Skip to content

PLA Commentary Accuses Japan of Moving Toward Nuclearization, Warns Hiroshima’s Tragedy Could Happen Again

On August 10, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) published an article through its Junzhengping (“Military Politics Commentary”) account criticizing Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for her remarks on Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles during ceremonies marking the 81st anniversaries of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The article highlighted Takaichi’s statement that Japan is “currently adhering to” the principles, arguing that the wording leaves open whether Tokyo intends to continue observing them. It warned that “What happened yesterday in Hiroshima and Nagasaki may not be impossible tomorrow in Japan.”

Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles—not possessing, not producing, and not introducing nuclear weapons—have served as a cornerstone of Japan’s nuclear policy since their adoption by the Diet in 1971. Japanese media noted that Takaichi’s wording differed from that traditionally used by previous prime ministers, who have explicitly affirmed Japan’s continued commitment to the principles.

The PLA commentary portrays Takaichi’s wording as evidence that Japan’s conservative government may be moving away from its postwar anti-nuclear policy. It concludes: “If the Japanese government insists on playing with fire over nuclear issues, the heavy hammer of history will eventually fall again. What happened yesterday in Hiroshima and Nagasaki may not be impossible tomorrow in Japan.”

Source: QQ, August 10, 2026
https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20260810A05ADE00?id=20260810A05ADE00&path=a&app=news&suid=&redirect_pc=1

China’s Joint Drill With Indonesia East of Taiwan Signals Push Toward Second Island Chain, Experts Say

China announced that its navy will conduct a maritime passage exercise with the Indonesian Navy in waters east of Taiwan in mid-August, involving communications and at-sea replenishment drills. Chinese state media described it as the first exercise between the Chinese and a foreign navy in waters east of Taiwan. The move comes as Chinese naval and coast guard activities increasingly extend beyond the First Island Chain, with Beijing seeking to expand its operational presence into the Philippine Sea or east of Taiwan, and toward the Second Island Chain.

The location and replenishment component have drawn particular attention. Military analysts cited by The Epoch Times argue that sustained operations beyond the First Island Chain require reliable long-range logistics, while at-sea replenishment could enable Chinese naval forces to remain deployed farther from the mainland for longer periods. The exercise could therefore contribute to Beijing’s efforts to develop the logistical capabilities needed for a more persistent military presence between the First and Second Island Chains.

The exercise also has a diplomatic dimension. To counter U.S. efforts to strengthen security cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, and other regional states, China has expanded maritime cooperation with Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, seeking to present itself as a regional security partner.

However, Indonesia has emphasized that its warship is conducting a routine “passing exercise” rather than a combat exercise, noting that similar naval passage drills are common with other countries. This qualification suggests that Jakarta may be seeking to maintain military ties with China without signaling alignment with Beijing’s broader strategic objectives.

Source: Epoch Times, August 12, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/12/n14828298.htm

South Korea Arrests Two Chinese Nationals for Alleged Espionage Near Military Bases

South Korean police said on August 11 that they had arrested two Chinese nationals for allegedly engaging in activities benefiting an enemy near South Korean and U.S. military facilities. One suspect, a Chinese man in his 60s, allegedly used a software-defined radio (SDR), antenna, and laptop from a hotel less than one kilometer from Gunsan Air Base in April to intercept communications between fighter aircraft and air traffic control. Police said he had repeatedly entered South Korea on a tourist visa since January 2024, including during joint U.S.-South Korean air exercises, and are investigating whether the intercepted intelligence was passed to Chinese authorities.

The second suspect, a 45-year-old ethnic Korean Chinese national, allegedly operated a military goods store near the main gate of U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys as a cover while recruiting a South Korean employee to obtain military information. From November 2021 to May 2026, he allegedly acquired materials related to U.S.-South Korean exercises, including the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield drills, as well as personnel information, command assignments, and photographs from military ceremonies. Police also accused him of observing and photographing weapons movements inside the base.

Both suspects are reportedly former military personnel. South Korean authorities are conducting digital forensics on their electronic devices and investigating whether military intelligence was transferred to Chinese authorities.

Source: Yonhap News Agency, August 11, 2026
https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20260811002000881

China’s Continued Criticism of Japan Also Targets the United States

China has continued to pressure Japan diplomatically, militarily, and economically since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks last year about a potential “Taiwan contingency,” with no signs of easing, according to Nikkei Asia. Analysts say Beijing’s campaign is aimed not only at Tokyo but also indirectly at Washington, seeking to weaken the U.S.-led security order in Asia. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly criticized Japan’s alleged return to militarism during meetings with foreign leaders, while Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also devoted significant attention to Japan in diplomatic engagements.

Japanese officials and China experts identify three main objectives behind Beijing’s pressure campaign. First, Xi’s strong reaction to Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks has hardened China’s policy toward Japan. Second, Beijing seeks to use Japan as a warning to other countries against challenging China’s position on Taiwan. Third, China views the U.S.-Japan alliance as a major obstacle to its efforts to expand its influence over the regional and international order.

Japan’s position as a key U.S. security partner and major power along the First Island Chain makes it particularly important to Beijing. By portraying Japan as returning to militarism, China hopes to undermine support for Japan’s defense buildup and its alliance with the United States. Beijing may also believe that President Trump’s relatively transactional approach to alliances provides greater room to pressure Tokyo.

However, the strategy carries risks. Major countries in North America, Europe, and Asia have largely rejected Beijing’s characterization of Japan as becoming militaristic. Continued Chinese pressure could instead heighten concerns about Beijing’s behavior and strengthen support for closer security cooperation with Japan.

