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China Tightens Restrictions on Catholic Activities

Chinese Catholics reportedly face growing restrictions on religious activities in Shanghai and Beijing, including access to religious books, pilgrimages, online prayer services, and Catholic funeral rites. In Shanghai, the religious-items store at Xujiahui Cathedral has reportedly stopped selling the Bible, theology books, and commonly used Catholic prayer books. Similar reports indicate that some Beijing churches have also removed Bibles from sale.

Restrictions reportedly extend to collective pilgrimages, with a Beijing-area priest saying that parish groups now need government approval to travel to churches in other regions. Catholic online activities have also been affected. A Chinese Catholic platform reportedly stopped livestreaming the Rosary from Lourdes in December 2025, cutting off an important source of religious content, particularly for older Catholics.

On August 18, a Shanghai Catholic reportedly said that funeral homes across the city had stopped allowing Catholic funeral rites beginning this month, suggesting that the restrictions may now extend beyond religious activities during believers’ lives to Catholic end-of-life and funeral practices.

Source: Epoch Times, August 20, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/20/n14833207.htm

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics Social Stability

China’s Grid Worker System Draws Scrutiny After Chongqing Landslide Death

A landslide in Pengshui County, Chongqing, on July 17 killed a grid worker named Gong Baodong, drawing public attention to China’s grassroots governance system known as grid management. Chinese state media describe the system as an industrialized approach to precision governance, dividing the country into roughly 4 million grids overseen by about 4.5 million grid workers.

The model originated in Beijing’s Dongcheng District in 2004, when officials divided the district into 1,652 grid units, each covering roughly 10,000 square meters, and assigned a supervisor to patrol the area and report problems using handheld devices. Reported issue-detection rates rose from about 30 percent to more than 90 percent, while response times fell from roughly one week to less than a day. The system received central government backing after the 2013 Third Plenum called for strengthening grassroots service platforms through grid-based management, leading to nationwide expansion by 2020.

In urban areas, grids typically cover 300–500 households, or about 800–1,000 people, while rural grids generally follow natural village boundaries. Each grid is assigned a unique code linked to administrative divisions and associated with detailed records on residents, businesses, safety risks, and other local conditions.

Grid workers typically perform five core functions: collecting information, mediating disputes, assisting vulnerable groups, conducting security patrols, and promoting government policies. The workforce includes full-time employees such as Gong, community cadres, retired Communist Party members, and volunteers.

The system also faces a number of challenges. Grid workers can carry heavy workloads while receiving uneven compensation, ranging from roughly 4,000–5,000 yuan (about $556–$694) per month in wealthier regions to 2,000–3,000 yuan (about $278–$417) elsewhere. Contract-based employment can limit opportunities for career advancement, while bureaucratic pressure to document activities often results in extensive photography and paperwork.

The system’s emphasis on detailed data collection has also raised concerns about privacy and the handling of residents’ personal information. How to balance the government’s goal of fine-grained grassroots management with individual privacy protections remains an unresolved issue.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), August 8, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202608080063.aspx

Briefings | | |   Social Stability

Passport Controls in China Reportedly Expanding Beyond Officials to Ordinary Residents

A discussion on X about Chinese workers in various sectors reportedly being required to surrender their passports drew more than 100,000 views on August 9. Images circulating online listed 13 categories of workers allegedly affected, including employees of research institutes, civil servants, public institutions, large state-owned enterprises, and financial-sector firms, as well as university and school teachers and senior hospital staff.

Reported cases include subway maintenance workers who have been required to surrender their passports since last year and employees of state-invested companies who must obtain prior approval before attending exhibitions in Hong Kong.

A Lanzhou resident said grid workers—community-level administrators responsible for managing residential areas—had inquired about passport safekeeping in some housing compounds, although the practice was not uniform across all communities. A Gansu-based internet user claimed that some neighborhood committees were requiring residents to hand their passports to grid workers, suggesting that the practice may extend beyond state employees to ordinary residents.

A Chengdu taxi driver recalled that Tibetan residents in Sichuan’s Garze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture had their passports confiscated years ago regardless of their employment or official status, with similar measures reportedly applied to Uyghurs.

A Chongqing resident said he had been barred from obtaining a passport after being classified as a security threat because of alleged links to the pro-democracy movement. Another commenter said a friend’s hospital had expanded passport collection requirements to include temporary workers.

