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Chinese Police Promote Population Monitoring Method in the Solomon Islands

Chinese police have begun introducing the “Fengqiao Experience” (枫桥经验), a “grassroots governance” model from China that emphasizes population control and community monitoring, to communities in the Solomon Islands.

China signed a security cooperation framework agreement with the Solomon Islands in 2022, following anti-government riots in 2021, which were partly triggered by opposition in Malaita Province to the Solomon Islands’ decision to sever ties with Taipei and establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Photos and reports show Chinese police visiting multiple islands, including the village of “Fighter 1” near the capital Honiara, where they helped implement population management, household registration, community mapping, and fingerprint collection. Chinese officers also promoted the model in 16 villages across Malaita Province, the country’s largest province.

This marks the first known implementation of the Fengqiao Experience outside China and has sparked human rights concerns.

Source: Radio France International, September 11, 2025
https://www.rfi.fr/cn/国际/20250911-当地居民-中国警方在所罗门群岛介绍-枫桥经验-开展试点项目

Ministry of State Security Reveals an Energy Sector Employee Espionage Case

China Central Television (CCTV) reported that the Ministry of State Security has arrested an energy-sector employee, identified as Yu, on charges of espionage for a foreign intelligence agency. According to officials, Yu was first approached in 2017 by a foreign contact who posed as a professional associate. Over time, Yu agreed to provide sensitive internal company information in exchange for financial compensation.

The case came to light in 2019 when Yu attempted to transition into a government position and sought to conceal his past activities during background checks. Investigators uncovered evidence of his cooperation with foreign intelligence, leading to his prosecution.

Chinese authorities stressed that espionage crimes cannot remain hidden indefinitely, and concealment only increases the severity of punishment. Officials further emphasized provisions under China’s Counter-Espionage Law, noting that individuals who voluntarily admit wrongdoing, cooperate with investigators, or make contributions to national security may face reduced penalties. “The public should report suspicious behavior through official hotlines and security platforms.”

Source: CCTV, August 20, 2025
https://news.cctv.com/2025/08/20/ARTIWHFWeIbJ78dnyn5WjjUX250820.shtml

Every Chinese Is Asking: Who Is Yang Lanlan?

In the early hours of July 27, a young lady crashed her Rolls-Royce worth AUD 1.5 million (US$ 1 million) into a Mercedes in an upscale eastern Sydney neighborhood. The Mercedes driver was seriously injured and hospitalized, while the lady was unharmed but arrested for drunk driving. Her lawyer later secured her release on bail.

It was said that the bail amount was AUD 70 million, or 323 million yuan. That huge amount caught Chinese netizens’ attention and the news was quickly wide-spreading among the Chinese community. New South Wales authorities later clarified that no monetary conditions were set for her bail, debunking the exaggerated claims circulating online.

The 23-year-old Chinese woman is named Yang Lanlan. She lives in a luxury ocean-view apartment in Sydney and is usually accompanied by a driver, assistant, and bodyguard. She owns multiple high-end cars, including an unregistered Rolls-Royce containing limited-edition Labubu dolls, and frequently wears designer brands. Despite media efforts, little personal information about her could be found, making her seem disconnected from ordinary society.

People believe she is a second-generation or third-generation of high-ranking Chinese officials. A bodyguard serving the local Chinese community noted that wealthy second-generation Chinese inherit family fortunes but live extremely low-profile lives. They hold private gatherings in their own homes, shop by appointment, and are always accompanied by security, making contact with outsiders nearly impossible.

Since there is no official information about who Yang Lanlan is, there has been much speculation about her.

One theory is that she has very high status. Someone said her bodyguard is Xu Zhengyang, a former Beijing Armed Police officer, who was one of the best trained bodyguards in China with job duty to serve the top officials in Zhongnanhai.

Another theory says that Yang, with 1.35 trillion RMB (US$ 190 billion) in deposits in Australia, is the daughter of Xi Jinping’s brother Xi Yuanping.

Another claims she is an illegitimate daughter of Xi Jinping.

A recent posting on X had that she flew to Hong Kong from Sydney on March 8, 2025 and was taken by 3 cars to Shenzhen to meet Qi Xin, Xi Jinping’s mother. This indicated that she is closely related to Xi’s family.

