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Speculations on the 82 Group Army

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily recently published an article titled “Rebuilding the Authority of Political Cadres in the 82nd Group Army.” The piece was notable for three reasons: it did not mention Xi Jinping, it emphasized “democratic centralism” (implicitly critiquing Xi’s more autocratic approach to government), and it advocated for restoration of the political authority of CCP cadres (hinting at a fix to Miao Hua’s military-political work).

The article stated: “When democratic centralism becomes the ‘golden key’ to consensus, when the fighting spirit becomes the ‘scalpel’ against entrenched problems, and when truth-telling becomes the ‘yardstick’ of combat readiness, the image and authority of political cadres will stand firm.”

Recently, reports surfaced online that during this year’s Beidaihe meetings, the 82nd Group Army (formerly the 38 Army) was deployed to Beijing and its neighboring area and also took over the defense of the Beidaihe venue. Large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition were reportedly stored in Beijing’s Zhongshan Park, with numerous barracks set up, and many military vehicles and tanks were stationed inside the city. The authorities said the activities were to prepare for a military parade scheduled for September 3, but in previous years’ military parades only saw defense deployments in suburban areas. There were reports that several buses blocked a line of tanks when they entered the city.

Commentator Chen Pokong noted that the PLA Daily ran this weighty article, conspicuously omitting Xi, rather than denying the rumors of (that a power struggle over the military could be ongoing).

Historically, the 38th Army played a major role in combat during the Korean War. It was repeatedly used in CCP power struggles. During the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, it was deployed to suppress and kill protesters. In 2012, amid the power struggle between Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, Hu’s faction deployed the 38th Army to Beijing to confront Jiang’s ally Zhou Yongkang, forcing Zhou into retreat. In 2015, Zhang Youxia led the 38th Army into Zhongnanhai to assist Xi Jinping in disarming the Central Guard Bureau and remove its chief Cao Qing and deputy chief Wang Qing.

Sources:
1. PLA Daily, August 16, 2025
http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/yw_214068/16402940.html
2.  China News Center, August 20, 2025
https://chinanewscenter.com/archives/49294

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Government/Politics

Ministry of State Security Reveals an Energy Sector Employee Espionage Case

China Central Television (CCTV) reported that the Ministry of State Security has arrested an energy-sector employee, identified as Yu, on charges of espionage for a foreign intelligence agency. According to officials, Yu was first approached in 2017 by a foreign contact who posed as a professional associate. Over time, Yu agreed to provide sensitive internal company information in exchange for financial compensation.

The case came to light in 2019 when Yu attempted to transition into a government position and sought to conceal his past activities during background checks. Investigators uncovered evidence of his cooperation with foreign intelligence, leading to his prosecution.

Chinese authorities stressed that espionage crimes cannot remain hidden indefinitely, and concealment only increases the severity of punishment. Officials further emphasized provisions under China’s Counter-Espionage Law, noting that individuals who voluntarily admit wrongdoing, cooperate with investigators, or make contributions to national security may face reduced penalties. “The public should report suspicious behavior through official hotlines and security platforms.”

Source: CCTV, August 20, 2025
https://news.cctv.com/2025/08/20/ARTIWHFWeIbJ78dnyn5WjjUX250820.shtml

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Social Stability

Taiwan Joins U.S.-Led “Northern Strike” Exercise in the State of Michigan

The United Sates’ two-week “Northern Strike” exercise concluded on August 16, with more than 7,500 service members from 36 U.S. states and territories participating, representing all U.S. military branches except the Space Force, along with nine international partners.

This year’s drills placed greater emphasis on maritime operations. Planners have indicated that future exercises will expand further in this direction. One scenario involved delivering supplies to troops stationed on an island, which is different from past scenarios such as resupplying by land in Europe or from large bases in the Middle East.

Michigan has emerged as the top training location for potential large-scale operations in the Asia theater, as its central Great Lakes location replicates an island environment.

At an August 4 briefing, a senior Michigan National Guard official stated that more than 500 Taiwanese soldiers took part in this year’s Northern Strike exercise. Briefing slides showed that Taiwan has been sending troops to participate at least since 2021.

