128 journalists from 48 media organizations beginning in 2009. Participants reportedly included journalists from CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, Reuters, Bloomberg, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, the Associated Press, and other leading news organizations. The filings describe the programs as providing prominent journalists with opportunities to gain a more positive understanding of China’s development and achievements through official meetings, site visits, and exchanges.

CUSEF, founded in 2008 by former Hong Kong Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, has long been identified by U.S. officials and congressional reports as part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) broader united front influence network. Beyond media engagement, the organization has funded exchanges with universities, think tanks, and political organizations, including programs for historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs). Critics contend that these activities are designed to cultivate long-term relationships with political, academic, and media elites capable of shaping public opinion and policy debates in ways favorable to Beijing.

The resurfaced FARA records have renewed attention to the CCP’s broader influence operations and the role of sponsored exchanges as a tool of public diplomacy. Critics argue that such programs form part of a wider strategy to shape Western media narratives and public discourse by cultivating relationships with influential journalists and opinion leaders over the long term.

Source: Aboluo, July 20, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0720/2410405.html

CCP Moves to Expand Party Building Among Gig Workers and New Economic Groups

The Chinese Communist Party is intensifying grassroots governance efforts, recently issuing a directive to strengthen Party building within new economic organizations—including online platforms—and “new employment groups” such as ride-hailing drivers and food delivery couriers. As these flexible forms of employment become increasingly common, authorities aim to achieve full Party organizational coverage at the grassroots level.

Since establishing the Central Social Work Department in 2023, the CCP has continued pushing Party-led grassroots governance. This included 2024 guidance on strengthening community worker teams, and this year’s “Opinions on Advancing the Professional Social Work Workforce,” alongside measures on registering public petition visits that took effect July 1.

While the Party has long required Party branches within enterprises, the high mobility of gig workers like delivery couriers and ride-hailing drivers has made traditional grassroots Party structures difficult to apply—prompting the new policy focus.

State news agency Xinhua reported that the CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly issued “Opinions on Strengthening Social Work in the New Era,” describing social work as vital to the Party’s long-term governance and national stability. The document calls for comprehensive Party leadership over social work, adherence to a people-centered approach, and development of the “Fengqiao Experience” model for the new era, with emphasis on Party building in new economic organizations, social organizations, and employment groups.

Specific measures include improving Party building quality in private enterprises, targeting internet platform companies, exploring approaches for tech innovation firms, and extending efforts to small businesses and individual vendors. The document also calls for strengthening Party building in social organizations and foundations, improving algorithmic governance of online platforms, and building social security systems suited to new employment patterns. Additionally, it emphasizes reforming grassroots political institutions and resolving public grievances at their source, before conflicts escalate.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 23, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202607230334.aspx

Australian Labor Party Rejects Chinese Demand to Expel Taiwan Representatives

Australia’s public broadcaster ABC reported that representatives from Taiwan’s office in Australia attended the governing Australian Labor Party’s national conference as observers. Chinese diplomats reportedly objected to their presence and asked Labor National Secretary Paul Erickson to remove the Taiwanese representatives. Erickson rejected the request, stating that the delegation had the right to attend as observers. Chinese diplomats subsequently walked out of the conference, a move that several diplomats and Labor delegates interpreted as a protest.

Mark Harrison, a China specialist at the University of Tasmania, said the Labor Party, as a political party rather than a government institution, is not bound by Australia’s One China policy. Given the close and complementary trade relationship between Australia and Taiwan, it was entirely appropriate to invite Taiwan to observe the conference.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 24, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202607240048.aspx

Revolving Door Between China’s State Security and Foreign Affairs Systems

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has appointed Li Qian, a former vice minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) team stationed at the ministry. Analysts say the appointment reflects Beijing’s growing emphasis on political security within the diplomatic corps.

The appointment follows a series of high-profile personnel exchanges between China’s foreign affairs and state security systems. Former Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong resurfaced this year as Executive Deputy Director of the Office of the Central National Security Commission, while Liu Haixing moved from the Foreign Ministry to the national security apparatus before returning to head the CCP’s International Department. Analysts view these appointments as evidence of increasingly close institutional ties between China’s diplomatic and state security systems.

The personnel shifts have renewed scrutiny of the intelligence role of Chinese diplomats abroad. Critics point to the 2023 expulsion of Chinese diplomat Zhao Wei from Canada over allegations of intimidating a lawmaker, while former U.S. diplomat John J. Tkacik Jr. has argued that former Foreign Minister Qin Gang may have conducted intelligence work under diplomatic cover. Some commentators also contend that China’s foreign-language universities have long served as recruitment channels for the Ministry of State Security, further blurring the line between diplomacy and intelligence.

Source: Epoch Times, July 10, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/10/n14806905.htm