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Beijing Rehearses “Maritime Militia” Strategy Against Taiwan

China has increasingly employed fishing vessels as part of its so-called “maritime militia” strategy, using civilian boats to assert control at sea while creating legal and moral dilemmas for its opponents. In January 2026, Beijing assembled roughly 1,400 Chinese fishing vessels into a floating maritime barrier stretching about 320 kilometers—widely interpreted as a rehearsal for a potential blockade of Taiwan. Similar operations in the past have reportedly involved more than 2,000 vessels arranged in formations exceeding 400 kilometers in length.

Independent media commentator Wen Zhao outlined three tactics of this maritime militia strategy.

Version 1.0:
Chinese fishing boats deliberately crossed other countries’ maritime “red lines,” provoking responses from foreign maritime law-enforcement agencies. When vessels were detained or crews arrested, China’s coast guard intervened under the pretext of defending fishermen’s rights, leading to standoffs, ramming incidents, and water-cannon exchanges. In some cases, naval forces were drawn in, creating a three-layered escalation model—fishing boats, coast guard, then navy. This approach has been used since 2012 in areas such as Scarborough Shoal against the Philippines and tends to be effective against countries with weaker maritime enforcement capabilities.

Version 2.0:
Against stronger maritime enforcers such as Japan, Chinese fishing vessels shifted from symbolic legal presence to active provocation. These boats deliberately cut across or collide with foreign coast guard patrol vessels, especially when Chinese maritime law-enforcement ships are nearby. According to Japanese police, the fishing boats often make sudden turns to block enforcement vessels, and if collisions occur, Chinese operators film and selectively edit footage to support its propaganda narratives against the foreign “bully.”

Version 3.0:
This method involves massing large numbers of fishing vessels into coordinated formations to support a blockade of Taiwan or to obstruct U.S. and Japanese military intervention. These slow-moving, densely packed formations exploit a legal gray zone, as military forces cannot lawfully attack civilian vessels. U.S. think tanks, including the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), have analyzed such scenarios and suggested countermeasures such as declaring military zone to prevent vessels from coming in, waiting for them to weaken due to fuel constraints, disrupting inter-vessel communications through electronic warfare, transiting the area before formations fully coalesce, or taking a detour route to bypass the formations.

Source: Gan Jing World, January 19, 2026
https://www.ganjingworld.com/video/1i8p0lkkjje6G3cHANsOJdBWk1n51c?playlist_id=1galt8gs0ti1LGq7DHJ5BZQ1q00p

Different Accounts Surround the Arrest of PLA Senior Leader Zhang Youxia

Following Beijing’s announcement of the detention of Zhang Youxia (张又侠), Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC), sharply differing stories about the circumstances of his arrest have circulated online.

Version One: Chinese democracy activist Sheng Xue (盛雪) stated in a social media post—citing sources within China’s political system—that Zhang Youxia and CMC Joint Staff Chief Liu Zhenli were detained over an alleged “failed coup attempt” targeting Xi Jinping. According to her account, the two were planning to move against Xi on the night of January 18, believing he would be staying at Beijing’s Jingxi Hotel. The plan was reportedly exposed about two hours before it was to be executed. After receiving the warning, Xi quietly left the hotel and swiftly arranged countermeasures. Unaware that the plot had been compromised, Zhang’s side allegedly sent advance personnel to the hotel, where an armed confrontation reportedly broke out between the two sides, resulting in casualties. Sheng claimed that Xi then ordered the immediate detention of Zhang and Liu, along with their family members, and that official announcements were released only after the situation had been fully brought under control.

Version Two: Independent political commentator Cai Shenkun (蔡慎坤), who was one of the first people reported Zhang’s arrest, offered a markedly different interpretation, arguing that the detentions were not an emergency response but the culmination of a large-scale, long-planned purge at the highest levels of the CCP. Citing cross-verified information from multiple sources familiar with internal operations, Cai said the action was carefully orchestrated in advance and jointly led by the Central Guard Bureau, the Ministry of Public Security’s special operations units, and senior officials from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. He described the operation as a centrally coordinated “joint action,” rather than a move by any single agency. A defining feature was “neutralizing the perimeter before targeting the core,” in which Zhang’s security staff, aides, and secretaries were replaced ahead of time to sever his access to his power network and real-time information, leaving him no room to react. Cai added that the timing was well calculated and that the overriding objective was absolute security and success. The rapid spread of information, Cai concluded, suggests the operation was broad in scope, with multiple senior military officers reportedly being investigated simultaneously rather than through isolated, sequential actions.