Source: Epoch Times, August 20, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/8/19/n14577051.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

PLA Briefs on Parade Preparations, Emphasizes Loyalty to Xi Jinping

On August 20, the State Council Information Office held a press conference on preparations for the upcoming September 3 military parade. Major General Wu Zeke, Deputy Director of the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department and Deputy Director of the Parade Leading Group Office, outlined the plans.

According to Wu, the parade will last about 70 minutes and proceed in two stages – a ceremonial review followed by a troop march-past. It will also feature demonstrations of some of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) latest advanced weaponry designed for modern warfare.

Wu explained the deeper meaning of the parade in four areas:

  1. Affirming the PLA’s loyalty to the Communist Party. Troops maintain firm political consciousness, and are always ready to receive the review of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Chairman Xi, and remain loyal to the core, rally behind the core, support the core, and protect the core. {Editor’s Note: In Xi Jinping’s time, “the core” refers to Xi himself.}
  2. Commemorating victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
  3. Highlighting the PLA’s restructured force composition, including new units such as the Strategic Support Force, Space Force, Cyber Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force alongside the traditional services.
  4. Demonstrating combat readiness and the confidence to win future wars.

Source: Ministry of Defense website, August 20, 2025
http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16403517.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

Xinhua: Kim Jong Un Meets Senior Commanders Supporting Russia in Ukraine War

Xinhua News Agency, citing North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), reported that Kim Jong Un met on August 20 with senior commanders of the Korean People’s Army overseas combat units at the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee headquarters.

According to the report, Kim received briefings on the specific military operations conducted by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) units in overseas theaters and praised their leadership in supporting North Korean troops contributing to Russia’s effort to retake Kursk.

KCNA quoted Kim as saying: “Our army is doing what it ought to do, what it is necessary to do. And it will continue to do so in the future.”

Source: Xinhua, August 21, 2025
http://www.xinhuanet.com/20250821/8793b762a03e45bfa1f54796f07f012c/c.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Huanqiu Times: USFK Commander Raises “Strategic Flexibility,” Sparks Concern in Seoul

Huanqiu Times reported the concerns from both Korean media and Chinese analysts regarding U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Xavier Brunson’s concept of “strategic flexibility” in deploying troops from South Korea to other regions.

Brunson, in his first press conference since taking office, highlighted the need for “strategic flexibility” – the ability to redeploy troops beyond the Korean Peninsula. His remarks came ahead of President Lee Jae-myung’s planned visit to Washington on August 25, which South Korean media saw as pressure on Seoul before the summit.

Brunson said the U.S.-ROK alliance must adapt to today’s security environment, a shift that requires South Korea to take greater responsibility against North Korea so U.S. troops can handle missions elsewhere. South Korean newspapers warned this shift could allow Washington to mobilize USFK forces in Taiwan Strait or South China Sea crises, marking a major departure from the forces’ traditional defensive role.

Chinese analysts cautioned that involving USFK in broader Asia-Pacific conflicts could expose South Korea to retaliation, making it difficult for Seoul to avoid being drawn in. They also warned that repeated U.S. emphasis on “strategic flexibility” risks destabilizing the region and undermining peace.

Source: Huanqiu Times, August 11, 2025
https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/4Ns6CSZhZjg

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Timeline of Events: Philippines-China Naval Collision near Scarborough Shoal (Since August 11) (Updated)

August 11 – The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) escorted a supply vessel delivering provisions to local fishermen near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel 3104 pursued the PCG vessel BRP Suluan at high speed, ultimately colliding with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) frigate Guilin. The PCG released video footage of the incident, stating that the collision severely damaged CCG 3104’s bow, leaving it unseaworthy.

August 12 – A Chinese J-15 fighter jet intercepted a PCG light aircraft conducting a maritime patrol over Scarborough Shoal. The jet reportedly approached within 200 feet (about 61 meters) and executed dangerous maneuvers above the Philippine aircraft.