Another suggestion is that her great-grandparents might include General Yang Chengwu from Fujian province, a key PLA figure in the 1960s and 1970s who served as acting Chief of Staff and Deputy Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission, and Qin Jiwei, a former Minister of Defense. Her grandfather, Yang Dongming, was a former Air Force deputy commander, and her grandmother, Qin Wanjiang, runs businesses. Allegedly, Yang Chengwu provided key assistance to Xi Jinping during his time in Fujian, and Xi is said to have looked after the Yang and Qin families.

Although the accident took place on July 27, it only became widely known in China on August 9. Some people feel this news was created and timed to make Xi Jinping look bad.

Sources:
1. Net Ease, August 9, 2025
https://www.163.com/dy/article/K6H42K740552MY16.html
2. Epoch Times, August 13, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/8/12/n14572291.htm
3. USOCCTN, August 12, 2025
https://usocctn.wordpress.com/2025/08/12/快递:杨兰兰是习远平前妻的女儿随母姓-灾民有家/
4. Secret China, August 14, 2025
https://www.secretchina.com/news/gb/2025/08/14/1086684.html
5. X, Shen Xue
https://x.com/ShengXue_ca/status/1957492509333926044

Beijing Hires Temporary “Bridge and Pole Guards” Ahead of the September 3 Parade

As the September 3, 2025 “9/3 Military Parade” approaches, districts in Beijing have begun recruiting temporary security personnel, primarily tasked with guarding utility poles, pedestrian overpasses, and other key areas.

These temporary jobs mainly cover the period from August 8 to September 4 (with some extending to September 5), and most require continuous work – wages will be withheld if the worker leaves early. According to screenshots of job postings circulating on Chinese social media platforms WeChat and QQ groups, the recruitment mainly targets healthy men aged 18 to 55, with minimum height requirements of 168 cm or 170 cm.

Some postings explicitly state the role is “bridge guard.” This “occupation” began after the 2022 Sitong Bridge incident where Peng Lifa posted banners denouncing the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping and the COVID lockdown. Since then, during politically sensitive periods, Beijing authorities have deployed “bridge watchers” to prevent the hanging of protest banners on overpasses. In addition, some recruitment ads mention “security guards” for utility poles. Netizens speculate this may be related to the large number of handwritten slogans found on utility poles in Beijing during this year’s June 4 anniversary.

A Beijing resident commented that this shows the times are unsettled.

Sources:
1. Epoch Times, August 8, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/8/8/n14569832.htm
2. NTDTV, August 8, 2025
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2025/08/07/a104009810.html

China’s “Temple Economy” Projected to Exceed 100 Billion Yuan as Young People Seek Spiritual Comfort

China’s “temple economy” is experiencing unprecedented growth as increasing numbers of young people flock to temples seeking spiritual comfort and purchasing temple-related merchandise. The market is projected to exceed 100 billion yuan ($13.9 billion) this year.

The temple economy refers to a comprehensive economic model centered around temples, developing through religious culture and tourism. This phenomenon has gained particular momentum among younger generations who visit temples to burn incense, pray for blessings, and purchase commemorative items as a form of emotional investment.

Beyond traditional revenue sources like entrance fees and incense offerings, the temple economy has expanded significantly through cultural and creative products. Young visitors frequently purchase items such as refrigerator magnets, canvas bags, protective amulets, and prayer bracelets. Popular examples include Beijing’s Yonghe Temple’s famous incense ash glass bead bracelets and Lingyin Temple’s eighteen-seed prayer chains.

Innovation has also emerged in this sector, with AI fortune-telling services and virtual lamp offerings attracting post-90s and post-2000s consumers as primary customer groups.

The market reached 80-90 billion yuan in 2023 and is expected to surpass the 100 billion yuan ($13.9 billion) milestone by 2025. Leading temples report substantial annual revenues: Mount Emei generates 820 million yuan ($114 million), Mount Jiuhua earns 720 million yuan ($100 million), and Lingyin Temple brings in 670 million yuan ($93 million) annually.