On August 7, China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection reiterated rules requiring registered officials to have their personal travel documents held by their work units. An independent scholar said police told him directly in 2023 that he was prohibited from leaving the country despite holding a valid passport.

Sources suggested that local officials often interpret central government intentions broadly and impose stricter controls without formal written directives. This can result in inconsistent and poorly documented enforcement across regions, with passport restrictions reportedly extending in some cases beyond government officials and state employees to ordinary residents.

Source: Radio Free Asia, August 12, 2026
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shehui/2026/08/12/china-entryexit-passport-revocation-exit-restriction/

Briefings | | |   Social Stability

Beijing Woman Confronts Police, Officer Backs Down During Coercive Call

A recorded phone conversation has circulated widely on Chinese-language social media after being shared by independent commentator Cai Shenkun. The recording allegedly captures a Beijing police officer calling local resident Chen Yongmei after she described her family’s financial hardships in a private online chat group. Normally the police harasses the citizens and demands them not to say anything deviating from the communist party’s tune.

However, instead of backing down, Chen defended her comments, saying they reflected her family’s reality. She said her family had gone without income for three months, was struggling to pay her child’s tuition, faced outstanding insurance loans, and could not afford surgery for an elderly family member. When the officer suggested she seek assistance from the local community office, Chen replied that repeated appeals had produced no results. She criticized officials for remaining insulated while ordinary citizens struggled to survive.

At one point, Chen exclaimed, “What else do you expect me to say? Aren’t you the biggest bully in China?” The officer responded, “Your situation was not caused by me. I was only trying to understand the circumstances.” Chen then ended the call.

Commentators noted that the exchange reportedly occurred in Beijing, home to China’s most elite and best-resourced domestic security apparatus. They argued that if even Beijing police responded to public anger primarily by retreating and deflecting responsibility, it will be harder for local police in other regions to control public grievances.

Source: Aboluo, July 31, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0731/2414892.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Social Stability

China Reports Renewed Rise in COVID-19 Infections

China’s Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) reported on July 30 that the COVID-19 test positivity rate continued to rise during the week of July 20–26, making COVID-19 the most frequently detected respiratory pathogen in the country’s sentinel surveillance system. The positivity rate increased by 4 percentage points from the previous week to 20.3 percent, surpassing influenza at 14.5 percent. The dominant circulating strain remains the NB.1.8.1 lineage.

Over the past three weeks, the COVID-19 positivity rate among outpatients and emergency patients with influenza-like illness has more than doubled, rising from 9.6 percent to 20.3 percent. The report also showed that COVID-19 had the highest positivity rate among children aged 0–4, adults aged 15–59, and those 60 and older. Southern provinces recorded significantly higher positivity rates than northern China.

Reports from medical personnel and social media suggest the outbreak is expanding. A physician in Liaoning reported a recent surge in COVID-19 and influenza cases, while social media users in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Shanxi, and Beijing described renewed infections, including household clusters. A physician in Shandong also reported overcrowded emergency departments and severe bed shortages. The full extent of the outbreak remains difficult to assess because China provides only limited public reporting on epidemic data.

Source: Epoch Times, August 2, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/1/n14821685.htm

Briefings | | |   @CS Social Stability

Report Claims “Restoration Party” Is Expanding Anti-CCP Activities

Yuan Hongbing, a Chinese legal scholar living in Australia, citing sources inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), claimed that an internal Ministry of Public Security document circulated after July 1 acknowledged widespread inaction and declining morale among officials responsible for China’s domestic stability maintenance system. According to Yuan, “lying flat,” bureaucratic inertia, and passive non-compliance have become increasingly common among local public security and grassroots officials.

The sources attributed the trend primarily to mounting fiscal pressures on local governments. Budget shortfalls have resulted in delayed or reduced salaries and bonuses for police officers, while grassroots officials—including neighborhood committees, township governments, and village Party branches—have also experienced prolonged delays in wage and subsidy payments. Yuan argued that these financial constraints have weakened the effectiveness of the CCP’s stability maintenance apparatus, particularly at the county and township levels.

Yuan also claimed that the same internal document identified an anti-CCP organization known as the “Restoration Party” (复国党), which reportedly advocates overthrowing Xi Jinping’s rule and replacing the current political system with a “Republic of China 2.0” framework. According to the report, the group has adopted a decentralized, cell-based organizational structure to expand its activities inside China.

