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China Passes Ethnic Unity Law, Raising Minority Rights Concerns

On March 12, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress. The legislation calls for greater integration among ethnic groups through policies related to education, housing, population mobility, community life, culture, tourism, and economic development. The law states that its goal is to strengthen national unity under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and foster a shared national identity among China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities, as part of efforts to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Critics argue that the measure could further erode the identities of non-Han ethnic groups and potentially allow authorities to label those who question such “unity” as separatists subject to legal punishment.

The law stipulates that Mandarin will be the primary language used in schools as well as in government and official affairs. In public settings where Mandarin and minority languages are used together, the law requires that the national common language be given prominence in terms of placement and order. In practice, the legislation establishes at the national level that minority languages cannot serve as the primary language of instruction. In regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, authorities have already significantly reduced opportunities for students to receive education in their native languages, despite strong opposition and protests from students, teachers, and parents.

The law also prohibits interference with freedom of marriage on the grounds of ethnic identity, customs, or religious beliefs, with the stated aim of encouraging interethnic marriage. It further calls for the development of “inter-embedded community environments.” Some scholars warn that this policy could lead to the dispersal of ethnic minority communities, as it appears designed to encourage Han Chinese and other ethnic groups to move into each other’s neighborhoods.

The legislation also requires religious organizations, religious schools, and places of worship to “adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion.” Ethnic affairs are incorporated into China’s broader social governance framework, with provisions covering anti-separatism measures, border security, risk prevention, and social stability. The law also states that foreign organizations and individuals who engage in activities that undermine ethnic unity or incite ethnic division may face legal consequences.

Source: Deutsche Welle, March 12, 2026
https://www.dw.com/zh/中国人大通过民族团结进步促进法-引发少数民族人权担忧/a-76331516

Japan Warns Firms Over Huawei 5G Risk in Ukraine Reconstruction

The Japanese government has issued a warning to Japanese companies interested in supporting Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction, cautioning them about the security risks associated with using 5G telecommunications infrastructure built on technology from Chinese tech giant Huawei. The warning reflects growing concern in Tokyo over the potential for technical and sensitive information leakage through Huawei-equipped networks.

The alert comes after a major Ukrainian mobile operator conducted 5G pilot tests with Huawei in several cities last year. The Ukrainian government subsequently allocated 5G frequency bands to that operator. Japan’s Rakuten Group had also applied to participate in Ukraine’s 5G market but was not selected as a candidate.

According to Japanese government documents obtained by Kyodo News, officials flagged serious concerns about the spread of Huawei 5G infrastructure in major cities including the capital Kyiv. The documents specifically warned that investment in critical infrastructure — including the energy sector — carried significant risks for Japan, the United States, and European nations. Officials also expressed concern that Chinese-made equipment could enter the Ukrainian market indirectly, through Turkish intermediary companies, even without direct involvement from Chinese firms.

Huawei has long been identified as a security vulnerability by U.S. authorities and remains subject to American sanctions. Japan’s decision to issue this kind of economic security warning to private firms is considered an unusual step, underscoring how seriously the government views the risk of Huawei technology proliferating in strategically important regions. The move signals that Tokyo is prepared to take a more active role in guiding Japanese corporate behavior abroad when national and allied security interests are at stake.

Source: Kyodo News, March 12, 2026
https://china.kyodonews.net/articles/-/7862

Honduras Signals Possible Reconsideration of Diplomatic Ties with Taiwan

The government of Honduras has indicated it may gradually reconsider its diplomatic alignment with Taiwan following a change in national leadership. Vice President María Antonieta Mejía stated that the administration is reviewing agreements signed with China under the previous government to assess their economic and political impact. The findings are expected to inform decisions by President Nasry Asfura, who took office in January 2026 and had previously expressed openness to restoring ties with Taiwan.

Honduras severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2023 under former president Xiomara Castro and established formal ties with China. At the time, the shift was presented as a strategic move to secure greater trade, investment, and development opportunities. However, domestic critics argue that the anticipated economic benefits from cooperation with Beijing have not materialized as expected, prompting renewed debate within Honduras about the country’s diplomatic direction.

