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Trump Administration Plans Nearly $500 Million Initiative to Counter China’s Global Influence

The Trump administration has notified Congress of plans to invest $175.8 million to replace aging undersea telecommunications cables in the Caribbean and Central America as part of a broader effort to counter China’s influence over the region’s communications infrastructure. The initiative, titled “Countering CCP Control of Caribbean and Central America Undersea Cables Project,” would fund the installation of strategically selected submarine cable systems and support partnerships between regional governments and private-sector providers to deploy secure U.S. and other trusted alternatives.

The proposed funding would support cable projects serving El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Because of strained U.S.-Nicaragua relations, Washington does not plan to work directly with the Nicaraguan government. The project reflects broader U.S. concerns over China’s expanding strategic presence in the Western Hemisphere, including its investments in telecommunications, critical infrastructure, and other sectors.

According to State Department planning documents, the cable initiative is part of a broader proposal to invest nearly $500 million in more than 50 projects across the Western Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia to counter Chinese influence. Proposed initiatives include strengthening cybersecurity, securing ports and critical mineral supply chains, countering China’s export of surveillance technologies, and reducing international support for Beijing’s space program. Other projects would establish regional security operations centers and bolster communications security, information resilience, and religious freedom, including efforts to counter Chinese influence over the selection of the next Dalai Lama.

Source: Epoch Times, July 28, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/28/n14818672.htm

Changchun Officials Warn of “Unprecedented” Economic Challenges

Authorities in Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province, have acknowledged that the city is facing “unprecedented difficulties and challenges” in economic development. On July 22, CCP Secretary Zhang Enhui chaired a meeting to review the city’s first-half economic performance and discuss priorities for the remainder of the year.

The meeting stated that Changchun’s economy is confronting unprecedented difficulties and challenges. Officials were urged to remain clear-headed, calmly assess the situation, and accurately assess current economic conditions. They were instructed to recognize both the severity and complexity of the broader macroeconomic environment and the more direct and serious challenges the city is facing; acknowledge both their efforts (to improve) and the still existing shortcomings; and recognize both the progress in regional coordination and the widening disparities among different districts and sectors.

Analysts view the unusually candid assessment as a rare public acknowledgment by a local government of the severity of its economic problems, in contrast to Beijing’s longstanding narrative that China’s economy remains stable and continues to improve.

The economic development at China’s northeast has been declining for decades. Once considered one of the few economic bright spots in the region, Changchun has also experienced a sharp slowdown, with GDP falling 9.9 percent year over year in the first half of 2022.

Source: Lianhe Zaobao, July 24, 2026
https://www.zaobao.com.sg/news/china/story20260724-9412767

State Media Profiles Raise Questions About PLA Rocket Force Personnel Skillsets

As part of celebrations marking the Chinese Communist Party’s 105th anniversary, state media profiled several “Outstanding Communist Party Members,” including He Xianda, a serviceman in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. A July 13 Xinhua article portrays He’s rise from military cook to model missile operator as an example of exceptional dedication. At the same time, the account offers unusual insights into the Rocket Force’s personnel practices and training standards.

According to the report, He enlisted in 1997 as a cook in a missile brigade. In six months, he self-studied and ranked among the top three in a brigade-wide missile theory examination. He was then reassigned as a missile-loading operator and, within five months, reportedly became the brigade’s top operator. In 2000, he qualified as the brigade’s first enlisted “No. 1 operator”—the missile launch position previously reserved for highly educated officers. His story of a cook becoming the top operator is an inspiration story, but it suggests many servicemen in the Rocket Force may not have strong education background.

The article notes that the “No. 1 operator” is an instable position since the educated officers were often promoted to higher positions after some time. The military had to fill the vacancies with enlisted personnel who had limited technical backgrounds and relatively short training periods.