Industry analysts attribute this growth to people’s heightened demand for spiritual comfort and emotional support. This has driven consumption in prayer tourism, meditation experiences, and cultural products, with more consumers willing to pay for emotional value. The temple economy demonstrates stable cash flow characteristics, reflecting deeper societal needs for spiritual fulfillment in modern China.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 10, 2025
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202506100214.aspx

China.com: Covid-19 Cases in China Currently at Highest Levels Since Beginning of 2025

China.com recently reported after the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention released May’s Covid-19 data. The latest National Coronavirus Infection Status report shows that from May 1 to May 31, 2025, China had 440,662 new reported and confirmed Covid-19 cases in 31 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities) and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.

Liu Qiyong, a researcher at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, said at a press conference held by the Chinese National Health Commission that the results of China’s monitoring of respiratory infectious diseases such as Covid-19 show that, since March 2025, Covid-19 has shown a gradual upward trend. At present, the national Covid-19 outbreak is at its high since the beginning of this year.

Regarding the reasons for this current peak, on the one hand, it has been half a year since the last peak, and the group immunity has declined relatively. On the other hand, the Covid-19 variants in this round are mainly XDV and XDV.1, which have a stronger ability to escape immunity and are more likely to break through the immune barrier established by previous infection or vaccination. These variants still belong to the Omicron family. There is no evidence that the pathogenicity of the variant has changed significantly, and the clinical severity of the disease has not changed significantly. Existing Covid-19 tests and drugs are still effective.

Source: China.com, June 10, 2025
http://news.china.com.cn/2025-06/10/content_117916855.html

China Plans to Convert Auxiliary Police into Civil Servants to Strengthen Control of “Social Stability”

The Chinese public security system is planning to convert a portion of its auxiliary police officers (contractors who perform/assist police duties) into officially registered civil servants over the next two years. Several experts view this as a significant signal that the authorities are seeking to strengthen their state control system in response to potentially increasing social risks. However, they caution that it may ultimately lead to bureaucratic bloating and more government spending.

The Ministry of Public Security led the conversion effort and will implement it in phases, with the goal of completing the reclassification and partial conversion nationwide by 2027.

Data from the Ministry of Public Security showed that by the end of 2024, there were over 1.2 million auxiliary police officers in China, accounting for 46 percent of frontline police personnel. However, due to poor compensation, lax management, and low loyalty, they are increasingly unable to meet the Chinese Communist Party’s political priority of stability.

Public reports indicate that Shanghai completed the first pilot program to convert 5,000 auxiliary officers in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Earlier this year, China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security officially included “auxiliary police” in the national occupational classification catalog, categorizing them as “security and fire protection support personnel.” The Ministry of Public Security classified the auxiliary officers into four categories: administrative support, law enforcement support, technical police work, and special positions. The ministry also introduced job-based salary structures and performance evaluations to improve standardization and management.

Source: Epoch Times, June 3, 2025
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/25/6/3/n14523333.htm

Lianhe Zaobao: Outflows From China’s Unemployment Insurance Fund Surged in First Quarter of 2025

Singapore’s primary Chinese language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao recently ran a report on data published by China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security regarding revenue and expenditure data for the Chinese national unemployment insurance fund.

In the first three months of this year, 244 million people in China drew from the national unemployment insurance fund, an increase of 2.56 million people year-over-year. During the same period, the income and expenditure of the unemployment insurance fund were RMB 49.54 billion yuan (around US$6.87 billion) and RMB 46.5 billion yuan (around US$6.45 billion) respectively. The fund expenditures increased significantly by 22.4 percent, year-over-year.

China paid out RMB 36.54 billion yuan (around US$5.07 billion) in unemployment insurance benefits in the first quarter, up 29.6 percent from last year. Unemployment insurance benefits include unemployment insurance, basic medical insurance premiums, vocational training and job referral subsidies, and other employment promotion expenses. The expenditure of the unemployment insurance fund has increased significantly relative to the number of insured persons and income. The biggest possibility for this increase is that the unemployment rate growth has led to an increase in the number of people receiving unemployment insurance benefits.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, May 12, 2025
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/finance/china/story20250512-6327319