August 13 – The United States deployed two warships to the contested waters in what it called a “freedom of navigation” operation. This marked the first U.S. warship entry in at least six years. Beijing claimed that the Chinese military monitored and “drove away” the USS Higgins, a U.S. destroyer near the shoal.

August 14 – Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose Manuel Romualdez stated that Manila and Washington are discussing the possible deployment of Naval Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile launchers. He noted these anti-ship systems could be stationed along Philippine coastlines and outlying islands facing the South China Sea to deter hostile actions.

August 15 – At a press conference, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin blamed the Philippines for the collision, accusing PCG vessels of “repeatedly engaging in dangerous maneuvers, including high-speed charges and sharp turns across the bows of Chinese ships.”
On the same day, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro rejected Beijing’s claims, stating, “The Philippines bears no responsibility for the collision between the PLAN vessel and the CCG vessel in Bajo de Masinloc. It was an unfortunate outcome, but not one caused by our actions.”

August 15 – Australia and the Philippines launched their largest-ever joint military exercise, codenamed Exercise ALON. More than 3,600 personnel took part, including members of the Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Darwin Rotational Force.

August 19 – The Philippine, Australian, and Canadian navies conducted a joint sail in the South China Sea. The Philippine frigate BRP Rizal, the Australian destroyer HMAS Brisbane, and the Canadian frigate HMCS Quebec City participated in the operation.

Sources:
1. Radio France International, August 15, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/国际/20250815-菲外长-菲律宾不对中国舰船相撞事件负责，再次要求中方就去年6月登船事件赔偿
2. Deutsche Well, August 13, 2025
https://www.dw.com/zh/中国军方称驱离进入黄岩岛海域的美军驱逐舰/a-73624543
3. Australia Broadcasting Corporation, August 14, 2025
https://www.abc.net.au/chinese/2025-08-15/us-and-philippines-discuss-more-missile-system-deployments-/105657476
4. Radio France International, August 19, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn国际/20250819-菲澳-阿隆-演习期间-菲澳加三国在南海联合航行

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Nearly a Third of Xi’s Promoted Generals Investigated or Disappearing

Since coming to power, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping has promoted 79 generals of full general rank (上将). At least 23 of them have since been investigated, removed from office, or have “disappeared,” representing an incident rate of nearly 30 percent. Most of the downfalls happened in the past couple of years.

The most notable cases include Miao Hua (苗华), a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and head of its Political Work Department, who was taken down (publicly announced) in November last year, and He Weidong (何卫东), a CCP Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman, who “disappeared” on March 11 this year.

Since the CCP’s 20th National Congress, and before Miao Hua’s downfall, at least five other full generals have been purged:

  • Li Shangfu (李尚福) (CMC member, State Councilor, Minister of National Defense)
  • Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) (former CMC member, State Councilor, Minister of National Defense, and former Commander of the Rocket Force, the first to serve in that position)
  • Zhou Ya’ning (周亚宁) (former Commander of the Rocket Force, the second to serve in that position)
  • Li Yuchao (李玉超) (former Commander of the Rocket Force, the third to serve in that position)
  • Ding Laihang (丁来杭) (former Air Force commander).

On July 31, the CCP Ministry of National Defense held a reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to celebrate the so-called “98th anniversary of the founding of the army.” Overseas media reported that at least nine active-duty full generals were absent from the event:

  • He Hongjun (何宏军) (Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department)
  • Wang Chunning (王春宁) (Commander of the People’s Armed Police)
  • Zhang Hongbing (张红兵) (Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police)
  • Hu Zhongming (胡中明) (Commander of the Navy)
  • Yuan Huazhi (袁华智) (Political Commissar of the Navy)
  • Li Qiaoming (李桥铭) (Commander of the Army)
  • Qin Shutong (秦树桐) (Political Commissar of the Army)
  • Wang Qiang (王强) (Commander of the Central Theater Command)
  • Xu Deqing (徐德清) (Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command).

On August 1, Huang Ming (黄铭), Commander of the Northern Theater Command, was absent from Liaoning Province’s “August 1st” Army–Government Symposium. In May this year, social media sources had claimed Huang had already been taken away for investigation.

Source: Epoch Times, August 7, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/8/6/n14568663.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military