Officials have emphasized that any potential change in diplomatic relations would proceed gradually and only after a thorough policy review. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has responded cautiously, stating that it remains open to strengthening ties with Honduras on the basis of mutual benefit and pragmatic cooperation. The situation underscores the broader geopolitical competition between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Source: Epoch Times, February 11, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/11/n14695888.htm

Philippines Reports Alleged Chinese Espionage Case

Philippine authorities say they have uncovered an alleged espionage network that leaked sensitive military information related to resupply missions in the South China Sea. The investigation resulted in the arrest of three Philippine citizens suspected of passing along operational details, including troop rotation schedules and logistics plans. Officials warned that such information is highly sensitive because it could reveal the timing and movement of military personnel, potentially placing service members at risk during routine supply operations in disputed areas.

According to investigators, the suspected operation relied on unusual communication methods. One report described a mobile phone game that allegedly contained a hidden messaging function accessible through a special code. Authorities also suggested the recruitment process may have begun gradually. One suspect reportedly said he was initially approached to write paid opinion articles, but the requests later shifted toward providing information related to the South China Sea and Philippine defense cooperation with allied countries.

The case comes amid rising tensions in the South China Sea, where territorial disputes and military activity have intensified in recent years. Philippine officials say the incident highlights how foreign intelligence efforts may target operational logistics and military planning. China has denied the allegations, stating that the claims lack clear evidence.

Source: Epoch Times, March 6, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/3/5/n14712174.htm

Report Claims CCP Bot Network Exploits X Algorithm to Suppress Dissident Voices

On March 7, a Chinese blogger living in Canada described what he believes to be a coordinated online attack by Chinese Communist Party (CCP)–linked “internet trolls” targeting his account on the social media platform X. According to the blogger, the tactic does not involve directly banning accounts but instead exploits weaknesses in the platform’s recommendation algorithm to restrict the reach of targeted users.

The blogger, who posts under the account name “Finding心归何处,” began operating the account in January 2026 and gradually gained followers by sharing personal experiences after leaving China and commenting on political issues. His follower count grew from about 2,800 on February 14 to 7,800 by March 7, with some posts reaching as many as 870,000 views. However, he soon noticed suspicious activity and described the alleged attack as unfolding in three stages. First, large numbers of bot accounts with no profile photos, posts, or followers suddenly followed him. Second, these accounts remained in his follower list for a period of time, potentially causing the platform’s algorithm to associate his account with a low-quality social network profile. Third, when his politically sensitive posts began gaining traction, the same accounts simultaneously unfollowed and blocked him, often during Beijing working hours.

The blogger argues that this coordinated activity manipulates the platform’s recommendation system. When many followers abruptly leave while a post is trending, the algorithm may interpret the content as offensive or misleading, triggering automated mechanisms that limit further distribution to new users. In addition, large numbers of blocks within a short period can reduce an account’s credibility score and may even place it in a search blacklist, making it difficult for others to locate the account. Because unfollowing and blocking are normal user actions, the tactic is difficult for platforms to classify as malicious behavior. A well-known political commentator also said he has observed similar tactics for years and believes CCP has studied platform algorithms to suppress anti-CCP voices while simultaneously amplifying pro-government narratives.

Source: Epoch Times, February 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/27/n14707579.htm

Massive Lunar New Year Promotions Boost Chinese AI Apps—But Most Users Quickly Leave

Major Chinese technology companies spent heavily to promote their artificial intelligence (AI) chat applications during the 2026 Lunar New Year holiday. Alibaba, Tencent, and ByteDance invested tens of billions of yuan (several billion US dollars) in marketing campaigns for their AI products—such as Tongyi Qianwen, Yuanbao, and Doubao. These promotions relied on incentives such as digital red-packet rewards and special holiday activities to attract users, temporarily driving large spikes in downloads and daily active users across multiple platforms.

