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PLA Briefs on Parade Preparations, Emphasizes Loyalty to Xi Jinping

On August 20, the State Council Information Office held a press conference on preparations for the upcoming September 3 military parade. Major General Wu Zeke, Deputy Director of the Operations Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department and Deputy Director of the Parade Leading Group Office, outlined the plans.

According to Wu, the parade will last about 70 minutes and proceed in two stages – a ceremonial review followed by a troop march-past. It will also feature demonstrations of some of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) latest advanced weaponry designed for modern warfare.

Wu explained the deeper meaning of the parade in four areas:

  1. Affirming the PLA’s loyalty to the Communist Party. Troops maintain firm political consciousness, and are always ready to receive the review of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and Chairman Xi, and remain loyal to the core, rally behind the core, support the core, and protect the core. {Editor’s Note: In Xi Jinping’s time, “the core” refers to Xi himself.}
  2. Commemorating victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
  3. Highlighting the PLA’s restructured force composition, including new units such as the Strategic Support Force, Space Force, Cyber Force, and Joint Logistics Support Force alongside the traditional services.
  4. Demonstrating combat readiness and the confidence to win future wars.

Source: Ministry of Defense website, August 20, 2025
http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/16403517.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

Xinhua: Kim Jong Un Meets Senior Commanders Supporting Russia in Ukraine War

Xinhua News Agency, citing North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), reported that Kim Jong Un met on August 20 with senior commanders of the Korean People’s Army overseas combat units at the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee headquarters.

According to the report, Kim received briefings on the specific military operations conducted by Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) units in overseas theaters and praised their leadership in supporting North Korean troops contributing to Russia’s effort to retake Kursk.

KCNA quoted Kim as saying: “Our army is doing what it ought to do, what it is necessary to do. And it will continue to do so in the future.”

Source: Xinhua, August 21, 2025
http://www.xinhuanet.com/20250821/8793b762a03e45bfa1f54796f07f012c/c.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Huanqiu Times: USFK Commander Raises “Strategic Flexibility,” Sparks Concern in Seoul

Huanqiu Times reported the concerns from both Korean media and Chinese analysts regarding U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Xavier Brunson’s concept of “strategic flexibility” in deploying troops from South Korea to other regions.

Brunson, in his first press conference since taking office, highlighted the need for “strategic flexibility” – the ability to redeploy troops beyond the Korean Peninsula. His remarks came ahead of President Lee Jae-myung’s planned visit to Washington on August 25, which South Korean media saw as pressure on Seoul before the summit.

Brunson said the U.S.-ROK alliance must adapt to today’s security environment, a shift that requires South Korea to take greater responsibility against North Korea so U.S. troops can handle missions elsewhere. South Korean newspapers warned this shift could allow Washington to mobilize USFK forces in Taiwan Strait or South China Sea crises, marking a major departure from the forces’ traditional defensive role.

Chinese analysts cautioned that involving USFK in broader Asia-Pacific conflicts could expose South Korea to retaliation, making it difficult for Seoul to avoid being drawn in. They also warned that repeated U.S. emphasis on “strategic flexibility” risks destabilizing the region and undermining peace.

Source: Huanqiu Times, August 11, 2025
https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/4Ns6CSZhZjg

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Timeline of Events: Philippines-China Naval Collision near Scarborough Shoal (Since August 11) (Updated)

August 11 – The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) escorted a supply vessel delivering provisions to local fishermen near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel 3104 pursued the PCG vessel BRP Suluan at high speed, ultimately colliding with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) frigate Guilin. The PCG released video footage of the incident, stating that the collision severely damaged CCG 3104’s bow, leaving it unseaworthy.

August 12 – A Chinese J-15 fighter jet intercepted a PCG light aircraft conducting a maritime patrol over Scarborough Shoal. The jet reportedly approached within 200 feet (about 61 meters) and executed dangerous maneuvers above the Philippine aircraft.

