The Zubr-class (known in China as Type 728, NATO reporting name: Pomornik-class) air-cushion landing craft is a large hovercraft designed by the Soviet Union in the late Cold War period, reflecting a focus on large-scale military transport. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine modified the design for export. In 2009, China signed a $315 million agreement with Ukraine to acquire four vessels—two built in Ukraine and two assembled in China from kits—along with the transfer of production technology. By 2017, Chinese defense firms had reportedly overcome key technical barriers and begun domestic production. In 2023, reports indicated that domestically built Zubr-class vessels had entered service with the PLA Navy’s Eastern Theater Command. China is believed to have produced at least five such vessels on its own and plans to further expand to 10–12 units, surpassing Russia (2 vessels) and Greece (4 vessels) to become the largest operator of this class.

The Zubr-class landing craft measures approximately 57 meters in length and has a full-load displacement of about 555 tons, making it the largest hovercraft in the world. Each vessel can carry up to 500 fully equipped troops, or three main battle tanks (MBTs), or ten light armored vehicles (AFVs) along with 230 troops. With a top speed exceeding 55 knots (about 102 km/h), it can rapidly deploy forces directly onto beaches that are inaccessible to conventional landing craft. Compared with traditional amphibious vessels, the Zubr-class is less vulnerable to certain types of naval mines and is capable of making multiple crossings of the Taiwan Strait within a single day, offering high mobility and strong assault capabilities.

This development suggests that China is continuing to expand its amphibious assault capabilities, with potential implications for future operations in areas such as the Taiwan Strait.

Source: Newtalk, March 30, 2026
https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2026-03-30/1027092

Sources close to China’s Foreign Ministry told The Epoch Times that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has repeatedly communicated with Iran, seeking assurances for the safety of Chinese commercial shipping. However, Iran’s response was limited, stating it could only guarantee the safety of “some” cargo bound for Iran, emphasizing that such protection would be partial. The source described this as a form of “selective security,” suggesting Iran may be using it as leverage to pressure China to ship more military supplies to Iran.

This situation was reflected in maritime activity on March 27, when two Chinese container shipsCSCL Indian Ocean and CSCL Arctic Ocean—attempted to pass through the Strait of Hormuz but ultimately turned back. (Update: The vessels successfully transited the strait on their second attempt on March 30.)

Another source indicated that Beijing had initially hoped to use its relationship with Iran to act as a mediator in the U.S.-Iran conflict and expand its influence in the “Global South.” However, this effort has faced challenges, including Russia’s competing influence in Iran. According to the report, China and Russia have differing interests, while Tehran has its own—prioritize tangible military support over diplomatic engagement. This dynamic has placed Beijing in a difficult position between maintaining ties with Iran and avoiding broader confrontation with the United States and its allies.

Source: Epoch Times, March 26, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/3/26/n14727332.htm