Source: United Daily News (Taiwan), August 11, 2026
https://udn.com/news/story/6809/9683085

Chinese Communist Party Cultivates Ties With U.S. Democratic Socialists

A Fox News commentary by Douglas MacKinnon on August 6 alleged that some members of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) have accepted Chinese government-sponsored trips to China, received VIP-level treatment, and publicly expressed support for the People’s Republic of China and “Chinese socialism.” The report cited research indicating that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has increasingly engaged with Western left-wing political groups through organized visits and high-level hospitality.

These exchanges appear to go beyond cultural diplomacy, with Chinese officials using carefully managed itineraries and political messaging to promote a favorable image of the CCP while downplaying criticism of its one-party rule, political repression, and human rights record. One DSA leader who recently visited China reportedly said Chinese officials treated the delegation “like royalty” and described the officials as displaying a “calm and comfortable confidence.”

The report also highlights an alleged double standard within parts of the DSA. While the organization advocates restricting or abolishing institutions such as police, prisons, ICE, and the military as instruments of state oppression, some members have expressed support for a Chinese political system built around extensive police, intelligence, surveillance, and censorship powers.

Source: Aboluo, August 10, 2026
https://www.aboluowang.com/2026/0810/2419098.html

L’Oréal’s Lancôme Closes China’s Largest Store, Highlighting Broader Beauty-Retail Contraction

L’Oréal-owned luxury cosmetics brand Lancôme has closed its flagship store at Beijing’s Wangfujing APM shopping center, less than six years after its high-profile opening in October 2020. The 320-square-meter store, billed as Lancôme’s first flagship in China and its second-largest globally, has been completely cleared out, with outdoor brand Salomon preparing to take over the space.

Lancôme’s withdrawal appears to be part of a broader contraction in China’s offline cosmetics market. According to the China Chain-Store & Franchise Association, the ratio of store openings to closures for cosmetics businesses was just 0.85 across 447 major shopping centers in 13 cities between 2022 and 2024, indicating a shrinking retail footprint. NielsenIQ data show that the number of cosmetics counters in department stores and shopping centers across 51 Chinese cities fell from more than 15,000 in 2019 to about 9,500 in 2023, a decline of nearly 6,000.

In 2025, China’s beauty market experienced a new wave of brand withdrawals. According to an incomplete tally by beauty industry media outlet Jumeili based on public information, more than 30 international and domestic beauty brands closed online flagship stores, withdrew offline counters, or ceased operations in China, including about 17 domestic brands. Among international companies, Japanese and South Korean brands accounted for the largest share. The trend continued into 2026, with French skincare brand Filorga closing its official Tmall flagship store in January and Yakult’s cosmetics business ending its cross-border e-commerce operations in China.

Source: Epoch Times, August 5, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/5/n14823536.htm

Japan’s Dominance in Critical Semiconductor Materials Strengthens Its Strategic Leverage over China

Japan’s dominance in several critical semiconductor and advanced technology materials has become an increasingly important source of strategic leverage amid intensifying competition with China. Japanese media report that despite Beijing’s ambitions to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and advanced communications, China’s technological progress remains constrained by its dependence on foreign suppliers. This vulnerability has been reinforced by the “de-risking” strategies adopted by Japan, the United States, and Europe, which have strengthened supply chain resilience while limiting China’s access to key technologies.

Japan maintains a dominant global position in three indispensable materials used in advanced manufacturing: photoresists, ultra-high-purity hydrogen fluoride, and fluorinated polyimide. Japanese companies control roughly 70–80 percent of the global market for photoresists and ultra-high-purity hydrogen fluoride—both essential for semiconductor fabrication—and nearly 90 percent of the global fluorinated polyimide market, a critical material used in flexible displays for foldable smartphones and electric vehicles.

Experts argue that any Japanese export restrictions on these materials could severely disrupt China’s semiconductor and electronics industries, affecting chipmakers such as SMIC as well as downstream manufacturers including Huawei, Baidu, and display producer BOE. China has also stepped up efforts to acquire advanced technologies through cyber espionage targeting Japanese defense, aerospace, and technology organizations. Japan’s decades-long technological leadership and manufacturing expertise continue to present formidable barriers to China.

Source: Liberty Times, August 7, 2026
https://stock.ltn.com.tw/article/4pqarmmnmrgv

Israel Closes Chengdu Consulate as Bilateral Relations with China Continue to Cool

Israel officially closed its Consulate General in Chengdu on August 5, marking a symbolic downgrade of its diplomatic presence in China. In a farewell message published on the consulate’s official WeChat account, Consul General Gadi Harpaz announced the closure of the mission, which had operated since November 2014 and covered Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, and Yunnan. Israel did not provide an official explanation for the decision.

Analysts attribute the closure to a combination of political, strategic, and practical considerations. The sharp deterioration in bilateral relations following Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel is widely viewed as the key turning point. Beijing’s refusal to explicitly condemn Hamas, coupled with its criticism of Israel’s military response, eroded mutual trust and accelerated the cooling of bilateral ties. The closure reflects a broader downgrading of Israel-China relations, which are now largely limited to routine diplomatic engagement.

For decades, Israel maintained close ties with China, supplying advanced technologies—including defense-related technologies—while expanding bilateral trade and investment. However, cooperation began to decline after 2019 amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, particularly in the infrastructure and technology sectors.

Analysts also note that the Chengdu consulate served a region with relatively limited commercial and consular activity, making it a practical candidate for closure as bilateral relations weakened.

Source: Epoch Times, August 8, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/8/8/n14825771.htm