August 13 – The United States deployed two warships to the contested waters in what it called a “freedom of navigation” operation. This marked the first U.S. warship entry in at least six years. Beijing claimed that the Chinese military monitored and “drove away” the USS Higgins, a U.S. destroyer near the shoal.

August 14 – Philippine Ambassador to the U.S. Jose Manuel Romualdez stated that Manila and Washington are discussing the possible deployment of Naval Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) missile launchers. He noted these anti-ship systems could be stationed along Philippine coastlines and outlying islands facing the South China Sea to deter hostile actions.

August 15 – At a press conference, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin blamed the Philippines for the collision, accusing PCG vessels of “repeatedly engaging in dangerous maneuvers, including high-speed charges and sharp turns across the bows of Chinese ships.”
On the same day, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro rejected Beijing’s claims, stating, “The Philippines bears no responsibility for the collision between the PLAN vessel and the CCG vessel in Bajo de Masinloc. It was an unfortunate outcome, but not one caused by our actions.”

August 15 – Australia and the Philippines launched their largest-ever joint military exercise, codenamed Exercise ALON. More than 3,600 personnel took part, including members of the Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps’ Darwin Rotational Force.

August 19 – The Philippine, Australian, and Canadian navies conducted a joint sail in the South China Sea. The Philippine frigate BRP Rizal, the Australian destroyer HMAS Brisbane, and the Canadian frigate HMCS Quebec City participated in the operation.

Sources:
1. Radio France International, August 15, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/国际/20250815-菲外长-菲律宾不对中国舰船相撞事件负责，再次要求中方就去年6月登船事件赔偿
2. Deutsche Well, August 13, 2025
https://www.dw.com/zh/中国军方称驱离进入黄岩岛海域的美军驱逐舰/a-73624543
3. Australia Broadcasting Corporation, August 14, 2025
https://www.abc.net.au/chinese/2025-08-15/us-and-philippines-discuss-more-missile-system-deployments-/105657476
4. Radio France International, August 19, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn国际/20250819-菲澳-阿隆-演习期间-菲澳加三国在南海联合航行

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Nearly a Third of Xi’s Promoted Generals Investigated or Disappearing

Since coming to power, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader Xi Jinping has promoted 79 generals of full general rank (上将). At least 23 of them have since been investigated, removed from office, or have “disappeared,” representing an incident rate of nearly 30 percent. Most of the downfalls happened in the past couple of years.

The most notable cases include Miao Hua (苗华), a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and head of its Political Work Department, who was taken down (publicly announced) in November last year, and He Weidong (何卫东), a CCP Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman, who “disappeared” on March 11 this year.

Since the CCP’s 20th National Congress, and before Miao Hua’s downfall, at least five other full generals have been purged:

  • Li Shangfu (李尚福) (CMC member, State Councilor, Minister of National Defense)
  • Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) (former CMC member, State Councilor, Minister of National Defense, and former Commander of the Rocket Force, the first to serve in that position)
  • Zhou Ya’ning (周亚宁) (former Commander of the Rocket Force, the second to serve in that position)
  • Li Yuchao (李玉超) (former Commander of the Rocket Force, the third to serve in that position)
  • Ding Laihang (丁来杭) (former Air Force commander).

On July 31, the CCP Ministry of National Defense held a reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to celebrate the so-called “98th anniversary of the founding of the army.” Overseas media reported that at least nine active-duty full generals were absent from the event:

  • He Hongjun (何宏军) (Executive Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department)
  • Wang Chunning (王春宁) (Commander of the People’s Armed Police)
  • Zhang Hongbing (张红兵) (Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police)
  • Hu Zhongming (胡中明) (Commander of the Navy)
  • Yuan Huazhi (袁华智) (Political Commissar of the Navy)
  • Li Qiaoming (李桥铭) (Commander of the Army)
  • Qin Shutong (秦树桐) (Political Commissar of the Army)
  • Wang Qiang (王强) (Commander of the Central Theater Command)
  • Xu Deqing (徐德清) (Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command).

