Geo-Strategic Trend - 14. page

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Kuala Lumpur on October 27, amid renewed tensions following a South China Sea confrontation between the two countries’ militaries. During the meeting, Albanese directly raised concerns over a Chinese military aircraft’s use of flares near an Australian patrol plane, while Li urged for stronger bilateral cooperation and stability in ties.

According to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Li expressed satisfaction with the positive momentum in China-Australia relations and called for deeper strategic alignment and policy coordination. He highlighted the role of dialogue mechanisms such as the China-Australia Strategic Economic Dialogue and Joint Economic Commission, and expressed interest in upgrading the bilateral free trade agreement to further expand economic cooperation.

Li also pledged continued support for Chinese investment in Australia, urging Canberra to ensure an open, transparent, and non-discriminatory environment for Chinese businesses. He further emphasized cooperation in youth exchanges, education, and tourism, areas that have seen steady recovery since the normalization of bilateral ties.

For his part, Albanese said Australia remains committed to maintaining open communication with China, deepening mutual understanding, and managing differences responsibly, while expanding cooperation in trade and other areas of shared interest. After the meeting, Albanese told reporters that he had raised the flare incident “directly and clearly,” calling it “a matter of concern” for Australia.

The meeting marked the seventh encounter between the two leaders since relations began to thaw in 2022, underscoring both sides’ willingness to address disagreements through dialogue despite ongoing friction.

The latest tensions stem from an October 19 incident in which Australia accused a Chinese fighter jet of firing flares near an Australian patrol aircraft over the South China Sea—an act Canberra described as unsafe and unprofessional. Beijing rejected the accusation, saying the Australian aircraft had violated Chinese sovereignty and that its forces took lawful and necessary countermeasures.

Beyond the South China Sea, Australia and China continue to vie for influence in the Pacific region, where both nations are seeking to strengthen defense and development partnerships with island states.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), October 27, 2025
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202510270194.aspx

On September 22, 2025, the Chinese container ship Istanbul Bridge departed from Ningbo-Zhoushan Port, embarking on a historic voyage through Russia’s Northern Sea Route to reach Britain’s Port of Felixstowe on October 13. This inaugural journey of the world’s first regular “China–Europe Arctic Express” container route cut travel time from the traditional 40–50 days to just 21 days—a savings of 22 days compared to routes via the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. The timing was notable, coming just as Poland suspended China–Europe Railway Express operations following Russian drone incursions near its border.

The Istanbul Bridge carried roughly 4,000 standard containers valued at about 1.4 billion yuan ($197 million), including power batteries and clothing—cargo that Chinese officials touted as proof of the “fastest maritime container route” linking China with major European ports. The ship sailed through the Sea of Japan, Bering Strait, along Russia’s Siberian coast, and into the North Sea, before docking at Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Gdansk.

Analysts say this development represents far more than a commercial trial. Malte Humpert, founder of The Arctic Institute in Washington, noted that a series of global trade disruptions—from the Red Sea crisis to intensifying U.S.–China trade disputes—has increased the Arctic’s appeal as an alternative corridor, potentially alleviating China’s long-standing “Malacca Strait dilemma.” Alexander Dalziel of Canada’s Macdonald-Laurier Institute added that the route also symbolizes Russia’s repayment for China’s diplomatic and economic support during the Ukraine war, while helping Beijing position itself as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder.

China first outlined its “Polar Silk Road” concept in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper, framing it as the northern extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, Beijing has steadily expanded its Arctic capabilities—this past summer alone, it deployed five research vessels, including icebreakers, in the Arctic Ocean, and conducted joint maritime patrols with Russia near Alaska.

The strategic implications extend beyond the Sino-Russian partnership. By making Gdansk a port of call, Beijing signals to Poland and other Central and Eastern European nations that it now possesses alternative trade routes independent of the overland China–Europe Railway Express—potentially undermining Warsaw’s leverage over logistics and transit timing. Analysts describe this as a classic “carrot-and-stick” approach: enticing Europe with cheap Russian LNG shipped via the Arctic, while implicitly warning that China can reroute trade flows at will.

