In late January, President Trump signed an executive order authorizing tariffs on countries that sell or supply oil to Cuba, part of a broader effort by Washington to tighten its energy blockade on the island. Cuban authorities believe the U.S. aims to make living conditions unbearable for the Cuban people through such measures. The country has experienced severe electricity disruptions as a result — on March 16, Cuba reported a complete nationwide power outage that took over a day to partially restore.

China has stepped in to help fill the gap, primarily through solar energy. According to U.S. media reports, Chinese solar panels already installed or being installed across parts of Cuba can supply up to 10 percent of the country’s electricity needs. More than 90 solar farms are expected to be completed by 2028, which could help Cuba partially offset U.S.-imposed oil restrictions. On March 11, China’s Ambassador to Cuba visited three Havana clinics equipped with Chinese medical and energy equipment, reaffirming Beijing’s willingness to support Cuba’s energy transition.

The scale of Chinese solar panel exports to Cuba has grown dramatically. China, which produced 80% of the world’s solar panels in 2024, exported just $3.86 million worth of panels to Cuba in 2020. That figure rose to $48.37 million in 2024, before surging to $117.27 million in 2025 — a 142.4 percent year-on-year increase and a staggering 2,938 percent jump compared to 2025. In terms of capacity, exports climbed from 0.01 gigawatts in 2020 to 1.17 gigawatts in 2025, a 160 percent rise from the prior year.

Cuba is well-suited for solar energy, averaging around 330 sunny days per year. China’s leading solar manufacturers — including JinkoSolar, LONGi, Trina Solar, JA Solar, and Tongwei — are positioned to play an even greater role in supporting Cuba’s energy future.

Source: Sputnik News, March 20, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260320/1070354363.html

China has significantly ramped up port state control (PSC) inspections of Panamanian-flagged vessels, detaining 44 ships between March 1 and 18 — roughly three times the number detained during the same period last year, according to data from the Tokyo Memorandum of Understanding (Tokyo MOU), a 22-member regional port authority body that includes both China and Panama.

The surge appears to be Beijing’s response to Panama’s decision to strip Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Holdings of its operating rights at two ports along the Panama Canal. Between March 8 and 12 alone, Chinese ports detained 28 Panamanian vessels, accounting for 75.7 percent of all detentions — far above historical norms, according to shipping publication Lloyd’s List.

What makes the crackdown particularly striking is its selective nature. Tokyo MOU data shows that many of the detained Panamanian ships were classified as “general risk” or “low risk,” while higher-risk vessels of other nationalities were largely left alone. In the same period last year, only high-risk Panamanian ships were detained. Chinese maritime analysts have noted that vessels which would not normally be subject to inspection are now being boarded, though Beijing’s use of legal mechanisms gives Panama little formal grounds for complaint.

The economic consequences could be severe. A WeChat maritime account estimated that each detained vessel faces an average daily demurrage cost increase of approximately $18,000. More broadly, analysts warn that shipowners may increasingly consider re-flagging their vessels away from Panama to avoid prolonged political and operational risks.

Panama, the world’s second-largest flag-of-convenience state with over 8,000 registered vessels, earns an estimated 3% to 5% of its national revenue from ship registration and annual fees — its second-largest stable income source after Panama Canal tolls. A large-scale exodus of Panamanian-flagged ships would deal a serious blow to the country’s public finances.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 20, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202603200300.aspx

On March 16, China and Vietnam convened the first ministerial-level meeting under their newly established “3+3” strategic dialogue mechanism in Hanoi, bringing together senior officials from both countries’ foreign affairs, defense, and public security ministries. The meeting was co-chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Defense Minister Dong Jun, and Public Security Minister Wang Xiaohong, alongside their Vietnamese counterparts.

The “3+3” format — expanding on the conventional “2+2” diplomatic and defense model by incorporating public security cooperation — is considered a global first and reflects the deepening of bilateral ties. Zhao Weihua, Director of Fudan University’s Center for China’s Neighborhood Studies, described the meeting as a landmark, noting it took place at a significant moment following both the conclusion of Vietnam’s 14th Party Congress and China’s National People’s Congress. He said the talks produced broad consensus and a clear roadmap for future relations.

Key outcomes included mutual commitments to uphold party leadership and socialist governance, resist “color revolutions,” and safeguard political stability. Vietnam reaffirmed that developing relations with China remains its top foreign policy priority and that it firmly adheres to the One China policy.

On security, both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in cybersecurity, combating online gambling and fraud, counter-narcotics, and fugitive repatriation. Their militaries agreed to conduct joint naval patrols and training, while also pledging to manage South China Sea disputes peacefully in accordance with international law and UNCLOS 1982.

Economically, both countries agreed to align China’s 15th Five-Year Plan with Vietnam’s development strategy, advancing cooperation in trade, infrastructure, cross-border economic zones, and emerging sectors such as digital economy and artificial intelligence.

Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam, who met separately with the three Chinese ministers, urged both sides to prioritize railway cooperation to facilitate trade and people-to-people exchanges, and called for the “3+3” mechanism to become a model for bilateral cooperation.

Source: Sputnik News, March 18, 2026
https://sputniknews.cn/20260318/1070305187.html