Sources:
1. Epoch Times, January 24, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/24/n14683367.htm
2. Yahoo! (Taiwan), January 24, 2026
https://tw.news.yahoo.com/張又俠被抓非臨時決策-蔡慎坤揭內幕-中央警衛局主導-行動早已佈局-042953943.html

China Launches Disciplinary and Legal Investigations Into Senior Military Leaders Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli

Beijing announced on January 24 that Zhang Youxia (张又侠), a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli (刘振立), a CMC member and Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department, are suspected of serious violations of Party discipline and the law. Following deliberations by the CCP Central Committee, authorities have decided to open formal disciplinary and legal investigations into both officials.

People’s Daily republished a PLA Daily commentary detailing the alleged misconduct. The commentary states that, “As senior Party and military leaders, Zhang and Liu gravely betrayed the trust of the Party Central Committee and the CMC. They seriously undermined and violated the CMC chairman responsibility system, exacerbated political and corruption-related problems that weaken the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces, and endangered the party’s governing foundation. Their actions damaged the authority and credibility of the CMC leadership, severely undermined political unity and morale within the armed forces, and inflicted major harm on the military’s political foundations, internal governance, and combat effectiveness. The case has had extremely serious negative consequences for the Party, the state, and the military.”

The “CMC chairman responsibility system” is a fancy term to state that Xi Jinping, the Chairman of the CMC, controls the military. Saying “Zhang and Liu are accused of undermining and violating the CMC chairman responsibility system” would imply that they challenged Xi’s dominance over the military.

Source: People’s Daily, January 24, 2026
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0125/c1001-40652025.html

People’s Daily: Drone Operators Become a “Standard Position” in Combat Squads

People’s Daily reported that the People’s Liberation Army’s 72nd Group Army has made drone flight control operators a standard billet within combat squads.

“Recent regional conflicts have clearly demonstrated the growing role of drones in modern warfare. Drone operators have become indispensable personnel for militaries around the world,” a senior officer from the group army told reporters. In recent years, the unit has adopted a training model in which the group army prepares instructors, while each brigade leverage those instructors to train their drone operators.

Instructors include both in-house specialists and expert faculty from military academies. The group army has implemented a system of platform-based classification and tiered personnel training, with instruction tailored to different drone types—such as FPV racing drones and aerial photography drones. Operators are divided into three levels—basic, intermediate, and advanced—with training groups adjusted weekly to enable differentiated instruction and a progressive talent-development pipeline. The unit has also established joint talent-development mechanisms with military academies and research institutes, regularly conducting technical exchanges and professional collaboration activities.

Source: People’s Daily, January 19, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0119/c1011-40647853.html

Former U.S. Defense Official Analyzes U.S. Indo-Pacific Military Deployment

Hu Zhendong, a former U.S. Department of Defense official, spoke at a forum hosted by Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research on January 15, offering an analysis of the current posture and future direction of U.S. military deployment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Hu said U.S. national security strategy prioritizes maintaining military overmatch in the Western Pacific as a cornerstone for deterring conflict in the Taiwan Strait and preserving regional stability. He noted that President Trump’s approach continues to emphasize “peace through strength,” with substantial U.S. forces deployed across key locations including South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. Alaska, in particular, hosts robust fifth-generation air power capable of supporting operations across the Pacific theater.

To sustain naval operations, major U.S. bases on the West Coast house submarine forces and an active aircraft carrier strike group, while additional carrier strike capabilities and expeditionary sea bases are deployed throughout the Pacific. The U.S. military presence also extends to Singapore, Saipan, Palau, Midway Island, Wake Island, and Australia—locations relatively close to Taiwan—forming a first-island-chain security network supported by logistics hubs and mutual defense arrangements.

Hu noted that joint military exercises with partner nations have expanded significantly in both scale and frequency. He cited the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, which in 2024 involved 29 countries, approximately 25,000 personnel, 40 ships, and more than 150 aircraft, and is expected to grow further in 2026.

He also outlined several key U.S. military modernization efforts, including:

  • Upgrading Pacific submarine forces with Virginia-class submarines;
  • Deploying advanced F-35 fighter aircraft while retiring older platforms at bases in Japan and South Korea;
  • Expanding amphibious and expeditionary sea base capabilities to support helicopters and unmanned systems.

In addition, Hu said the United States is refining arrangements to increase the flexibility of forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula, enabling them to respond rapidly across the broader Indo-Pacific rather than being confined to a narrow regional role.