However, user engagement declined sharply once the holiday promotions ended. Industry data suggests that more than 80 percent of users stopped using the apps after the incentives disappeared, leaving an estimated 30-day retention rate of only about 12–13 percent. Many users reportedly joined primarily to collect promotional rewards rather than to use the AI tools regularly, highlighting the difficulty of converting short-term promotional traffic into sustained engagement.

The trend suggests, as analysts argue, that the long-term success of AI products cannot rely on financial incentives alone. Instead, it depends on factors such as model capability, reliability, and integration within broader digital ecosystems.

Source: Epoch Times, February 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/2/27/n14707559.htm

Italy Expels Eight Chinese Nationals Over Surveillance of Dissidents

Italy recently expelled eight Chinese nationals accused of monitoring and intimidating Chinese dissidents living in the country, reigniting public debate over China’s use of overseas “police stations” to extend its repression networks across multiple countries.

The eight individuals were removed on March 5, following a lengthy investigation by Italy’s DIGOS unit and Turin prosecutors. Four left voluntarily, three were immediately deported, and one woman remains detained after applying for asylum. The primary target of their surveillance was a prominent online activist known as “Teacher Li” — whose account “Teacher Li is Not Your Teacher” regularly exposes human rights abuses by the Chinese Communist Party. Li stated that he and his team had faced years of transnational harassment and intimidation, and welcomed Italy’s action as a defense of democratic principles and the rule of law.

The case also drew attention to a separate cyberattack on Italy’s Interior Ministry in February, in which hackers attempted to access information on Chinese dissidents and Italian officials investigating Chinese organizations. A prior attack between 2024 and 2025 allegedly resulted in the theft of data on approximately 5,000 Italian police officers holding sensitive positions.

The phenomenon is not limited to Italy. In France, the rights group Safeguard Defenders previously identified at least four clandestine Chinese police stations in the greater Paris area, part of a global network of over 100 such outposts spanning 53 countries. French authorities confirmed the closure of nine such stations and issued expulsion orders against at least two individuals linked to their operation.

These stations, ostensibly offering administrative assistance to overseas Chinese communities, are widely reported to be used for pressuring dissidents and coercing individuals into returning to China.

Source: Radio France International, March 10, 2026
https://rfi.my/CVxq

Political Scientist: Activists Focus on “China After Xi,” but Should Focus on “China After the CCP”

New Century Net, an Chinese language media outside China, published an interview with political scientist Wu Guoguang discussing the prospects for political change in China after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Wu argues that China’s political transformation does not necessarily need to follow the classic four-stage transition model proposed by Samuel P. Huntington, often referred to as “transplacement,” which involves regime liberalization, the rise of opposition forces, authoritarian retrenchment, and eventual negotiation between the regime and opposition. Instead, Wu suggests that social and political change in China could emerge even without deliberate political liberalization initiated by the ruling authorities.

Wu emphasizes that discussions about China’s future often focus on “China after Xi Jinping” rather than “China after the CCP.” He argues that this perspective reflects the preferences of some political elites who may hope for a return to a relatively moderate period such as the Jiang Zemin–Hu Jintao era. However, Wu argues that genuine democratization in China cannot emerge from within the CCP leadership but would require the end of the Party’s rule.

Wu identifies three key challenges facing democratic change in China. First, democratic forces must clearly articulate demands for systemic democratization rather than focusing solely on leadership changes. Second, opposition movements need stronger organizational capacity, although Wu suggests they should move beyond traditional Leninist-style hierarchical structures and explore new forms of organization suited to the internet era. Third, meaningful political transformation ultimately depends on broad public support. According to Wu, widespread social grievances in China reflect deeper demands for rights and representation, which could form the foundation for democratic aspirations.

Overall, Wu concludes that China’s future political transformation could involve a complex interaction between reformist pressures and more revolutionary forces. Whether such change becomes possible, he argues, will depend on the ability of democratic forces to develop clear political goals, build effective organizational structures, and mobilize broad public support.

Source: New Century Net
https://2newcenturynet.blogspot.com/2026/03/blog-post_40.html