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State Media Profiles Raise Questions About PLA Rocket Force Personnel Skillsets

As part of celebrations marking the Chinese Communist Party’s 105th anniversary, state media profiled several “Outstanding Communist Party Members,” including He Xianda, a serviceman in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. A July 13 Xinhua article portrays He’s rise from military cook to model missile operator as an example of exceptional dedication. At the same time, the account offers unusual insights into the Rocket Force’s personnel practices and training standards.

According to the report, He enlisted in 1997 as a cook in a missile brigade. In six months, he self-studied and ranked among the top three in a brigade-wide missile theory examination. He was then reassigned as a missile-loading operator and, within five months, reportedly became the brigade’s top operator. In 2000, he qualified as the brigade’s first enlisted “No. 1 operator”—the missile launch position previously reserved for highly educated officers. His story of a cook becoming the top operator is an inspiration story, but it suggests many servicemen in the Rocket Force may not have strong education background.

The article notes that the “No. 1 operator” is an instable position since the educated officers were often promoted to higher positions after some time. The military had to fill the vacancies with enlisted personnel who had limited technical backgrounds and relatively short training periods.

The profile also recounts an incident in which onboard equipment reported an abnormal voltage reading shortly before a missile launch. Instead of aborting the mission, He crawled beneath the launcher, manually inspected the system by touch, concluded the circuit was functioning normally, and authorized the launch to proceed. State media praised his judgment, claiming “his hands were more reliable than the instruments.” The episode, however, suggests that field units may rely heavily on operator experience when equipment warnings are considered unreliable or diagnostic capabilities are limited.

A separate Xinhua article published on June 30 profiled Fang Yongzheng, a missile launch operator in the PLA’s “First Dongfeng Brigade.” According to the report, Fang compiled operational procedures, technical manuals, and troubleshooting guides that were adopted across the brigade. The article also states that, despite 26 years of service, he has never participated in an actual missile launch. This suggests that key training materials is missing and the military has to rely on documents developed by personnel whose expertise was derived primarily from training rather than operational experience.

Taken together, the two showcase exemplary Rocket Force servicemen inadvertently suggest persistent shortages of technically qualified personnel, extensive reliance on accelerated on-the-job training, and continued dependence on experienced individuals to compensate for gaps in technical expertise and organizational capacity.

Sources:
1. Xinhua, July 13, 2026
https://www.news.cn/20260713/959650c9a06b414d91cdb56746c54da1/c.html
2. Xinhua, June 30, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260630/46cce79284e74942a780dc8af0fca9a4/c.html
3. Epoch Times, July 19, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/18/n14812116.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

PLA Daily: Europe Faces Long Road to Defense Industrial Autonomy

People’s Daily republished an article from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily arguing that Europe continues to face formidable obstacles to achieving defense industrial autonomy despite years of increased spending and ambitious policy initiatives. Citing the collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program after nearly a decade of disputes, the article argues that deep political and structural divisions continue to hinder Europe’s efforts to build an independent defense industry.

The article identifies four major challenges: poorly coordinated defense spending, limited industrial capacity, technological dependence on the United States, and conflicting national interests. It notes that although European defense spending has risen sharply since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, a large share of procurement has gone to non-European suppliers, particularly U.S. defense contractors. It also argues that European defense manufacturers continue to face production bottlenecks, underinvestment in research and development, and fragmented procurement practices that limit economies of scale.

According to the article, these challenges stem from deeper structural constraints, including member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty over defense policy, Europe’s longstanding reliance on the NATO security framework, and a fragmented defense market. It concludes that political divisions—rather than industrial capacity alone—will remain the principal obstacle to Europe’s pursuit of strategic and defense industrial autonomy.