Overall, Hu argued, these developments demonstrate that the United States is reinforcing its strategic military posture throughout the Indo-Pacific to deter aggression and strengthen collective security partnerships, continuing to rely on military strength as the foundation for regional peace and stability.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/15/n14676384.htm/amp

Xinhua: South Korea Studies Restoration of 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement

A senior South Korean official said on January 14 that the government is reviewing the possibility of restoring the September 19, 2018 Inter-Korean Military Agreement with North Korea. The remarks were made by Wee Sung-lok, director of South Korea’s National Security Office, at a press conference in Nara, Japan, during a visit accompanying President Lee Jae-myung.

Wee said that reviving the agreement is a key policy direction and reflects guidance from President Lee, but emphasized that the issue is complex and involves multiple stakeholders, meaning no concrete decisions have yet been finalized.

President Lee previously signaled this approach on August 15, 2025, during a speech marking the 80th anniversary of Korea’s Liberation Day. He said South Korea would take the initiative in restoring the September 19 Military Agreement in a phased manner to prevent accidental clashes between the two Koreas and to rebuild military confidence.

The 2018 agreement, signed following the Panmunjom Declaration, aimed to reduce military tensions across the Korean Peninsula and establish it as a “permanent peace zone.” South Korea suspended the agreement in June 2024, and discussions on its potential revival are now underway.

Source: Xinhua, January 14, 2026
https://www.xinhuanet.com/20260114/1e7dd8b7ca374dbe85d71ce5f93b4dd9/c.html

China’s Expanding Arctic Strategy: From Greenland Autonomy to the “Polar Silk Road”

In June 2009, Greenland’s Self-Government Act took effect, transferring most governing powers from Denmark to the Greenlandic government—excluding foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy—and granting Greenland the right to declare independence at any time. Economic independence, however, remains a prerequisite. Nearly 60 percent of Greenland’s revenue still comes from an annual Danish subsidy of about 3.5 billion kroner (US$ 346,000), frozen at the time of autonomy, forcing the territory to shoulder increasing fiscal responsibility.

Against this backdrop, Beijing’s involvement in Greenland gradually emerged. Today, Greenland has the highest level of Chinese investment as a share of GDP in the Arctic region. In 2016, Chinese rare-earth firm Shenghe Resources became the largest shareholder in the Kvanefjeld mine, and in 2018 it signed a memorandum of understanding to lead the processing and sale of materials extracted from the site.

Prior to 2013, China kept a deliberately low profile in the Arctic, avoiding open discussion of polar resources. This approach shifted after Xi Jinping took power. In April 2013, China’s 12th Five-Year Plan for Marine Development highlighted research into Arctic shipping routes and the normalization of polar expeditions. In June 2014, the People’s Liberation Army’s “Strategic Assessment 2013” identified Arctic shipping and resource development as having major strategic value and described access to Arctic resources as an “important strategic interest.”

In January 2018, China released its first “Arctic Policy White Paper,” declaring itself a “near-Arctic state” and formally introducing the “Polar Silk Road,” which added a northern maritime corridor to the Belt and Road Initiative. The route encompasses the Northeast Passage, the Northwest Passage, and a future Central Arctic route. The Northeast Passage, largely controlled by Russia, reduces shipping time from Shanghai to Hamburg to about 18 days, compared with roughly 35 days via the Suez Canal, while the Northwest Passage through Canada shortens routes by about 20 percent compared with the Panama Canal.

The Polar Silk Road is widely regarded as a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely commercial project, with significant implications for the global balance of power. Analysts argue that China aims to expand its Arctic influence in coordination with Russia, potentially laying the groundwork for a parallel global system and enabling the future deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to counter the United States.

In operational terms, China COSCO began using Arctic routes in 2013 and, over the following eight years, conducted 56 voyages with 26 vessels, including 14 trips in 2021 alone. In 2015, five Chinese naval vessels transited the Bering Sea near Alaska, drawing U.S. attention. In 2017, China’s “Xuelong” icebreaker completed its first passage through the Northwest Passage.

China’s Arctic ambitions have also raised security concerns. In 2016, a Hong Kong–based company proposed purchasing a decommissioned Danish naval base, and in 2018 a Chinese state-owned enterprise bid to expand and modernize Greenland’s airports; both proposals were ultimately blocked by Copenhagen. In 2020, Chinese scholars openly argued that Greenland should serve as a strategic hub for the Polar Silk Road.

In October 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Arctic Ocean waters for the first time, operating farther north than previously recorded and signaling an expansion into areas traditionally viewed as within the U.S. strategic sphere.

China frames its Arctic policy around four principles—“understanding, protecting, utilizing, and participating in the governance of the Arctic”—while asserting its “near-Arctic” status and seeking greater influence within Arctic institutions.

Source: Epoch Times, January 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/1/14/n14676123.htm