The profile also recounts an incident in which onboard equipment reported an abnormal voltage reading shortly before a missile launch. Instead of aborting the mission, He crawled beneath the launcher, manually inspected the system by touch, concluded the circuit was functioning normally, and authorized the launch to proceed. State media praised his judgment, claiming “his hands were more reliable than the instruments.” The episode, however, suggests that field units may rely heavily on operator experience when equipment warnings are considered unreliable or diagnostic capabilities are limited.

A separate Xinhua article published on June 30 profiled Fang Yongzheng, a missile launch operator in the PLA’s “First Dongfeng Brigade.” According to the report, Fang compiled operational procedures, technical manuals, and troubleshooting guides that were adopted across the brigade. The article also states that, despite 26 years of service, he has never participated in an actual missile launch. This suggests that key training materials is missing and the military has to rely on documents developed by personnel whose expertise was derived primarily from training rather than operational experience.

Taken together, the two showcase exemplary Rocket Force servicemen inadvertently suggest persistent shortages of technically qualified personnel, extensive reliance on accelerated on-the-job training, and continued dependence on experienced individuals to compensate for gaps in technical expertise and organizational capacity.

Sources:
1. Xinhua, July 13, 2026
https://www.news.cn/20260713/959650c9a06b414d91cdb56746c54da1/c.html
2. Xinhua, June 30, 2026
https://www.news.cn/politics/20260630/46cce79284e74942a780dc8af0fca9a4/c.html
3. Epoch Times, July 19, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/7/18/n14812116.htm

Chinese Universities Scale Back Foreign Language Programs Amid AI and Employment Pressures

Chinese universities are increasingly merging or eliminating foreign language departments as Artificial Intelligence (AI) transforms language education and employment prospects deteriorate. Recently, Guilin University of Information Technology dissolved its School of Foreign Trade and Foreign Languages, transferring language instruction to a newly established School of General Education while merging its faculty into the Business School. According to Chinese media, at least 10 universities have restructured foreign language departments since 2025, with several also suspending enrollment in language majors.

Analysts attribute the trend to rapid advances in AI-powered translation, which have diminished demand for traditional language skills, as well as a weakening job market for language graduates. Employment data show that foreign language majors have below-average job placement rates and salaries, while English has been identified as an oversupplied major in several provinces.

Rather than abandoning foreign language education, many universities are integrating language training with disciplines such as business, communications, and international studies to cultivate graduates with broader, interdisciplinary skill sets that are better aligned with evolving labor market demands.

Source: Epoch Times, May 31, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/5/31/n14778725.htm

CCP Moves to Expand Party Building Among Gig Workers and New Economic Groups

The Chinese Communist Party is intensifying grassroots governance efforts, recently issuing a directive to strengthen Party building within new economic organizations—including online platforms—and “new employment groups” such as ride-hailing drivers and food delivery couriers. As these flexible forms of employment become increasingly common, authorities aim to achieve full Party organizational coverage at the grassroots level.

Since establishing the Central Social Work Department in 2023, the CCP has continued pushing Party-led grassroots governance. This included 2024 guidance on strengthening community worker teams, and this year’s “Opinions on Advancing the Professional Social Work Workforce,” alongside measures on registering public petition visits that took effect July 1.

While the Party has long required Party branches within enterprises, the high mobility of gig workers like delivery couriers and ride-hailing drivers has made traditional grassroots Party structures difficult to apply—prompting the new policy focus.

State news agency Xinhua reported that the CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly issued “Opinions on Strengthening Social Work in the New Era,” describing social work as vital to the Party’s long-term governance and national stability. The document calls for comprehensive Party leadership over social work, adherence to a people-centered approach, and development of the “Fengqiao Experience” model for the new era, with emphasis on Party building in new economic organizations, social organizations, and employment groups.