Source: People’s Daily, July 13, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0713/c1011-40759395.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend

Leaked China–Russia Plan to Counter Starlink Satellites

A July 10 investigative report by the Kyiv Post cites a leaked briefing from a Chinese military forum indicating that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Russia have discussed strategies to counter SpaceX’s Starlink satellite communications network as part of a broader framework for military-technology cooperation. The document, reportedly prepared by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), outlines a range of measures designed to degrade Starlink through kinetic attacks, electronic warfare, and cyber operations.

The briefing proposes three categories of countermeasures. First, it advocates cost-effective anti-satellite operations capable of destroying multiple low-Earth-orbit satellites with a single munition, potentially through anti-satellite weapons or other interception methods. Second, it recommends deploying high-powered electronic jamming systems to disrupt Starlink communications in targeted areas. Third, it outlines cyber operations aimed at compromising the network through malware implanted in Starlink ground terminals, potentially disrupting or disabling satellite communications.

Beyond military and technical measures, the document proposes diplomatic and regulatory efforts to constrain Starlink’s global expansion. It suggests that China and Russia coordinate through international organizations to argue that the rapid growth of Starlink’s satellite constellation increases collision risks and complicates space governance, while also challenging SpaceX’s use of radio spectrum and low-Earth-orbit resources. If authentic, the leaked briefing suggests that Sino-Russian military cooperation is extending beyond joint exercises to include coordinated strategies for undermining Western space-based communications infrastructure.

Source: Aboluo, July 15, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0715/2408385.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military

PLA Daily Calls for New Counter-Drone “Three Attacks, Three Defenses” Training

A commentary published by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily argues that the PLA should modernize its long-standing “Three Attacks, Three Defenses” (三打三防) training doctrine to address the growing role of unmanned systems in modern warfare. The article contends that as drones increasingly reshape the battlefield, counter-drone operations should become a core component of military training to enhance combat effectiveness and battlefield survivability.

The proposed “Three Attacks” focus on targeting small drones, large unmanned platforms, and the command-and-control nodes that support drone operations. The article calls for improving troops’ ability to detect, track, and engage low, slow, and small aerial targets, while also developing capabilities to disrupt and destroy larger unmanned platforms and the networks that enable coordinated drone operations.

The corresponding “Three Defenses” emphasize countering drone reconnaissance, defending against mass drone swarm attacks, and protecting critical assets from precision strikes by loitering munitions and other unmanned weapons. The article advocates strengthening low-altitude surveillance, electronic warfare, camouflage and deception, rapid battlefield maneuver, and integrated air defense capabilities to improve the PLA’s resilience against evolving drone threats.

Source: People’s Daily, July 16, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0716/c1011-40761831.html

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military

Dutch Report Warns of CCP Interference in Strategic Industries

A report released on July 3 by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the China Knowledge Network (CKN) warns that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is employing a broad range of foreign interference tactics to expand its influence over the Netherlands’ strategic industries, particularly the semiconductor, maritime, and aerospace sectors. The report identifies cyber espionage, talent recruitment, economic coercion, information operations, legal pressure, and supply chain leverage as key tools used by Beijing.

The report identifies Dutch semiconductor giant ASML as a primary target because of its global monopoly on commercial extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, which are essential for producing advanced semiconductors used in cutting-edge electronics and military systems. According to the report, the CCP has sought to acquire ASML’s technology through talent recruitment, academic collaboration, and reverse engineering, while also using rare earth export controls to exert pressure on the company’s supply chain. Other semiconductor firms, including NXP, are also identified as targets.

In the maritime sector, the report warns that Chinese state-owned enterprises, including COSCO Shipping Ports and China Merchants Port Holdings, have established significant operational roles at the Port of Rotterdam. It cautions that, in a crisis, Beijing could exploit these positions through cyber espionage, data access, or targeted disruption, potentially affecting European energy supplies, industrial production, and NATO logistics. The report concludes that China’s growing influence over Dutch strategic industries could constrain the Netherlands’ policy options, delay military preparedness, and complicate coordination with allies in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.