Yuan further claimed that the Restoration Party has carried out operations in the Beijing–Tianjin region to seize what it describes as illicit wealth held by CCP officials, with the stated goals of assisting the public and financing anti-CCP resistance activities. According to Yuan, the group has conducted more than 100 successful operations and has also organized anti-CCP graffiti campaigns in multiple regions across China. He argued that declining enforcement by local stability maintenance authorities has created unprecedented opportunities for domestic resistance movements. The authenticity of the Ministry of Public Security document and Yuan’s claims could not be independently verified.

Source: NTDTV, July 15, 2026
https://www.ntdtv.com/gb/2026/07/15/a104115463.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Government/Politics Social Stability

Chinese Courts Rule Against Pension Suspensions in Two Falun Gong Cases

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has persecuted Falun Gong practitioners since launching its nationwide campaign against the spiritual group in July 1999. In addition to imprisonment and other forms of physical and legal persecution, authorities have also imposed financial penalties, including dismissals from employment and suspension of pensions. Although China’s laws protect citizens’ pension rights, Minghui.org has documented numerous cases in which Falun Gong practitioners have had their pensions suspended or been ordered to repay previously received benefits after serving prison sentences.

However, two recent court rulings have challenged this CCP’s longstanding practice.

One case involved Jia Fengxian, a 62-year-old retired government employee in Zhuozhou, Hebei Province. She was sentenced to seven months in prison in 2019 for distributing information about Falun Gong. In February 2026, the Zhuozhou Social Insurance Service Center suspended her pension and demanded repayment of approximately RMB 480,000 (US$71,000) in pension benefits, citing an internal government document. The agency also filed a civil lawsuit against her. On June 25, the court dismissed the case, ruling that the Zhuozhou Social Insurance Service Center and Jia Fengxian were not equal civil parties, making the agency’s civil lawsuit legally improper.

A second case involved Cui Zhongxin, 89, and his wife Qi Guoxin, 84, both retired employees of the Liaohe Oilfield system in Liaoning Province. After serving prison sentences related to their Falun Gong practice, the couple’s pensions were suspended in 2020. After years of unsuccessful petitions and legal challenges, the Liaoning Provincial High Court ruled on March 2 that the pension suspension was unlawful, ordered the authorities to restore the couple’s pension benefits and repay the withheld funds, and overturned the earlier lower-court rulings.

Source: Epoch Times, July 15, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/14/n14809468.htm

Briefings | | |   Government/Politics Social Stability

Former Tsinghua Scholar’s Lecture on China’s Economy Reportedly Triggers Police Inquiry

A paid seminar led by former Tsinghua University associate professor Zheng Yuhuang in Beijing was reportedly interrupted by police after someone allegedly reported it as an “illegal gathering,” apparently objecting to the event’s pessimistic assessment of China’s economy, according to Hong Kong media.

Zheng, a former associate professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management who has since become an online influencer, hosted a two-day “Harvard Business School Case Analysis Camp” at a hotel near Beijing Capital International Airport on June 27–28.

On the first day, former Tsinghua sociology professor Sun Liping delivered a lecture on macroeconomic trends. According to attendees, Sun described China as being in a “recessionary period,” while the United States and Europe were “overheating” economically and Japan and South Korea were “recovering.”

During Zheng’s session on future economic trends on the second day, two police officers reportedly entered the venue and asked him to step outside for questioning. Participants said Zheng characterized China’s economic outlook as “pessimistic at the macro level, optimistic at the micro level,” predicting that the current environment could persist for another 20 to 30 years and drawing comparisons with Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation.

Zheng later wrote on social media that the event had been reported as a suspected “illegal gathering.” After he explained the nature of the seminar, the officers left within about five minutes, allowing the session to resume. He added that public visibility often attracts controversy and criticism.

Zheng left Tsinghua University about two years ago to establish the CMSI Institute of Scientific Marketing. The organization charges an annual membership fee of 999 yuan (approximately US$147), which includes one in-person lecture each year. The June seminar attracted around 500 attendees, while the separately ticketed “Harvard Business School Case Analysis Camp” that reportedly prompted the complaint cost 9,800 yuan (approximately US$1,444) per participant.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 2, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202607020038.aspx

Briefings | | |   Social Stability