Yet significant hurdles persist. The Northern Sea Route is navigable for only five to six months each year, with less than 30% annual viability. Severe winter storms and drifting ice can delay voyages by over a week, and search-and-rescue operations in the region remain perilous and logistically challenging.

Despite these constraints, Beijing’s message is unmistakable: as the polar ice recedes, China has arrived in the Arctic—and its ambitions are no longer frozen at the periphery.

Source: BBC, October 24, 2025
https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/cdx4gdpn2eyo/simp

Radio France Internationale (RFI) Chinese Edition recently reported that North Korea is circumventing UN sanctions by using cryptocurrencies to trade weapons and raw materials. The DPRK is also sending computer programmers abroad to launder money and earn foreign currency.

Under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, Pyongyang has seen a significant increase in initiation of cyberattacks. The Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), which oversees UN sanctions against North Korea, found that North Korean hackers stole at least US$1.65 billion between January and September 2025, of which US$1.4 billion was stolen from the cryptocurrency exchange Bybi in February alone. North Korean officials also use stablecoins (cryptocurrencies pegged to fiat currencies such as the U.S. dollar) for procurement-related transactions, including the sale and transfer of military supplies and raw materials such as copper.

In the meantime, North Korea has also circumvented UN sanctions by sending IT professionals to work in at least eight countries. Most of these individuals have been sent to China, but some have also gone to Russia, Laos, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Nigeria, and Tanzania. MSMT cited a 2024 report by the U.S. think tank 38 North, saying that some North Korean IT experts concealed their identities and successfully undertook outsourcing work for animation projects from Japanese and U.S. companies, including Amazon and HBO Max. South Korean intelligence agencies say North Korean spies are also using the social networking platform LinkedIn to impersonate recruiters and lure employees of South Korean defense companies.

Source: RFI Chinese, October 25, 2025
https://tinyurl.com/53zk8rvb

When Sanae Takaichi was elected and sworn in as Japan’s new prime minister on October 21, China’s response was notably restrained. A commentary published on the WeChat account “Niu Tan Qin,” which is linked to China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency, analyzed Beijing’s cautious stance toward the new leader, dubbing her the “female Trump.”

China notably refrained from offering any formal congratulations to Takaichi, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun merely acknowledging that China had “noted the election results” and describing it as “Japan’s internal affair.” This was in stark contrast to China’s immediate congratulations to Bolivia’s newly elected president on the same day. More pointedly, Guo reiterated hopes that Japan would “honor its political commitments on major issues, including history and Taiwan”—a statement not made when Ishiba Shigeru previously assumed office, suggesting Beijing may be drawing a “red line” for Takaichi.

The commentary portrays Takaichi as consistently antagonistic toward China, accusing her of tarnishing China’s image, denying the Nanjing Massacre, promoting the “China threat” narrative, and making provocative statements on Taiwan. Her frequent visits to the contentious Yasukuni Shrine and her push for constitutional reform to transform Japan’s Self-Defense Forces into a national military were also highlighted. Takaichi’s focus on cross-strait issues is well-known, including her famous assertion that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency.”

The analysis presents three potential scenarios for Sino-Japanese relations under Takaichi’s leadership, but it dismisses the possibility of her moderating her positions as unrealistic. The article warns that if she pursues her conservative agenda and attempts to turn Japan into an anti-China pivot in the Indo-Pacific, bilateral relations could face “turbulent waters or even stormy seas.” Despite these concerns, the analysis expresses confidence, questioning what damage even a hostile Japanese leader could inflict on China given the current balance of power. It concludes with a prediction that Takaichi’s tenure will be short-lived—one year would be an achievement, two years a miracle, and three years would be impossible.

Source: Central News Agency (Taiwan), October 22, 2025
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/acn/202510220244.aspx

Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) reports that the European Union (EU) is weighing new measures that could require Chinese companies to transfer technology to European firms as a condition for operating within the EU. The proposed policy aims to bolster the bloc’s industrial competitiveness and reduce dependence on foreign technology.