Specific measures include improving Party building quality in private enterprises, targeting internet platform companies, exploring approaches for tech innovation firms, and extending efforts to small businesses and individual vendors. The document also calls for strengthening Party building in social organizations and foundations, improving algorithmic governance of online platforms, and building social security systems suited to new employment patterns. Additionally, it emphasizes reforming grassroots political institutions and resolving public grievances at their source, before conflicts escalate.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 23, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202607230334.aspx

PLA Daily: Europe Faces Long Road to Defense Industrial Autonomy

People’s Daily republished an article from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily arguing that Europe continues to face formidable obstacles to achieving defense industrial autonomy despite years of increased spending and ambitious policy initiatives. Citing the collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program after nearly a decade of disputes, the article argues that deep political and structural divisions continue to hinder Europe’s efforts to build an independent defense industry.

The article identifies four major challenges: poorly coordinated defense spending, limited industrial capacity, technological dependence on the United States, and conflicting national interests. It notes that although European defense spending has risen sharply since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, a large share of procurement has gone to non-European suppliers, particularly U.S. defense contractors. It also argues that European defense manufacturers continue to face production bottlenecks, underinvestment in research and development, and fragmented procurement practices that limit economies of scale.

According to the article, these challenges stem from deeper structural constraints, including member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty over defense policy, Europe’s longstanding reliance on the NATO security framework, and a fragmented defense market. It concludes that political divisions—rather than industrial capacity alone—will remain the principal obstacle to Europe’s pursuit of strategic and defense industrial autonomy.

Source: People’s Daily, July 13, 2026
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2026/0713/c1011-40759395.html

Australian Labor Party Rejects Chinese Demand to Expel Taiwan Representatives

Australia’s public broadcaster ABC reported that representatives from Taiwan’s office in Australia attended the governing Australian Labor Party’s national conference as observers. Chinese diplomats reportedly objected to their presence and asked Labor National Secretary Paul Erickson to remove the Taiwanese representatives. Erickson rejected the request, stating that the delegation had the right to attend as observers. Chinese diplomats subsequently walked out of the conference, a move that several diplomats and Labor delegates interpreted as a protest.

Mark Harrison, a China specialist at the University of Tasmania, said the Labor Party, as a political party rather than a government institution, is not bound by Australia’s One China policy. Given the close and complementary trade relationship between Australia and Taiwan, it was entirely appropriate to invite Taiwan to observe the conference.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 24, 2026
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202607240048.aspx

China Expands Tax Scrutiny of Offshore Trusts Held by Wealthy Individuals

As China’s economic growth slows and fiscal pressures mount, authorities are reportedly expanding tax enforcement to offshore trusts, which have long been used by wealthy Chinese individuals to protect assets, manage inheritance, and mitigate financial and political risks.

Sources inside China said that tax authorities in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shenzhen, and other jurisdictions have begun requiring owners of offshore trusts to disclose detailed financial information, including dividend income and capital gains from share sales. Shanghai reportedly began collecting information on income earned during the previous two years in early 2025. In one reported case, a local tax bureau imposed a 20 percent tax on investment income along with additional penalties. The campaign targets trusts established in offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, and Hong Kong.

A 2023 study found that the Chinese business elites’ use of offshore family trusts accelerated after 2018, with founders of more than 60 overseas-listed Chinese companies establishing such structures. According to the China Business Journal, in 2018 alone at least 15 Chinese entrepreneurs listed in Hong Kong established offshore trusts, transferring an estimated US$28.5 billion in assets overseas. They included Alibaba founder Jack Ma, PDD Holdings founder Colin Huang, Xiaomi founder Lei Jun, and JD.com founder Richard Liu (Liu Qiangdong).

Analysts believe most wealthy individuals are unlikely to conceal offshore assets, as their businesses, families, and core assets remain closely tied to China, making the legal and political consequences of noncompliance potentially severe. Instead, many are expected to adopt a strategy of public compliance while quietly restructuring their holdings, redesigning family trust arrangements, and accelerating the overseas relocation of assets—and, in some cases, their personal residency.

Source: Epoch Times, June 5, 2026
https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/26/6/4/n14782255.htm