Source: Epoch Times, July 16, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/15/n14810251.htm

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend Information/Technology

Global Times Commentary: Japan’s Rare Earth Recycling Effort Reflects Its Military Ambition

Global Times published a commentary arguing that Japan’s plan to recover rare earth materials from discarded household air conditioners reflects the country’s growing strategic vulnerability following China’s tighter export controls on rare earths and other dual-use materials.

The article cites Japanese media reports that Mitsubishi Electric, a major defense contractor that has been placed on China’s export control list, is leading the recycling initiative. It argues that rare earth magnets recovered from consumer appliances could ultimately be used to support Japan’s defense industrial base, reinforcing Beijing’s rationale that its export restrictions are intended to prevent the transfer of dual-use materials that could contribute to the expansion of Japan’s military capabilities.

According to the commentary, Japan has sought to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare earth supplies through overseas mining projects in countries such as Namibia and Greenland, as well as by exploring deep-sea mineral resources. However, these efforts have produced only limited results. The article concludes that Japan’s rare earth recycling initiative underscores the difficulty of building a resilient alternative supply chain and suggests that efforts to “de-risk” from or reduce dependence on China have yet to achieve their intended objectives.

Source: Huanqiu Times, July 5, 2026
https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/4SGFYaCaV7P

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Economy/Resources Geo-Strategic Trend

PLA Daily: U.S. Pacific Command Name Change Reflects Strategic Refocus on the Western Pacific

People’s Daily republished a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily analysis examining the U.S. Department of Defense’s June 16 decision to restore the name U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), replacing the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command designation adopted in 2018. The Pentagon stated that the command’s area of responsibility, mission, and organizational structure remain unchanged. However, The article argues that the renaming reflects a broader adjustment in U.S. strategic priorities rather than a purely symbolic change.

According to the analysis, Washington’s effort to make India a central pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy has fallen short of expectations, as New Delhi has maintained an independent foreign policy on issues including Ukraine, the Middle East, and international trade. At the same time, growing U.S. military commitments in Europe and the Middle East have placed increasing pressure on defense resources, prompting Washington to reduce its strategic emphasis on the Indian Ocean while encouraging regional allies to assume greater security responsibilities.

The article argues that the United States is increasingly concentrating military resources in the Western Pacific, which it identifies as the primary theater of great-power competition under the Trump administration’s national security strategy. It predicts expanded deployments of carrier strike groups and amphibious forces, accelerated modernization of U.S. aircraft based in Japan and South Korea, increased operations from Guam, and further development of distributed basing and unmanned capabilities. The analysis concludes that the U.S. will continue to strengthen its military posture in the Western Pacific, sustaining long-term strategic competition and increasing the risk of military confrontation in the region.

Source: People’s Daily, July 6, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0706/c1011-40754050.html

Briefings | | |   @CS Defense/Military US-China Relations

Australia and Fiji Sign Landmark Defense Pact Amid Growing Chinese Influence in the Pacific

Australia and Fiji signed a landmark defense alliance on July 6, strengthening bilateral security cooperation amid growing concerns over China’s expanding influence in the South Pacific. Under the agreement, known as the “Ocean of Peace Alliance,” each country commits to assisting the other in the event of an armed attack.

The pact marks Fiji’s first formal defense alliance and makes it Australia’s fourth treaty ally, alongside the United States, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. The agreement also includes a provision allowing other Pacific Island nations to join in the future, reflecting Canberra’s broader effort to strengthen regional security partnerships.

The agreement comes as China continues to expand its economic and security presence across the Pacific. Beijing’s 2022 security pact with the Solomon Islands raised concerns among Australia and its partners that China could eventually establish a permanent military presence in the region.

Just days before signing the Fiji pact, Australia concluded a separate security agreement with Vanuatu, designating Canberra as the country’s preferred security and policing partner.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, July 6, 2026
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/world/story20260706-9318425

Briefings | | |   Defense/Military Geo-Strategic Trend