The measures would target companies entering key EU digital and manufacturing sectors, including automotive and battery industries. They may mandate the use of a certain proportion of EU-made components or labor, and require value-added production within Europe. The EU is also considering compulsory joint ventures between European and non-European companies. Although the rules would technically apply to all foreign firms, officials acknowledge that the initiative is primarily aimed at curbing the dominance of Chinese manufacturers.

The proposal, expected to be unveiled in November, reflects growing anxiety within Europe about China’s expanding presence in strategic industries. It also signals a potential shift toward a more protectionist approach in EU industrial policy.

Analysts warn, however, that mirroring Beijing’s own protectionist practices could trigger retaliation from China and strain the crucial trade ties between the two economies.

Source: CNA, October 14, 2025
https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202510143005.aspx

South Korea faces growing pressure to diversify its supply chains as new data from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy reveals a deep dependence on China for key materials underpinning its high-tech industries. Information obtained by National Assembly member Lee Jae-gwan shows that South Korean strategic sectors remain overwhelmingly reliant on Chinese imports for essential raw materials and components.

The battery industry is among the most vulnerable. China accounts for 97.6 percent of South Korea’s natural graphite imports and 98.8 percent of synthetic graphite—both crucial for secondary battery anodes. Imports of precursors and nickel hydroxide, used in cathode materials, depend on China by 94.1 percent and 96.4 percent, respectively. The robotics sector shows a similar trend, with reliance on Chinese core drive components rising from 77.7 percent in 2021 to 80.3 percent in 2023.

Advanced display technologies also expose structural weaknesses. Over 90 percent of core materials for Micro LED displays come from China, while OLED materials such as dopants and fine metal masks depend on China by 67 percent and more than 95 percent, respectively. Of the 31 rare metals managed by the South Korean government, 20 are imported from China.

Semiconductor production faces comparable risks: niobium and silicon imports rely on China by 78 percent and 63 percent, while lithium—essential for battery cathodes—is 65 percent sourced from China. Other critical materials such as gallium (98 percent), graphite (97 percent), indium (93 percent), and magnesium (84 percent) also come predominantly from China, underscoring the urgency for Seoul to restructure its supply chains and reduce strategic vulnerabilities.

Source: Yonhap News Agency, October 13, 2025
https://cn.yna.co.kr/view/ACK20251013000900881

Indonesia has announced a landmark deal to procure at least 42 Chinese-made J-10C fighter jets from Chengdu Aircraft Corporation—its first-ever purchase of combat aircraft from a non-Western supplier. The move marks a historic shift away from Jakarta’s decades-long reliance on Western and Russian defense partners.

The Indonesian Defense Ministry confirmed the deal on October 15, with Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin stating that deliveries will begin soon, though further details remain undisclosed. The Finance Ministry later approved a budget exceeding $9 billion for the acquisition. The purchase aligns with Indonesia’s broader military modernization strategy, which also includes orders for 42 French Rafale and 48 Turkish Kaan fighters, alongside joint development of the KF-21 with South Korea.

Defense analysts view the deal as a major geopolitical signal. Beny Sukadis of Indonesia’s Defense and Strategy Institute noted that while Indonesia maintains a non-aligned policy, the large-scale arms purchase from Beijing reflects a clear tilt in strategic orientation and underscores China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia. He also warned that the move could heighten regional sensitivities given China’s claims in the South China Sea.

The acquisition demonstrates growing confidence in Chinese aerospace technology. The J-10C features advanced systems such as digital fly-by-wire controls, composite airframe materials, and an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar—capabilities comparable to leading Western fighters. Indonesia’s procurement follows Pakistan’s induction of the J-10CE and reports that Bangladesh is considering a similar purchase by 2027, highlighting China’s accelerating rise as a key player in the global defense market.

Source: Sputnik News, October 16, 2025
https://sputniknews.cn/20251016/1067933070.html