On August 1, Huang Ming (黄铭), Commander of the Northern Theater Command, was absent from Liaoning Province’s “August 1st” Army–Government Symposium. In May this year, social media sources had claimed Huang had already been taken away for investigation.

Source: Epoch Times, August 7, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/8/6/n14568663.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

Philippine President: Taiwan Conflict Would Inevitably Involve Us

During his state visit to India, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. gave an interview to local media outlet Firstpost.

When asked what the Philippines would do if China used force against Taiwan, Marcos replied:

“Speaking very pragmatically, if China and the United States clash over Taiwan, the Philippines cannot possibly stay out of it – simply because of our geographical location. To understand how close Taiwan is to the Philippines, it only takes 40 minutes to fly from Laoag, the capital of my home province in northern Philippines, to Kaohsiung, a major city in Taiwan. That’s how close it is.”

“So, if you think about it, if an all-out war breaks out, we would be drawn into it. I assure you, although very reluctantly – let me say it again – we must defend our territory and sovereignty.”

“In addition, there are many Philippine nationals in Taiwan. That would immediately become a humanitarian issue, because we would have to intervene – either by going there or finding a way to get there – to locate our people and bring them home, just as we always do when they are in conflict zones. To me, at least initially, that is our greatest concern.”

“So I’m saying we would immediately mobilize all our resources to evacuate our people. Given that they would be in the heart of a war zone, that is no easy task. This is definitely no small matter.”

Source: Radio France International, August 7, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/国际/20250807-小马科斯-若中美在台湾问题上发生冲突，菲律宾不可能置身事外

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

TikTok Fulfilling CCP’s United Front Strategy to Brainwash Taiwanese Youth

Eric Hsu, a researcher at the Taiwan Democracy Lab, shared findings on how TikTok (Chinese version is called Douyin) is used in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) united front strategy toward Taiwan. A 2025 survey conducted by the lab revealed that TikTok appeals to Taiwanese teens with trendy, short, and algorithm-driven content. However, after entertainment videos, the app often pushes two to three videos of political content related to war, cross-strait unity, as well as political corruption and legislative chaos in Taiwan.

Many teens surveyed see the CCP as efficient but authoritarian and believe its governance model may be necessary for managing such a large country. They feel TikTok offers a more “real” view of China and perceive that cross-strait differences are mostly political.

The study suggests TikTok is used to stir negative emotions, undermine trust in Taiwan’s democracy, and promote unification narratives. Some teens believe unification wouldn’t affect ordinary people much. They view war (CCP’s taking over Taiwan by military) as terrifying and are concerned for their loved ones’ safety; some say they might choose surrender.

TikTok also contains harmful content like cyberbullying and child exploitation, which the study says deserves more serious attention in Taiwan.

Source: Epoch Times, July 25, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/7/24/n14559632.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend Government/Politics

Chinese Land Purchases on Japanese Island Raise Security Concerns

Japanese media report that in recent years, Chinese capital has increasingly targeted islands in the Seto Inland Sea of Japan. Delegations from Dalian, China toured Kasasa Island, and Chinese nationals living in Tokyo and Saitama have also offered high prices to acquire land there.

A recent concern is that a Chinese national has quietly bought over 3,600 square meters of land on Kasasa Island, a small island near Yamaguchi Prefecture with only seven residents. The buyer cleared land, improved roads, and installed utility poles, allegedly to build private villas and a yacht dock.

Residents are alarmed due to the island’s proximity to key military sites, including the Kure Naval Base and former Etajima Army artillery facilities. They fear the land could be used for surveillance or other strategic purposes, especially since the Chinese National Defense Mobilization Law and Intelligence Law require Chinese citizens to cooperate with government orders, even abroad.

Although Japan passed the Important Land Survey Law in 2022 to investigate sensitive land sales, critics say it lacks enforcement power. Local officials warn Kasasa Island could become a Chinese-controlled outpost or drone base, likening it to a form of covert occupation.

Source: Epoch Times, July 29, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/7/28/n14562444.htm

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